ÿWPC*2 ×µ|›…2 Sº6‚S°,m3 “ˆØÇÃlê–é2eý‡v’pÊ"¦Ã,¶jÎÿâ%f¹™rßiˆÇ{¬LZ9øðp`0¦û=³ Pý{ɭݹÆòŸ–%§Ùw]ÀâØ,çO<ÎUÞOmºÂÊ ÖØgž¯£Ýayd_›=B(FÈÜiðo™;ÃkóOÈ1xK(þ-=œ‘Œ k[»Žµ%íY´›šªûéfõ•opH?×Î5ìÓgU·m|H ,#!h %‰ 0 D 0(ÓU:û 0Æ5UNûUFIòU>UB¿N b ò ý ÙŒ Eefgaiî}÷kobžÑåo<T^ Äœw@`4 ´Ã mÅòÜåÎ<³ ï"o~%÷í& Bä(î)žï*Ä,ÙQ/˜HP LaserJet 4,ü,,,,,ü0X(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó($¡¡<þ6X9`("Courier NewTT(d:2ëX$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóvÖr Z‹6Times New Roman Regular´¾½Q 9Z+‹.Courier New Regular èÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ö_XÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú*Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Of€the€District€of€Massachusetts,€sitting€by€designation.<è\( 9Z+&Courier Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- ù- èÝ ƒV«$ÝÓ=€Ö ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú*Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Of€the€District€of€Massachusetts,€sitting€by€designation. …Ý ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€151B,€ðð€4(1B)€provides€that€it€is€unlawful€"[Ô_Ôf]orÔ_Ô€anÐ ° Ðemployer€in€the€private€sector,€by€himself€or€his€agent,€because€ofÏthe€age€of€any€individual,€to€refuse€to€hire€or€employ€or€to€bar€orÏto€discharge€from€employment€such€individual,€or€to€discriminateÏagainst€such€individual€in€compensation€or€in€terms,€conditions€orÏprivileges€of€employment,€unless€based€upon€a€bona€fideÏoccupational€qualification."€€ ÏÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€29€U.S.C.€ðð€1132(c)(1)€provides€in€pertinent€part:€"AnyÐ ° Ðadministrator€.€.€.€who€fails€or€refuses€to€comply€with€a€requestÏfor€any€information€which€such€administrator€is€required€by€thisÏÔ_ÔsubchapterÔ_Ô€to€furnish€to€a€participant€or€beneficiary€.€.€.€may€inÏthe€court's€discretion€be€personally€liable€to€such€participant€orÏbeneficiary€in€the€amount€of€up€to€$100€a€day€from€the€date€of€suchÏfailure€or€refusal,€and€the€court€may€in€its€discretion€order€suchÏother€relief€as€it€deems€proper."øÀTABLE A äÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Section€301€of€the€Ô_ÔLMRAÔ_Ô€establishes€federal€jurisdiction€forÐ ° Ð"[Ô_Ôs]uitsÔ_Ô€for€violation€of€contracts€between€an€employer€and€a€laborÏorganization€representing€employees€in€an€industry€affectingÏcommerce."€29€U.S.C.€ðð€185(a).€€ íÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€152,€ðð€75B€provides€in€pertinent€part:€"No€employerÐ ° Ðor€duly€authorized€agent€of€an€employer€shall€discharge,€refuse€toÏhire€or€in€any€other€manner€discriminate€against€an€employeeÏbecause€the€employee€has€exercised€a€right€afforded€by€thisÏchapter."€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€152,€ðð€75B(2). eÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€151,€ðð€4(4)€makes€it€illegal€for€an€employer€"toÐ ° Ðdischarge,€expel€or€otherwise€discriminate€against€any€personÏbecause€he€has€.€.€.€filed€a€complaint." ”Ý ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô€provided€Ô_ÔNMRÔ_Ô€with€the€reports€of€Dr.€Maureen€NormanÐ ° Ðand€Dr.€George€Hazel€for€this€second€review.€€We€discuss€both€ofÏthese€reports€below. ÛÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€It€is€not€clear€from€the€record€when€Sullivan€applied€forÐ ° Ðworkers'€compensation.€€Because€the€decision€awarding€him€benefitsÏstates€that€Sullivan's€claim€was€Ô_ÔconferencedÔ_Ô€on€July€18,€1994,€weÏassume€that€his€application€was€dated€prior€to€that€time. 2Ý ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Although€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô€stated€in€its€letter€of€October€1997€thatÐ ° Ðit€was€"reinstating"€Sullivan's€claim€to€benefits€through€April€30,Ï1994€because€he€was€fully€disabled,€he€did€not€actually€receive€anyÏbenefits€under€the€plan€because€his€social€security€benefits€andÏworkers'€compensation€benefits€reduced€his€benefits€under€the€planÏto€zero.