ÿWPCÛ… rÅÂ4ò^Ÿ²ÜÓ*Të©×&Ù¯Ô|ÆPœ<¤qÕ:*pNX%;ƒíe…$׸§ž-3,3äϦåФɫ>ƒNê½m.q«~Úúù Zž¨ ÷ù©þ³•yá±Ï©uŸ¶‘JíJVš7"’|6e¯¤[ýý)]K覇uô¸‘øÔUóÔ…ú™‘0„3M¤§¶m•?(1isò¡e½RPÏTä*Wþ-À•„cF)§É_˜ÝÍ4%"£¶k,fò3¯k3“?‘—L§C^•0 ”#¥Z£­YG5™F6_\R…ŒÞˆÜÉ9%».ÃùÚ+Þ‰8»k‡„ ‚\z~ ×rÑÈDµ¯še.¨”Ø’ºfÊ¿Öp€þ…52&_†„÷N­®Õª ~0dàø&½>Ïì¿ms9(~c”‰†W „úø'õã€@Ǻœ”éëx¶Dh˜5ê³!ˆKh#âõª‘B¿”‡Œ«ak”†oxÃ{8BäÁ†jÎnê0nG7€ Ta]”Ö˜cC²ü´Eîä`ðíòuWæÀ×|ªÏAišU"Àµ-Vûúy[ð$ë”™ÎaTÙÖk½û ƒIÓäk(mÊjÈB 7lñ<Œ#!¨ %É 0DÏ 0( ¢; 0ÆÝÿ£¢8ª^ âw@î4.bBJY m[ErftavNŠõŒù$ùz+UFs2UF¹2 ÿ2Ù 6UFâ8;(9.c:d‘:Õõ>UFÊE]FUFmL¢³LUSUFäT B*UªGUUFñV¢7WUFÙ] ^UF)adoaUFÓe]fU>vlUF´lªúlUF¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤n¤nUFênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênênUF0o¢vo vd"y]†}ªãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒãƒUN…˜HP LaserJet 4,ü,,,,,ü0tX(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó($¡¡ ˜Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€This€is€in€contrast€to€the€statuteððs€providing€leave€forÐ ° Ðspouses€to€take€care€of€their€seriously€ill€spouse€withoutÏlimitation€and€for€adult€children€to€take€care€of€their€seriouslyÏill€parent€also€without€limitation.€€Although€some€might€believeÏthe€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€adult€child€should€be€equal€or€similarÏto€oneððs€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€spouse€or€parent,€Congress€plainlyÏdid€not€see€matters€that€way.Ìà  àCongress€seemed€to€have€faced€something€of€a€dilemma€in€theÏcase€of€parental€leave€for€adult€children.€€The€statute€for€theÏfirst€time€òòforcedóó€qualifying€employers€to€grant€leave€to€theirÐ 6 †  Ðemployees€in€order€to€assist€family€members.€€Some€members€ofÏCongress€might€have€felt€that€employers€should€not€be€forced€toÏgrant€any€leave€at€all€for€care€of€adult€children€because€of€theÏadult€childððs€presumed€independence.€€And,€if€leave€were€to€beÏgranted,€it€might€be€believed€that€a€line€should€be€drawn€betweenÏthose€adult€children€qualifying€for€parental€care€and€the€moreÏusual€case€of€those€who€should€be€expected€to€look€elsewhere.€€TheÏconcept€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€appears€to€have€been€harnessed€as€a€way€toÏresolve€this€dilemma,€the€idea€being€that€an€adult€who€is€legallyÏdisabled€(thus€having€a€serious€impairment€that€continues€overÏtime)€belongs€to€a€more€dependent€category€justifying€continuingÏparental€care€to€the€employerððs€detriment,€whereas€an€adult€childÏwho€is€seriously€ill€but€is€not€deemed€disabled€does€not.(d:2~]$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó õÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€distinction€between€duration€and€long„term€impact€is€notÐ ° Ðobvious€on€its€face.€€The€EEOC's€interpretive€guidance€states€thatÏduration€"refers€to€the€length€of€time€an€impairment€persists,"Ïwhile€long„term€impact€"refers€to€the€residual€effects€of€anÏimpairment."€€29€C.F.R.€pt.€1630,€App.€ðð€1630.2(j).  .Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThis€verity€is€made€manifest€by€the€inclusion€of€long„termÐ ° Ðimpact€in€its€litany€of€factors€to€be€considered€when€determiningÏthe€existence€of€a€disability€under€the€ADA.€€The€EEOC's€gloss€isÏthat€long„term€impact€refers€to€an€impairment's€residual€effectsÏ(e.g.,€a€limp€resulting€from€a€spinal€injury€or€an€improperlyÏhealed€broken€leg).€€29€C.F.R.€pt.€1630,€App.€ðð€1630.2(j).€ÏClearly,€this€factor€is€not€relevant€in€òòeveryóó€ADA€case.€€ForÐ ´  Ðexample,€if€an€impairment€is€severe€and€of€indeterminate€duration,Ïa€finding€of€disability€would€lie€even€if€long„term€impact€wasÏentirely€speculative.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòMcKenzieóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔDovalaÔ_Ôóó,€242€F.3d€967,Ð 6 †  Ð972„73€(10th€Cir.€2001)€(reversing€summary€judgment€for€employer;Ïconcluding€that€plaintiff€could€show€disability€when€impairment€wasÏsevere€and€of€significant€duration,€despite€lack€of€any€evidence€ofÏlong„term€impact).€The€lesson€to€be€gleaned€is€that€the€threeÏlisted€factors€can€combine€in€a€number€of€different€ways,€even€toÏthe€exclusion€of€one€or€more€of€them.€€This€is€all€the€more€trueÏunder€the€FMLA,€where€common€sense€counsels€that€the€long„termÏimpact€of€a€family€member's€serious€health€condition€should€haveÏlittle€if€anything€to€do€with€an€employee's€entitlement€to€anÏunpaid€leave€that,€by€definition,€cannot€exceed€twelve€weeks.€‹+Æ ûrüý þÿEïS‡+6X Fil C‹- ù-3|x4ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀøÀTABLE A ëÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWe€wish€to€make€clear€that€even€if€òòChevronóó€applied,€we€stillÐ ° Ðwould€not€defer€to€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidance€because€theÏregulation€in€question€is€not€ambiguous.€€òòSeeóó€òòNLRBóó€v.€òòBeverlyÐ \¬ ÐÔ_ÔEnterpsÔ_Ô„Mass.,€Inc.óó,€174€F.3d€13,€22€(1st€Cir.€1999)€("Thus,€if€theÐ 2‚ Ðlegislative€intent€is€clear,€we€do€not€defer€to€the€agency€and€weÏend€the€òòChevronóó€analysis€at€step€one.").€€The€regulation€clearlyÐ Þ. Ðsets€forth€a€balancing€test.€€Under€Supreme€Court€precedent,€thisÐ ´  € Ðdoes€not€permit€deference€to€an€agency's€guidance€on€how€such€aÏbalance€should€be€calibrated.€€In€òòChristensenóó,€for€example,€theÐ †Ö ÐCourt€examined€the€validity€of€an€interpretation€of€a€regulationÏpromulgated€by€the€Secretary€of€Labor€under€the€Fair€LaborÏStandards€Act.€€The€regulation€provided€that€"[an]€agreement€orÏunderstanding€òòmayóó€include€other€provisions€governing€theÐ Þ. Ðpreservation,€use,€or€cashing€out€of€compensatory€time€so€long€asÏthese€provisions€are€consistent€with€[the€applicable€statute]."€€29ÏÔ_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€553.23(a)(2)€(emphasis€supplied).€€The€Court€concludedÏthat€"[Ô_Ôt]heÔ_Ô€text€of€the€regulation€itself€indicates€that€itsÏcommand€is€permissive,€not€mandatory,"€and€thus€refused€to€defer€toÏan€opinion€letter€issued€by€the€Secretary€advising€that€thisÏregulation€required€employers€to€include€a€compelled€use€policy€inÏan€agreement.€€òòChristensenóó,€529€U.S.€at€588.€€So€it€is€here:€€theÐ ŽÞ  Ðtext€of€the€regulation,€29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€825.113(c)(2),€quoted€òòsupraóó,Ð d´  Ðpermits€a€court€to€weigh€the€duration€of€an€impairment€as€one€ofÏthree€factors€to€determine€the€severity€of€a€putative€disability.€ÏAs€such,€it€is€unambiguous,€and€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidance€onÏhow€such€a€balance€should€be€weighed€is€not€entitled€to€deference. ïÝ ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€FMLA's€legislative€history€is€not€very€precise€as€toÐ ° ÐCongress's€reason€for€elevating€the€bar€for€older€children.€€TheÏsole€pertinent€passage€in€the€legislative€history€reads:Ìà8  àThe€bill€thus€recognizes€that€in€special€circumstances,Ð 2‚ € Ðwhere€a€child€has€a€mental€or€physical€disability,€aÏchild's€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€sheÏreaches€18€years€of€age.€€In€such€circumstances,€parentsÏmay€continue€to€have€an€active€role€in€caring€for€the€sonÏor€daughter.€€An€adult€son€or€daughter€who€has€a€seriousÏhealth€condition€and€who€is€incapable€of€self„careÏbecause€of€a€mental€or€physical€disability€presents€theÏsame€compelling€need€for€parental€care€as€the€child€underÏ18€years€of€age€with€a€serious€health€condition.Ð Ð Ð  ÐS.€Rep.€No.€103„3,€at€22€(1993),€òòreprintedóó€òòinóó€1993€Ô_ÔU.S.C.C.A.N.Ô_Ô€3,Ð 6 †  Ð24.€€This€rather€amorphous€paragraph€admits€of€two€possibleÏconstructions.€€Our€dissenting€brother€opts€for€the€moreÏrestrictive€construction:€€that€Congress€wanted€to€afford€coverageÏonly€if€a€child's€disability€continues€from€an€early€age€untilÏafter€he€or€she€turns€eighteen.€€For€reasons€stated€in€thisÏopinion,€we€deem€it€far€more€likely€that€the€paragraph€is€properlyÏconstrued€to€reflect€Congress's€recognition€that€the€bond€betweenÏparent€and€child€endures€long€after€the€child€turns€eighteen,€andÏthat€the€Act€affords€coverage€whenever€an€adult€child€suffers€fromÏa€serious€health€condition€and€is€incapable€of€self„care€as€theÏresult€of€a€disability. ïÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€FMLA's€legislative€history€is€not€very€precise€as€toÐ ° ÐCongress's€reason€for€elevating€the€bar€for€older€children.€€TheÏsole€pertinent€passage€in€the€legislative€history€reads:Ìà8  àThe€bill€thus€recognizes€that€in€special€circumstances,Ð 2‚ € Ðwhere€a€child€has€a€mental€or€physical€disability,€aÏchild's€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€sheÏreaches€18€years€of€age.€€In€such€circumstances,€parentsÏmay€continue€to€have€an€active€role€in€caring€for€the€sonÏor€daughter.€€An€adult€son€or€daughter€who€has€a€seriousÏhealth€condition€and€who€is€incapable€of€self„careÏbecause€of€a€mental€or€physical€disability€presents€theÏsame€compelling€need€for€parental€care€as€the€child€underÏ18€years€of€age€with€a€serious€health€condition.Ð Ð Ð  ÐS.€Rep.€No.€103„3,€at€22€(1993),€òòreprintedóó€òòinóó€1993€Ô_ÔU.S.C.C.A.N.Ô_Ô€3,Ð 6 †  Ð24.€€This€rather€amorphous€paragraph€admits€of€two€possibleÏconstructions.€€Our€dissenting€brother€opts€for€the€moreÏrestrictive€construction:€€that€Congress€wanted€to€afford€coverageÏonly€if€a€child's€disability€continues€from€an€early€age€untilÏafter€he€or€she€turns€eighteen.€€For€reasons€stated€in€thisÏopinion,€we€deem€it€far€more€likely€that€the€paragraph€is€properlyÏconstrued€to€reflect€Congress's€recognition€that€the€bond€betweenÏparent€and€child€endures€long€after€the€child€turns€eighteen,€andÏthat€the€Act€affords€coverage€whenever€an€adult€child€suffers€fromÏa€serious€health€condition€and€is€incapable€of€self„care€as€theÏresult€of€a€disability.ÿ.Courier New Regularÿ.Courier New Regular Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majority€misconstrues€my€position€as€wanting€ð ðto€affordÐ ° Ðcoverage€only€if€a€childððs€disability€continues€from€an€early€ageÏuntil€after€he€or€she€turns€eighteen.ðð€€While€certain€language€inÏthe€Senate€Report€could€lead€to€that€interpretation€(òòe.g.óó,€ð ðaÐ 2‚ Ðchildððs€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€she€reachesÏ18€years€of€ageðð),€a€more€reasonable€reading€is€simply€that€at€theÏtime€leave€is€sought,€the€child€is€disabled€in€the€ADA€sense,€òòseeóóÐ ´  Ðòòinfraóó,€whether€or€not€continuously€disabled. ÏÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔEven€though€we€do€not€grant€a€high€level€of€deference€to€anÐ ° ÐEEOC€interpretive€guidance€or€policy€manual€in€an€FMLA€context,€òòseeóóÐ †Ö Ðtext€òòinfraóó,€we€note€the€EEOC's€recognition€that€complicationsÐ \¬ Ðresulting€from€pregnancy€can€be€impairments.€€òòSeeóó€EEOC€ComplianceÐ 2‚ ÐManual€ðð€902.2(c)(3),€at€5308€(1999).€€In€taking€that€position,€theÏEEOC€specifically€cites€hypertension€brought€on€by€pregnancy€as€anÏexample€of€a€covered€impairment.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óóÿ.Courier New Regular 1Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔOther,€equally€valid,€combinations€of€factors€are€possible,Ð ° Ðdepending€on€the€circumstances€of€particular€cases. $Ñ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñ ZÝ ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€!“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€ADA€defines€disability€as,€among€other€things,€ð ðaÐ ° Ðphysical€or€mental€impairment€that€substantially€limits€one€or€moreÏof€the€major€life€activities€of€an€individual.ðð€€42€U.S.C.€ððÏ12012(2)(A).€€The€relevant€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€state:ÌÌà8  àThe€following€factors€should€be€considered€in€determiningÏwhether€an€individual€is€substantially€limited€in€a€majorÏlife€activity:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€€€The€nature€and€severity€of€the€impairment;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(ii)€The€duration€or€expected€duration€of€theÏimpairment;€andÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(iii)€The€permanent€or€long€term€impact,€or€theÏexpected€permanent€or€long€term€impact€of€or€resultingÏfrom€the€impairment.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌ29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€1630.2(j)(2)(ii),(iii).€ ËÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€taking€this€step,€we€acknowledge€that€it€might€proveÐ ° Ðdifficult€(or€at€least€complex)€for€the€appellant€to€show€that€herÏdaughter's€reproductive€activity€was€substantially€limited.€€òòCf.óóÐ \¬ ÐòòBragdonóó,€524€U.S.€at€639„42.€€We€likewise€acknowledge€thatÐ 2‚ Ðsurviving€summary€judgment€by€demonstrating€an€impairment€whichÏsubstantially€limits€the€major€life€activity€of€working€involves,Ïfor€purposes€of€the€ADA,€a€specialized€series€of€showings€anent€theÏindividual's€inability€to€perform€either€a€class€of€jobs€or€a€broadÏrange€of€jobs€in€various€classes.€€òòSeeóó€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630(j)(3);€òòseeóóÐ ` ° Ðòòalsoóóò ò€ó óòòÔ_ÔGelabertÔ_Ô„Ô_ÔLadenheimÔ_Ôóó€v.€òòAm.€Airlines,€Inc.óó,€252€F.3d€54,€59„61Ð 6 †  Ð(1st€Cir.€2001)€(performing€"individualized€inquiry"€by€which€aÏcourt€determines€whether€a€plaintiff€is€substantially€limited€inÏthe€activity€of€working);€òòQuintóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔA.E.