ÿWPCgE ¶ä6¯{àpJù Ì1µ!Çòizs Òù¨Îšûz²Ýs*o iMU`a~;³ä–¡g"y²mMQu‚¾Y(–Jfâ9žjNè/ÝõÂBX4LA@ÈЈ¨ÕéÛÜ%W§¼Iÿój/4a¼PÞW½×Ïay‘§‹‰]úDG\÷xJÖ-ØÃS<•qfÖòn]ÌD|}ôJfîq>K ŽPPk VžéºÆ1f9/xõ‚®nÀHýÚ‘¼r»êÆzˆ½6," :BXN†Sišñ±Œq üŒ?ƒÿÔËt6”ðºV*ù}žåˆÑùo‚—dÔd•hqæ ã %+¬ñÍüŒ4i‹0l9‡¹`<@´È'ö:¸Œ<¾é$‡Ñ„ÎD—zy ÖîêÏ Lm<Ûä´ªjŠüïsϬ¸†n'ÁyW c¢)5°4Õ(a£«¥¶ðqÔ˜…ÑP=¼ ¡¼S ymo°¾32TÉ'Ø‚÷Ž€hKPÌ]}®¾ó˜ÕVqoÕ{“uÜ…ÛÕ:H Ñç&âURmñ·pJaøðÓ‡%büêã¼xèRÀ ¥fF”ÊM¼£Ž›Ù‡¾ª ùI?×ìôXQÿWtô(›eÔÁ¾Ì¿wèêóÚ- ^#!$E %â 0(è ^  w@ 4\ p  m ˜ N  ]¢ UBÿ bA 0µI 0Dþ ØBU >XrçUNYUF§­íªšôDE8 f: Ï< Ÿ $ª(a¿*¿* Ó*ß-ß-õ-õ-õ-õ-õ-#’/mµ1p"4Ï’5ba8·Ã<’zAU> E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E BJE˜HP LaserJet 4 LOCAL,ü,,,,,ü0 “Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` à39€U.S.C.€ðð€401€reads€in€relevant€part,€"The€PostalÐ ° ÐService€shall€have€the€following€general€powers:€(1)€to€sue€and€beÏsued€in€its€official€name.€.€."Ì‹($¡¡–¥:*Æ    Eïê†0*Æ.wpdÑ3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ  SÝ ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` à39€U.S.C.€ðð€409,€entitled€"Suits€by€and€against€theÐ ° ÐPostal€Service,"€provides€in€relevant€part,€"(c)€The€provisions€ofÏchapter€171€and€all€other€provisions€of€title€28€relating€to€tortÏclaims€[the€Ô_ÔFTCAÔ_Ô]€shall€apply€to€tort€claims€arising€out€ofÏactivities€of€the€Postal€Ô_ÔService."Ô_Ô<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- ù-(e(2Ýë$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÎÝ ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àThe€full€text€of€28€Ô_ÔU.S.CÔ_Ô€ðð€2679(a)€provides€that€Ô‡Xîð‹‹‹Ô"[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_ÔÐ ° Ðauthority€of€any€federal€agency€to€sue€and€be€sued€in€its€own€nameÏshall€not€be€construed€to€authorize€suits€against€such€federalÏagency€on€claims€which€are€cognizable€under€section€1346(b)€of€thisÏtitle,€and€the€remedies€provided€by€this€title€in€such€cases€shallÏbe€exclusive."Ô#†‹îð‹‹Xîð:#Ô<èÀ( 9Z+&Courier Regular …Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` à28€U.S.C.€ðð€2680€reads€in€relevant€part,€"The€provisionsÐ ° Ðof€this€chapter€and€section€1346(b)€of€this€title€shall€not€applyÏto€„„€*€*€*€(h)€Any€claim€arising€out€of€assault,€battery,€falseÏimprisonment,€false€arrest,€malicious€prosecution,€abuse€ofÏprocess,€libel,€slander,€misrepresentation,€deceit,€or€interferenceÏwith€contract€rights,"€with€limited€exception€for€law€enforcementÏofficials.€ hÝ ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àÔ_ÔDavricÔ_Ô's€complaint€also€included€the€Postal€Service€inÐ ° Ðthis€count,€but€the€Postal€Service€was€dismissed€from€the€count€byÏthe€district€court€because€òòBivensóó€actions€are€not€available€againstÐ @ Ðfederal€agencies.€€òòSeeóó€òòMeyeróó,€510€U.S.€at€486.€€Davric€does€notÐ X Ðappeal€this€dismissal.vÖr Z‹6Times New Roman Regular<õÑ 9Z+‹.Courier New Regular £Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àThe€Attorney€General€has€delegated€her€certificationÐ ° Ðauthority€under€this€statute€to€the€United€States€attorneys.€€28ÏÔ_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€15.3(a).  Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àAnother€case€interpreting€the€scope€of€the€Ô_ÔPRAÔ_Ô's€sue„and„Ð ° Ðbe„sued€clause,€òòFranchise€Tax€Bd.óó€v.€òòUnited€States€Postal€Serv.óó,Ð xÈ Ð467€U.S.€512€(1984),€did€not€involve€a€tort€at€all,€but€rather€aÏstatutory€wage€garnishment€procedure€to€assist€the€state€inÏcollecting€its€tax€revenues.€€As€such€it€did€not€involve€the€Ô_ÔFTCAÔ_ÔÏat€all.òòóó êÝ ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àÔ_ÔDavricÔ_Ô's€attorney€offered€a€Rule€56(f)€affidavitÐ ° Ðindicating€that€plaintiffs€believed€discovery€would€reveal€that,€asÏalleged€in€the€complaint,€Leonti€was€advised€in€front€of€non„Ð @ € Ðclients€by€a€Postal€Service€attorney€that€he€was€"on€his€own"€withÏregard€to€one€of€the€defamatory€statements,€and€also€that€discoveryÏmight€uncover€videotapes€of€the€meetings€at€which€the€allegedÏdefamatory€statements€were€made.€ò òó ó€These€facts€are€already€allegedÐ X Ðin€the€complaint,€and€were€not€disputed€by€the€defendants€for€theÏpurposes€of€the€motion€to€substitute.€€Moreover,€there€is€noÏsuggestion€that€either€the€content€of€the€purported€videotapes€orÏthe€confirmation€of€the€statement€by€the€Postal€Service€attorneyÏwould€show€that€Leonti€was€not€acting€at€his€place€of€employmentÏperforming€his€duties€as€director€of€the€distribution€center€inÏfurtherance€of€the€purposes€of€the€Postal€Service€in€the€incidentsÏout€of€which€the€claim€arose.€øÀ ÅÝ ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àPlaintiffs'€brief€also€makes€a€passing€reference€thÔ‡Xîð‹‹‹ÔatÐ ° Ð"the€allegations€are€sufficiently€clear€to€assert€that€DefendantÏLeonti€violated€the€Plaintiff's€First€Amendment€rights€byÏattempting€to€punish€them€for€their€Whistle€Blowing€.€.€."€€Ô#†‹îð‹‹Xîð#ÔTo€theÐ X Ðextent€that€this€suggests€a€òòBivensóó€claim€for€an€unconstitutionalÐ Ð  Ðretaliation€for€the€exercise€of€First€Amendment€rights,€plaintiffsÏhave€failed€to€adequately€present€this€argument€either€here€orÏbefore€the€district€court,€and€so€it€is€waived.€€Therefore€we€doÏnot€reach€the€question€of€whether€such€an€allegation€would€state€aÏclaim€for€a€òòBivensóó€action. •Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àDavric's€brief€makes€a€passing€reference€that€Leonti€mayÐ ° Ðhave€been€motivated€by€"personal€animus"€in€making€the€defamatoryÏstatements.€€However,€the€brief€does€not€adequately€argue€thatÏLeonti€had€a€private€purpose€in€defaming€the€plaintiffs€independentÏfrom€his€duties€as€an€employee€of€the€Postal€Service€so€as€toÏrender€his€actions€outside€the€scope€of€employment,€nor€does€theÏbrief€or€the€complaint€suggest€any€reason€for€Leonti€to€have€suchÏanimus€toward€the€plaintiffs€apart€from€those€duties.€€PlaintiffsÏnever€allege€Leonti€had€any€personal€motive€to€malign€them,€nor€doÏthey€allege€any€relationship€or€incident€with€Leonti€that€may€haveÏcreated€personal€animus.€€Indeed,€their€theory€that€he€retaliatedÏagainst€them€because€of€their€interference€in€the€Postal€Service'sÏsite€selection€process€belies€any€personal€motive.