‚+Æ ºÝ ƒëX$ÝÓ  ÓÓ=€ÖXÐXdÐd=Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Putting€the€shortcomings€of€Dr.€Hazel's€evaluation€aside,Ð ° Ðhis€conclusion€that€Sullivan's€disability€is€permanent€does€notÏcompel€a€finding€that€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô's€termination€of€Sullivan's€benefitsÏwas€arbitrary€and€capricious.€€As€we€have€said,€sufficiency€of€theÏevidence€to€support€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô's€determination€"does€not€disappearÐ Ð   Ðmerely€by€reason€of€contradictory€evidence."€€òòDoyleóó,€144€F.3d€atÐ ° Ð184. KELMENEOEPEQRÓ€TUS‡+è¨Mˆ3|xUÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ èÝ ƒV«$ÝÓ=€Ö ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú*Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Of€the€District€of€Massachusetts,€sitting€by€designation. ÛÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€It€is€not€clear€from€the€record€when€Sullivan€applied€forÐ ° Ðworkers'€compensation.€€Because€the€decision€awarding€him€benefitsÏstates€that€Sullivan's€claim€was€Ô_ÔconferencedÔ_Ô€on€July€18,€1994,€weÏassume€that€his€application€was€dated€prior€to€that€time. 2Ý ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Although€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô€stated€in€its€letter€of€October€1997€thatÐ ° Ðit€was€"reinstating"€Sullivan's€claim€to€benefits€through€April€30,Ï1994€because€he€was€fully€disabled,€he€did€not€actually€receive€anyÏbenefits€under€the€plan€because€his€social€security€benefits€andÏworkers'€compensation€benefits€reduced€his€benefits€under€the€planÏto€zero. …Ý ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€151B,€ðð€4(1B)€provides€that€it€is€unlawful€"[Ô_Ôf]orÔ_Ô€anÐ ° Ðemployer€in€the€private€sector,€by€himself€or€his€agent,€because€ofÏthe€age€of€any€individual,€to€refuse€to€hire€or€employ€or€to€bar€orÏto€discharge€from€employment€such€individual,€or€to€discriminateÏagainst€such€individual€in€compensation€or€in€terms,€conditions€orÏprivileges€of€employment,€unless€based€upon€a€bona€fideÏoccupational€qualification."€€ eÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€151,€ðð€4(4)€makes€it€illegal€for€an€employer€"toÐ ° Ðdischarge,€expel€or€otherwise€discriminate€against€any€personÏbecause€he€has€.€.€.€filed€a€complaint." íÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Chapter€152,€ðð€75B€provides€in€pertinent€part:€"No€employerÐ ° Ðor€duly€authorized€agent€of€an€employer€shall€discharge,€refuse€toÏhire€or€in€any€other€manner€discriminate€against€an€employeeÏbecause€the€employee€has€exercised€a€right€afforded€by€thisÏchapter."€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€152,€ðð€75B(2). d äÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Section€301€of€the€Ô_ÔLMRAÔ_Ô€establishes€federal€jurisdiction€forÐ ° Ð"[Ô_Ôs]uitsÔ_Ô€for€violation€of€contracts€between€an€employer€and€a€laborÏorganization€representing€employees€in€an€industry€affectingÏcommerce."€29€U.S.C.€ðð€185(a).€€ ”Ý ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô€provided€Ô_ÔNMRÔ_Ô€with€the€reports€of€Dr.€Maureen€NormanÐ ° Ðand€Dr.€George€Hazel€for€this€second€review.€€We€discuss€both€ofÏthese€reports€below. ºÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€Putting€the€shortcomings€of€Dr.€Hazel's€evaluation€aside,Ð ° Ðhis€conclusion€that€Sullivan's€disability€is€permanent€does€notÏcompel€a€finding€that€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô's€termination€of€Sullivan's€benefitsÏwas€arbitrary€and€capricious.€€As€we€have€said,€sufficiency€of€theÏevidence€to€support€Ô_ÔMetLifeÔ_Ô's€determination€"does€not€disappearÐ Ð  / Ðmerely€by€reason€of€contradictory€evidence."€€òòDoyleóó,€144€F.3d€atÐ ° Ð184. ÏÝ ƒRÓ$ÝÓ=€–ÐXdÐd=ÓÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_Ô€29€U.S.C.€ðð€1132(c)(1)€provides€in€pertinent€part:€"AnyÐ ° Ðadministrator€.€.€.€who€fails€or€refuses€to€comply€with€a€requestÏfor€any€information€which€such€administrator€is€required€by€thisÏÔ_ÔsubchapterÔ_Ô€to€furnish€to€a€participant€or€beneficiary€.