Ô_Ô€Ô_ÔStaleyÔ_Ô€Mfg.€Co.óó,€172€F.3dÐ Æ  Ð1,€11„13€(1st€Cir.€1999)òòóó.€€The€EEOC€suggests€avoiding€thisÐ œì  Ðspecialized€inquiry€where€an€individual€is€substantially€limited€inÏanother€major€life€activity.€€òòSeeóó€29€C.F.R.€pt.€1630,€App.€ððÐ H˜  Ð1630.2(j).€€Although€the€case€at€bar€is€an€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€case,€there€is€noÏreason€not€to€follow€such€a€course,€and€prudence€dictates€that€weÏdo€so.ÿ.Courier New Regular SÝ ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€#“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majorityððs€holding€that€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidanceÐ ° Ðdeserves€no€deference,€while€the€Secretary€of€Laborððs€regulationsÏ(which€include€her€adoption€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations)€does€deserveÏdeference,€makes€little€sense€to€me.€€Although€I€understand€theÏmajorityððs€reasoning,€following€òòMeadóó,€that€interpretive€guidelinesÐ X Ðof€the€kind€at€issue€here€are€often€not€due€anything€but€òòÔ_ÔSkidmoreÔ_ÔóóÐ Þ. Ðdeference,€I€see€no€basis€for€distinguishing€in€this€case€betweenÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidance€and€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations.€€If€theÏSecretary€had€really€meant€to€exclude€the€former,€surely€she€wouldÏhave€so€indicated;€nothing€in€the€Secretaryððs€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€regulationsÏsuggests€such€a€bizarre€separation.€€Where€we€all€agree€to€defer€toÏthe€Secretaryððs€choice€of€definitions,€taken,€in€relevant€part€fromÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€promulgated€under€another€statute,€how€can€weÏchoose€to€defer€only€to€her€choice€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€and€notÏto€its€interpretive€guidance€issued€to€illuminate€thoseÏregulations?€€It€seems€to€me€that€neither€òòMeadóó€nor€òòChristensenóóÐ :Š  Ðspeak€to€this€precise€scenario.ÿ.Courier New Regular ˜Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€&“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€This€is€in€contrast€to€the€statuteððs€providing€leave€forÐ ° Ðspouses€to€take€care€of€their€seriously€ill€spouse€withoutÏlimitation€and€for€adult€children€to€take€care€of€their€seriouslyÏill€parent€also€without€limitation.€€Although€some€might€believeÏthe€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€adult€child€should€be€equal€or€similarÏto€oneððs€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€spouse€or€parent,€Congress€plainlyÏdid€not€see€matters€that€way.Ìà  àCongress€seemed€to€have€faced€something€of€a€dilemma€in€theÏcase€of€parental€leave€for€adult€children.€€The€statute€for€theÏfirst€time€òòforcedóó€qualifying€employers€to€grant€leave€to€theirÐ 6 †  Ðemployees€in€order€to€assist€family€members.€€Some€members€ofÏCongress€might€have€felt€that€employers€should€not€be€forced€toÏgrant€any€leave€at€all€for€care€of€adult€children€because€of€theÏadult€childððs€presumed€independence.€€And,€if€leave€were€to€beÏgranted,€it€might€be€believed€that€a€line€should€be€drawn€betweenÏthose€adult€children€qualifying€for€parental€care€and€the€moreÏusual€case€of€those€who€should€be€expected€to€look€elsewhere.€€TheÏconcept€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€appears€to€have€been€harnessed€as€a€way€toÏresolve€this€dilemma,€the€idea€being€that€an€adult€who€is€legallyÏdisabled€(thus€having€a€serious€impairment€that€continues€overÏtime)€belongs€to€a€more€dependent€category€justifying€continuingÏparental€care€to€the€employerððs€detriment,€whereas€an€adult€childÏwho€is€seriously€ill€but€is€not€deemed€disabled€does€not. …Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔNavarro's€husband€and€their€conjugal€partnership€joined€asÐ ° Ðparties€plaintiff.€€Their€claims€are€derivative€of€Navarro's€own,Ïso€for€simplicity's€sake€we€proceed€as€if€she€were€the€onlyÏappellant.ÿ.Courier New Regular d  Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€)“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Another€reason€why€I€respectfully€suggest€the€majorityÐ ° Ðopinion€is€ill„conceived€is€that€no€party€to€this€case,€to€myÏknowledge,€has€championed€the€argument€or€urged€the€legal€positionÏon€which€the€majority€opinion€rests.€ÿ.Courier New Regular ˜Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€+“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€This€is€in€contrast€to€the€statuteððs€providing€leave€forÐ ° Ðspouses€to€take€care€of€their€seriously€ill€spouse€withoutÏlimitation€and€for€adult€children€to€take€care€of€their€seriouslyÏill€parent€also€without€limitation.€€Although€some€might€believeÏthe€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€adult€child€should€be€equal€or€similarÏto€oneððs€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€spouse€or€parent,€Congress€plainlyÏdid€not€see€matters€that€way.Ìà  àCongress€seemed€to€have€faced€something€of€a€dilemma€in€theÏcase€of€parental€leave€for€adult€children.€€The€statute€for€theÏfirst€time€òòforcedóó€qualifying€employers€to€grant€leave€to€theirÐ 6 †  Ðemployees€in€order€to€assist€family€members.€€Some€members€ofÏCongress€might€have€felt€that€employers€should€not€be€forced€toÏgrant€any€leave€at€all€for€care€of€adult€children€because€of€theÏadult€childððs€presumed€independence.€€And,€if€leave€were€to€beÏgranted,€it€might€be€believed€that€a€line€should€be€drawn€betweenÏthose€adult€children€qualifying€for€parental€care€and€the€moreÏusual€case€of€those€who€should€be€expected€to€look€elsewhere.€€TheÏconcept€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€appears€to€have€been€harnessed€as€a€way€toÏresolve€this€dilemma,€the€idea€being€that€an€adult€who€is€legallyÏdisabled€(thus€having€a€serious€impairment€that€continues€overÏtime)€belongs€to€a€more€dependent€category€justifying€continuingÏparental€care€to€the€employerððs€detriment,€whereas€an€adult€childÏwho€is€seriously€ill€but€is€not€deemed€disabled€does€not.ÿ.Courier New Regular Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€-“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majority€misconstrues€my€position€as€wanting€ð ðto€affordÐ ° Ðcoverage€only€if€a€childððs€disability€continues€from€an€early€ageÏuntil€after€he€or€she€turns€eighteen.ðð€€While€certain€language€inÏthe€Senate€Report€could€lead€to€that€interpretation€(òòe.g.óó,€ð ðaÐ 2‚ Ðchildððs€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€she€reachesÏ18€years€of€ageðð),€a€more€reasonable€reading€is€simply€that€at€theÏtime€leave€is€sought,€the€child€is€disabled€in€the€ADA€sense,€òòseeóóÐ ´  Ðòòinfraóó,€whether€or€not€continuously€disabled.ÿ.Courier New Regular ZÝ ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€/“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€ADA€defines€disability€as,€among€other€things,€ð ðaÐ ° Ðphysical€or€mental€impairment€that€substantially€limits€one€or€moreÏof€the€major€life€activities€of€an€individual.ðð€€42€U.S.C.€ððÏ12012(2)(A).€€The€relevant€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€state:ÌÌà8  àThe€following€factors€should€be€considered€in€determiningÏwhether€an€individual€is€substantially€limited€in€a€majorÏlife€activity:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€€€The€nature€and€severity€of€the€impairment;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(ii)€The€duration€or€expected€duration€of€theÏimpairment;€andÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(iii)€The€permanent€or€long€term€impact,€or€theÏexpected€permanent€or€long€term€impact€of€or€resultingÏfrom€the€impairment.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌ29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€1630.2(j)(2)(ii),(iii).€ÿ.Courier New Regular SÝ ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€2“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majorityððs€holding€that€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidanceÐ ° Ðdeserves€no€deference,€while€the€Secretary€of€Laborððs€regulationsÏ(which€include€her€adoption€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations)€does€deserveÏdeference,€makes€little€sense€to€me.€€Although€I€understand€theÏmajorityððs€reasoning,€following€òòMeadóó,€that€interpretive€guidelinesÐ X Ðof€the€kind€at€issue€here€are€often€not€due€anything€but€òòÔ_ÔSkidmoreÔ_ÔóóÐ Þ. Ðdeference,€I€see€no€basis€for€distinguishing€in€this€case€betweenÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidance€and€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations.€€If€theÏSecretary€had€really€meant€to€exclude€the€former,€surely€she€wouldÏhave€so€indicated;€nothing€in€the€Secretaryððs€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€regulationsÏsuggests€such€a€bizarre€separation.€€Where€we€all€agree€to€defer€toÏthe€Secretaryððs€choice€of€definitions,€taken,€in€relevant€part€fromÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€promulgated€under€another€statute,€how€can€weÏchoose€to€defer€only€to€her€choice€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€and€notÏto€its€interpretive€guidance€issued€to€illuminate€thoseÏregulations?€€It€seems€to€me€that€neither€òòMeadóó€nor€òòChristensenóóÐ :Š  Ðspeak€to€this€precise€scenario.&Courier Regularÿ.Courier New Regular  Ý ƒÝ$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€4“WDXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Another€reason€why€I€respectfully€suggest€the€majorityÐ ° Ðopinion€is€ill„conceived€is€that€no€party€to€this€case,€to€myÏknowledge,€has€championed€the€argument€or€urged€the€legal€positionÏon€which€the€majority€opinion€rests.€ÿ.Courier New Regularÿ.Courier New Regular<4šÛ 9Z+‹.Courier New Regular ˜Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€This€is€in€contrast€to€the€statuteððs€providing€leave€forÐ ° Ðspouses€to€take€care€of€their€seriously€ill€spouse€withoutÏlimitation€and€for€adult€children€to€take€care€of€their€seriouslyÏill€parent€also€without€limitation.€€Although€some€might€believeÏthe€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€adult€child€should€be€equal€or€similarÏto€oneððs€duty€to€care€for€oneððs€spouse€or€parent,€Congress€plainlyÏdid€not€see€matters€that€way.Ìà  àCongress€seemed€to€have€faced€something€of€a€dilemma€in€theÏcase€of€parental€leave€for€adult€children.€€The€statute€for€theÏfirst€time€òòforcedóó€qualifying€employers€to€grant€leave€to€theirÐ 6 †  Ðemployees€in€order€to€assist€family€members.€€Some€members€ofÏCongress€might€have€felt€that€employers€should€not€be€forced€toÏgrant€any€leave€at€all€for€care€of€adult€children€because€of€theÏadult€childððs€presumed€independence.€€And,€if€leave€were€to€beÏgranted,€it€might€be€believed€that€a€line€should€be€drawn€betweenÏthose€adult€children€qualifying€for€parental€care€and€the€moreÏusual€case€of€those€who€should€be€expected€to€look€elsewhere.€€TheÏconcept€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€appears€to€have€been€harnessed€as€a€way€toÏresolve€this€dilemma,€the€idea€being€that€an€adult€who€is€legallyÏdisabled€(thus€having€a€serious€impairment€that€continues€overÏtime)€belongs€to€a€more€dependent€category€justifying€continuingÏparental€care€to€the€employerððs€detriment,€whereas€an€adult€childÏwho€is€seriously€ill€but€is€not€deemed€disabled€does€not. Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majority€misconstrues€my€position€as€wanting€ð ðto€affordÐ ° Ðcoverage€only€if€a€childððs€disability€continues€from€an€early€ageÏuntil€after€he€or€she€turns€eighteen.ðð€€While€certain€language€inÏthe€Senate€Report€could€lead€to€that€interpretation€(òòe.g.óó,€ð ðaÐ 2‚ Ðchildððs€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€she€reachesÏ18€years€of€ageðð),€a€more€reasonable€reading€is€simply€that€at€theÏtime€leave€is€sought,€the€child€is€disabled€in€the€ADA€sense,€òòseeóóÐ ´  Ðòòinfraóó,€whether€or€not€continuously€disabled. ZÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€ADA€defines€disability€as,€among€other€things,€ð ðaÐ ° Ðphysical€or€mental€impairment€that€substantially€limits€one€or€moreÏof€the€major€life€activities€of€an€individual.ðð€€42€U.S.C.€ððÏ12012(2)(A).€€The€relevant€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€state:ÌÌà8  àThe€following€factors€should€be€considered€in€determiningÏwhether€an€individual€is€substantially€limited€in€a€majorÏlife€activity:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(Ô_ÔiÔ_Ô)€€€The€nature€and€severity€of€the€impairment;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(ii)€The€duration€or€expected€duration€of€theÏimpairment;€andÐ Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(iii)€The€permanent€or€long€term€impact,€or€theÏexpected€permanent€or€long€term€impact€of€or€resultingÏfrom€the€impairment.€Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌ29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€1630.2(j)(2)(ii),(iii).