€€SinceÏplaintiffs€do€not€present€such€allegations€or€argument,€we€do€notÏconsider€the€issue. Ý ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àDavric's€complaint€also€included€the€Postal€Service€inÐ ° Ðthis€count,€but€the€Postal€Service€was€dismissed€from€the€count€byÏthe€district€court€because€òòBivensóó€actions€are€not€available€againstÐ @ Ðfederal€agencies.€€òòSeeóó€òòMeyeróó,€510€U.S.€at€486.€€Davric€does€notÐ X Ðappeal€this€dismissal.TABLE A Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àBecause€the€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€28€U.S.C.€ððÐ ° Ð2679(b)(1)€immunizes€federal€employees€from€suit€even€when€an€Ô_ÔFTCAÔ_ÔÏexception€precludes€recovery€against€the€United€States,€theÏsubstitution€in€this€case€effectively€dismisses€the€claim.€€òòSeeóóÐ X ÐòòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòSmithóó,€499€U.S.€160,€165€(1991);€òòÔ_ÔNasutiÔ_Ôóó€v.Ð Ð  ÐòòÔ_ÔScannellÔ_Ôóó,€906€F.2d€802,€810€n.14€(1st€Cir.€1990). Ñ e Ñ “Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àThe€Postal€Service€thereafter€disclaimed€any€firmÐ ° Ðintention€to€move€to€the€Lewiston/Auburn€area€and€reopenedÏconsideration€of€greater€Portland€area€sites. Ý ƒÝë$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€îðЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€îð‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àPlaintiffs€also€alleged€violations€of€the€NationalÐ ° ÐEnvironmental€Policy€Act,€42€U.S.C.€ðð€4321€òòet€seq.óó,€and€Maine'sÐ xÈ ÐSite€Location€of€Development€Act,€38€Ô_ÔM.R.S.A.Ô_Ô€ðððð€481„490.€€TheÏdismissal€of€these€counts€was€not€appealed. cÝ ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àAnother€case€interpreting€the€scope€of€the€Ô_ÔPRAÔ_Ô's€sue„and„Ð ° Ðbe„sued€clause,€òòFranchise€Tax€Bd.óó€v.€òòUnited€States€Postal€Serv.óó,Ð xÈ Ð467€U.S.€512€(1984),€did€not€involve€a€tort€at€all,€but€rather€aÏstatutory€wage€garnishment€procedure€to€assist€the€state€inÏcollecting€its€tax€revenues.€€As€such€it€did€not€involve€the€Ô_ÔFTCAÔ_ÔÏat€all.òòóó fÝ ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àThe€Attorney€General€has€delegated€her€certificationÐ ° Ðauthority€under€this€statute€to€the€United€States€attorneys.€€28ÏÔ_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€15.3(a). ÅÝ ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àBecause€the€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€28€U.S.C.€ððÐ ° Ð2679(b)(1)€immunizes€federal€employees€from€suit€even€when€an€Ô_ÔFTCAÔ_ÔÏexception€precludes€recovery€against€the€United€States,€theÏsubstitution€in€this€case€effectively€dismisses€the€claim.€€òòSeeóóÐ X ÐòòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòSmithóó,€499€U.S.€160,€165€(1991);€òòÔ_ÔNasutiÔ_Ôóó€v.Ð Ð  ÐòòÔ_ÔScannellÔ_Ôóó,€906€F.2d€802,€810€n.14€(1st€Cir.€1990). XÝ ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àDavric's€brief€makes€a€passing€reference€that€Leonti€mayÐ ° Ðhave€been€motivated€by€"personal€animus"€in€making€the€defamatoryÏstatements.€€However,€the€brief€does€not€adequately€argue€thatÏLeonti€had€a€private€purpose€in€defaming€the€plaintiffs€independentÏfrom€his€duties€as€an€employee€of€the€Postal€Service€so€as€toÏrender€his€actions€outside€the€scope€of€employment,€nor€does€theÏbrief€or€the€complaint€suggest€any€reason€for€Leonti€to€have€suchÏanimus€toward€the€plaintiffs€apart€from€those€duties.€€PlaintiffsÏnever€allege€Leonti€had€any€personal€motive€to€malign€them,€nor€doÏthey€allege€any€relationship€or€incident€with€Leonti€that€may€haveÏcreated€personal€animus.€€Indeed,€their€theory€that€he€retaliatedÏagainst€them€because€of€their€interference€in€the€Postal€Service'sÏsite€selection€process€belies€any€personal€motive.€€SinceÏplaintiffs€do€not€present€such€allegations€or€argument,€we€do€notÏconsider€the€issue. ­Ý ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àÔ_ÔDavricÔ_Ô's€attorney€offered€a€Rule€56(f)€affidavitÐ ° Ðindicating€that€plaintiffs€believed€discovery€would€reveal€that,€asÏalleged€in€the€complaint,€Leonti€was€advised€in€front€of€non„Ð @  Ðclients€by€a€Postal€Service€attorney€that€he€was€"on€his€own"€withÏregard€to€one€of€the€defamatory€statements,€and€also€that€discoveryÏmight€uncover€videotapes€of€the€meetings€at€which€the€allegedÏdefamatory€statements€were€made.€ò òó ó€These€facts€are€already€allegedÐ X Ðin€the€complaint,€and€were€not€disputed€by€the€defendants€for€theÏpurposes€of€the€motion€to€substitute.€€Moreover,€there€is€noÏsuggestion€that€either€the€content€of€the€purported€videotapes€orÏthe€confirmation€of€the€statement€by€the€Postal€Service€attorneyÏwould€show€that€Leonti€was€not€acting€at€his€place€of€employmentÏperforming€his€duties€as€director€of€the€distribution€center€inÏfurtherance€of€the€purposes€of€the€Postal€Service€in€the€incidentsÏout€of€which€the€claim€arose.€ ˆÝ ƒœ«$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€^¾Ð‹dÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ôà ` àPlaintiffs'€brief€also€makes€a€passing€reference€thÔ‡1X^¾‹‹‹ÔatÐ ° Ð"the€allegations€are€sufficiently€clear€to€assert€that€DefendantÏLeonti€violated€the€Plaintiff's€First€Amendment€rights€byÏattempting€to€punish€them€for€their€Whistle€Blowing€.€.€."€€Ô#†1‹^¾‹‹X^¾Ü#ÔTo€theÐ X Ðextent€that€this€suggests€a€òòBivensóó€claim€for€an€unconstitutionalÐ Ð  Ðretaliation€for€the€exercise€of€First€Amendment€rights,€plaintiffsÏhave€failed€to€adequately€present€this€argument€either€here€orÏbefore€the€district€court,€and€so€it€is€waived.€€Therefore€we€doÏnot€reach€the€question€of€whether€such€an€allegation€would€state€aÏclaim€for€a€òòBivensóó€action.<èÀ( 9Z+&Courier Regular dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€^½Ð‹dÐd=ÓÑTRXà3Ø'Xà3Ø' Letter3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÑ ? ÑÙ*ƒ !ÙÔ‡‹'•‹‹‹ÔÔ‡°$7°‹‹'•Ôò òÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÔ_ÔUnited€States€Court€of€AppealsÔ#†‹'•‹°°$7#ÔÔ‡„ž˜„‹‹'•ÔÐ ° ÐFor€the€First€Circuitó óÔ#†„-„„„ž˜ç#ÔÔ‡„'R„„„-ÔÔ#†‹‹“ ‹„„'R‘#ÔÔ‡X§ X ‹‹‹“ÔÐ „Ô ÐÓ4ÓÌÌßA€]) °°` dE< ` AßÐ  à ÐÌÌÔ#†X^½‹ XX§#ÔNo.