€.€.€may€inÏthe€court's€discretion€be€personally€liable€to€such€participant€orÏbeneficiary€in€the€amount€of€up€to€$100€a€day€from€the€date€of€suchÏfailure€or€refusal,€and€the€court€may€in€its€discretion€order€suchÏother€relief€as€it€deems€proper."Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTRXà3Ø'Xà3Ø' Letter3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÑ ? ÑÙ*ƒ !ÙÔ€X XXXÔÔ€°•°XX Ôò òÓ  ÓÓ  ÓUnited€States€Court€of€AppealsÔ€„ïׄ°°•ÔÐ ° ÐFor€the€First€Circuitó óÔ€„?v„„„ï×ÔÔ€XåâX„„?vÔÐ „Ô ÐÓ÷ÓÌÌßA€') °°` dE< ` AßÐ  à ÐÌÌNo.€00„2551ÌÌà@xx!ìàDONALD€E.€SULLIVAN,ˆÌÌà@ ìàPlaintiff,€Appellant,ˆÌÌà@tt)ìàv.ˆÌÌÓ  Óà@@,,"ìàRAYTHEON€COMPANY,ÌRAYTHEON€DISABILITY€TRUST,€ANDÌMETROPOLITAN€LIFE€INSURANCE€COMPANY,ÌÓ ÓÌà@ÄÄìàDefendants,€Appellees.ˆÌÌßA€') °°` dE<þ` AßÐ ÿO ÐÌÓ  Óà@@œ œ ìàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€UNITED€STATES€DISTRICT€COURTÌÌFOR€THE€DISTRICT€OF€MASSACHUSETTSÌÌ[Hon.€Mark€L.€Wolf,€òòU.S.€District€Judgeóó]Ð <Œ ÐÓ§ÓÌßA€') °°` dE<ç` AßÐ è8 ÐÌà@„„'ìàBeforeˆÌÌÓ  Óà@@((ìà€Torruella€and€Lipez,€òòCircuit€Judgesóó,Ð yÉ! Ðand€Stearns,€òòDistrict€Judgeóó.ñQññRñ׃ ×ñRññRñ׃!×ñRññQññQñ׃×ñQñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú*Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð O Ÿ" ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<ú!` AßÐ û!K$ ÐÌÓ  ÓÓ  Óà  àòòFrederick€T.€Ô_ÔGolderÔ_Ôóó,€with€whom€òòBernstein,€Ô_ÔGolderÔ_Ô€&€Miller,Ð à"0& ÐP.A.óó,€was€on€brief€for€appellant.Ð ¶#' Ðà  àòòStephen€S.€Churchillóó,€with€whom€òòJames€F.€Ô_ÔKavanaughÔ_Ô,€Jr.óó€andÐ Œ$Ü( ÐòòConn,€Ô_ÔKavanaughÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔRosenthalÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔPeischÔ_Ô€&€Ford,€Ô_ÔLLPÔ_Ôóó€were€on€brief€forÐ b%² ) ÐappelleeñTñsñTñ.ÌÌÌÔ*‹ƒ'ddd Xdd Xdd X°(#°(#‹ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ+  ÔÐ  º( $- ‹‹ÐÓtÓÐ 0&)n$. „„‹‹0ÐÌâ âñUñAugust€29.€Ô_Ô2001ñUñÔ_ÔÌÐ 0&!Ê*&1" ‹‹0Ðâ âÐ," )n$2 ? ,ÐÔ_ÔÙ* !ÙØØÑ  ÑñRñÓ=€Ö ÐXdÐd=ÓñRñÓÓÑ8€ ö_ XXdÈXXdÈ8ÑÑ€ ÑÓ*°,X°` ¨ ƒX°œX*ÓÝ ƒÿÝÝ  ÝÔ‡ Xö_XXXåâÔà ` àò òòòóóLIPEZ,€òòCircuit€Judgeó óóó.€€Donald€Sullivan€appeals€from€theÐ ° Ðjudgment€of€the€district€court€granting€summary€judgment€in€favorÏof€his€employer,€Raytheon,€on€claims€of€employment€discriminationÏand€violations€of€the€Employee€Retired€Income€Security€Act€(ERISA).€ÏSullivan€alleges€that€Raytheon€discriminated€against€him€on€theÏbasis€of€disability€and€age€in€refusing€to€reinstate€him€to€hisÏposition€at€Raytheon.€€Sullivan€also€argues€that€Raytheon's€failureÏto€reinstate€him€constituted€discriminatory€retaliation€forÏSullivan's€application€for€workers'€compensation€benefits€and€hisÏfiling€a€charge€with€the€Massachusetts€Commission€AgainstÏDiscrimination€(MCAD).€€In€addition,€Sullivan€asserts€that€RaytheonÏand€the€claims€administrator€of€Raytheon's€long€term€disabilityÏbenefits€plan,€Metropolitan€Life€Insurance€Company€(MetLife),Ïwrongly€denied€his€application€for€disability€benefits€and€violatedÏERISA€in€not€furnishing€him€documents€about€Raytheon's€disabilityÏplan.€€Finding€no€error€in€the€determinations€of€the€districtÏcourt,€we€affirm.€ÌÓ  Óò òI.€Backgroundó óÐ à" ÐÓTÓà ` àSullivan€began€his€employment€as€a€security€guard€withÏRaytheon€in€1965.€€Between€1971€and€1990,€he€suffered€sevenÏindustrial€accidents€that€caused€injuries€to€his€neck,€lower€back,Ïand€legs.€€Sullivan€sought€medical€treatment€for€some€of€theseÏinjuries€and€occasionally€missed€work.€€Shortly€after€Sullivan'sÏseventh€accident€in€1990,€his€absenteeism€from€work€increased.€Ïâ âAfter€giving€him€a€written€warning€in€June€1990€and€imposing€aÐ Ð* &0 Ðsuspension€for€abuse€of€Raytheon's€sick€leave€policy€in€SeptemberÏ1991,€Raytheon€terminated€Sullivan's€employment€on€March€31,€1992.Ìâ âà ` àSullivan€filed€a€grievance€pursuant€to€the€collectiveÏbargaining€agreement€between€Raytheon€and€his€union,€the€RaytheonÏGuards€Association€(the€Union),€challenging€his€termination.