€ SÝ ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€The€majorityððs€holding€that€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidanceÐ ° Ðdeserves€no€deference,€while€the€Secretary€of€Laborððs€regulationsÏ(which€include€her€adoption€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations)€does€deserveÏdeference,€makes€little€sense€to€me.€€Although€I€understand€theÏmajorityððs€reasoning,€following€òòMeadóó,€that€interpretive€guidelinesÐ X Ðof€the€kind€at€issue€here€are€often€not€due€anything€but€òòÔ_ÔSkidmoreÔ_ÔóóÐ Þ. Ðdeference,€I€see€no€basis€for€distinguishing€in€this€case€betweenÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€interpretive€guidance€and€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations.€€If€theÏSecretary€had€really€meant€to€exclude€the€former,€surely€she€wouldÏhave€so€indicated;€nothing€in€the€Secretaryððs€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€regulationsÏsuggests€such€a€bizarre€separation.€€Where€we€all€agree€to€defer€toÏthe€Secretaryððs€choice€of€definitions,€taken,€in€relevant€part€fromÏthe€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€promulgated€under€another€statute,€how€can€weÏchoose€to€defer€only€to€her€choice€of€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô€regulations€and€notÏto€its€interpretive€guidance€issued€to€illuminate€thoseÏregulations?€€It€seems€to€me€that€neither€òòMeadóó€nor€òòChristensenóóÐ :Š  Ðspeak€to€this€precise€scenario.  Ý ƒ~]$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€Dã~DXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Another€reason€why€I€respectfully€suggest€the€majorityÐ ° Ðopinion€is€ill„conceived€is€that€no€party€to€this€case,€to€myÏknowledge,€has€championed€the€argument€or€urged€the€legal€positionÏon€which€the€majority€opinion€rests.€(ÈhH  Z6Times New Roman RegularÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTRXà3Ø'Xà3Ø' Letter3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÑ ? ÑÙ*ƒ !Ùò òÓ  ÓÓ  ÓÔ‡t°T°XtXÔÔ‡‹°W°°t°TÔUnited€States€Court€of€AppealsÐ ° ÐÔ#†‹XWÖX°‹°WÅ#ÔÔ‡‹„dº„X‹XWÖÔFor€the€First€CircuitÔ#†‹XWÖX„‹„dºY#ÔÔ#†tXó'XX‹XWÖä#Ôó óÐ à ÐÓ¹ÓÌÌßA€') °°` dE<£ ` AßÐ ¤ ô ÐÌÌNo.€00„1856ÌÌà@€€ìàGLADYS€NAVARRO,€A/K/A€GLADYS€NAVARRO€Ô_ÔPOMARESÔ_Ô,€ET€AL.,ˆÌÌà@ˆˆìàPlaintiffs,€Appellants,ˆÌÌà@tt)ìàv.ˆÌÌà@xx!ìàÔ_ÔPFIZERÔ_Ô€CORPORATION,ˆÌÌà@<< ìàDefendant,€Appellee.ˆÌÌßA€') °°` dE<f` AßÐ g· ÐÌà@œ œ ìàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€UNITED€STATES€DISTRICT€COURTˆÌÌà@¨ ¨ ìàFOR€THE€DISTRICT€OF€PUERTO€RICOˆÌÌà@¼¼ìà[Hon.€Jaime€Ô_ÔPierasÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€òòSenior€U.S.€District€Judgeóó]ˆÐ ¤ô ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<O` AßÐ P  ÐÌà@„„'ìàBeforeˆÌÌÓ  Óà@@((ìà€Torruella,€òòCircuit€Judgeóó,Ð á1 ÐÌCampbell,€òòSenior€Circuit€Judgeóó,Ð Ý! ÐÌand€Selya,€òòCircuit€Judgeóó.Ð 9!‰# ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<ä"` AßÐ å"5% ÐÌÓ  ÓÓ  Óà  àòòManuel€Ô_ÔPorroÔ_Ô„Ô_ÔVizcarraÔ_Ôóó€for€appellants.Ð Ê#' Ðà  àòòPedro€J.€Ô_ÔManzanoÔ_Ô„Ô_ÔYatesÔ_Ôóó,€with€whom€òòFiddler€Gonzalez€&Ð  $ð( ÐRodriguez,€Ô_ÔLLPÔ_Ôóó€was€on€brief,€for€appellee.Ð v%Æ ) ÐÌÌÔ*‹ƒ'ddd Xdd Xdd X°(#°(#‹ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ+  ÔÐ  ø'H#, ‹‹ÐÓhÓññÐ SI\(¬#- @ â@37122„„‰@ â@‰‹‹SÐññññÐ 0&\(¬#- „„‹‹0ÐññÌññAugust€20ññññññ.ññññññ,ññññ€2001ññÌÐ SID*X%0" @ â@37122 @ â@ ‹‹SÐÐ(\(¬#1  (ÐÓ  ÓÙ* !ÙÌÌÓ  ÓÌÐ  -à(4? ÐÑ  ÑÓÓÑ€ ÑÓ*°,X°` ¨ ƒX°œX*ÓÑ€îÑÑ8€1Žß1X XdÈXXdÖ8Ñà ` àò òSELYA,€òòCircuit€Judgeóó.ó ó€€Faced€with€the€arduous€demands€ofÐ ° Ðlegislating€for€an€increasingly€complex€society,€Congress€oftenÏleaves€interstitial€details€to€selected€administrative€agencies.€ÏCongress€followed€this€praxis€when€it€enacted€the€Family€andÏMedical€Leave€Act€of€1993€(Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô),€29€U.S.C.€ðððð€2601„2654,Ïdelegating€implementation€to€the€Secretary€of€Labor€(theÏSecretary).€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€ðð€2654.Ð Ô$  Ðà ` àResponding€to€this€directive,€the€Secretary€promulgatedÏextensive€regulations.€€òòSeeóó€29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðððð€825.100„825.800.€€At€oneÐ ,|  Ðpoint€in€the€process,€however,€she€caught€the€nearest€way;€in€lieuÏof€tailoring€the€definition€of€terms€such€as€"impairment,"€"majorÏlife€activities,"€and€"substantially€limits"€to€suit€the€peculiarÏneeds€of€the€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô,€the€Secretary€simply€co„opted€existingÏdefinitions€designed€by€a€different€agency€ð"ð€the€Equal€EmploymentÏOpportunity€Commission€(Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô)€ð"ð€for€use€in€connection€with€aÏdifferent€statute€ð"ð€the€Americans€with€Disabilities€Act€(ADA),€42ÏU.S.C.€ðððð€12101„12213.€€òòSeeóó€29€Ô_ÔC.F.R.Ô_Ô€ðð€825.113(c)(2).€€SomeÐ ŒÜ  Ðperplexing€difficulties€lurk€in€the€shadows€cast€by€this€cross„¼reference,€including€questions€about€the€extent€to€which€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ô'sÏinformal€interpretations€of€the€borrowed€definitions€are€binding€inÏthe€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€context.Ìà ` àThis€appeal€brings€those€difficulties€into€sharp€focus.€ÏIt€requires€us€to€explore€òòterraóó€òòincognitaóó€ð"ð€to€date,€no€other€courtÐ ”)ä$, Ðof€appeals€has€grappled€with€the€meaning€of€the€term€"disability"Ð @+&. ÐÔ_Ôunder€the€FMLA€ð"ð€and€set€the€parameters€of€a€mother's€right€to€takeÏan€unpaid€leave€of€absence€in€order€to€care€for€her€seriously€illÏadult€child.€€The€able€district€judge,€considering€himself€bound€toÏdefer€unhesitatingly€to€an€EEOC€interpretive€guidance€devised€withÏthe€ADA€in€mind,€found€that€the€mother€had€no€such€entitlement€inÏthe€circumstances€of€this€case€and,€accordingly,€granted€theÏemployer's€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€òòNavarro€Pomaresóó€v.€òòPfizerÐ ¸  ÐCorp.óó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€208,€214€(D.P.R.€2000).€€We€think€that€theÐ d´  Ðcourt€below€acquiesced€too€readily€in€this€interpretive€guidance.€ÏFor€FMLA€purposes,€the€guidance€neither€merits€òòChevronóó€deference,Ð ¼  Ðòòseeóó€òòChevron€U.S.A.,€Inc.óó€v.€òòNatural€Res.€Def.€Council,€Inc.óó,€467Ð h¸ ÐU.S.€837,€842„43€(1984),€nor€possesses€persuasive€force.€€TheÏobjectives€and€structure€of€the€FMLA,€and€the€scope€of€the€reliefÏthat€it€provides,€require€us€to€give€effect€instead€to€theÏregulation€as€written.€€Doing€so,€we€reverse€and€remand€for€furtherÏproceedings.Ìò òI.€€BACKGROUNDÐ pÀ  Ðó óà ` àBecause€the€district€court€determined€this€case€onÐ 8!ˆ" Ðsummary€judgmentòòóó,€we€recount€the€essential€facts€in€the€light€mostÐ ä"4$ Ðfavorable€to€the€summary€judgment€loser.€€òòSuarezóó€v.€òòPueblo€Int'l,Ð $à& ÐInc.óó,€229€F.3d€49,€53€(1st€Cir.€2000).Ð <&Œ!( Ðà ` àPlaintiff„appellant€Gladys€Navarro€Pomares€(Navarro)Ïbegan€working€for€Pfizer€Corporation€as€a€secretary€in€1994.€€OnÏOctober€14,€1997,€she€requested€an€unpaid€leave€of€absence€untilÐ @+&. ÐJanuary€5,€1998;€her€plan€was€to€travel€to€Germany€so€that€sheÏmight€minister€to€her€adult€daughter€(Gladys€Hernandez)€and€her€twoÏgrandchildren.€€At€the€time€she€made€this€request,€the€appellantÏprovided€Pfizer€with€a€note€from€her€daughter's€attending€physicianÏwhich€reported€that€"Mrs.€Hernandez€is€pregnant€in€36th€week.€ÏBecause€of€high€blood€pressure€bed€rest€is€recommended€to€carry€theÏbaby€to€full€term.€€So€she€cannot€watch€her€other€children."Ìà ` àPfizer€denied€the€appellant's€request.€€She€implored€theÏcompany€to€reconsider.€€On€October€25,€having€received€no€furtherÏresponse€from€her€employer,€the€appellant€departed€for€Germany.€€OnÏNovember€6,€she€received€correspondence€from€Pfizer€directing€herÏto€return€to€work€forthwith.€€The€appellant€remained€at€herÏdaughter's€bedside€and€Pfizer€terminated€her€employment€within€theÏweek.Ìà ` àEleven€months€later,€the€appellant€sued.׃%×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€She€assertedÐ h Ðthat€Pfizer€had€denied€her€leave€to€which€she€was€entitled€underÏthe€FMLA€and€then€had€added€insult€to€injury€by€cashiering€her€forÏattempting€to€exercise€her€rights.€€When,€thereafter,€Pfizer€movedÏfor€òòbrevisóó€disposition,€the€district€court€determined€that€theÐ È"$ Ðappellant€was€not€entitled€to€FMLA€leave€and€granted€the€motion.€Ð t$Ä& ÐòòNavarro€Pomaresóó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€214.€Ð  &p!( Ðà ` àOn€appeal,€we€consider€the€appellant's€asseveration€thatÏshe€raised€a€trialworthy€issue€anent€her€entitlement€to€FMLA€leave.€ÏBecause€she€has€not€renewed€her€retaliation€charge,€we€deem€thatÏclaim€abandoned.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòZanninoóó,€895€F.2d€1,€17€(1stÐ ´  ÐCir.€1990).Ìò òII.€€STANDARD€OF€REVIEWó óÐ  \  Ðà ` àWe€review€orders€granting€or€denying€summary€judgment€deÏnovo.€€òòSuarezóó,òòóó€229€F.3d€at€53.€€The€decisional€path€is€well„Ð €Ð  Ðtrodden,€so€we€borrow€an€earlier€description€of€how€the€operativeÏrule,€Federal€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€56,€functions:ÌÓÓà8 ` àOnce€a€properly€documented€motion€has€engagedÏthe€gears€of€Rule€56,€the€party€to€whom€theÏmotion€is€directed€can€shut€down€the€machineryÏonly€by€showing€that€a€trialworthy€issueÏexists.€€As€to€issues€on€which€the€summaryÏjudgment€target€bears€the€ultimate€burden€ofÏproof,€she€cannot€rely€on€an€absence€ofÏcompetent€evidence,€but€must€affirmativelyÏpoint€to€specific€facts€that€demonstrate€theÏexistence€of€an€authentic€dispute.€€Not€everyÏfactual€dispute€is€sufficient€to€thwartÏsummary€judgment;€the€contested€fact€must€beÏ"material"€and€the€dispute€over€it€must€beÏ"genuine."€€In€this€regard,€"material"€meansÏthat€a€contested€fact€has€the€potential€toÏchange€the€outcome€of€the€suit€under€theÏgoverning€law€if€the€dispute€over€it€isÏresolved€favorably€to€the€nonmovant.€€By€likeÏtoken,€"genuine"€means€that€the€evidence€aboutÏthe€fact€is€such€that€a€reasonable€jury€couldÏresolve€the€point€in€favor€of€the€nonmovingÏparty.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÓÓòòMcCarthyóó€v.€òòNorthwest€Airlines,€Inc.óó,€56€F.3d€313,€315€(1st€Cir.Ð ¾($+ Ðâ â1995)€(citations€and€some€internal€punctuation€omitted).Ð j*º%- Ðà ` àApplying€these€tenets€in€a€given€case€requires€the€courtÏâ âto€scrutinize€the€summary€judgment€record€"in€the€light€mostÏhospitable€to€the€party€opposing€summary€judgment,€indulging€allÏreasonable€inferences€in€that€party's€favor."€€òòGriggs„Ryanóó€v.Ð ´  ÐòòSmithóó,€904€F.2d€112,€115€(1st€Cir.€1990).€€If€no€genuine€issue€ofÐ ` ° Ðmaterial€fact€emerges,€then€the€case€may€be€ripe€for€summaryÏadjudication.Ìò òIII.€€THE€FMLA:€€AN€OVERVIEWó óÐ d´  Ðà ` àThe€FMLA€applies€to€private€sector€concerns€that€employÏfifty€or€more€persons.€€29€U.S.C.€òòóóðð€2611(4).€€Congress€enacted€itÐ Ø( Ðas€a€means€of€alleviating€the€tension€that€so€often€exists€betweenÏthe€demands€of€earning€a€living€and€the€obligations€of€family€life.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòHodgensóó€v.€òòGen.€Dynamics€Corp.óó,€144€F.3d€151,€159€(1st€Cir.Ð Ü, Ð1998);€òòPriceóó€v.€òòCity€of€Fort€Wayneóó,€117€F.3d€1022,€1024€(7th€Cir.Ð ˆØ Ð1997).€€To€achieve€this€objective,€the€FMLA€seeks€to€balanceÏauthentic€family€needs€and€legitimate€employer€interests.€€òòSeeóó€29Ð à0 ÐU.S.C.€ðð€2601(b)(1),€(3).€€This€accommodation€entails€a€set€ofÏentitlements€for€employees€and€a€matched€set€of€rules€forÏemployers.Ìà ` àAn€employee€becomes€eligible€for€FMLA€leave€if€he€or€sheÏhas€been€employed€by€a€covered€employer€for€no€less€than€a€year€andÏhas€worked€at€least€1250€hours€during€the€preceding€twelve€months.€ÏòòId.óó€ðð€2611(2)(A).€€Once€eligible,€an€employee€may€take€reasonableÐ ”)ä$, Ðperiods€of€unpaid€leave€for€medical€reasons,€for€childbirth€orÐ @+&. Ðadoption,€or€for€the€care€of€a€spouse,€parent,€or€child€who€suffersÏfrom€a€serious€health€condition.€€òòId.óó€ðð€2601(b)(2).€€Leave€periodsÐ \¬ Ðare€circumscribed:€€an€eligible€employee€may€take€a€maximum€ofÏtwelve€workweeks€of€FMLA€leave€in€any€twelve„month€span.€€òòId.óó€ððÐ ´  Ð2612(a)(1).€€Following€such€a€leave,€an€employee€is€entitled€toÏreclaim€his€or€her€former€job€(or€some€other€position€withÏequivalent€pay,€benefits,€and€conditions€of€employment).€€òòId.óó€ððÐ ¸  Ð2614(a)(1).Ìà ` àMinistering€to€sick€childrenò òó ó€falls€within€a€section€ofÐ `  Ðthe€FMLA€that€permits€a€period€of€leave€"[i]n€order€to€care€for€theÏ.€.€.€son€[or]€daughter€of€the€employee,€if€such€.€.€.€son€[or]Ïdaughter€.€.€.€has€a€serious€health€condition."€€òòId.óó€ððÐ d Ð2612(a)(1)(C).€€In€providing€this€protection,€the€FMLAÏdifferentiates€between€children€under€eighteen€years€of€age€andÏchildren€eighteen€years€of€age€and€older,€defining€a€son€orÏdaughter€asÌÓÓà8 ` àa€biological,€adopted,€or€foster€child,€aÏstepchild,€a€legal€ward,€or€a€child€of€aÏperson€standing€in€loco€parentis,€who€is€ð"ðÐ ` x` x Ðà8 ` àà8¨ ` x` xà(A)€under€18€years€of€age;€orÐ ¨ 0¨ 0 Ðà8 ` àà8¨ ` x` xà(B)€18€years€of€age€or€older€andÏincapable€of€self„care€becauseÏof€a€mental€or€physicalÏdisability.Ð ¨ 0¨ 0 ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€2611(12).ñúñ׃×ñúññúñ׃×ñúñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ö&F") Їà ` àThe€rules€for€employers€are€straightforward.