€00„1672Ð K › ÐÌà@  ìàÔ_ÔDAVRICÔ_Ô€MAINE€CORPORATION,€AND€JOSEPH€Ô_ÔRICCIÔ_ÔˆÌÌà@ˆˆìàPlaintiffs,€Appellants,ˆÌÌà@tt)ìàv.ˆÌÌà@èèìàUNITED€STATES€POSTAL€SERVICE,€AND€JOSEPH€Ô_ÔLEONTIÔ_ÔˆÌÌà@ÄÄìàDefendants,€Appellees.ˆÌÌßA€]) °°` dE<ª` AßÐ «û ÐÌà@¬¬ìàON€APPEAL€FROM€THE€UNITED€STATES€DISTRICT€COURT€ˆÌÓ  ÓFOR€THE€DISTRICT€OF€MAINEÌÓÓÌà@ppìà[Hon.€D.€Brock€Ô_ÔHornbyÔ_Ô,€òòU.S.€Chief€District€Judgeóó]ˆÐ Ú* ÐÌßA€]) °°` dE<i` AßÐ jº ÐÌà@„„'ìàBeforeˆÌÌÓ  Óà@@((ìà€Ô_ÔTorruellaÔ_Ô,€òòChief€Judgeóó,Ð Ñ! ÐÔ_ÔBownesÔ_Ô,€òòSenior€Circuit€Judgeóó,Ð ™é Ðand€Lynch,€òòCircuit€Judgeóó.Ð a±  ÐÌÌßA€]) °°` dE<¸` AßÐ ¹ # ÐÌÓ  ÓÓ  Óà  àòòEdward€S.€Ô_ÔMacCollÔ_Ôóó,€with€whom€òòThompson,€Bull,€Ô_ÔFureyÔ_Ô,€Bass€&Ð  à% ÐÔ_ÔMacCollÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ôóó,€òòJohn€S.€Campbellóó,€and€òòCampbell€&€Ô_ÔMcArdleÔ_Ô,€P.A.óó,Ð X!¨& Ðwere€on€brief,€for€appellant.ÌÌà  àòòÔ_ÔHasleyÔ_Ô€B.€Frankóó,€Assistant€United€States€AttorneyÔ#†‹^½‹‹X^½B#ÔÔ‡X^½‹‹‹^½Ô,€with€whomÐ °#) ÐòòJay€P.€Ô_ÔMcCloskeyÔ_Ôóó,€United€States€Attorney,€was€on€brief,€forÐ x$È* Ðappellee.ÌÌÌÔ*‹ƒ] ddd Xdd Xdd X°(#°(#‹ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ+  ÔÐ  ˜'è". ‹‹ÐÓ›ÓññÐ SIü'L#/ €â@36916„„‰€â@‰‹‹SÐññññÐ 0&ü'L#/ „„‹‹0ÐññÌññJanuññññññryññññññary€26,€Ô_Ô2001ññÔ_ÔÌÐ SIDŒ)Ü$2" €â@36916 €â@ ‹‹SÐÐ(ü'L#3  (ÐÓ  ÓÙ* !ÙÌÌâ âÓ  ÓÐ ,d'5? ÐÔ_ÔÔ#†‹^½‹‹X^½´ #ÔÑ  ÑÓÓÑ8€^½X‹dÈ‹‹dÈ8ÑÑ€ÑÓ*°,X°` ¨ ƒX°œX*ÓÑ€#ïW ÑÝ ƒÿÝÝ  ÝÔ€X^½‹‹‹^½Ôà ` àò òòòóóLYNCH,€òòCircuit€Judgeó óóó.€€In€the€course€of€deciding€on€aÐ ° Ðsite€for€a€new€postal€facility,€Joseph€Leonti,€the€plant€manager€ofÏthe€Portland,€Maine,€United€States€Postal€Service€center,€made€ill„¼considered€statements€about€one€of€the€sites€that€had€been€underÏconsideration.€€The€owner€of€the€site,€the€Davric€MaineÏCorporation,€felt€that€it€and€the€site€had€been€defamed.€€DavricÏand€the€man€who€owns€it,€Joseph€Ricci,€filed€suit€in€federal€courtÏagainst€both€the€Postal€Service€and€Leonti€for€defamation€andÏtortious€interference€under€state€law,€and€in€addition€claimed€thatÏa€constitutional€tort€had€been€committed.€€Ìà ` àThe€district€court€dismissed€the€claims€against€theÏPostal€Service€on€the€ground€that€the€Postal€Service€enjoysÏsovereign€immunity€from€suit€absent€a€waiver,€and€that€its€immunityÏhad€not€been€waived€as€to€defamation€or€tortious€interferenceÏclaims.€€The€court€also€dismissed€the€state€law€tort€claims€againstÏthe€official€on€the€ground€that€the€official€had€been€acting€withinÏthe€scope€of€his€employment,€and€dismissed€the€constitutional€tortÏclaim€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€Plaintiffs€appeal.€€This€caseÏpresents€an€interesting€question€of€first€impression€about€theÏrelation€and€interaction€between€the€Postal€Reorganization€Act,€39ÏU.S.C.€ðð€101€òòet€seq.óóò òó ó,€and€the€Federal€Tort€Claims€Act,€28€U.S.C.€ððððÐ @$( Ð1346(b),€2671„2680ò òó ó.€€We€affirm€the€district€court's€dismissal€basedÐ Ð% !* Ðon€the€conclusion€that€these€Acts,€taken€together,€do€not€waive€theÏPostal€Service's€immunity€for€state€defamation€or€tortiousÏinterference€claims.€€We€also€affirm€the€dismissal€of€the€claimsÏagainst€Leonti.Ð ,`'2 Ðà@tt)ìàò òI.ó óˆÐ ° Ðà ` àFor€the€purposes€of€a€motion€to€dismiss,€we€accept€asÏtrue€the€facts€alleged€in€the€complaint.€€òòSeeóó€òòDayóó€v.€òòMassachusettsÐ  p ÐAir€Nat'l€Guardóó,€167€F.3d€678,€680€(1st€Cir.€1999);€òòDuckworthóó€v.Ð °  ÐòòPratt€&€Whitney,€Inc.óó,€152€F.3d€1,€3€(1st€Cir.€1998).€€The€PostalÐ @  ÐService€in€Maine€entered€into€a€search€for€a€new€location€for€itsÏprocessing€and€distribution€center.€€One€site€under€considerationÏwas€a€parcel€in€Scarborough€Downs€owned€by€Davric.€€The€PostalÏService€entered€into€initial€negotiations€to€purchase€the€site,€butÏsoon€focused€on€a€different€site,€one€on€Rand€Road,€as€itsÏpreferred€site.€€Joseph€Ricci,€the€indirect€owner€of€Davric,€andÏTony€Armstrong,€Davric's€real€estate€broker,€became€outspokenÏcritics€of€the€Rand€Road€site,€charging€that€the€site€wasÏenvironmentally€sensitive€and€alleging€other€mischief€behind€theÏPostal€Service's€preference€for€the€Rand€Road€site.€€The€PostalÏService€eventually€rejected€the€Rand€Road€site.Ìà ` àAfter€rejecting€that€site,€the€Postal€Service€againÏreviewed€several€possible€sites,€including€the€Davric€site,€andÏultimately€announced€a€plan€to€move€the€center€to€Lewiston,׃%×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€ratherÐ  !p$ Ðthan€settling€on€the€Davric€site.€€Plaintiffs€maintain€that€the€ÏDavric€site€was€preferable€and€that€this€rejection€of€the€site€wasÏin€retaliation€for€their€outspoken€opposition€to€the€Rand€RoadÏsite.Ð `'°", Ðà ` àIt€is€in€the€course€of€defending€this€decision€that€theÏalleged€defamation€took€place.€€In€a€series€of€meetings€with€PostalÏService€employees€to€explain€the€site€selection€process,€JosephÏLeonti,€the€plant€manger€of€the€current€distribution€centerò òó ó,€saidÐ ` ° Ðthat€the€Davric€site€was€environmentally€contaminated€and€that€itsÏdevelopment€posed€serious€wetlands€problems.€€In€one€instance,ÏLeonti€allegedly€linked€Ricci€and€Davric€to€organized€crime,Ïclaiming€that€there€were€dead€horses€and€bodies€buried€on€the€site,Ïand€"maybe€even€Jimmy€Hoffa€could€be€buried€there."€€Plaintiffs€sayÏthat€all€of€these€descriptions€are€untrue.€€These€meetings€alsoÏincluded€presentation€materials€prepared€in€part€by€the€PostalÏService,€allegedly€defamatory€as€well.Ìà ` àPlaintiffs€then€filed€this€suit,׃*×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€contending€that€theseÐ pÀ Ðfalse€statements€have€diminished€the€value€of€Davric's€property€andÏwill€continue€to€do€so,€and€that€they€have€also€caused€substantialÏdamages€to€Ricci's€reputation.Ìà@88)ìàò òII.ó óˆÐ °  Ðà ` àSovereign€immunity€presents€a€threshold€issue€forÏDavric's€suit€for€damages€against€the€Postal€Service.€€The€PostalÏService€argues€that€under€ðð€409(c)€of€Title€39,€codifying€theÏPostal€Reorganization€Act,€all€state„law€tort€claims€against€theÏPostal€Service€must€be€brought€under€the€Federal€Tort€Claims€Act.€ÏHowever,€the€Postal€Service€says,€the€FTCA€explicitly€exempts€mostÐ `'°", Ðintentional€torts,€including€defamation€and€tortious€interference,Ïfrom€its€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity.€€òòSeeóó€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2680(h).€Ð @ ÐTherefore,€the€Postal€Service€concludes,€the€defamation€andÏinterference€claims€must€be€dismissed.€€Davric€responds€that€theÏPostal€Reorganization€Act's€general€"sue€and€be€sued"€provision,Ïòòseeóó€39€U.S.C.€ðð€401(1),€governs€all€suits€against€the€PostalÐ € Ð  ÐService€not€cognizable€under€the€FTCA,€and€since€defamation€suitsÏare€not€cognizable€under€the€FTCA,€they€fall€under€the€PRA'sÏgeneral€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity.Ìà ` àThese€contending€constructions€of€the€statutory€schemeÏpresent€a€close€question.€€The€text€of€the€individual€sections€doesÏnot€present€a€clear€answer,€but€the€structure€of€the€scheme€arguesÏagainst€Davric's€position.€€The€legislative€history€of€theseÏprovisions€affords€little€guidance.€€Absent€evidence€ofÏCongressional€intent€to€have€the€Postal€Service,€a€quasi„publicÏentity,€held€liable€for€intentional€torts€under€state€law,€theÏexclusion€from€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity€controls.Ìà ` àEnacted€in€1970,€the€PRA€established€the€Postal€ServiceÏas€a€quasi„public€entity€that€was€to€compete€on€essentially€levelÏground€with€private€enterprise.€òòóó€To€that€end,€ðð€401(1)€providesÐ `"°& Ðthat€the€Postal€Service€can€"sue€and€be€sued,"€generally€waivingÏthe€immunity€from€suit€it€would€otherwise€have€as€a€public€entity.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р€%Ð * ÐòòSeeóó€39€U.S.C.€ðð€401(1).€€òòSee€alsoóó€òòLoeffleróó€v.€òòFrankóó,€486€U.S.€549,Ð '`", Ð556€(1988)€("By€launching€'the€Postal€Service€into€the€commercialÏworld'€and€including€a€sue„and„be„sued€clause€in€its€charter,ÏCongress€has€cast€off€the€Service's€'cloak€of€sovereignty'€andÏgiven€it€the€'status€of€a€private€commercial€enterprise.'")€(òòcitingóóÐ ` ° ÐòòLibrary€of€Congressóó€v.€òòShawóó,€478€U.S.€310,€317€n.5€(1986)).Ð ð @ ÐHowever,€ðð€409€of€the€PRA€provides€that€tort€suits€brought€againstÏthe€Postal€Service€are€governed€by€the€provisions€of€the€FTCA.׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð `  ÐòòSeeóó€39€U.S.C.€ðð€409(c);€òòsee€alsoóó€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2679(a)€(providingÐ  ð  Ðthat€claims€against€"sue€and€be€sued"€agencies€must€be€broughtÏthrough€the€FTCA€where€"cognizable"€under€the€FTCA).׃x×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Finally,€ððÐ À Ð2680€lists€exceptions€to€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity,Ïincluding€the€exemption€of€most€state€intentional€torts.׃ð ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€28Ð à0 ÐU.S.C.€ðð€2680(h).Ìà ` àThe€issue€turns€on€how€these€provisions€areÏcharacterized,€that€is,€whether€state€intentional€torts€such€asÐ à Ðdefamation€fall€within€the€scope€of€the€FTCA€but€are€excepted€fromÏits€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity€and€so€suit€cannot€be€broughtÏunder€the€PRA,€or€whether€they€simply€fall€outside€of€its€scope€asÏa€result€of€their€exception€and€so€suit€under€the€PRA€isÏpermissible.€€While€murky€on€this€point,€the€structure€of€theÏstatutory€scheme,€taken€altogether,€suggests€the€formerÏinterpretation.Ìà ` àBy€its€terms,€ðð€409(c)€of€the€PRA€limits€the€scope€of€theÏmore€general€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity€contained€in€ðð€401(1).€ÏFor€state€tort€claims€arising€out€of€the€activity€of€the€PostalÏService,€ðð€409(c)€compels€the€application€of€the€FTCA€and€itsÏattendant€provisions.€€Read€in€context,€then,€ðð€409(c)€of€the€PRAÏis€best€understood€to€waive€the€immunity€from€suit€that€the€PostalÏService€would€otherwise€enjoy€as€a€federal€entity€only€insofar€asÏthat€immunity€would€have€been€waived€under€the€FTCA.€€Such€aÏreading€accords€with€the€language€in€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2679(a)€providingÏthat€for€claims€that€fall€within€the€purview€of€the€FTCA,€claimsÏagainst€sue„and„be„sued€agencies€are€to€be€treated€like€a€claimÏagainst€any€other€federal€agency.€€Two€distinct€avenues€forÏinterpreting€ðð€409(c)€both€arrive€at€this€conclusion.Ìà ` àFirst,€the€reference€in€PRA€ðð€409(c)€to€"chapter€171€andÏall€other€provisions€of€title€28€relating€to€tort€claims"€can€beÏread€to€incorporate€the€FTCA€in€its€entirety€as€the€exclusiveÏvehicle€for€bringing€state€tort€claims€against€the€Postal€Service,Ïincluding€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€immunity€from€suit€in€ðð€1346(b),€itsÏattendant€procedural€requirements,€the€exclusiveness€of€its€remedyÐ À+'2 Ðcompelled€by€ðð€2679(a),€and€its€exceptions,€as€provided€in€ðð€2680.€ÏOn€this€approach,€the€question€becomes€simply€whether€the€claimÏpresented€is€a€state€tort€claim€"arising€out€of€the€activities€ofÏthe€Postal€Service"€under€ðð€409(c).€€If€so,€then€the€claim€isÏgoverned€by€the€FTCA€as€a€whole,€including€its€exception€ofÏdefamation€and€interference€claims€from€its€waiver€of€sovereignÏimmunity.Ìà ` àDavric€argues€that€once€the€claim€falls€outside€the€scopeÏof€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity,€it€then€must€fall€backÏwithin€the€ambit€of€the€PRA's€more€general€waiver.€€The€best€basisÏin€the€statutory€language€for€this€claim€is€the€introduction€to€theÏexceptions€provision,€which€states€that€the€provisions€of€the€FTCAÏ"shall€not€apply"€to€defamation€suits.€€òòSeeóó€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2680.€€IfÐ pÀ Ðthe€FTCA€shall€not€apply€to€defamation€claims,€Davric€says,€thenÏdefamation€claims€are€not€cognizable€under€the€FTCA€and€hence€theÏgeneral€waiver€of€immunity€in€the€PRA€applies.€€However,€attentionÏto€the€remainder€of€ðð€2680€makes€clear€that€this€reading€is€notÏtenable.€€Section€2680(b)€excepts€any€claim€"arising€out€of€theÏloss,€miscarriage,€or€negligent€transmission€of€letters€or€postalÏmatter"€from€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity.€€FollowingÏDavric's€proposed€construction€of€the€statutory€scheme,€thisÏprovision,€ðð€2680(b),€would€be€rendered€mere€surplusage,€as€suitsÏagainst€the€Postal€Service€for€loss€of€postal€matter€could€thenÏsimply€be€brought€under€the€PRA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunityÏrather€than€under€the€FTCA.€€Since€this€outcome€is€not€conceivablyÏwithin€Congress's€intent,€Davric's€suggested€construction€of€theÐ À+'2 Ðstatutory€scheme€must€be€rejected,€and€the€best€reading€of€theÏstatutory€scheme€affords€the€Postal€Service€with€the€protectionsÏafforded€all€other€federal€agencies€by€the€exceptions€to€the€FTCA'sÏwaiver€of€immunity,€including€the€exception€for€state€intentionalÏtort€claims.Ìà ` àAlternatively,€PRA€ðð€409(c)€can€be€read€to€incorporateÏeach€individual€provision€of€Title€28€relating€to€state€tort€claimsÏdirectly€into€the€PRA's€general€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity.€€OnÏthis€approach,€ðð€409(c)€compels€the€application€of€the€exceptionsÏprovision,€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2680,€to€tort€claims€arising€out€of€theÏactivity€of€the€Postal€Service.€€Section€409(c)€limits€the€scope€ofÏthe€general€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity€in€ðð€401(1),€and€by€thisÏreference€incorporates€the€exceptions€provided€in€the€FTCA.€€Hence,Ïplaintiffs'€defamation€and€tortious€interference€claims€must€beÏdismissed,€as€they€fall€within€these€incorporated€exceptions.€Ìà ` àDavric€argues€that€prior€interpretations€of€sue„and„be„¼sued€waivers€by€the€Supreme€Court€compel€a€broader€reading€of€theÏwaiver€of€immunity€in€the€PRA.€€First,€in€òòLoeffleróó,€the€SupremeÐ @" ÐCourt€held€that€sovereign€immunity€did€not€bar€recovery€ofÏprejudgement€interest€against€the€Postal€Service€in€a€Title€VIIÏaction.€€486€U.S.€at€565.€€In€reaching€this€conclusion,€the€CourtÏnoted€that€the€PRA,€including€the€sue„and„be„sued€provision€in€ððÏ401(1),€reflected€Congress's€"general€design€that€the€PostalÏService€'be€run€more€like€a€business€than€its€predecessor.'"€€òòId.óóÐ  (ð#. Ðat€556€(citation€omitted).€€Given€that€the€purpose€òòòòóóóóof€such€sue„and„Ð 0*€%0 Ðbe„sued€clauses€is€to€enable€such€agencies€to€engage€in€commercialÐ À+'2 Ðand€business€transactions€on€equal€footing€with€the€private€sector,ÏDavric€argues€that€courts€ought€to€construe€such€clauses€liberallyÏand€impose€exceptions€on€their€waiver€reluctantly,€in€order€toÏeffectuate€that€purpose.€€òòSeeóó€òòLoeffleróó,€486€U.S.€at€554,€òòcitingóóÐ ` ° ÐòòFederal€Housing€Admin.óó€v.€òòBurróó,€309€U.S.€242,€245€(1940).€Ð ð @ Ðà ` àIn€òòF.D.I.C.óó€v.€òòMeyeróó,€510€U.S.€471€(1994),€the€SupremeÐ € Ð  ÐCourt€held€that€the€predecessor€of€the€FDIC,€an€agency€authorizedÏto€"sue€and€be€sued,"€could€be€sued€in€a€òòBivensóó€constitutional€tortÐ  ð  Ðaction.€€While€recognizing€that€ðð€2679(a)€of€the€FTCA€sought€to€putÏsue„and„be„sued€agencies€on€the€same€footing€as€other€federalÏagencies€with€respect€to€"claims€which€are€cognizable"€under€theÏFTCA,€òòid.òòóó€óóat€476,€the€Court€concluded€that€constitutional€tortsÐ à0 Ðwere€not€cognizable€under€the€FTCA€and€therefore€such€an€actionÏagainst€the€FDIC€was€not€barred,€òòid.óó€at€477„78.€€Again€the€CourtÐ P  Ðemphasized€that€sue„and„be„sued€clauses€should€be€read€broadly.€ÏòòId.óó€at€481.€€Davric€argues€that€under€the€reasoning€of€òòMeyeróó,€andÐ pÀ Ðin€light€of€the€direction€in€òòMeyeróó€and€òòLoeffleróó€to€construe€clausesÐ P  Ðsuch€as€ðð€401(1)€broadly,€the€fact€that€defamation€claims€areÏexcepted€from€the€FTCA€should€be€interpreted€to€render€them€notÏcognizable€under€the€FTCA€and€therefore€within€the€scope€of€theÏgeneral€sue„and„be„sued€waiver€of€the€PRA.€€Ìà ` àWhile€Davric€is€correct€that€both€of€these€opinionsÏcontain€language€suggesting€that€sue„and„be„sued€clauses€should€beÏconstrued€broadly€to€effectuate€their€purpose,€a€closer€look€at€theÏreasoning€of€these€opinions€shows€they€do€not€aid€Davric.€€In€eachÏcase€where€courts€have€allowed€tort€cases€to€proceed€against€sue„Ð ,`'2 Ðand„be„sued€agencies€outside€of€the€procedures€and€limitations€ofÏthe€FTCA,€the€plaintiffs€advanced€federal€claims€„„€either€federalÏconstitutional€torts€or€federal€statutory€torts.ññ׃×ññññ׃+×ññÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€òòMeyeróó,€510Ð Ð  ÐU.S.€471€(federal€constitutional€tort);€òòGlobal€Mail€Ltd.óó€v.€òòUnitedÐ ` ° ÐStates€Postal€Serv.óó,€142€F.3d€208€(4th€Cir.€1998)€(claim€underÐ ð @ ÐLanham€Act);€òòFederal€Express€Corp.óó€v.€òòUnited€States€Postal€Serv.óó,Ð € Ð  Ð141€F.3d€536€(6th€Cir.€1998)€(same);€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòQ€Int'lÐ `  ÐCourier,€Inc.óó,€131€F.3d€770€(8th€Cir.€1997)€(same).òòòòóóóóÐ  ð  Ðà ` àPlaintiffs€ask€this€court€to€extend€this€reasoning€toÏthose€state€common€law€torts€excepted€by€ðð€2680,€such€as€theÏdefamation€and€interference€claims€they€advance€in€this€case.€ÏHowever,€the€reasoning€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€òòMeyeróó€is€explicitlyÐ à0 Ðpremised€on€the€fact€that€the€òòBivensóó€claim€presented€in€that€actionÐ pÀ Ðarose€under€federal€rather€than€state€law.€€òòMeyeróó€reasoned€that€theÐ P Ðconstitutional€tort€was€not€cognizable€under€the€FTCA€because€itÏdid€not€fall€within€the€scope€of€the€waiver€of€sovereign€immunityÏin€ðð€1346(b),€as€that€waiver€was€limited€to€claims€where€"a€privateÏperson"€would€be€liable€"in€accordance€with€the€law€of€the€placeÏwhere€the€act€or€omission€occurred."€€òòMeyeróó,€510€U.S.€477„78.€€TheÐ Ð $ ÐCourt€has€consistently€held€that€this€reference€to€"the€law€of€theÏplace"€means€the€law€of€the€state,€which€provides€the€source€ofÏsubstantive€liability€under€the€FTCA.€€òòId.óó€at€478€(citing€cases).€Ð €%Ð * ÐÑ#ïW Ñâ #âÑe°Ñâ #âÑ  ÑSince€by€definition€"federal€law,€not€state€law,€provides€theÏsource€of€liability"€for€a€federal€constitutional€tort€claim,€it€isÏnot€cognizable€under€the€FTCA€and€therefore€the€claim€can€fallÏwithin€the€general€sue„and„be„sued€waiver.€€òòId.óó€at€477„78.€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àDavric's€argument€fails.€€As€the€defamation€and€tortiousÏinterference€claims€Davric€advances€clearly€arise€under€the€law€ofÏthe€place€„„€i.e.,€Maine's€substantive€law€of€tort€liability€„„Ïthey€are€claims€that€are€cognizable€under€the€FTCA.