€€AfterÏa€hearing€on€August€10,€1995,€the€arbitrator€found€that€SullivanÏhad€been€terminated€without€just€cause.€€However,€noting€that€"onÏa€current€and€prospective€basis,€[Sullivan]€is€not€able€to€work,"Ïthe€arbitrator€ordered€Sullivan€reinstated€retroactive€to€March€31,Ï1992€on€"inactive€employment€status"€so€that€Sullivan€could€applyÏfor€disability€benefits€under€Raytheon's€long€term€disability€planÏ(the€LTD€plan).€€Shortly€after€the€arbitrator's€decision,€SullivanÏwrote€to€Raytheon€and€requested€information€about€the€long„termÏdisability€plan€so€that€he€could€apply€for€benefits.Ìà ` àUnder€Raytheon's€LTD€plan,€benefits€are€payable€forÏtwenty„four€months€for€an€employee€who€is€"fully€disabled";€theyÏare€payable€indefinitely€for€an€employee€who€is€"totally€disabled."€ÏIn€statements€provided€to€plan€participants,€employees€are€informedÏthat€they€are€fully€disabled€if€"because€of€a€sickness€or€an€injuryÏyou€cannot€do€your€job."€€An€employee€is€totally€disabled€ifÏ"because€of€sickness€or€injury:€(a)€you€can€not€do€your€job;€andÏ(b)€you€can€not€do€any€other€job€for€which€you€are€fit€by€yourÏeducation,€your€training,€or€your€experience."€Ìà ` àSullivan€submitted€an€application€for€long„termÏdisability€benefits€in€November€1995.€€MetLife,€the€claimsÏadministrator€responsible€for€determining€a€participant'sÐ À+'2 Ðeligibility€under€the€plan,€denied€his€claim€in€March€1996.€ÏMetlife€stated€that€there€was€"inadequate€evidence€of€a€disablingÏcondition€that€would€prevent€him€from€performing€his€occupation€asÏa€Guard€from€April€1,€1992€through€the€present."€€In€addition,ÏMetLife€concluded€that€Sullivan's€application€for€benefits€wasÏuntimely.€€Sullivan€appealed€the€denial€of€benefits€to€MetLife.Ìà ` àSullivan€also€applied€for€workers'€compensationÏbenefits.ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃"×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€On€August€4,€1994,€an€administrative€law€judge€for€theÐ  ð  ÐMassachusetts€Department€of€Industrial€Accidents€(DIA)€found€thatÏSullivan€was€partially€disabled€as€of€March€22,€1992,€and€totallyÏdisabled€as€of€October€12,€1994.€€Sullivan€received€workers'Ïcompensation€benefits€until€1998,€when€he€exhausted€his€entitlementÏto€them.Ìà ` àSullivan€requested€reinstatement€to€Raytheon€by€letterÏdated€June€18,€1996.€€In€that€letter,€he€stated€that€either€he€wasÏtotally€disabled,€in€which€case€he€should€receive€long„termÏdisability€benefits,€or€he€was€not€disabled,€in€which€case€heÏsought€reinstatement€to€a€position€with€or€without€reasonableÏaccommodation.€€By€letter€dated€July€10,€1996,€Raytheon€advisedÏSullivan€that€it€would€not€consider€reinstating€him€until€afterÏMetLife€considered€Sullivan's€appeal€from€its€denial€of€his€claimÏfor€benefits.€€Sullivan€filed€a€charge€of€discrimination€with€theÏMCAD€on€October€9,€1996.Ð '`", Ðà ` àOn€October€17,€1997,€MetLife€determined€that€Sullivan€wasÏfully€disabled€for€the€first€twenty„four€months€of€his€disabilityÏthrough€April€30,€1994€because€he€was€not€capable€of€performing€hisÏjob€as€a€security€guard,€and€thus€entitled€to€benefits€during€thatÏtime.ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃#×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€this€respect,€MetLife's€decision€of€October€1997Ð ð @ Ðdiffered€from€its€denial€of€benefits€in€March€1996.€€However,ÏMetLife€affirmed€its€previous€determination€that€Sullivan€was€notÏtotally€disabled€because€he€was€not€disabled€from€all€occupationsÏfor€which€he€was€fit€by€his€training€or€experience.€€Accordingly,ÏMetLife€terminated€his€benefits.€€Sullivan's€appeal€of€thatÏdetermination€to€MetLife€was€denied.Ìà ` àSullivan€filed€suit€in€Massachusetts€Superior€Court€onÏNovember€3,€1998.