€€In€writingÏthe€FMLA,€Congress€took€pains€to€proscribe€employers€fromÏ"interfer[ing]€with,€restrain[ing],€or€deny[ing]€the€exercise€of€orÏthe€attempt€to€exercise,€any€right€provided"€by€the€law.€€òòId.óó€ððÐ ´  Ð2615(a)(1).€€To€this€end,€an€employer€may€not€discharge€orÏotherwise€unfairly€discriminate€against€an€individual€for€opposingÏpractices€made€illegal€by€the€FMLA.€€òòId.óó€ðð€2615(a)(2).€€An€employerÐ ¸  Ðwho€flouts€these€rules€can€be€held€liable€for€compensatory€damagesÏand,€unless€the€violation€occurred€in€good€faith,€additionalÏliquidated€damages.€€òòId.óó€ðð€2617(a)(1)(A).€€Appropriate€equitableÐ ¼  Ðrelief,€such€as€reinstatement,€also€may€be€available.€€òòId.óó€ððÐ h¸ Ð2617(a)(1)(B).ÌÐ À Ðò òIV.€€FRAMING€THE€THRESHOLD€LEGAL€ISSUEòòó óóóÐ ° Ðà ` àIn€this€case,€it€is€undisputed€that€Pfizer€was€a€coveredÏemployer,€that€the€appellant€was€an€eligible€employee,€thatÏHernandez€was€over€eighteen€years€of€age,€and€that€ò òó ó29€U.S.C.€ððÐ Ð  Ð2611(12)(B)€governed€the€appellant's€claim€of€entitlement€to€theÏrequested€leave.€€Hence,€the€appellant's€case€depends€upon€whetherÏher€daughter€(1)€had€a€serious€health€condition,€(2)€was€incapableÏof€self„care,€and€(3)€was€so€incapacitated€because€of€a€mental€orÏphysical€disability.€€For€summary€judgment€purposes,€the€first€twoÏsteps€in€this€pavane€have€been€satisfactorily€executed,€but€theÏthird€is€problematic.Ìà ` àWe€start€with€the€existence€òòvelóó€òònonóó€of€a€"serious€healthÐ 0€ Ðcondition."ò òó ó€€ò òó óThis€phrase€can€denote€"an€illness,€injury,Ð Ü, Ðimpairment,€or€physical€or€mental€condition€that€involves€.€.€.Ïcontinuing€treatment€by€a€health€care€provider."€€òòId.óó€ðð€2611(11).€Ð 4„ ÐThe€regulations€promulgated€for€the€FMLA€by€the€Secretary€supplyÏfurther€insight:€€one€way€to€demonstrate€a€serious€health€conditionÏbased€on€continuing€treatment€by€a€health€care€professional€is€toÏshow€that€the€underlying€condition€involves€a€period€of€incapacityÏdue€to€pregnancy€or€for€prenatal€care.€€òòSeeóó€29€C.F.R.€ððÐ $à& Ð825.114(a)(2)(ii).Ìà ` àThe€appellant's€evidence€suffices€to€create€a€genuineÏissue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€her€adult€daughter€was€in€theÏthroes€of€a€serious€health€condition.€€The€doctor's€certification,Ð @+&. Ðwhich€plainly€indicates€that€Hernandez's€incapacity€was€tied€to€herÏpregnancy,€serves€this€purpose.€€It€follows€that€the€appellant€hasÏmade€a€showing€adequate€to€withstand€summary€judgment€on€the€firstÏof€the€three€required€inquiries.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòPendarvisóó€v.€òòXeroxÐ ´  ÐCorp.óó,€3€F.€Supp.€2d€53,€55„56€(D.D.C.€1998)€(denying€summaryÐ ` ° Ðjudgment€to€employer€in€an€FMLA€case€on€the€ground€that€anyÏpregnancy„related€period€of€incapacity,€including€morning€sickness,Ïconstitutes€a€serious€health€condition).Ìà ` àWe€turn€next€to€the€question€of€whether€Hernandez€wasÏable€to€care€for€herself.€€An€individual€is€incapable€of€self„careÏif€she€"requires€active€assistance€or€supervision€to€provide€dailyÏself„care€in€three€or€more€of€the€'activities€of€daily€living'Ï(ADLs)€or€'instrumental€activities€of€daily€living'€(IADLs)."€€29ÏC.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(1).€€The€same€regulation€defines€ADLs€toÏencompass€"adaptive€activities€such€as€caring€appropriately€forÏone's€grooming€and€hygiene,€bathing,€dressing€and€eating."€€òòId.óó€Ð Ä ÐIADLs€"include€cooking,€cleaning,€shopping,€taking€publicÏtransportation,€paying€bills,€maintaining€a€residence,€usingÏtelephones€and€directories,€using€a€post€office,€etc."€€òòId.óóÐ È"$ Ðà ` àConsidering€the€broad€sweep€of€these€definitions,€theÏdoctor's€note€appears€sufficient€to€create€a€genuine€issue€ofÏmaterial€fact€as€to€Hernandez's€capability€to€care€for€herself.€ÏAfter€all,€her€physician€confined€her€to€bed€for€the€remainder€ofÏher€pregnancy.€€At€a€bare€minimum,€such€a€prescription€would€appearÐ $+t&. Ðto€signal€the€patient's€need€for€active€assistance€or€supervisionÏin€the€performance€of€everyday€activities€such€as€cooking,Ïcleaning,€shopping,€and€doing€housework.€€òòCf.óó€òòBryantóó€v.€òòDelbarÐ X ÐProds.,€Inc.óó,€18€F.€Supp.€2d€799,€803€(M.D.€Tenn.€1998)€("[I]t€isÐ ´  Ðonly€logical€to€conclude€that€[plaintiff's€son]€could€not€cook,Ïclean,€shop€or€take€public€transportation€.€.€.€while€he€was€in€theÏhospital.").€€It€follows€that€the€appellant€has€made€a€showingÏadequate€to€withstand€summary€judgment€on€the€second€of€the€threeÏrequired€inquiries.Ìà ` àThe€district€court€appropriately€analyzed€the€case€toÏthis€juncture.€€It€then€pondered€the€third€inquiry€and€ruled€thatÏthe€appellant€had€alleged€no€facts€sufficient€to€support€a€reasonedÏconclusion€that€her€daughter's€impairment€qualified€as€aÏ"disability"€(and,€therefore,€that€the€appellant€had€failed€toÏraise€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€regarding€her€eligibilityÏfor€FMLA€leave).€€òòNavarro€Pomaresóó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€214.€€This€isÐ Ä Ðthe€nub€of€the€case,€and€it€presents€a€question€of€first€impressionÏat€the€appellate€level.€€We€approach€this€question€ð"ð€the€meaning€ofÏthe€term€"disability"€under€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2611(12)€ð"ð€mindful€that€theÏcrucial€moment€for€determining€if€a€particular€condition€qualifiesÏas€a€disability€for€FMLA€purposes€is€the€time€that€leave€isÏrequested€or€taken.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòBryantóó,€18€F.€Supp.€2d€at€804.ò òó óÐ Ì'#* ÐÌÐ $+t&. Ðò òV.€€RESOLVING€THE€THRESHOLD€LEGAL€ISSUEÐ ° Ðà ` àó óCongress€left€the€task€of€defining€"disability"€to€theÐ xÈ ÐSecretary,€òòseeóó€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2654,€who€reasonably€concluded€that€aÐ $t Ðdisability€is€an€"impairment€that€substantially€limits€one€or€moreÏof€the€major€life€activities€of€an€individual."€€29€C.F.R.€ððÏ825.113(c)(2).€€In€so€doing,€she€abjured€any€independent€effort€toÏdefine€the€terms€"impairment,"€"major€life€activities,"€andÏ"substantially€limits,"€instead€referring€the€reader,€withoutÏexplanation,€to€regulations€issued€by€the€EEOC€pursuant€to€the€ADA.€ÏòòSeeóó€29€C.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(2).€€Given€the€provenance€of€theseÐ Ø( Ðborrowed€definitions,€we€think€it€is€useful€to€proceed€by€askingÏthe€same€three€questions€as€in€an€ADA€inquiry:€€(1)€Is€there€aÏphysical€impairment?€€(2)€What,€if€any,€major€life€activity€isÏimplicated?€€(3)€Does€the€impairment€substantially€affect€theÏidentified€major€life€activity?€òòóó€òòBragdonóó€v.€òòAbbottóó,€524€U.S.€624,Ð 4„ Ð631€(1998).Ìà@hh#ìàò òA.€€òòImpairmentóó.ó óˆÐ ŒÜ  Ðà ` àThe€EEOC's€regulations€state€that€an€impairment€can€be:ÌÓÓà8 ` àAny€physiological€disorder,€or€condition,Ïcosmetic€disfigurement,€or€anatomical€lossÏaffecting€one€or€more€of€the€following€bodyÏsystems:€€neurological,€musculoskeletal,Ïspecial€sense€organs,€respiratory€(includingÏspeech€organs),€cardiovascular,€reproductive,Ïdigestive,€genito„urinary,€hemic€andÏlymphatic,€skin,€and€endocrine.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÓÓ29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(h)(1).€€High€blood€pressure€is€such€anÏimpairment.€€òòSeeóó€òòMurphyóó€v.€òòUnited€Parcel€Servs.,€Inc.óó,€527€U.S.Ð 2,‚'/ Ð516,€523„24€(1999).€€Because€the€source€of€an€impairment€isÏirrelevant€to€a€determination€of€whether€that€impairmentÏconstitutes€a€disability,€òòcf.óó€òòCookóó€v.€òòR.I.€Dep't€of€MHRHóó,€10€F.3dÐ X Ð17,€24€(1st€Cir.€1993)€(stating€that€the€Rehabilitation€Act€ð"ð€aÏprecursor€of€the€ADA€ð"ð€contains€no€language€suggesting€that€itsÏprophylaxis€is€linked€to€how€an€individual€became€impaired),€itÏmakes€no€difference€that€the€appellant's€daughter's€high€bloodÏpressure€was€induced€by€her€gravidity.Ìà ` àEven€were€the€source€of€the€impairment€relevant,€theÏresult€would€be€the€same.€€While€pregnancy€itself€may€not€be€anÏimpairment,€the€decided€ADA€cases€tend€to€classify€complicationsÏresulting€from€pregnancy€as€impairments.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòGabrielóó€v.Ð d ÐòòCity€of€Chicagoóó,€9€F.€Supp.€2d€974,€981„82€(N.D.€Ill.€1998);Ð À ÐòòHernandezóó€v.€òòCity€of€Hartfordóó,€959€F.€Supp.€125,€130€(D.€Conn.Ð l¼ Ð1997);€òòCerratoóó€v.€òòDurhamóó,€941€F.€Supp.€388,€393€(S.D.N.Y.€1996).€Ð h ÐòòButóó€òòseeóó€òòTsetseranosóó€v.€òòTech€Prototype,€Inc.óó,€893€F.€Supp.€109,€119Ð Ä Ð(D.N.H.€1995)€(finding€that€neither€pregnancy€nor€pregnancy„relatedÏconditions€are€impairments€under€the€ADA).€€We€agree€with€theÏâ âmajority€view.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РÈ"$ Ðà ` àThese€cases€indicate€to€us€that€there€is€at€least€aÏâ âgenuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€the€appellant'sÏdaughter's€high€blood€pressure€constitutes€an€impairment€under€theÏADA.€€We€discern€no€reason€why€we€should€not€similarly€consider€itÏa€possible€impairment€for€FMLA€purposes.€€Consequently,€theÏappellant€has€made€a€sufficient€showing,€at€the€summary€judgmentÏstage,€on€the€impairment€prong.Ìà@LLìàò òB.€€òòMajor€Life€Activityóó.ó óˆÐ d´  Ðà ` àWe€next€must€identify€the€impacted€major€life€activity.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòBragdonóó,€524€U.S.€at€631.€€The€appellant€has€made€a€prima€facieÐ Ø( Ðshowing€that€her€daughter€was€substantially€limited€in€at€leastÏthree€such€pursuits:€€working,€caring€for€herself,€andÏreproduction.€€For€ADA€purposes,€the€EEOC€specifically€acknowledgesÏthat€both€working€and€caring€for€oneself€are€major€life€activities,Ïòòseeóó€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(i),€and€the€Supreme€Court€has€held€thatÐ 4„ Ðreproduction€so€qualifies,€òòseeóó€òòBragdonóó,€524€U.S.€at€637„39.€€We€seeÐ à0 Ðno€reason€why€this€taxonomy€should€not€hold€true€under€the€FMLA€asÏwell.€€As€a€taxonomic€matter,€then,€the€appellant€has€made€aÏsufficient€showing,€for€summary€judgment€purposes,€on€the€"majorÏlife€activity"€prong.Ìà@˜ ˜ ìàò òC.€€òòSubstantially€Limitingóó.ó óˆÐ <&Œ!( Ðà ` àWe€now€reach€the€crux€of€the€parties'€dispute:€€whetherÏthe€specified€impairment€substantially€limits€the€identified€majorÏlife€activity.€€òòSeeóó€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(g)(1).€€We€put€the€majorÐ \+¬&. Ðlife€activities€of€reproduction€and€working€to€one€side׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€focusÐ ° Ðon€what€we€perceive€to€be€the€appellant's€strongest€case:€€herÏemphasis€on€the€major€life€activity€of€caring€for€oneself.Ìà ` àAccording€to€the€regulations,€"substantially€limits"Ïmeans€that€an€individual€is:ÌÓÓà8 ` à(i)€Unable€to€perform€a€major€life€activityÏthat€the€average€person€in€the€generalÏpopulation€can€perform;€orÐ ` x` x Ðà8 ` à(ii)€Significantly€restricted€as€to€theÏcondition,€manner€or€duration€under€which€anÏindividual€can€perform€a€particular€major€lifeÏactivity€as€compared€to€the€condition,€manner,Ïor€duration€under€which€the€average€person€inÏthe€general€population€can€perform€that€sameÏmajor€life€activity.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÓÓòòId.óó€ðð€1630.2(j)(1).€€For€ADA€purposes,€the€factors€to€be€evaluatedÐ >Ž Ðin€assessing€whether€an€individual€is€substantially€limited€in€aÏmajor€life€activity€include€(1)€the€nature€and€severity€of€theÐ –æ Ðimpairment,€(2)€the€duration€or€expected€duration€of€theÏimpairment,€and€(3)€the€permanent€or€long„term€impact,€or€theÏexpected€permanent€or€long„term€impact,€of€or€resulting€from€theÏimpairment.€€òòId.óó€ðð€1630.2(j)(2).׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ´  Ðà ` àThe€appellant's€position€is€that€a€factfinder,€drawingÏreasonable€inferences€in€her€favor€from€the€doctor's€note,€couldÏconclude,€consistent€with€the€borrowed€material,€that€Hernandez'sÏhigh€blood€pressure€constituted€an€impairment€that€substantiallyÏlimited€her€in€major€life€activities€(including€the€ability€to€careÏfor€herself).€€For€summary€judgment€purposes,€the€employer€does€notÏcontest€the€facts€that€undergird€this€claim,€but,€rather,€positsÏthat€so€fleeting€an€impairment€ð"ð€one€that€may€last€no€more€than€aÏmatter€of€weeks€ð"ð€cannot€substantially€limit€a€major€life€activityÏ(and,€therefore,€cannot€constitute€a€covered€disability).€ÏAccepting€this€reasoning,€the€district€court€ruled€that€theÏappellant's€daughter's€condition€was€"a€temporary,€non„chronicÏimpairment€[]€of€short€duration"€and€that,€therefore,€it€did€notÏamount€to€a€disability.€€òòNavarro€Pomaresóó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€214.€Ð !l" ÐThough€plausible€at€first€blush,€this€ruling€cannot€survive€closeÏâ âscrutiny.òòóóÐ t$Ä& Ðà ` àIn€holding€that€a€"temporary,€non„chronic€impairment"€didÏâ ânot€constitute€a€disability,€the€lower€court€relied€entirely€on€anÏEEOC€interpretive€guidance,€29€C.F.R.€Pt.€1630,€App€ðð€1630(h),€atÏ396,€thereby€implicitly€if€not€explicitly€granting€òòChevronóóÐ ´  Ðdeference€to€the€EEOC's€interpretation€of€its€own€rules.€€This€wasÏerror:€€although€òòChevronóó€deference€to€an€agency's€interpretiveÐ  \  Ðguidance€is€generally€appropriate€when€a€regulation€is€ambiguousÏand€the€agency's€resolution€of€the€ambiguity€is€a€permissibleÏconstruction€of€the€regulation,€òòChristensenóó€v.