€€Since€theÏclaims€are€cognizable€under€the€FTCA,€all€the€requirements€andÏlimitations€upon€which€the€FTCA's€waiver€of€sovereign€immunity€isÏconditioned€apply.€€Indeed,€many€of€the€cases€relied€upon€by€DavricÏmake€clear€that€the€FTCA€governs€state€tort€claims€against€theÏPostal€Service.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòLoeffleróó,€486€U.S.€at€562;€òòFederalÐ pÀ ÐExpressóó,€151€F.3d€at€540„41;€òòGlobal€Mailóó,€142€F.3d€at€214„15.òòóó€Ð P ÐHence€the€defamation€and€tortious€interference€claims€must€beÏdismissed.Ìà ` àSection€2680(h)€of€the€FTCA€embodies€an€understandableÏpolicy€against€compelling€the€public€fisc€to€bear€the€costs€ofÏintentional€torts€committed€by€public€employees.€€The€extent€toÏwhich€this€policy€rationale€extends€to€quasi„public€agencies€is€not€Ïimmediately€evident.€€More€importantly,€however,€that€determinationÏis€properly€one€of€òòlegislativeóó€policy€judgment.€€òòCf.óó€òòWestfallóó€v.Ð €%Ð * ÐòòErwinóó,€484€U.S.€292,€300€(1988)€(noting€that€Congress€is€"in€theÐ '`", Ðbest€position€to€provide€guidance"€on€complex€questions€ofÏsovereign€immunity).€€In€the€absence€of€any€evidence€that€CongressÏdid€not€intend€to€afford€quasi„public,€sue„and„be„sued€agencies€theÐ À+'2 Ðprotection€of€the€exemption€from€suit€for€state€intentional€torts,Ïand€in€light€of€the€judicial€policy€of€construing€waivers€ofÏsovereign€immunity€narrowly,€we€cannot€find€that€the€statutoryÏscheme€indicates€that€the€Postal€Service€has€waived€its€immunityÏfrom€suit€for€defamation€or€tortious€interference€claims.€ÏTherefore,€Davric's€claims€against€the€Postal€Service€were€properlyÏdismissed.Ìà@üü(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ  ð  Ðà ` àDavric€also€appeals€the€dismissal€of€defendant€JosephÏLeonti.€€Plaintiffs€sued€Leonti€individually€on€all€three€claims.€ÏThe€district€court€dismissed€the€defamation€and€tortiousÏinterference€claims€against€Leonti,€substituting€the€United€StatesÏas€party€defendant€for€Leonti€under€the€Westfall€Act,€òòseeóó€28€U.S.C.Ð À Ððð€2679(d),€and€dismissed€the€òòóóconstitutional€tort€claim€againstÐ P  ÐLeonti€for€failure€to€state€a€claim.€€Plaintiffs€appeal.Ìà@tt)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ pÀ Ðà ` àFirst,€plaintiffs€challenge€the€substitution€of€theÏUnited€States€for€Leonti€on€the€defamation€and€tortiousÏinterference€claims.€€The€defendants€moved€to€substitute€the€UnitedÏStates€for€Leonti€as€a€defendant€pursuant€to€28€U.S.C.€ððÏ2679(d)(1),€which€provides€that€"[u]pon€certification€by€theÏAttorney€General€that€the€defendant€employee€was€acting€within€theÏscope€of€his€office€or€employment€at€the€time€of€the€incident€outÏof€which€the€claim€arose,"€the€action€"shall€be€deemed€an€actionÏagainst€the€United€States€.€.€.€and€the€United€States€shall€beÏsubstituted€as€the€party€defendant."€€òòId.óó€€The€motion€wasÐ `,°'2 Ðaccompanied€by€a€certification€from€the€United€States€Attorneyññ׃×ññññ׃,×ññÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ° Ðthat€Leonti€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€employment€at€the€timeÏof€the€alleged€incidents.€€The€district€court€granted€the€motion€asÏto€the€tortious€interference€and€defamation€claims€(though€not€asÏto€the€alleged€constitutional€torts,€as€they€fall€outside€the€scopeÏof€the€FTCA),€substituted€the€United€States,€and€dismissed€theÏclaims.ñ ñ׃"è×ñ ññ ñ׃-è×ñ ñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Davric€appeals,€arguing€that€while€the€court€recognizedÐ `  Ðthat€the€certification€is€provisional€and€subject€to€judicialÏreview,€the€plaintiffs€were€unable€to€make€the€requisite€factualÏshowing€that€Leonti€was€acting€outside€the€scope€of€his€employmentÏbecause€they€were€not€allowed€to€pursue€discovery€on€the€issue.Ìà ` àThe€law€of€immunity€strikes€a€balance€between€the€publicÏinterest€in€having€injurious€acts€compensated€and€the€competingÏpublic€interest€in€safeguarding€the€ability€of€responsibleÏgovernmental€employees€to€"faithfully€carry€out€their€dutiesÏwithout€fear€of€protracted€litigation€in€unfounded€damages€suits."Ð  p ÐòòSeeóó€òòAversaóó€v.€òòUnited€Statesóó,€99€F.3d€1200,€1203€(1st€Cir.€1996).€InÐ °  Ð1988€Congress€amended€the€FTCA€to€reinforce€federal€employees'Ïindividual€immunity€from€tort€actions€with€the€Federal€EmployeesÏLiability€Reform€and€Tort€Compensation€Act€of€1988.€€TheseÐ `"°& Ðamendments€„„€commonly€known€as€the€"Westfall€Act"€because€theyÏwere€a€response€to€òòWestfallóó€v.€òòErwinóó,€484€U.S.€292€(1988)€„„€affordÐ @ Ðfederal€employees€who€allegedly€commit€a€common€law€tort€absoluteÏimmunity€where€they€were€acting€within€the€scope€of€employment,€òòseeóóÐ ` ° Ð28€U.S.C.€ðððð€2679(b)(1)€and€2679(d),€but€allow€the€suit€to€proceedÏagainst€the€federal€government€unless€some€exception€to€the€FTCAÏapplies,€òòAversaóó,€99€F.3d€at€1203.€€Ð `  Ðà ` àThe€mechanism€through€which€the€federal€employee€isÏprotected€in€these€circumstances€is€certification€by€the€AttorneyÏGeneral€under€28€U.S.C.€ðð€2679(d)€that€the€employee€was€actingÏwithin€the€scope€of€employment.€€Once€such€a€certification€is€made,Ïthe€court€dismisses€the€federal€employee€from€the€case,€andÏsubstitutes€the€United€States€as€defendant.€€This€certification,Ïhowever,€does€not€conclusively€establish€that€the€United€StatesÏshould€be€substituted,€but€rather€is€provisional€and€subject€toÏjudicial€review.€€òòSeeóó€òòGutierrez€de€Martinezóó€v.€òòLamagnoóó,€515€U.S.Ð  p Ð417,€434€(1995).€€Upon€a€showing€that€the€employee€was€actingÏoutside€the€scope€of€employment,€as€determined€by€the€applicableÏstate€law,€that€employee€may€be€re„substituted.€€òòAversaóó,€99€F.3d€atÐ Ð $ Ð1208.€€Plaintiffs€challenge€the€certification€here€that€Leonti€wasÏacting€within€the€scope€of€his€employment,€and€appeal€the€denial€ofÏtheir€efforts€to€conduct€discovery€in€order€to€uncover€the€factsÏnecessary€to€show€that€Leonti€was€not€acting€within€the€scope€ofÏemployment.€€Ìà ` àWhere€a€plaintiff€asserts€that€a€defendant€acted€outsideÏthe€scope€of€his€or€her€employment€despite€the€Attorney€General'sÐ À+'2 Ðcertification€to€the€contrary,€the€burden€of€proof€is€on€theÏplaintiff.