€€His€three„count€complaint€included€the€followingÏclaims:€(1)€that€Raytheon€discriminated€against€him€on€the€basis€ofÏdisability€and€age€and€engaged€in€discriminatory€retaliation€inÏviolation€of€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€151B;€(2)€that€Raytheon€retaliatedÏagainst€him€for€filing€a€worker's€compensation€claim€in€violationÏof€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€152,€ðð€75B;€and€(3)€that€Raytheon€violatedÏhis€rights€under€the€Employees€Retirement€Income€Security€ActÏ(ERISA),€29€U.S.C.€ðð€1140.€€Raytheon€removed€the€case€to€federalÏâ âdistrict€court.Ð ð#@( Ðà ` àIn€October€1999,€the€district€court€granted€Raytheon'sÏâ âmotion€to€dismiss€the€retaliation€claims€in€count€one€and€two.€ÏÔ#†XÅžXX XÖí #ÔÔ‡XÖXXXÅžÔBecause€the€parties€submitted€evidence€outside€the€pleadings€inÐ Ð  Ðarguing€this€motion,€we€treat€the€district€court's€ruling€as€one€onÏsummary€judgment.€€òòSeeóó€òòDavisóó€v.€òòLucent€Tech.,€Inc.óó,€251€F.3d€227,Ð ð @ Ð231€(1st€Cir.€2001).Ô#†XÅžXXXÖŽ&#ÔÔ‡ XÖXXXÅžÔ€€The€district€court€granted€summary€judgmentÐ € Ð  Ðin€favor€of€Raytheon€on€the€remaining€counts€in€October€2000.€ÏSullivan€appeals€these€rulings.ÌÓ  Óò òII.€Claims€of€Discriminationó óÐ 0€  ÐÓ¤(Óò òó óà ` àSullivan€argues€that€the€district€court€erred€in€grantingÐ ` Ðsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€Raytheon€on€his€claims€of€disabilityÏand€age€discrimination€and€retaliation.€€We€review€the€districtÏcourt's€entry€of€summary€judgment€de€novo,€viewing€the€record€inÏthe€light€most€favorable€to€Sullivan.€€òòSeeóó€òòSantiago„Ramosóó€v.Ð P  ÐòòCentennial€P.R.€Wireless€Corp.óó,€217€F.3d€46,€52€(1st€Cir.€2000).€Ð à0 Ð"Summary€judgment€is€appropriate€only€if€'there€is€no€genuine€issueÏas€to€any€material€fact'€and€'the€moving€party€is€entitled€toÏjudgment€as€a€matter€of€law.'"€òòId.óó€(quoting€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€56Ð à" Ð(c)).Ìò òA.€Disability€Discriminationó óÐ °"& Ðà ` àTo€establish€a€prima€facie€case€of€disabilityÏdiscrimination€under€chapter€151B€of€Massachusetts€law,€SullivanÏmust€demonstrate€that€he€is€a€"qualified€handicapped€person."€€òòSeeóóÐ °'#, ÐòòAugustóó€v.€òòOffices€Unlimited,€Inc.óó,€981€F.2d€576,€580€(1st€Cir.Ð @)$. Ð1992);€òòLabonteóó€v.€òòHutchins€&€Wheeleróó,€678€N.E.2d€853,€859€(Mass.Ð Ð* &0 Ð1997).€€Chapter€151B€defines€this€term€as€"a€handicapped€person€whoÐ `,°'2 Ðis€capable€of€performing€the€essential€functions€of€a€particularÏjob,€or€who€would€be€capable€of€performing€the€essential€functionsÏof€a€particular€job€with€reasonable€accommodation€to€his€handicap."€ÏMass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€151B,€ðð€1(16).€€Thus,€Sullivan€must€demonstrateÏthat€he€is€capable€of€performing,€with€or€without€reasonableÏaccommodation,€the€essential€functions€of€the€position€of€securityÏguard€at€Raytheon.€Ìà ` àAs€the€district€court€noted€in€its€written€memorandum€andÏorder,€Sullivan€has€"continually€and€consistently€claimed€that€heÏwas€totally€disabled."€€In€a€1994€deposition,€Sullivan€stated€thatÏhe€believed€he€was€totally€disabled€from€March€1992€(when€RaytheonÏterminated€his€employment)€to€the€present€time.€€In€anotherÏdeposition€six€years€later,€Sullivan€stated€that€his€condition€hadÏstayed€the€same€or€worsened€since€his€1994€deposition.€€SullivanÏalso€represented€that€he€was€disabled€in€applications€for€socialÏsecurity€disability€insurance€and€workers'€compensation€benefits.€ÏAdditionally,€he€stated€on€his€tax€returns€for€the€years€1995Ïthrough€1998€that€his€occupation€was€"disabled."€€Ìà ` àThese€claims€of€disability€do€not€necessarily€precludeÏSullivan's€ability€to€argue€now€that€he€is€capable€of€performingÏhis€job€with€reasonable€accommodation.€€òòSeeóó€òòClevelandóó€v.€òòPolicyÐ ð#@( ÐMgmt.€Sys.€Corp.óó,€526€U.S.€795,€797€(1999)€(holding€that€pursuit€ofÐ €%Ð * Ðbenefits€under€Social€Security€Disability€Insurance€(SSDI)€"doesÏnot€automatically€estop€the€recipient€from€pursuing€an€ADA€claim").€ÏHowever,€to€defeat€Raytheon's€motion€for€summary€judgment,€SullivanÏmust€explain€why€the€representations€of€total€disability€he€hasÐ À+'2 Ðmade€in€the€past€are€consistent€with€his€current€claim€that€heÏcould€perform€the€essential€functions€of€a€security€guard€atÏRaytheon€with€reasonable€accommodation.