€òòHarris€Countyóó,€529Ð `  ÐU.S.€576,€587€(2000),€the€Supreme€Court€recently€has€clarified€thatÏnot€òòallóó€agency€interpretations€merit€òòChevronóó€deference.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnitedÐ h¸ ÐStatesóó€v.€òòMead€Corp.óó,€121€S.€Ct.€2164,€2171€(2001).€€Pertinently,Ð d Ðthe€òòMeadóó€Court€warned€that€"where€statutory€circumstances€indicateÐ À Ðno€intent€to€delegate€general€authority€to€make€rules€with€force€ofÏlaw,€or€where€such€authority€was€not€invoked,"€a€court€must€reviewÏagency€interpretations€under€a€less€tolerant€standard.€€òòId.óó€at€2177Ð Ä Ð(directing,€in€such€circumstances,€resort€to€the€rule€of€òòSkidmoreóóÐ pÀ  Ðv.€òòSwift€&€Co.óó,€323€U.S.€134€(1944)).€€In€the€last€analysis,€then,Ð !l" Ðsuch€an€agency€interpretation€is€entitled€to€respect€only€to€theÏextent€that€the€interpretation€has€the€power€to€persuade.€€òòMayburgóóÐ t$Ä& Ðv.€òòSec'y€of€HHSóó,€740€F.2d€100,€106€(1st.€Cir.€1984)€("[U]nderÐ  &p!( ÐòòSkidmoreóó€the€agency€ultimately€must€depend€upon€the€òòpersuasiveÐ Ì'#* Ðâ âpoweróó€of€its€argument.€€The€simple€fact€that€the€agency€òòhasóó€aÐ x)È$, Ðposition,€in€and€of€itself,€is€of€only€marginal€significance.")Ï(Breyer,€J.).€Ìâ âà ` àThis€is€significant€here€because€an€EEOC€interpretiveÏguidance€issued€pursuant€to€the€ADA€simply€is€not€entitled€toÏòòChevronóó€deference€when€applied€in€the€FMLA€context.€€The€EEOC€neverÐ ` ° Ðhad€any€authority€to€promulgate€regulations€pursuant€to€the€FMLA.€ÏTo€the€contrary,€Congress€explicitly€delegated€to€the€Secretary€ofÏLabor€the€òòsoleóó€authority€to€promulgate€such€regulations.€€Even€ifÐ d´  Ðthe€Secretary€adopts€certain€EEOC€rules€as€her€own€(as€happenedÏhere),€she€does€not€automatically€adopt€the€EEOC's€informalÏinterpretations€of€those€rules.€€Moreover,€the€EEOC€itself€has€beenÏgranted€no€rulemaking€power€under€the€FMLA,€and€therefore€itsÏinterpretive€guidance€is€certainly€not€entitled€to€deference.€ÏIndeed,€it€borders€on€the€Kafkaesque€to€suggest€that€the€EEOC,Ïacting€some€three€years€before€Congress€passed€the€FMLA,€hadÏinvoked€the€authority€delegated€to€the€Secretary€of€Labor€andÏwritten€interpretations€to€govern€an€as„yet„unenacted€statute.€ÏAccordingly,€we€decline€to€grant€òòChevronóó€deference€to€the€EEOC'sÐ !l" Ðinterpretive€guidance€and€instead€apply€the€òòSkidmoreóó€standard.Ð È"$ Ðà ` àDespite€the€concerns€of€our€dissenting€brother,€thisÏseems€to€us€a€bedrock€principle€of€administrative€law.€€After€all,Ïa€court€cannot€blindly€defer€to€the€interpretations€of€anÏadministrative€agency€simply€because€that€agency€has€expertise€inÏa€field€that€bears€some€relation€to€the€statute€at€issue.€€ToÐ $+t&. Ðwarrant€òòChevronóó€deference,€Congress€must€actually€delegateÐ ° Ðauthority€to€that€agency,€and€the€agency€must€invoke€thatÏauthority.Ìà ` àWhere,€as€here,€an€agency's€pronouncement€(in€thisÏinstance,€the€EEOC's€interpretive€guidance)€fails€to€meet€theseÏcriteria,€an€inquiring€court€must€scrutinize€that€pronouncement€andÏquestion€whether€it€is€in€harmony€with€the€statute€and€theÏregulations.€€òòSeeóó€òòJoy€Techs.,€Inc.óó€v.€òòSec'y€of€Laboróó,€99€F.3d€991,Ð d´  Ð996€(10th€Cir.€1996);€(explaining€that€regulations€should€beÏconstrued€to€mesh€with€the€objectives€of€the€statute€that€theyÏimplement);€òòDunnóó€v.€òòSec'y€of€USDAóó,€921€F.2d€365,€367€(1st€Cir.Ð h¸ Ð1990)€(similar);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòMartinezóó€v.€òòR.I.€Hous.€&€Mortg.€Fin.Ð d ÐCorp.óó,€738€F.2d€21,€26€(1st€Cir.€1984)€(noting€that€"a€rule€out€ofÐ À Ðharmony€with€the€statute€is€a€mere€nullity").€€The€results€of€thisÏinquiry€will,€in€turn,€determine€the€persuasive€force€of€theÏinterpretive€guidance.€€We€turn,€then,€to€the€question€of€whetherÏthe€interpretive€guidance€passes€òòSkidmoreóó€muster€when€applied€in€anÐ pÀ  ÐFMLA€context.€€Ìà ` àUnder€òòSkidmoreóó,€we€are€constrained€to€weigh€theÐ È"$ Ð"thoroughness€evident€in€[the€guidance's]€consideration,€theÏvalidity€of€its€reasoning,€its€consistency€with€earlier€and€laterÏpronouncements,€and€all€those€factors€which€give€it€power€toÏâ âpersuade,€if€lacking€power€to€control."€€òòSkidmoreóó,€323€U.S.€at€140.€Ð x)È$, ÐThe€EEOC's€guidance€does€not€fare€well€when€measured€against€theseÏbenchmarks.Ìâ âà ` àWe€can€find€no€thoroughness€evident€in€the€considerationÏof€the€guidance.€€For€one€thing,€an€interpretive€guidance,€muchÏlike€"interpretations€contained€in€policy€statements,€agencyÏmanuals,€and€enforcement€guidelines,"€is€not€the€product€of€notice„¼and„comment€rulemaking€or€formal€adjudication.€€òòChristensenóó,€òòóó529Ð ¸  ÐU.S.€at€587.òòóó€€For€another€thing,€this€guidance€simply€was€not€meantÐ d´  Ðto€apply€in€the€FMLA€context;€the€EEOC€promulgated€it€well€beforeÏthe€FMLA€was€anything€more€than€a€gleam€in€its€sponsors'€eyes.€€ByÏlike€token,€the€guidance€is€idiosyncratic;€it€has€littleÏconsistency€with€other€EEOC€pronouncements€on€the€FMLA€as€the€EEOCÏhas€made€no€such€pronouncements.Ìà ` àThis€interpretive€guidance,€moreover,€cannot€beÏreconciled€with€the€fundamental€premise€that€a€balancing€testÏshould€be€pliant,€the€scale€weighted€differently€in€each€case.€€TheÏSupreme€Court€has€cautioned€that€"in€the€context€of€a€rule€based€onÏa€multifactor€weighing€process[,]€every€consideration€need€not€beÏequally€applicable€to€each€individual€case."€€òòFCCóó€v.€òòNat'l€CitizensÐ È"$ ÐComm.€for€Broad.óó,€436€U.S.€775,€808€n.29€(1978).€€The€regulationÐ t$Ä& Ðhere€at€issue€constructs€just€such€a€balancing€test,€and€theÏSupreme€Court's€caveat€conduces€to€the€view€that€the€regulation'sÏâ âlist€of€factors€should€not€be€treated€as€some€sort€of€mandatoryÐ x)È$, Ðchecklist€(even€in€the€ADA€context).׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€Court's€heavy€emphasisÐ ° Ðâ âon€the€individualized€nature€of€what€constitutes€a€disability€forÏpurposes€of€the€ADA,€òòseeóó€òòAlbertson's,€Inc.óó€v.€òòKirkingburgóó,€527€U.S.Ð X Ð555,€566€(1999);€òòSuttonóó€v.€òòUnited€Air€Lines,€Inc.óó,€527€U.S.€471,Ð ´  Ð483€(1999);€òòBragdonóó,€524€U.S.€at€641„42,€reinforces€theÐ ` ° Ðdesirability€of€a€flexible€case„by„case€approach.Ìà ` àIndeed,€the€Court's€ADA€jurisprudence€strongly€suggestsÏthat€the€three€factors€contained€in€the€borrowed€regulatoryÏdefinition€of€"substantially€limits"€should€not€be€given€equalÏweight.€€When€considering€the€definition€of€"disability"€under€theÏADA,€the€Justices€have€maintained€a€steady€focus€on€the€presentÏstate€of€an€individual's€impairment.€€The€òòSuttonóó€Court€observedÐ d Ðthat€"[b]ecause€the€phrase€'substantially€limits'€appears€in€theÐ À ÐAct€in€the€present€indicative€verb€form,€we€think€that€language€isÏproperly€read€as€requiring€that€a€person€be€presently€ð"ð€notÏpotentially€or€hypothetically€ð"ð€substantially€limited€in€order€toÏdemonstrate€a€disability."€€òòSuttonóó,€527€U.S.€at€482.€€This€keenÐ ´  Ðattention€to€the€statute's€verb€tense€is€persuasive€evidence€thatÏan€individual's€present,€actual€state€(rather€than€a€hypothetical,Ïprojected€state)€is€paramount€in€determining€whether€he€or€sheÏsuffers€from€a€disability.€€In€turn,€this€designated€point€ofÏreference€militates€against€according€talismanic€effect€to€factorsÏsuch€as€duration€and€long„term€impact,€which€may€require€theÏfactfinder€to€hypothesize€as€to€the€future€course€of€theÏimpairment.€€òòAccordóó€òòKatzóó€v.€òòCity€Metal€Co.óó,€87€F.3d€26,€30„32€(1stÐ d ÐCir.€1996)€(reversing€directed€verdict€for€employer€on€ADA€claimÏeven€though€plaintiff€had€presented€almost€no€evidence€as€to€theÏduration€of€his€impairment);€EEOC€Compliance€Manual€ðð€902.4(a),€atÏ5311€(1999)€(calling€the€"extent€to€which€an€impairment€restrictsÏone€or€more€of€an€individual's€major€life€activities"€the€hallmarkÏof€a€disability€under€the€ADA,€and€noting€that€the€impairment'sÏduration€is€no€more€than€a€"secondary€factor€that€òòmayóó€affect€theÐ È"$ Ðanalysis")€(emphasis€supplied).€€The€mechanistic€assumption€thatÏall€the€enumerated€factors€invariably€must€be€present€before€anÏimpairment€can€be€termed€"substantially€limiting"€in€an€ADA€caseÏis,€therefore,€unfounded.€€The€argument€against€the€assumption€isÏeven€more€cogent€in€an€FMLA€case.Ð $+t&. Ðà ` àMost€importantly,€the€EEOC€interpretive€guidance€cannotÏbe€applied€to€the€FMLA€because€it€clashes€with€the€underlyingÏpurposes€of€the€statute.€€The€ADA€and€the€FMLA€have€divergent€aims,Ïoperate€in€different€ways,€and€offer€disparate€relief.€€TheseÏdissimilarities€argue€convincingly€that€the€trio€of€factors€ð!ðÏparticularly€duration€ð!ð€must€be€treated€somewhat€differently€in€theÏFMLA€context€than€in€the€ADA€context.€€òòCf.óó€òòChevronóó,òòóó€467€U.S.€atÐ ¸  Ð863„64€(finding€definition€of€ð ðsourceðð€to€be€flexible€and€approvingÏEPAððs€varying€interpretations€of€it€in€different€contexts);€òòStowellóóÐ `  Ðv.€òòSec'y€of€HHSóó,€3€F.3d€539,€542€(1st€Cir.€1993)€(deeming€itÐ ¼  Ð"apodictic€that€Congress€may€choose€to€give€a€single€phraseÏdifferent€meanings€in€different€parts€of€the€same€statute").Ìà ` àTwo€salient€considerations€fortify€this€conclusion.€ÏFirst,€the€concept€of€disability€serves€a€much€different€functionÏin€the€ADA€than€in€the€FMLA.€€Where€the€ADA€is€concerned,€a€findingÏof€disability€is€the€key€that€unlocks€the€storehouse€of€statutoryÏprotections.€€Title€I€of€the€ADA€provides€that€a€covered€employerÏmay€not€discriminate€against€a€qualified€individual€with€aÏdisability€because€of€that€disability.€€42€U.S.C.€ðð€12112(a).€€ThisÏmeans€that€the€employer€must,€inter€alia,€make€"reasonableÏaccommodations€to€the€known€physical€or€mental€limitations€of€anÏotherwise€qualified€individual€with€a€disability"€as€long€as€thatÏdisability€persists,€unless€and€until€those€accommodations€imposeÏan€undue€hardship€on€the€employer.€€òòId.óó€ðð€12112(b)(5)(A).€€SuchÐ $+t&. Ðaccommodations€can€take€various€forms,€and€the€duty€to€accommodateÏis€an€ongoing€responsibility€that€is€not€exhausted€by€a€singleÏeffort€on€the€employer's€part.€€òòGarca„Ayalaóó€v.€òòLederleÐ X ÐParenterals,€Inc.óó,€212€F.3d€638,€648€n.12€(1st€Cir.€2000).€€GivenÐ ´  Ðthe€centrality€of€a€finding€of€disability€under€the€ADA€and€theÏpanoply€of€rights€and€responsibilities€that€such€a€findingÏtriggers,€it€makes€sense€to€insist€that,€in€most€cases,€anÏimpairment€have€an€extended€duration€before€it€will€be€deemed€soÏlimiting€as€to€constitute€a€disability.Ìà ` àIn€contrast,€the€only€time€that€the€concept€of€disabilityÏbecomes€relevant€under€the€FMLA€is€in€the€relatively€rare€instanceÏin€which€an€employee€seeks€FMLA€leave€to€care€for€a€seriously€illÏchild€over€the€age€of€eighteen.€€Even€then,€the€existence€òòvelóó€òònonóóÐ À Ðof€a€disability€simply€provides€a€partial€answer€to€the€question€ofÏwhether€the€employee€is€entitled€to€leave.€€òòSeeóó€29€U.S.C.€ððððÐ h Ð2612(a)(1)(C),€2611(12)(B).€€The€minor€role€that€the€disabilityÏdetermination€plays€in€the€context€of€the€FMLA€ð"ð€one€of€threeÏcriteria€to€be€met€in€respect€to€the€infirmity€of€an€adult€childÏbefore€a€modest€unpaid€leave€can€be€taken€ð"ð€indicates€that€veryÏlittle€weight€should€be€placed€on€the€duration€of€an€impairment.€ÏThis€is€especially€so€since€the€duration€of€the€impairment€is€notÏeven€likely€to€determine€the€precise€term€of€an€FMLA€leave,€whichÏis€far€more€apt€to€be€measured€by€how€long€the€child's€seriousÏhealth€condition€lasts€or€how€long€the€child€is€incapable€of€self„Ð $+t&. Ðcare.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòBryantóó,€18€F.€Supp.€2d€at€804€(reporting€thatÐ ° Ðwhile€son's€disabling€kidney€condition€persisted€over€a€period€ofÏyears,€plaintiff's€FMLA€leave€was€only€part€of€one€day).Ìà ` àThe€second€consideration€that€leads€us€to€believe€thatÏfactors€such€as€duration€must€be€accorded€reduced€significance€inÏthe€FMLA€context€is€that€the€FMLA€deals€in€much€lower€levels€ofÏemployer€engagement€and€employee€rewards€than€does€the€ADA.€€ForÏone€thing,€the€FMLA€implicates€shorter€time€frames:€€an€employeeÏmay€qualify€for€FMLA€leave€to€care€for€a€child€under€eighteenÏmerely€by€showing€that€the€child€suffers€from€a€serious€healthÏcondition,€which,€as€defined,€can€be€an€illness€that€lasts€asÏlittle€as€four€days.€€òòSeeóó€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2612(a)(1)(C);€29€C.F.R.€ððÐ d Ð825.114(a)(2)(i);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòBrannonóó€v.€òòOshkosh€B'Gosh,€Inc.óó,€897€F.Ð À ÐSupp.€1028,€1037€(M.D.€Tenn.€1995)€(finding€that€a€child€who€had€aÏfever,€was€taken€to€a€doctor,€and€stayed€home€from€day€care€fromÏFriday€through€Tuesday€had€a€serious€health€condition€within€theÏpurview€of€the€FMLA).€€For€another€thing,€the€maximum€annualÏbenefit€under€the€FMLA€is€twelve€weeks€of€unpaid€leave,€òòseeóó€29Ð !l" ÐU.S.C.€ðð€2612(a)(1),€whereas€reasonable€accommodations€under€theÏADA€can€last€for€years€on€end.€Finally,€the€obligatory€interactiveÏprocess€that€is€a€staple€of€the€ADA,€òòseeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòCriadoóó€v.€òòIBMÐ  &p!( ÐCorp.óó,€145€F.3d€437,€444€(1st€Cir.€1998),€is€entirely€foreign€toÐ Ì'#* Ðthe€FMLA.