€€òòSeeóó€òòDayóó€v.€òòMassachusetts€Air€Nat'l€Guardóó,€167€F.3d€678,Ð @ Ð685€(1st€Cir.€1999);€òòLyonsóó€v.€òòBrownóó,€158€F.3d€605,€610€(1st€Cir.Ð Ð  Ð1998).€€State€law€controls€the€determination€of€whether€a€federalÏemployee€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€employment.€€òòSeeóó€òòLyonsóó,€158Ð ð @ ÐF.3d€at€609;€òòAversaóó,€99€F.3d€at€1208„09.€€Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àIn€order€to€strike€the€substitution€of€the€United€States,Ïplaintiffs€here€must€show€that,€under€Maine€law,€Leonti€was€actingÏoutside€the€scope€of€his€employment€at€the€time€of€the€incident€outÏof€which€the€claims€arose.€€Maine€courts€apply€ðð€228€of€theÏRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency€on€the€issue€of€scope€of€employment.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòBergeronóó€v.€òòHendersonóó,€47€F.€Supp.€2d€61,€65€(D.€Me.€1999),Ð à0 Ðòòcitingóó€òòMcLainóó€v.€òòTraining€and€Dev.€Corp.óó,€572€A.2d€494,€497€(Me.Ð pÀ Ð1990).€€Under€Maine€law€an€employee's€actions€are€within€the€scopeÏof€employment€if€they€are€of€the€kind€that€he€is€employed€toÏperform,€they€occur€within€authorized€time€and€space€limits,€andÏthey€are€actuated€by€a€purpose€to€serve€the€employee's€master.€€òòSeeóóÐ °  ÐRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency€ðð€228,€at€504€(1958),€òòcited€inóóÐ @" ÐòòBergeronóó,€47€F.€Supp.€2d€at€65.€€Under€the€Restatement€(Second),€anÐ Ð $ Ðaction€may€be€within€the€scope€of€employment€although€"forbidden,Ïor€done€in€a€forbidden€manner,"€òòseeóó€Restatement€(Second)€ðð€230,€orÐ ð#@( Ðeven€"consciously€criminal€or€tortious,"€òòseeóó€òòid.óó€ðð€231.€€ActionsÐ €%Ð * Ð"relating€to€work"€and€"done€in€the€workplace€during€working€hours"Ïare€typically€within€the€scope.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðððð€229,€233,€234òòóó.€€WhetherÐ  (ð#. Ðthe€motivation€of€the€employee€is€to€serve€the€master's€interest€orÏhis€or€her€own€private€purposes€is€often€an€important€element€inÐ À+'2 Ðthis€determination.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðððð€228,€235„236;€òòsee€alsoóó€òòLyonsóó,€158Ð ° ÐF.3d€at€609.€€Where€seemingly€work„related€acts€taken€by€theÏfederal€employee€are€done€with€a€private€purpose€on€the€employee'sÏpart€to€retaliate€or€discriminate€against€the€plaintiff,€they€mayÏfall€outside€the€scope€of€employment€under€Maine€law;€where€theÏacts€were€done€in€good€faith€to€serve€the€employer's€interest,€evenÏif€the€federal€employee's€judgment€was€mistaken,€then€the€conductÏis€likely€within€the€scope€of€employment.€€òòSeeóó€òòLyonsóó,€158€F.3d€atÐ  ð  Ð610.Ìà ` àThe€district€court€refused€to€re„substitute€Leonti€forÏthe€United€States€as€party€defendant,€affirming€the€magistrateÏjudge's€conclusion€that€the€plaintiffs€had€not€produced€anyÏevidence€to€find€that€Leonti€was€acting€outside€the€scope€of€hisÏemployment€under€Maine€law.€€We€affirm€this€determination.€ÏDisputes€over€Westfall€certifications€arise€in€two€distinctÏprocedural€contexts.€€First,€the€Attorney€General's€certificationÏmight€accept€the€plaintiff's€characterization€of€the€incidents€atÏissue,€but€nevertheless€certify€that€the€relevant€incident€occurredÏwhile€the€employee€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€employment.€€OnÏthe€other€hand,€this€court€has€also€held€that€the€Attorney€GeneralÏmay€dispute€the€plaintiff's€characterization€of€the€incident€andÏother€subsidiary,€immunity„related€facts,€though€the€certificateÏmust€assume€some€harm„causing€incident.€€òòSeeóó€òòWoodóó€v.€òòUnited€Statesóó,Ð '`", Ð995€F.2d€1122,€1126€(1st€Cir.€1993)€(en€banc).€€Where€the€movantÏcontends€that,€even€accepting€the€allegations€of€the€complaint€asÏtrue,€the€defendant€acted€within€the€scope€of€employment,€theÐ À+'2 Ðmotion€to€substitute€may€be€decided€on€the€face€of€the€complaintÏ(akin€to€a€motion€to€dismiss);€where€the€movant€contests€the€factsÏas€pled,€the€motion€may€be€decided€by€reference€to€affidavits€andÏother€evidence€outside€the€pleadings€(akin€to€a€summary€judgmentÏmotion);€and€where€the€plaintiff€demonstrates€that€a€genuine€issueÏof€material€fact€exists€with€respect€to€the€scope€of€employment,Ïthe€district€court€may€hold€an€evidentiary€hearing€to€resolve€theÏmaterial€factual€disputes€about€the€immunity„related€facts.€€òòSeeóóÐ  ð  ÐòòTaboasóó€v.€òòMlynczakóó,€149€F.3d€576,€581€(7th€Cir.€1998);€òòsee€alsoóóÐ 0€  ÐòòDayóó,€167€F.3d€at€686;€òòLyonsóó,€158€F.3d€at€610.Ð À Ðà ` àDavric's€complaint€alleges€that€Leonti€made€defamatoryÏstatements€about€the€Davric€property€and€Ricci€at€a€series€ofÏmeetings€at€the€Postal€facility€with€Postal€Service€employeesÏduring€work€hours.€€The€complaint€presents€a€number€of€statements,Ïallegedly€defamatory€and€made€in€an€angry€tone.€€The€complaint€alsoÏalleges€that€at€one€point,€a€Postal€Service€official€informedÏLeonti€that€he€was€"on€his€own"€with€regard€to€one€of€the€defamingÏstatements.€€For€the€purposes€of€this€motion,€the€defendants€do€notÏcontest€any€of€these€alleged€facts,€but€instead€contend€thatÏLeonti's€actions€in€these€incidents,€even€as€characterized€in€theÏcomplaint,€arose€while€he€was€acting€within€the€scope€of€hisÏemployment.Ìà ` àWhile€it€is€true€that€where€plaintiff's€proffer€"soÏwarrants"€and€the€facts€alleged€"are€in€controversy"€a€districtÏcourt€may€hold€evidentiary€hearings€to€resolve€scope„of„employmentÏissues,€òòseeóó€òòLyonsóó,€158€F.3d€at€610,€that€is€not€this€situation.€Ð À+'2 ÐHere,€Davric's€complaint€contains€allegations€about€the€content,Ïtone,€and€location€of€the€defaming€statements.€€Yet€Davric€has€notÏadvanced€any€viable€theory€that€Leonti€was€not€acting€within€theÏscope€of€his€employment€under€Maine€law€when€making€theseÏstatements.€€Ô‡‹îð‹‹XîðÔPlaintiffs€argue€in€their€brief€that€Leonti€"exceededÐ ð @ Ðthe€scope€of€his€employment€in€the€avalanche€of€derogatory€commentsÏhe€directed€at€Plaintiffs"€and€in€the€"series€of€highly€defamatoryÏcharges"€he€directed€at€plaintiffs,€"made€in€a€very€angry€fashion."