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€798€("ToÐ Ð  Ðsurvive€a€defendant's€motion€for€summary€judgment,€[the€plaintiff]Ïmust€explain€why€that€SSDI€contention€is€consistent€with€her€ADAÏclaim€that€she€could€'perform€the€essential€functions'€of€herÏprevious€job,€at€least€with€'reasonable€accommodation.'").€ÏSullivan€has€offered€no€evidence€to€explain€this€discrepancy.€ÏAccordingly,€Sullivan€has€not€demonstrated€that€he€is€a€"qualifiedÏhandicapped€person"€for€purposes€of€chapter€151B,€and€summaryÏjudgment€in€favor€of€Raytheon€was€proper.€€òòSeeóó€òòAugustóó,€981€F.2d€atÐ P  Ð584€("Having€conceded€that€he€was€totally€disabled€at€all€relevantÏtimes,€[the€plaintiff]€cannot€now€establish€that€he€was€aÏ'qualified€handicapped€person'€and€thus€cannot€make€the€òòprimaóó€òòfacieóóÐ P Ðcase€required€to€prevail€on€his€claim€under€Mass.€Gen.€LñKññHñañHññKññLñ.ñLññKññJñ.ñJññKñ€ch.€151B,Ïðð€4(16).").€€òòCompareóó€òòD'Aprileóó€v.€òòFleet€Servs.€Corp.óó,€92€F.3d€1,€5Ð  p Ð(1st€Cir.€1996)€(rejecting€the€reasoning€of€òòAugustóó€where€theÐ °  Ðplaintiff€"never€claimed€to€have€been€totally€disabled€during€theÏtime€she€requested€her€accommodation,€and€demonstrated€her€abilityÏto€work€with€the€accommodation€she€requested").€€Ìà ` àSullivan€also€contends€that€the€district€court€erred€inÏgranting€summary€judgment€because€Raytheon€did€not€engage€in€"anÏinteractive€process"€with€Sullivan€to€determine€an€appropriateÏaccommodation€that€would€allow€him€to€return€to€his€position€as€aÏsecurity€guard.€€As€Raytheon€points€out,€the€ADA's€interpretiveÏregulations€"may€require€an€employer€'to€initiate€an€informal,Ð À+'2 Ðinteractive€process'€with€the€individual€seeking€accommodation."€Ð ° ÐòòSoto„Ocasioóó€v.€òòFederal€Express€Corp.óó,€150€F.3d€14,€19€(1st€Cir.Ð @ Ð1998)€(quoting€29€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(o)(3)).€€However,€there€is€noÏsuch€requirement€under€Massachusetts€law€in€chapter€151B.€ÏMoreover,€even€if€Raytheon€were€required€to€have€engaged€SullivanÏin€such€an€interactive€process,€we€found€in€òòSoto„Ocasioóó€that€anÐ € Ð  Ðinteractive€process€is€not€necessary€where,€as€here,€no€reasonableÏtrier€of€fact€could€have€found€that€the€employee€was€capable€ofÏperforming€the€job,€with€or€without€reasonable€accommodation,€forÏwhich€he€was€seeking€reinstatement.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€€Because€Sullivan€hasÐ À Ðpresented€no€evidence€to€indicate€that€he€was€capable€of€returningÏto€work€as€a€security€guard,€even€with€a€reasonable€accommodation,ÏRaytheon€was€not€required€to€engage€with€him€in€an€interactiveÏprocess.Ìò òB.€Age€Discriminationó óÐ à Ðà ` àSullivan€also€appeals€the€district€court's€entry€ofÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€Raytheon€on€his€claim€of€ageÏdiscrimination€under€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€151B,€ðð€4(1B).ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃$×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€SullivanÐ à" Ðalleged€in€his€complaint€that€he€was€more€than€forty€years€old€atÏthe€time€Raytheon€refused€to€reinstate€him€and€that€Raytheon€"hiredÏyounger€persons€to€fill€positions€for€which€Sullivan€was€qualifiedÐ @$( Ðto€fill."€€To€establish€a€prima€facie€case€of€discrimination€underÏthis€statute,€Sullivan€must€prove€"by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence€that€(1)€he€was€a€member€of€the€protected€class;€(2)€heÏwas€qualified€for€the€position€in€question;€(3)€he€was€denied€theÏposition;€and€(4)€his€employer€sought€to€fill€the€position€byÏhiring€a€younger€individual€with€qualifications€similar€to€those€ofÏthe€plaintiff."€€òòLehmanóó€v.€òòPrudential€Ins.€Co.€of€Am.óó,€74€F.3d€323,Ð `  Ð327„28€(1st€Cir.€1996)€(footnote€omitted).