€€We€mention€these€contrasting€levels€of€engagement€andÏreward€because€we€think€it€highly€unlikely€that,€with€so€much€lessÐ $+t&. Ðat€stake€under€the€FMLA,€Congress€would€have€required€FMLAÏlitigants€to€make€the€same€durational€showing€as€ADA€litigants.Ìà ` àHaving€established€that€the€differences€between€the€ADAÏand€the€FMLA€render€the€durational€factor€less€important€under€theÏlatter€statute,€we€turn€to€the€purpose€of€the€FMLA€and€the€lightÏthat€it€sheds€on€that€factor's€proper€role.€€A€regulation€mustÏharmonize€with€the€purpose€of€the€statute€it€implements.€€òòSeeóóÐ ¸  ÐòòGrunbeckóó€v.€òòDime€Sav.€Bankóó,€74€F.3d€311,€336€(1st€Cir.€1996)Ð d´  Ð("[C]ourts€will€reject€an€agency€interpretation€which€conflictsÏwith€congressional€intent.").€€The€FMLA's€primary€purposes€are€"toÏbalance€the€demands€of€the€workplace€with€the€needs€of€families,€toÏpromote€the€stability€and€economic€security€of€families,€and€toÏpromote€national€interests€in€preserving€family€integrity."€€29ÏU.S.C.€ðð€2601(b)(1).€€Those€objectives€would€be€frustrated€byÏreading€the€implementing€regulations€through€the€prism€of€theÏEEOC's€interpretive€guidance,€for€this€would€impose€a€rigidÏrequirement€that€an€employee€must€prove€that€an€impairment€is€long„¼lasting€before€it€can€qualify€as€substantially€limiting€(and,€thus,Ïfurnish€the€basis€for€FMLA€leave).Ìà ` àWe€illustrate€this€point€with€a€practical€example.€€AÏworker€who€seeks€to€take€FMLA€leave€to€care€for€a€child€often€doesÏso€in€response€to€a€crisis€situation.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòCaldwellóó€v.Ð Ì'#* ÐòòHolland€of€Tex.,€Inc.óó,€208€F.3d€671,€673€(8th€Cir.€2000)€(three„Ð x)È$, Ðyear„old€son's€sudden€ear€infection);€òòBryantóó,€18€F.€Supp.€2d€at€802Ð $+t&. Ð(adult€son's€unanticipated€kidney€failure).€€In€many€instances,€theÏemergency€will€have€abated€by€the€time€that€the€duration€of€theÏchild's€impairment€can€be€ascertained.€€If€a€hard„and„fastÏdurational€requirement€is€enforced,€an€employee€will€be€effectivelyÏprevented€from€taking€family€leave€to€care€for€an€adult€child€untilÏit€can€be€established€that€the€child's€problem€will€have€anÏadequate€duration.€€By€then,€the€crisis€may€well€have€passed.Ìà ` àSuch€a€scenario€would€place€an€employee€with€a€sick€adultÏchild€between€a€rock€and€a€hard€place,€forcing€him€or€her€to€chooseÏbetween€employment€demands€and€family€needs.€€This€would€run€atÏcross€purposes€with€the€FMLA's€goal€of€reassuring€workers€thatÏ"[w]hen€a€family€emergency€arises€.€.€.€they€will€not€be€asked€toÏchoose€between€continuing€their€employment,€and€meeting€theirÏpersonal€and€family€obligations."€€29€C.F.R.€ðð€825.101.€€We€do€notÏbelieve€that€Congress€intended€to€create€so€illusory€a€benefit.Ìà ` àThe€foregoing€analysis€of€the€purpose€of€the€FMLA,€itsÏstructure,€and€the€relief€it€provides€leads€us€to€conclude€that€ð"ðÏas€the€borrowed€definition€provides€ð"ð€the€duration€of€an€impairmentÏis€one€of€several€factors€that€should€be€considered€in€determiningÏthe€existence€of€a€disability€under€the€FMLA.€€We€also€conclude,Ïhowever,€that€Congress€did€not€intend€that€the€impairment€always€beÏshown€to€be€long„lasting.€€This€last€conclusion€comports€with€theÏmajor€goals€of€the€statute€while€at€the€same€time€respectingÏCongress's€clear€intent€to€set€a€higher€bar€for€a€parent's€leaveÐ $+t&. Ðentitlement€to€care€for€a€child€eighteen€years€of€age€or€older.€ÏòòSeeóó€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2611(12).€€All€that€is€required€to€ground€a€leaveÐ \¬ Ðrequest€vis„„vis€a€younger€child€is€that€the€child€have€a€seriousÏhealth€condition,€òòseeóó€òòid.óó€ðððð€2612(a)(1)(C),€2611(12)(A),€which€canÐ ´  Ðbe€an€illness€lasting€as€little€as€four€days,€òòseeóó€29€C.F.R.€ððÐ ` ° Ð825.114(a)(2)(i).€€In€comparison,€to€be€eligible€for€leave€to€careÏfor€an€older€child,€the€child€not€only€must€have€a€serious€healthÏcondition€but€also€must€lack€the€capacity€to€care€for€himself€orÏherself€due€to€a€disability€(which€requires€demonstrating€anÏimpairment,€identifying€a€major€life€activity,€and€showing€how€theÏimpairment€substantially€limits€the€major€life€activity).€€òòSeeóó€29Ð h¸ ÐU.S.C.€ðð€2611(12)(B);€29€C.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(2).€€Thus,€we€do€notÏ"overlook[],"€as€our€dissenting€brother€charges,€that€CongressÏintended€a€meaningful€consequence€to€attach€to€its€use€of€the€wordÏ"disability"€in€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2911(12)(B).€€Rather,€we€recognize€thatÏalthough€the€regulation,€29€C.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(2),€properlyÏinterpreted€(i.e.,€without€regard€to€the€EEOC's€interpretiveÏguidance),€does€not€eliminate€duration€as€relevant€factor,€itÏleaves€room€for€an€impairment€of€modest€duration€to€be€regarded,€inÏsome€cases,€as€"substantially€limiting"€for€FMLA€purposes.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð t$Ä& Їò òVI.€€DECIDING€THE€APPEALó óÐ ° Ðà ` àWe€now€return€to€the€case€at€hand.€€At€this€point,€weÏcrystalize€the€insights€derived€from€our€investigation€into€theÏnuances€of€administrative€law€and€the€comparative€jurisprudence€ofÏthe€ADA€and€the€FMLA.€€We€distill€these€insights€into€a€tripartiteÏrule:€€(1)€Courts€facing€the€question,€under€the€FMLA,€of€whetherÏan€adult€childððs€impairment€substantially€limits€a€major€lifeÏactivity€should€apply€the€Secretary's€borrowed€regulation,€29ÏC.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(2),€as€written,€ignore€the€EEOC's€unpersuasiveÏinterpretive€guidance€(crafted€for€use€in€connection€with€aÏdifferent€statute),€and€consider€(a)€the€nature€and€severity€of€theÏimpairment,€(b)€its€expected€duration,€(c)€its€anticipated€long„¼term€impact,€and€(d)€any€other€relevant€factors.€€(2)€ThisÏassessment€must€be€performed€on€a€case„by„case€basis,€balancing€allÐ ˆØ Ðfactors€in€light€of€the€FMLAððs€purpose,€structure,€and€provisionsÏfor€relief.€€òòSeeóó€òòO'Connellóó€v.€òòShalalaóó,€79€F.3d€170,€176€(1st€Cir.Ð \¬ Ð1996)€(emphasizing€the€need€to€afford€statutes€a€practical,Ïcommonsense€reading€that€gives€due€weight€to€design,€structure,Ïpurpose,€and€overall€language).€€(3)€The€requisite€test€is€aÏbalancing€test:€€apart€from€the€severity€of€the€impairment,€no€oneÏfactor€is€indispensable€to€finding€that€a€disability€exists€forÏFMLA€purposes.Ìà ` àApplying€this€rule,€we€hold€that€the€provisions€of€29ÏU.S.C.€ðð€2611(12)(B)€may€be€satisfied€by€various€combinations€ofÏfactors.€€One€such€permissible€combination€entails,€at€least€inÏcertain€circumstances,€a€showing€that€the€employee's€adult€child€isÏsuffering€from€a€severe€impairment€which€has€a€modest€projectedÏduration€and€an€as„yet„unquantified€long„term€impact.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€caseÐ l¼ Ðbefore€us€fits€within€the€contours€of€that€category.€€It€followsÏthat€the€court€below€improvidently€granted€summary€judgment€forÏPfizer.€€We€expound€on€this€conclusion.Ìà ` à€High€blood€pressure€is,€by€its€nature,€a€seriousÏimpairment.€€Given€that€the€attending€physician€ordered€HernandezÏconfined€to€bed,€a€factfinder€reasonably€could€regard€itsÏmanifestation€as€severe.€€As€to€duration,€the€appellant€providedÏevidence€that€Hernandez's€high€blood€pressure€would€last€at€leastÐ Ì'#* ÐÑîÑâ âÑÑÑ  ÑѰÑâ âÑ  Ñto€the€end€of€her€pregnancy,€an€interval€of€several€weeks.€€Long„¼term€impact€hardly€seems€relevant€to€the€appellant's€leave€request,Ïòòseeóó€òòsupraóó€note€6,€but€in€all€events,€Hernandezððs€condition€arguablyÐ X Ðmight€persist€after€childbirth€and€have€a€lasting€impact.€ÏCrediting€this€evidence,€as€we€must€at€the€summary€judgment€stage,Ïthe€record€seems€adequate€to€support€a€finding€ð"ð€although€it€surelyÏdoes€not€compel€one€ð"ð€that€the€appellant's€daughter€had€aÏ"disability"€within€the€purview€of€the€FMLA.Ìà ` àWe€summarize€succinctly.€€Taking€the€evidence€as€itÏstands,€drawing€all€reasonable€inferences€in€the€appellant's€favor,Ïand€applying€the€appropriate€legal€standard,€there€is€a€juryÏquestion€as€to€whether€Hernandez's€high€blood€pressureÏsubstantially€limited€her€in€the€major€life€activity€of€self„care.€ÏFrom€the€evidence,€a€jury€could€find€that,€at€the€time€theÏappellant€requested€leave,€her€bedridden€daughter€wasÏ"[s]ignificantly€restricted€as€to€the€.€.€.€manner"€in€which€sheÏcould€perform€the€major€life€activity€of€self„care€"as€compared€toÏthe€.€.€.€manner€[in]€which€the€average€person€in€the€generalÏpopulation€[could]€perform€that€same€major€life€activity."€€29ÏC.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(j)(1)(ii).€€The€jury€also€could€find€thatÏHernandez's€condition,€though€not€proven€to€be€of€extremelyÏâ âprotracted€duration,€threatened€to€persist€long€enough€to€qualifyÐ Ì'#* Ðher€as€disabled€òòfor€purposes€of€the€FMLAóó.€€Consequently,€the€lowerÐ ° Ðcourt€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment.Ìâ âò òVII.€€CONCLUSIONó óÐ X Ðà ` àWe€need€go€no€further.€€Reading€the€statutory€text€andÏthe€applicable€regulation€with€an€eye€toward€congressional€purposeÏand€practical€consequences,€òòóóand€disregarding€the€EEOC'sÐ ( x  Ðinterpretive€guidance,€òòseeóó€òòMeadóó,€121€S.€Ct.€at€2177;€òòSkidmoreóó,€323Ð Ô$  ÐU.S.€at€139„40,€we€hold€that€the€district€court's€decisionÏoverstates€the€importance€of€the€durational€element€to€theÏdetermination€of€the€existence€of€a€disability€under€the€FMLA.€ÏSince€the€summary€judgment€previously€entered€in€the€employer'sÏfavor€hinged€on€that€overstatement,€it€must€be€set€aside.ÌÌò òòòReversed€and€remandedóó.ó óÐ ˆØ ÐÌò òà@ä ä ìàð"ð€Dissenting€Opinion€Follows€ð"ðó óˆÐ  üL ÐÔ‡1XŽß XXtXã~ÔñûñØØñûñà ` àò òCAMPBELL,€òòSenior€Circuit€Judgeóó,€dissenting.ó ó€€While€myÐ ° Ðcolleaguesðð€result€is€humanly€appealing,€I€cannot€agree€with€it.€ÏIt€seems€to€me€to€run€counter€to€proper€standards€of€legal€analysisÏand€to€substitute€judicial€discretion€for€that€conferred€upon€theÏSecretary€of€Labor.€€I€would€affirm€the€district€court.ÌÌÓ  Óò òI.ó óÐ `°  ÐÓƒÇÓà ` àAppellant€complains€that€her€employer€violated€the€FamilyÏMedical€Leave€Act€(FMLA€or€the€Act)€by€refusing€to€grant€leave€soÏthat€she€could€look€after€her€pregnant€daughter.€€In€her€thirty„¼sixth€week€of€pregnancy,€the€daughter€had€been€placed€on€bed€restÏbecause€of€a€pregnancy„induced€hypertension.€€Because€the€districtÏcourt€found€the€daughter€was€not€ð ðdisabledðð€„„€a€thresholdÏrequirement€for€FMLA€leave€in€order€to€care€for€an€adult€child,Ïð ðdisabilityðð€being€defined€in€the€Actððs€regulations€in€terms€of€ADAÏcriterññiñña€„„€the€district€court€dismissed€appellantððs€FMLA€claim.€ÏMy€colleagues€now€reverse€that€judgment.€€They€do€not€suggest€that,Ïunder€ADA€standards,€appellantððs€daughter€was€disabled,€but€ratherÏthey€hold€that€the€FMLA€requires€a€more€relaxed€standard€ofÏdisability€than€does€the€ADA€„„€one€with€little€or€no€durationalÏrequirements.€€I€think€my€colleagues€both€misread€the€FMLA€andÏimproperly€override€the€authority€given€by€Congress€to€theÏâ âSecretary€of€Labor€to€prescribe€regulations€in€this€area.€Ð °'#, Ðà ` àTo€explain,€I€begin€with€the€words€of€the€statute.€€InÏâ âenacting€the€FMLA,€Congress€specifically€distinguished€betweenÏentitlements€of€leave€to€care€for€minor€children€and€of€leave€toÏcare€for€adult€children.€€The€Act€broadly€grants€leave€rights€toÏemployees€ð ð[i]n€order€to€care€for€the€spouse,€or€a€son,€daughter,Ïor€parent,€of€the€employee,€if€such€spouse,€son,€daughter,€orÏparent€has€a€serious€health€condition,ðð€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2612(a)(1)(C).€ÏHowever,€the€Act€then€proceeds€to€provide€a€limiting€definition€ofÏwho€may€be€considered€to€be€a€son€or€a€daughter:€ð ð[S]on€orÏdaughterðð€is€defined€as€the€employeeððs€child€who€is€ð ð(A)€under€18Ïyears€of€age;€or€(B)€18€years€of€age€or€older€and€òòincapable€ofÐ P  Ðself„care€because€of€mental€or€physical€disabilityóó.ðð€€29€U.S.C.€ððÐ à0 Ð2911(12)(emphasis€supplied).€€The€statuteððs€clause€(B)€thus€imposesÏa€significant€limitation€upon€the€class€of€adult€children€for€whoseÏcare€parental€leave€is€mandated.€€Leave€is€provided€solely€to€careÏfor€those€adult€children€fitting€within€the€category€of€childrenÏwho€are€ð ðincapable€of€self„care€because€of€...€disability.ðð€ÏNotably,€the€statute€imposes€no€such€disability€limitation€inÏrespect€to€leaves€to€care€for€minor€children,€spouses€and€parents.€ÏWhile€the€majority€brushes€aside€as€ð ðweakðð€the€above€limitationÏpertaining€to€adult€children€only,€the€fact€that€it€was€crafted€asÏpart€of€the€very€definition€of€the€class€for€whose€care€leaves€mayÏbe€granted€accentuates€its€importance.€€Whether€or€not€we€like€theÏlimiting€phrase€in€ðð€2911(12)(B),€we€cannot€responsibly€ignore€orÏdownplay€it.€€òòSeeóó€òòMassachusetts€Ass'n€of€Health€MaintenanceÐ 0*€%0 ÐOrganizationóó€v.€òòRuthardtóó,€194€F.3d€176,€181€(1st€Cir.€1999)€("[A]llÐ ° Ðwords€and€provisions€of€statutes€are€intended€to€have€meaning€andÏare€to€be€given€effect,€and€no€construction€should€be€adopted€whichÏwould€render€statutory€words€or€phrases€meaningless,€redundant€orÏsuperfluous.")(internal€quotation€marks€omitted).