€Ïò òó óHowever,€even€if€true,€the€mere€fact€that€Leonti€made€statementsÐ 0€  Ðthat€were€defamatory€does€not€render€his€actions€outside€the€scopeÏof€employment.€€Plaintiffs€place€particular€emphasis€on€the€allegedÏstatement€by€a€senior€Postal€Service€official€to€Leonti€in€regardÏto€one€of€the€defamatory€statements€that€he€was€"on€his€own€on€thatÏone."€€Again,€even€if€true,€the€fact€that€the€Postal€Service€didÏnot€endorse€all€of€Leonti's€opinions€as€expressed€does€not€renderÏthe€statements€outside€the€scope€of€employment.ñ ñ׃×ñ ññ ñ׃.×ñ ñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòCf.óó€òòAversaóó,€99Ð  p Ðâ âF.3d€at€1211€(under€New€Hampshire€law€and€the€Restatement,Ð °  Ðstatements€of€government€employee€were€with€scope€of€employmentÏeven€when€they€plainly€were€not€authorized).Ìâ âà ` àRather,€under€the€Westfall€Act,€the€relevant€analysisÏmust€be€made€under€Maine€law,€and€under€Maine€law,€even€acceptingÏthe€allegations€of€the€complaint€as€true,€Leonti's€actions€wereÏwithin€the€scope€of€employment.€Ô#†Xîð‹‹‹îðAƒ#ÔLeonti€was€director€of€theÐ € Ð  Ðdistribution€center.€€He€was€at€a€meeting€of€Postal€ServiceÏemployees€called€during€work€hours€and€at€work€for€the€purpose€ofÏexplaining€the€Postal€Service's€site€selection€process.€€While€someÏof€Leonti's€statements€may€have€amounted€to€defamation,€DavricÏprovides€no€reason€to€believe€that€the€statements€did€not€further,Ïand€were€not€intended€to€further,€the€Postal€Service's€purposes€inÏjustifying€its€site€selection€process€to€its€own€employees.€€òòCf.óóÐ pÀ ÐRestatement€(Second)€ðð€228(1)(c).€€Actions€taken€in€the€workplaceÏto€serve€the€purposes€of€the€employer€are€prototypical€actionsÏwithin€the€scope€of€employment€under€the€Restatement€principlesÏoutlined€above.€€Ìà ` àNor€is€Davric's€argument€that€discovery€was€necessaryÏavailing.€€Davric€does€not€say€what€facts,€if€discovered,€wouldÏlead€to€a€viable€theory€that€Leonti€was€acting€outside€of€the€scopeÏof€employment.€€Indeed,€the€only€specific€facts€on€which€DavricÏindicates€it€sought€discovery€were€already€alleged€in€theÏcomplaint,€and€do€not€undermine€the€determination€that€Leonti€wasÏacting€within€the€scope€of€his€employment.ñ ñ׃×ñ ññ ñ׃/×ñ ñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€order€for€discoveryÐ  (ð#. Ðof€immunity„related€facts€to€be€warranted,€the€plaintiff€mustÏindicate€what€sort€of€facts€he€or€she€hopes€to€discover€that€wouldÏcreate€a€material€factual€dispute€and€could€support€a€viable€theoryÏthat€the€individual€defendant€was€acting€outside€the€scope€ofÏemployment.€€Davric€fails€to€do€so,€and€so€we€affirm€theÏsubstitution€of€the€United€States€for€Leonti€on€the€defamation€andÏtortious€interference€claims.Ìà@tt)ìàò òB.ó óˆÐ  ð  Ðà ` àDavric€also€sued€Leonti€in€his€individual€capacity€forÏdamages€for€a€violation€of€plaintiffs'€constitutional€rights,Ïclaiming€that€Leonti's€actions€constitute€a€constitutional€tortÏunder€òòBivensóó€v.€òòSix€Unknown€Federal€Narcotics€Agentsóó,€403€U.S.€388Ð 0€ Ð(1971).ññ׃ð ×ññññ׃ð ×ññÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€district€court€dismissed€the€claim€against€Leonti€onÐ À Ðthe€grounds€that€a€plaintiff€may€not€recover€for€an€allegedÏconstitutional€tort€for€defamation€unless€his€damages€resulted€fromÏsome€action€taken€by€the€defendant€apart€from€the€allegedÐ pÀ Ðdefamation,€and€Davric€failed€to€allege€any€such€additional€stepsÏundertaken€by€Leonti.€€On€appeal,€Davric€argues€that€LeontiÏdeprived€plaintiffs€of€due€process€in€making€the€allegedlyÏdefamatory€statements,€both€because€it€deprived€them€of€"anÏidentified€interest€in€life,€liberty€or€property€protected€by€theÏFifth€Amendment"ò òó ó€and€because€his€conduct€"shocks€the€conscience."ññ׃×ññññ׃0×ññÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€ò òó óÐ € Ð  Ðà ` àWhile€the€plaintiffs€fail€to€identify€expressly€whatÏ"identified€interest€in€life,€liberty€or€property"€Leonti's€actionsÏdeprived€them€of,€they€go€on€to€cite€several€cases€regarding€harmÏto€"good€name"€or€"reputation."€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòGossóó€v.€òòLopezóó,€419€U.S.Ð À Ð565,€574€(1975);€òòWisconsinóó€v.€òòConstantineauóó,€400€U.S.€433,€437Ð P  Ð(1971).€€Therefore€we€assume€the€protected€interest€Davric€assertsÏis€in€plaintiffs'€reputations.Ìà ` àDefamation€alone€does€not€constitute€a€constitutionalÏtort€under€òòBivensóó.€€In€order€to€recover€in€a€òòBivensóó€action,€theÐ à Ðplaintiff€has€to€suffer€a€loss€that€results€from€some€furtherÏaction€by€the€defendant€in€addition€to€the€defamation€itself.€€AsÏthe€Supreme€Court€held€in€òòSiegertóó€v.€òòGilleyóó,€"so€long€as€suchÐ @" Ðdamage€flows€from€injury€caused€by€the€defendant€to€a€plaintiff'sÏreputation,€it€may€be€recoverable€under€state€tort€law€but€it€isÐ `"°& Ðnot€recoverable€in€a€òòBivensóó€action."€€500€U.S.€226,€234€(1991).€Ð ° ÐòòSee€alsoóó€òòPaulóó€v.€òòDavisóó,€424€U.S.€693,€701€(1976)€("stigma"€toÐ @ Ðreputation€alone€is€an€injury€to€neither€liberty€nor€propertyÏsufficient€to€invoke€Due€Process€Clause);€òòAversaóó,€99€F.3d€at€1215„Ð ` ° Ð16.€€To€hold€otherwise€would€effectively€elevate€state€common€lawÏtorts€to€constitutional€status.€€Ìà ` àHere,€Davric€identifies€no€damages€resulting€to€eitherÏits€properties€or€Ricci€apart€from€the€alleged€reputational€harms,Ïand€identifies€no€additional€actions€undertaken€by€Leonti€thatÏmight€have€caused€additional€damages.€€Plaintiffs'€suggestion€thatÏLeonti's€actions€"shock€the€conscience"€also€must€fail€„„€Leonti'sÏconduct€simply€fails€even€to€approach€the€sort€of€"extreme€orÏintrusive€physical€conduct"€which€is€the€gravamen€of€this€doctrine.€ÏòòSee,€e.g.óó€òòBrownóó€v.€òòHot,€Sexy€and€Safer€Prod.,€Inc.óó,€68€F.3d€525,Ð P Ð531€(1st€Cir.€1995),€òòcert.óó€òòdeniedóó,€516€U.S.€1159€(1996).òòòòóóóó€€€ThusÐ à Ðwhile€Davric's€claims€may€adequately€state€a€state€tort€claim,€theyÏfail€to€state€a€constitutional€claim€cognizable€in€a€òòBivensóó€action.€Ð °  ÐThe€òòBivensóó€claim€was€properly€dismissed.Ð @" Ðà@88)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ Ð $ Ðà ` àThe€decision€of€the€district€court€dismissing€the€actionÏis€affirmed.