€€As€we€have€explained€inÏour€discussion€of€his€claim€for€disability€discrimination,€SullivanÏfailed€to€show€that€he€was€qualified€for€the€position€he€sought€atÏRaytheon.€€Accordingly,€he€cannot€establish€a€prima€facie€case€ofÏage€discrimination,€and€the€district€court€properly€enteredÏjudgment€in€favor€of€Raytheon.Ìò òC.€Discriminatory€Retaliationó óÐ P Ðà ` àò ò1.€Retaliation€for€filing€a€charge€of€discriminationó óÐ à0 Ðà ` àSullivan€further€claims€that€Raytheon€violated€his€rightsÏunder€chapter€151B,€ðð€4(4)ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃%×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€by€engaging€in€retaliatoryÐ P   Ðdiscrimination€in€not€reinstating€him€after€he€filed€a€charge€ofÏdiscrimination€with€the€MCAD.€€To€establish€a€prima€facie€case€forÏretaliation,€Sullivan€had€to€show€that:€(1)€he€engaged€in€conductÏprotected€under€Massachusetts€or€federal€law;€(2)€he€"suffered€anÏadverse€employment€action";€and€(3)€"a€causal€connection€existedÏbetween€the€protected€conduct€and€the€adverse€action."€òòóó€òòMcMillanóó€v.Ð °'#, ÐòòMass.€Soc'y€for€the€Prevention€of€Cruelty€to€Animalsóó,€140€F.3d€288,Ð ° Ð309€(1st€Cir.€1998).€€Sullivan's€claim€falters€on€the€third€prongÏof€this€test.€€He€has€not€demonstrated€a€causal€connection€betweenÏhis€protected€conduct€€„€filing€a€charge€of€discrimination€with€theÏMassachusetts€Commission€Against€Discrimination€in€OctoberñNñ,ñNñ€1996€„Ïand€Raytheon's€refusal€to€reinstate€him€to€his€position€as€aÏsecurity€guard€in€JulyñMñ,ñMñ€1996.€€Indeed,€Sullivan€concedes€thisÏchronology€in€the€facts€section€of€his€brief€when€he€states:€"WhenÏSullivan€was€not€given€disability€benefits,€and€was€not€reinstatedÏto€a€suitable€position€at€Raytheon,€he€filed€a€Charge€ofÏDiscrimination€with€the€Massachusetts€Commission€againstÏDiscrimination€on€October€9,€1996."€€Because€Sullivan's€protectedÏaction€„€filing€a€charge€of€discrimination€„€occurred€òòafteróó€theÐ pÀ Ðadverse€employment€action,€we€affirm€the€district€court's€entry€ofÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€Raytheon€on€the€retaliation€claim.€Ìà ` àò ò2.€Retaliation€for€filing€for€workers'€compensationó óÐ  p Ðà ` àSullivan€also€claims€that€the€district€court€should€notÏhave€dismissed€his€claim€under€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€152,€ðð€75B.ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃&×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рà" ÐSection€75B€"bars€discrimination€against€qualified€handicappedÏworkers€exercising€their€rights€under€the€workers'€compensationÏlaw,€which€includes€procedures€for€filing€claims€for€injuries,Ïreceiving€payments,€and€determining€re„employment."€€òòFantóó€v.€òòNewÐ Ð% !* ÐEngland€Power€Serv.€Co.óó,€239€F.3d€8,€13€(1st€Cir.€2001).€€TheÐ ° Ðdistrict€court€found€that€this€state€law€claim€was€preempted€underÏsection€301€of€the€Labor€Management€Relations€Act€(LMRA),€29€U.S.C.Ïðð€185.ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃(×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€We€agree.Ð ` ° Ðà ` à"Section€301€[of€the€LMRA]€completely€preempts€a€stateÏlaw€claim,€'if€the€resolution€of€[the]€state„law€claim€depends€uponÏthe€meaning€of€a€collective€bargaining€agreement.'"€€òòMagereróó€v.Ð `  ÐòòJohn€Sexton€&€Co.óó,€912€F.2d€525,€528€(1st€Cir.€1990)€(alteration€inÐ  ð  Ðoriginal)€(quoting€òòLingleóó€v.€òòNorge€Division€of€Magic€Chef,€Inc.óó,Ð 0€  Ð486€U.S.€399,€405„06€(1988)).€€With€respect€to€the€MassachusettsÏworkers'€compensation€statute,€"the€protections€of€ðð€75B€areÏsubordinate€to€the€terms€of€any€collective€bargaining€agreement"Ïbetween€Sullivan's€union€and€Raytheon.€€òòFantóó,€239€F.3d€at€14.€€òòSeeóóÐ pÀ Ðòòalsoóó€òòMagereróó,€912€F.2d€at€529€("[S]uch€claims€[under€section€75B]Ð P Ðare,€by€the€express€terms€of€the€statute,€subject€to€the€terms€ofÏany€applicable€collective€bargaining€agreement.").€€The€statuteÏprovides:€"In€the€event€that€any€right€set€forth€in€this€section€isÏinconsistent€with€an€applicable€collective€bargaining€agreement,Ïsuch€agreement€shall€prevail."