€€Ìà ` àThe€Senate€Report€relating€the€legislative€history€of€theÏFMLA€illuminates€Congressððs€reasons€for€inserting€this€uniqueÏprovision,€which€limits€leave€to€parents€to€care€for€theirÏseriously€ill€adult€children€to€only€those€children€ð ðincapable€ofÏself„care€because€of€...€disability.ðð€€This€legislative€historyÏdeserves€repeating,€òòanteóó€note€2,€as€it€clarifies€the€critical€issueÐ P  Ðin€this€appeal:€the€significance€and€meaning€of€the€phraseÏð ðincapable€of€self€care€because€of€mental€or€physical€disability.ððÏThe€majority€simply€describes€this€history€as€ð ðamorphousðð€andÏthereafter€treats€the€Senate€Report€as€essentially€without€import.€ÏNevertheless,€the€Senate€Report€states:€ÌÓÓà8 ` àThe€bill€[FMLA]€thus€recognizes€that€inÏspecial€circumstances,€where€a€child€has€aÏmental€or€physical€disability,€a€childððs€needÏfor€parental€care€may€not€end€when€he€or€sheÏreaches€18€years€of€age.€€In€suchÏcircumstances,€parents€may€continue€to€have€anÏactive€role€in€caring€for€the€son€or€daughter.€ÏAn€adult€son€or€daughter€who€has€a€seriousÏhealth€condition€and€who€is€incapable€of€self„¼care€because€of€a€mental€or€physicalÏdisability€presents€the€same€compelling€needÏfor€parental€care€as€the€child€under€18€yearsÏof€age€with€a€serious€heath€condition.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÓ×ÓS.€Rep.€No.€103„3,€at€22€(1993),€òòreprintedóó€òòinóó€1993€U.S.C.C.A.N.€3,Ð  (ð#. Ð24.€€€Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àThe€most€obvious€and€reasonable€construction€of€the€aboveÏquoted€passage€„„€a€reading€that€the€Secretary€of€LaborððsÏregulations€faithfully€mirror,€òòinfraó󀄄€indicates€that€CongressÐ Ð  Ðwanted€to€restrict€leave€benefits€for€parents€to€care€for€theirÏadult€children€18€and€older€to€only€those€special€cases€whereÏbecause€of€some€mental€or€physical€disability€the€adult€child€is€orÏremains€especially€dependent€on€the€parent€in€the€same€ways€minorÏchildren€typically€are€dependent.ñüññýññþñ׃u×ñþññþñ׃*×ñþññýññýñ׃$×ñýññüññüñ׃×ñüñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€other€words,€for€the€adultÐ  ð  Ðchild€to€trigger€leave€rights,€it€is€not€enough€that€he€or€she€beÏseriously€ill;€the€child€must€also€be€ð ðincapable€of€self„careÏbecause€of€...€disability,ðð€a€factor€Congress€deemed€essential€toÐ P  Ðplace€the€adult€child€within€a€special€class€deserving€of€parentalÏcare€for€FMLA€leave€purposes.€€The€Senate€Report€explains€that€inÏsuch€cases€ð ða€childððs€need€for€parental€care€may€not€end€[asÏpresumably€happens€otherwise]€when€he€or€she€reaches€18€years€ofÏage.€...€[And]€parents€may€continue€to€have€an€active€role€inÏcaring€for€the€son€or€daughter.ðð€€òòId.óó€€It€is€clear€from€thisÐ € Ð  Ðpassage€that€Congress€contemplated€an€adult€child€who€is€especiallyÏdependent€over€some€period€of€time€on€parental€care€for€physical€orÏmental€reasons.ñýññÿñ׃v×ñÿññÿñ׃,×ñÿññýññýñ׃×ñýñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€is€in€contrast€to€the€typical€scenario€inÐ 0€  Ðwhich,€at€and€after€age€18,€a€child€may€be€regarded€as€havingÏachieved€substantial€independence€and€self„sufficiency€so€as€to€beÏable€to€live€on€her€own,€support€herself,€and€be€ministered€to€byÏothers€than€her€parents.€€By€restricting€parental€leaves€toÏunemancipated€minor€children€and€a€restricted€class€of€adultÏchildren€who€may€still€require€some€sort€of€on„going€parental€care,ÏCongress€was€imbuing€the€word€ð ðdisabilityðð€with€a€serious€andÏsevere€consequence,€one€which,€however,€the€majority€simplyÏoverlooks€in€its€assumption€that€the€sole€and€overriding€purpose€ofÏthe€FMLA€is€to€provide€a€liberal€leave€policy€in€all€instances.Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àFor€the€above€reasons,€I€believe€that€CongressððsÏintentions€along€the€lines€indicated€are€amply€signaled€both€in€theÏstatutory€language€and€the€Senate€Report.€€The€FMLA,€however,Ïleaves€to€the€Secretary€of€Labor€a€major€role€in€the€interpretationÏof€Congressððs€wishes,€hence€I€turn€next€to€the€SecretaryððsÏregulations.€€€The€FMLA€provides€that€the€ð ðSecretary€of€Labor€shallÏprescribe€such€regulations€as€are€necessary€to€carry€out€...€thisÏchapter....ðð€€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2654.€€In€promulgating€regulations€toÏenforce€congressional€intent,€including€the€difference€in€theÏstatute€between€leave€granted€to€care€for€minor€children€and€leaveÏgranted€to€care€for€adult€children,€the€Secretary€of€Labor€hasÏdefined€the€relevant€terms€ð ðincapable€of€self„careðð€and€ð ðphysicalÏor€mental€disability.ðð€€And,€in€so€doing,€the€Secretary€hasÏconstrued€the€terms€precisely€in€accord€with€the€congressionalÏintent€one€would€glean€from€the€construction€of€the€statute€and€theÏSenate€Report€I€have€just€set€forth.€€Ìà ` àAs€the€majority€notes,€with€regard€to€the€term€ð ðphysicalÏor€mental€disability,ðð€instead€of€defining€from€scratch€the€termÏð ðdisabilityðð€for€the€purposes€of€the€FMLA,€the€Secretary€hasÏborrowed€the€statutory€ADA€definition€as€further€refined€inÏregulations€issued€by€the€EEOC€pursuant€to€the€ADA.€€The€SecretaryÏstates€in€her€FMLA€regulations€thatÌÓÓà8 ` àphysical€or€mental€disability€means€a€physicalÏor€mental€impairment€that€substantially€limitsÏone€or€more€of€the€major€life€activities€of€anÏindividual.€[The€ADA€definition.]€RegulationsÏat€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(h),(i),€and€(j),€issuedÐ 0*€%0 Ðby€the€Equal€Employment€Opportunity€CommissionÏunder€the€Americans€with€Disabilities€Act€...Ð xÈ Ðòòdefine€these€termsóó.ÓéÓÐ@` x` x Ð29€C.F.R.€ðð€825.113(c)(2)(2000)(emphasis€supplied).€€The€relevantÏADA€provision€and€EEOC€regulations€are€undoubtedly€restrictive€inÏtheir€scope€with€regard€to€the€kinds€and€durations€of€impairmentsÏthat€will€qualify€as€disabilities.ñýññÿñ׃w×ñÿññÿñ׃.×ñÿññýññýñ׃×ñýñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Nonetheless,€as€alreadyÐ € Ð  Ðdiscussed€above,€Congressððs€very€purpose€in€using€the€termÏð ðdisabilityðð€seems€to€have€been€to€limit€the€class€of€adultÏchildren€for€whose€benefit€leave€was€mandated.€€The€ADA€and€EEOCÏdefinitions€achieve€this€task€very€reasonably.€€They€effectuateÏcongressional€intent€to€differentiate€between€entitlement€to€leaveÏto€care€for,€on€the€one€hand,€a€narrower€class€of€adult€childrenÏwhose€long„term€afflictions€limit€major€life€activities,€and,€onÏthe€other€hand,€òòallóó€seriously€ill€minor€children€whether€or€notÐ P Ðdisabled.Ð à Ðà ` àAnd€in€cross„referencing€to€the€ADA€and€to€the€EEOCÏregulations,€the€Secretary€achieves€advantages€that€would€be€lostÏwere€she€to€have€defined€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€by€new€and€separateÏregulations€tailored€solely€to€the€FMLA.€€By€cross„referencing,€theÏSecretary€makes€use€of€interpretations€developed€and€beingÏdeveloped€in€another€relevant€on„going€regulatory€scheme,€therebyÏachieving€more€precise€standards€in€what€„„€given€the€vagueness€ofÏthe€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€„„€could€otherwise€be€a€chaotic€area€ofÏinterpretation.€€Ìà ` àGiven€what€Congress€was€attempting€to€accomplish€byÏcreating€in€the€FMLA€a€narrower,€more€needy€class€of€adultÏchildren,€I€see€nothing€wrong€or€unreasonable€with€the€SecretaryððsÏgiving€the€FMLA€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€the€exact€same€meaning€asÏprovided€in€the€ADA€and€its€interpretive€regulations.€€The€ADA€pre„¼dates€the€FMLA€and€is€perhaps€the€primary€federal€statute€dealingÏwith€the€subject€of€disability.€€Its€incorporated€concept€of€aÏrelatively€long„term€physical€or€mental€condition€ties€preciselyÏinto€what€the€FMLA€intended€when€separating€out€all€adult€childrenÏwhose€need€for€parental€care€has€ended€from€those€whose€ð ðparentsÏmay€continue€to€have€an€active€roleðð€in€their€care.€€€S.€Rep.€No.Ï103„3,€at€22€(1993),€òòreprintedóó€òòinóó€1993€U.S.C.C.A.N.€3,€24.€€OverÐ ð#@( Ðtime,€the€ADA€definition€has€been€refined€by€regulation€andÏadministrative€and€judicial€precedent€so€that€by€now€its€meaning€inÏmany€(or€even€most)€situations€has€become€relatively€clear.€€TheÏSecretaryððs€cross„reference€to€the€ADAððs€definition€of€ð ðdisabilityððÐ 0*€%0 Ðwith€its€concomitant€history€and€administrative€and€judicialÏguidance€makes€it€possible€for€employers,€employees€and€tribunalsÏinterpreting€the€FMLA€to€refer€to€well„established€coherentÏprinciples€and€precedent,€providing€predictability€and€clarity€toÏa€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€that,€by€itself,€is€anything€but€plain.€Ìà ` àViewed€this€way,€the€Secretaryððs€borrowing€of€ADA€andÏEEOC€criteria€to€define€ð ðdisabilityðð€under€the€FMLA€makes€eminentÏgood€sense.€€These€criteria,€it€is€true,€will€limit€leave€toÏparents€whose€sons€or€daughters€suffer€from€more€chronic,€fairlyÏlong„term€physical€and€mental€handicaps.€€Borrowing€and€faithfullyÏapplying€to€the€FMLA€the€ADAððs€disability€definition€means€thatÏparental€leaves€will€not€be€available€in€all€situations€whereÏleaves,€from€a€purely€compassionate€point€of€view,€may€seem€equallyÏwell„justified€ð!ð€as€where,€for€example,€an€adult€child€needs€butÐ P Ðlacks€care,€yet€falls€short€of€having€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€within€theÏdefinition€of€that€term€in€the€ADA€and€the€applicable€EEOCÏregulations.€€But,€given€both€the€plain€statutory€language€andÏCongressððs€intent€as€explained€in€the€Senate€Report€in€insertingÏthe€limiting€phrase€ð ðincapable€of€self„care€because€of€mental€ofÏphysical€disability,ðð€I€cannot€see€how€one€can€contend€that€theÏlimitation€inherent€in€borrowing€from€the€ADA€and€its€precedentÏruns€counter€to€the€objectives€of€the€FMLA.€€Ìà ` àI€therefore€believe€that€the€district€courtððs€analysisÏand€judgment€is€correct€on€the€facts€of€this€case.€€The€pregnancy„¼related€medical€condition€of€appellantððs€daughter€lacked€sufficientÐ 0*€%0 Ðduration€to€be€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€as€that€term€is€used€within€the€ADAÏas€further€defined€by€the€EEOC€regulations.€€Indeed,€my€colleaguesÏdo€not€seem€to€contend€otherwise.€€That€should€end€the€matter.Ìà ` àInstead,€however,€my€colleagues€insist€that€because€thisÏis€an€FMLA€case,€a€different,€more€relaxed€durational€standard€ofÏtheir€own€invention€needs€to€be€read€into€the€ADA€and€EEOCÏcriteria.€€This€they€term€a€ð ðbalancingðð€process.€€But€balancingÏusually€means€balancing€the€facts€of€a€case€against€statutory€andÏregulatory€standards,€not€altering€the€latter€at€will.€€In€anyÏcase,€I€see€no€contradiction€between€the€intent€of€Congress€whenÏusing€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€in€the€FMLA€context€and€the€ADAÏð ðdisabilityðð€definition€and€related€EEOC€criteria€as€used€in€an€ADAÏcontext.€€Curiously,€my€colleagues€do€not€suggest€that€borrowingÏthe€ADA€definition€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€and€related€EEOC€regulationsÏconstituted€legal€error€by€the€Secretary.€€They€accept€theÏSecretaryððs€borrowing€from€the€ADA€and€EEOC€but€then€say€the€sameÏregulations€should€mean€different€things€depending€on€whether€usedÏin€an€ADA€case€or€in€an€FMLA€case.€€Not€only€do€I€find€thisÏincomprehensible,€but€I€can€see€no€reason€for€attempting€such€anÏexercise€given€the€close€fit,€òòseeóó€òòsupraóó,€between€Congressððs€reasonsÐ `"°& Ðfor€using€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€in€the€FMLA€and€the€meaning€of€thatÏterm€as€developed€in€ADA€case€law.Ìà ` àIn€taking€a€different€view,€my€colleagues€point€only€toÏthe€FMLAððs€broadly€stated,€and€by€no€means€self„explanatory,Ïstatutory€purpose€of€balancing€family€needs€with€employerÐ 0*€%0 Ðinterests.€€But€striking€the€balance€so€as€to€favor€only€personsÏdisabled€under€ADA€criteria€appears€to€meet€this€very€principleÏgiven€the€statutory€language€and€the€intent€of€Congress€as€set€outÏin€the€Senate€Report.€€Of€course,€one€may€still€argue€as€a€matterÏof€personal€preference€that€it€would€be€better€to€strike€theÏbalance€differently€or€more€in€favor€of€the€family,€but€it€is€notÏour€business€as€judges€to€choose€among€competing€policies€where€theÏstatutory€text,€the€legislative€history,€and€the€SecretaryððsÏinterpretation€are€all€so€plainly€in€accord.€€Ìà ` àIn€effect,€my€colleagues€are€instructing€courts€to€turnÏtheir€backs€on€the€Secretaryððs€entirely€rational€invocation€of€theÏADA€standards€ð!ð€standards€which,€if€applied€as€construed€in€ADAÐ à0 Ðcases,€reasonably€effectuate€congressional€purpose€in€using€theÏterm€ð ðdisabilityðð€here.€€The€result€of€the€majorityððs€opinion€willÏbe€simply€to€destabilize€the€meaning€of€the€FMLA€in€an€areaÏrequiring€clarification,€not€greater€obscurity.€€The€only€futureÏguidance€the€majority€gives€to€litigants€and€the€courts€is€toÏð ðbalanceðð€and€presumably€to€follow€the€majorityððs€preference€forÏgranting€leaves€liberally€to€all€parents€with€sick€adult€children.€ÏThis€approach€effectively€reads€the€phrase€ð ðincapable€of€self„careÏbecause€of€...€disability,ðð€as€applied€solely€to€adult€children,Ïout€of€the€FMLA.€€I€see€no€proper€legal€justification€for€thisÏposition.à@ìì*ìàˆÐ '`", Ðâ âÐ  (ð#. ÐÓ  Óò òII.€€ó ó€Ð ° Ðâ âÓŠÓà ` àTo€be€sure,€in€reversing€the€district€court,€the€majorityÏsays€that€it€does€not€dispute€the€Secretaryððs€importation€of€theÏADA€and€its€concomitant€EEOC€regulations€into€the€FMLA.€€TheÏmajority€says€it€takes€issue€only€with€the€district€courtððsÏconsideration€of€the€EEOCððs€interpretive€guidance€in€its€analysisÏof€the€plaintiffððs€entitlement€to€FMLA€leave.€€In€particular,€theÏmajority€contends€that€it€was€error€for€the€district€court€to€relyÏon€the€EEOCððs€interpretive€guidance€that€a€ð ðtemporary,€non„chronicÏimpairmentðð€does€not€constitute€a€disability.€€29€C.F.R.€Pt.€1630,ÏApp€ðð€1630(h),€at€396.€€Such€reliance€was€error,€says€the€majority,Ïbecause€the€EEOCððs€interpretive€guidance,€issued€pursuant€to€itsÏown€regulations€promulgated€to€enforce€the€ADA,€merits€no€deferenceÏin€the€context€of€another,€distinct€statute,€such€as€the€FMLA.€ÏòòAnteóó€at€16„17€(citing€to€classic€administrative€law€jurisprudence,Ð à0 Ðsuch€as€òòChevronóó€and€òòSkidmoreóó,€as€modified€by€recent€Supreme€CourtÐ pÀ Ðcases,€such€as€òòMeadóó€and€òòChristensenóó).€€In€so€holding,€the€majorityÐ P  Ðseems€to€imply€either€that€the€EEOCððs€interpretive€rule€flies€inÏthe€face€of€the€FMLA€or€that€absent€reliance€on€the€EEOC€guidance,Ïthe€result€below€would€have€been€different.€€I€see€no€basis€forÏeither€position.€€€As€already€suggested,€and€as€further€discussed,Ïthe€ADAððs€durational€concepts,€as€clarified€in€the€EEOCððsÏinterpretive€guidance,€mesh€well€with€the€purpose€of€the€termÏð ðdisabilityðð€as€used€in€this€part€of€the€FMLA.€€Moreover,€I€fail€toÐ ð(@$. Ðsee€how€one€can€reject€the€EEOCððs€interpretive€guidance€withoutÏalso€rejecting€the€ADA€or€the€EEOCððs€regulation,€both€of€which€theÏSecretary€expressly€adopts€and€which€my€colleagues€do€notÏquestion.ñýññÿñ׃x×ñÿññÿñ׃0×ñÿññýññýñ׃"×ñýñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€result€of€the€majorityððs€opinion,€even€absentÐ ` ° Ðconsideration€of€the€EEOC€interpretive€guidance,€is€to€read€out€ofÏthe€Secretaryððs€and€the€EEOCððs€regulations€any€requirement€that€theÏplaintiff„parent€provide€some€evidence€of€the€duration€and€long„¼term€impact€of€their€childððs€impairment.€€This,€I€think,€we€are€notÏpermitted€to€do.€€I€explain€briefly.Ìà ` àLet€us€assume€òòarguendoóó,€in€line€with€my€brethrenððsÐ À Ðconclusion,€that€the€EEOC€interpretive€guidance€deserves€noÏdeference€(despite€my€own€belief€that€utilization€of€the€provisionÏis€entirely€sound,€òòseeóó€òòsupraóó€note€4).€€The€outcome,€in€my€view,Ð pÀ Ðwould€still€be€to€affirm€the€district€court€by€relying€solely€onÐ P Ðthe€ADA€standards€and€EEOC€regulations,€the€reasonableness€of€whichÏno€one€„„€not€even€my€colleagues€„„€disputes.Ìà ` àIn€finding€a€genuine€dispute€of€fact€as€to€whetherÏNavarroððs€daughter€is€disabled€within€the€meaning€of€the€FMLAÏ(òòi.e.óó,€within€the€meaning€of€the€ADA€minus€the€EEOC€interpretiveÐ ð @ Ðguidance),€the€majority€argues€that€the€balancing€required€of€theÏADA€and€EEOC€factors,€òòseeóó€òòsupraóó€note€3,€ð ðshould€not€be€treated€asÐ `  Ðsome€mandatory€checklist.ðð€€òòAnteóó€at€20.€€From€this,€the€majorityÐ  ð  Ðexplains€that€the€Supreme€Court€has€decided€that€each€factor€of€theÏð ðsubstantially€limitsðð€prong€as€illuminated€by€the€EEOC€ð ðshould€notÏbe€given€equal€weight.ðð€€òòAnteóó€at€21€(citing€òòSuttonóó€v.€òòUnited€AirÐ P  ÐLines,€Inc.óó,€527€U.S.€471,€481„82€(1999)).€€In€particular,€theÐ à0 Ðmajority€argues€that€the€durational€and€long„term€impact€factorsÏ(numbers€(ii)€and€(iii)€at€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(j)(2),€òòseeóó€òòsupraóó€noteÐ P Ð3òòóó)€should€not€be€accorded€ð ðtalismanic€effectðð.€€As€this€is€so€inÐ à Ðthe€ADA€context€where€the€label€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€is€the€touchstoneÏfor€any€relief€under€the€statute,€it€should€be€even€more€true,€theyÏsay,€in€the€FMLA€context,€given€that€the€FMLA€provides€only€short„¼term€relief€and€that€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€becomes€relevant€onlyÏwith€regards€to€relatively€rare€cases€in€which€FMLA€leave€isÏrequested€to€care€for€an€adult€child.€€A€proper€balancing€on€thisÏrecord€of€the€EEOC€factors€in€light€of€the€FMLAððs€distinct€purposeÏ(as€compared€with€the€ADA),€leads€the€majority€to€conclude€that€aÏâ âjury€could€find€that€Navarroððs€daughter€is€disabled€despite€Ô_ÔtheÐ  (ð#. Ðlack€of€evidence€that€her€impairment€would€last€beyond€the€threeÏweeks€remaining€in€her€pregnancy.Ìâ âà ` àThe€difficulty€with€this€analysis€is€that€it€disregardsÏthe€ADAððs€and€the€Ô_ÔEEOCÔ_Ôððs€requirement€that€some€consideration€beÏgiven€both€to€duration€and€long„term€or€permanent€impact.€€TheÏplaintiff€has€pointed€to€no€evidence€that€would€support€anÏinference€that€Navarroððs€daughter€would€not€fully€recover€upon€theÏbirth€of€her€child€from€her€pregnancy„induced€hypertension,€anÏimpairment€that€developed€in€her€thirty„sixth€week€of€pregnancy.€ÏAs€was€the€case,€the€record€shows€that€plaintiff€requested€leave€onÏOctober€14,€1997€to€begin€on€October€25,€1997.€€PlaintiffððsÏdaughter€gave€birth€on€October€26,€1997.€€The€only€evidence€offeredÏby€plaintiff€in€support€of€her€contention€that€her€daughterÏqualified€as€disabled€under€the€Ô_ÔFMLAÔ_Ô€was€a€physicianððs€certificateÏwherein€her€daughterððs€doctor€certified€that€ð ðNavarroððs€daughterÏwas€in€her€thirty„sixth€week€of€pregnancy,€was€suffering€from€high„¼blood€pressure,€and€had€been€placed€on€bed€rest€so€that€she€couldÏbring€her€fetus€to€term,€which€made€her€incapable€of€caring€for€herÏtwo€young€children.ðð€€As€the€district€court€stated€ð ð[Ô_Ôp]laintiffÔ_Ô[]Ïdoes€not€allege€that€[her]€daughter€was€suffering€from€high€bloodÏpressure€throughout€much€of€her€pregnancy,€or€that€her€conditionÏwould€have€any€long„term€or€permanent€impact.ðð€€€Without€more,Ïthere€is€simply€not€enough€evidence€to€raise€a€genuine€issue€ofÏmaterial€fact€as€to€the€existence€of€a€disability€as€defined€by€theÏADA,€unless,€of€course,€we€do€not€consider€duration€or€long„termÐ 0*€%0 ÐÔ_Ôimpact€at€all,€two€of€the€three€factors€the€ADAððs€regulationsÏrequire€a€court€to€consider.€Ìà ` àIn€disregarding€these€two€factors,€the€majority€contendsÏit€is€merely€ð ðbalancingðð€and,€in€so€doing,€according€little€weightÏto€the€duration€and€long„term€impact€prongs€in€view€of€the€FMLAððsÏpurpose.€€With€respect,€I€see€no€balancing€whatsoever€in€light€ofÏthe€total€absence€of€evidence,€as€described€above,€regarding€anyÏduration€or€long„term€impact€of€Navarroððs€daughterððs€hypertensionÏbeyond€the€three€weeks€left€in€her€pregnancy.€€Morever,€I€see€noÏbasis€for€the€court€to€rely€on€the€FMLAððs€broadly€stated€purposesÏ(òòe.g.óó,€balancing€ð ðthe€demands€of€the€workplace€with€the€needs€ofÐ P  Ðfamilies,ðð€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2601(b)(1)(ð ðPurposes€[for€the€FMLA]ðð))€as€aÏreason€to€accord€so€little€weight€to€two€of€the€three€EEOC€factorsÏ(if€any€weight€could€in€fact€be€given€on€this€bare€record).€€TheÏmajority€is,€in€effect,€using€the€FMLAððs€generally€stated€aims€toÏoverturn€what€are€otherwise€the€specifics€of€the€operation€of€theÏSecretaryððs€regulation.€€As€noted,€however,€Congress€seems€to€haveÏused€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð€deliberately€and€precisely€to€limit€inÏcertain€respects€the€granting€of€parental€leaves€in€situationsÏinvolving€adult€children.€€It€is€circular€reasoning€to€evade€thatÏdeliberate€limitation,€as€adduced€by€Congress€and€construed€by€theÏSecretary,€by€reference€to€nothing€more€than€bland€and€by€theirÏnature€imprecise€statutory€objectives.€€€Ìà ` àOn€this€record,€€applying€only€the€ADA€standards€and€itsÏEEOC€regulations€and€adducing€no€durational€or€long„term€impact€ofÐ 0*€%0 Ðplaintiffððs€daughterððs€impairment,€no€reasonable€jury€couldÏconclude€that€Navarroððs€adult€daughter€had€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€and€thatÏNavarro€was,€therefore€entitled€to€leave€to€care€for€her€under€theÏFMLA.ÌÌÓ  Óò òIII.ó óÐ € Ð  ÐÓW)Óà ` àAs€Congress€gives€the€parents€of€some€seriously€ill€adultÏchildren€a€statutory€right€to€leave€(their€children€having€aÏð ðdisabilityðð),€and€yet€denies€leave€to€other€parents€of€adultÏchildren€whose€situations€may€be€equally€disturbing€(their€children€Ïnot€having€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€but€being€nonetheless€seriously€ill),€òòanyóóÐ  ð Ðline„drawing€in€this€area€will€obviously€to€some€degree€beÏdiscomfiting.€€Unhappiness€over€this€dilemma€seems€to€be€theÏimpetus€behind€the€majority€opinion.€€Ìà ` àAs€an€antidote,€my€colleagues€have€created€a€legal€cureÏthat€is,€in€my€view,€worse€than€the€disease.€€They€have€rejectedÏthe€durational€aspects€of€the€ADA€definition€of€ð ðdisabilityðð,€thusÏblurring€the€line€drawn€in€the€FMLA€between€minor€children€andÏadult€children,€a€line€that€Congress€itself€inserted€into€theÏstatute.€€The€reasons€they€offer€for€doing€so€are€that€a€strictÏapplication€of€the€EEOC€factors€would,€in€their€opinion,€be€out€ofÏharmony€with€the€general€aims€of€the€FMLA€and€that,€under€the€ADA,Ïthe€Supreme€Court€has€mandated€ð ðbalancing.ðð€€For€the€reasons€statedÏin€Parts€I€and€II€of€this€dissenting€opinion,€however,€it€is€by€noÐ ð(@$. Ðmeans€obvious€that€this€lack€of€harmony€exists€or€that€a€properÏbalancing€does€not€lead€to€an€affirmance€of€the€district€courtððsÏjudgment.€€Congress€itself€added€the€disability€condition€to€leavesÏfor€parents€to€care€for€their€adult€children,€while€inserting€noÏsuch€condition€limiting€the€granting€of€leaves€to€care€for€parents,Ïminors€or€spouses.€€òòCompareóó€29€U.S.C.€ðð€2611(12)(B)(children€18Ð € Ð  Ðyears€of€age€or€older)€òòwithóó€29€U.S.C.€ððÐ `  Ð2611(7)(ð ðParentðð),(12)(A)(children€under€18€years€of€age)€andÏ(13)(ð ðSpouseðð).€€Thus,€by€using€the€term€ð ðdisabilityðð,€CongressÏrather€clearly€intended€to€place€special€limits,€not€imposed€forÏcare€of€other€family€members,€on€leaves€to€provide€parental€careÏfor€children€18€years€of€age€or€older€ð!ð€otherwise€why€require€thatÐ à0 Ðadult€children,€but€not€others,€be€ð ðincapable€of€self€care€becauseÏof€...€disabilityðð€in€addition€to€having€a€serious€health€conditionÏwhich€in€all€other€cases€would€alone€justify€a€leave?€€òòSeeóó€SenateÐ à ÐReport,€òòsupraóó.€€By€eviscerating€the€difference€Congress€clearlyÐ  p Ðintended€there€be€between€leave€policy€for€parents€to€care€forÏtheir€adult€children€and€leave€policy€for€parents€to€care€for€theirÏminor€children,€my€colleagues€ignore€the€strong€evidence€of€theÏcongressional€purpose€behind€the€FMLA€provision€at€issue.€ÏConsideration€of€the€record€in€light€of€the€statute€and€the€SenateÏReport€leads,€in€my€mind,€to€the€conclusion€that€summary€judgmentÏwas€properly€granted.Ìà ` àIn€sum,€without€much€clearer€evidence€of€congressionalÏpurpose€favoring€my€colleaguesðð€position,€I€see€no€basis€forÐ 0*€%0 Ðrejecting€a€textual€reading€of€the€Secretaryððs€directive€„„Ïadopting€the€ADA€and€the€EEOCððs€regulations€promulgated€thereunderÏ„„€as€the€basis€for€determining€whether€or€not€a€parent„employeeÏmay€take€leave€under€the€FMLA€to€care€for€an€adult€child.€€In€soÏsaying,€I€do€not€wish€to€imply€that,€had€I€been€in€Congress€whenÏthe€FMLA€was€enacted,€I€would€necessarily€have€favored€theÏdisability€distinction€that€Congress€inserted.€€As€a€matter€ofÏpolicy,€I€might€well€agree€with€my€colleagues€that€the€currentÏdisability€yardstick€is€a€rather€arbitrary€and€clumsy€way€toÏseparate€out€those€adult€children€entitled€to€be€cared€for€by€theirÏparents€under€the€FMLA€from€those€who€are€not.€€But,€as€judges,€ourÏown€philosophies€and€policy„choices€are€not€the€issue.€€TheÏquestions€here€are€what€Congress€wrote,€how€the€Secretary€of€LaborÏhas€exercised€her€power€under€the€statute,€whether€what€she€did€wasÏwithin€her€authority,€and,€finally,€whether€putting€that€allÏtogether,€the€district€court€construed€the€law€properly.€€I€amÏconstrained€to€believe€that€the€district€court€did€construe€the€lawÏwith€total€propriety.€€Indeed,€I€find€it€hard€to€see€how€theÏdistrict€court€could€have€read€the€statute€and€regulationsÏdifferently.€€This€is€not€an€obscure€or€ambiguous€statute€asÏregards€the€provision€in€issue.€€That€seems€to€me€to€end€theÏmatter,€however€any€one€of€us€might€have€acted€as€a€member€ofÏCongress€or€the€Secretary€of€Labor.€€€Ìà ` àUnwonted€activism€in€the€present€appeal€not€only€upsetsÏa€district€court€judgment€reached€by€application€of€the€appropriateÐ 0*€%0 Ðand€conventional€legal€rules,€it€creates€a€precedent€with€theÏpotential€for€serious€mischief,€since€our€decision€will€createÏconfusion€as€to€the€relevant€standard,€while€adherence€to€theÏSecretaryððs€directive€would€not.ñýññÿñ׃y×ñÿññÿñ׃3×ñÿññýññýñ׃(×ñýñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€If€Congress€were€to€be€persuadedÐ ` ° Ðin€the€future€that€the€Secretaryððs€interpretation€of€the€Act€is€tooÏnarrow,€or€that€its€own€language€needs€enlargement,€it€can€alwaysÏamend€the€FMLA;€€and,€of€course,€the€Secretary,€too,€can€rewriteÏher€regulations.€€These€well„established€remedies€would€come€tooÏlate,€to€be€sure,€to€assist€the€present€appellant,€but€I€think€theyÏbetter€serve€the€public€than€a€judicial€opinion€that€is€sure€toÏcreate€more€uncertainty€than€answers.Ìà ` àI€would€affirm€the€district€court.Ô#†tXã~X X1XŽßãÅ#Ô