€€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€152,€ðð€75B(3).€ÏWe€have€said€that€this€language€ÌÓÓà8 ` àmakes€clear€that€to€the€extent€that€theÏcollective€bargaining€agreement€providesÏstandards€to€govern€the€conduct€underlyingÏplaintiff's€retaliatory€discharge€claim,€theÏclaim€will€be€governed€by€the€standards€of€theÏagreement,€rather€than€by€the€standards€of€ch.Ð Ø'(#- Ð152€ðð€75B.€€And€to€that€extent,€claims€underÏsection€75B€will€require€interpretation€of€theÏagreement€and,€therefore,€will€be€preempted€byÏSection€301.€ÓrUÓòòÐX` x` x ÐMagereróó,€912€F.2d€at€529.€€We€need€not€find€explicitly€that€theÐ ˜è Ðcollective€bargaining€agreement€at€issue€here€is€inconsistent€withÏsection€75B€to€find€Sullivan's€claim€under€that€statute€preempted.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòFantóó,€239€F.3d€at€16.€€In€similar€circumstances,€we€have€foundÐ H ˜  Ðclaims€under€section€75B€preempted€"not€because€the€collectiveÏbargaining€agreement€òòisóó€inconsistent€with€the€state€claimsÐ h¸  Ðasserted,€but€because€it€òòmayóó€be€so€and€requires€interpretation."€òòóóÐ øH  ÐòòMartinóó€v.€òòShaw's€Supermarkets,€Inc.óó,€105€F.3d€40,€44€(1st€Cir.Ð ˆØ Ð1997);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòFantóó,€239€F.3d€at€16€(finding€retaliation€claimÐ h Ðbrought€under€section€75B€preempted€by€the€LMRA).€€Ìà ` àHere,€the€collective€bargaining€agreement€betweenÏRaytheon€and€the€Union€contained€a€management€rights€clauseÏproviding€that€"the€management€and€control€of€the€Company'sÏbusiness€and€operations,€working€force€and€plant,€as€well€as€theÏdirection,€supervision€and€assignment€of€duties€of€the€Guards,€isÏvested€exclusively€in€the€management€of€the€Company."€€This€broadÏgrant€of€supervisory€discretion€to€Raytheon€could€conflict€with€theÏprovisions€of€section€75B€that€place€limits€on€Raytheon's€abilityÏto€refuse€to€reinstate€employees€after€they€have€filed€a€claim€forÏworkers'€compensation€benefits.€€Because€we€would€have€to€interpretÏthe€agreement€to€determine€whether€this€clause€conflicts€withÏsection€75B,€Sullivan's€claim€is€preempted.€€òòSeeóó€òòMartinóó,€105€F.3dÐ h)¸$/ Ðat€43„44€(finding€claim€under€chapter€75B€preempted€because€of€aÏpotential€conflict€with€the€management€rights€clause€of€theÐ ˆ,Ø'3 Ðcollective€bargaining€agreement);€òòMagereróó,€912€F.2d€at€530€(findingÐ ° Ðthat€management€rights€clause€"could€be€construed€to€govern€theÏconduct€underlying€plaintiff's€retaliatory€discharge€claim").€ÏTherefore,€the€district€court€correctly€concluded€that€Sullivan'sÏsection€75B€claim€was€preempted€by€ðð€301€of€the€LMRA.Ìà ` àWe€have€recognized€that€this€outcome€„€finding€a€claimÏunder€chapter€75B€preempted€because€of€a€òòpotentialóó€conflict€withÐ `  Ðthe€management€rights€clause€in€a€collective€bargaining€agreement€„Ïseems€"faintly€troubling."€€òòMartinóó,€105€F.3d€at€44.€€However,€theÐ 0€  Ðunion€may€bargain€to€avoid€this€outcome€in€the€future:ÌÓÓà8 ` àIf€all€else€fails,€the€union€is€free€toÏnegotiate€language€that€eliminates€this€issueÏthe€next€time€it€renews€its€labor€agreement.€.Ï.€.€All€that€it€would€take€to€preventÏpreemption€is€an€explicit€provision€statingÏthat€nothing€in€the€agreement€is€intended€toÏcreate€management€rights€inconsistent€with€anyÏworkers'€rights€under€sections€75A€and€75B.Ó4aÓòòÐÈ` x` x ÐId.óó€€Moreover,€even€if€we€found€that€Sullivan's€claim€under€chapterÐ X¨ Ð75B€was€not€preempted,€no€rational€factfinder€could€infer€aÏdiscriminatory€animus€on€Raytheon's€part€because€Raytheon€refusedÏto€reinstate€him€more€than€two€years€after€Sullivan€filed€forÏworkers'€compensation.€€òòSeeóó€òòMesnickóó€v.€òòGen.€Elec.€Co.óó,€950€F.2dÐ ˜!è% Ð816,€828€(1st€Cir.€1991)€(finding€that€period€of€nine€monthsÏ"suggests€the€absence€of€a€causal€connection€between€theÏstatutorily€protected€conduct€and€the€adverse€employment€action").€Ìò òÓ  ÓIII.€Termination€of€Benefitsó óÐ Ø'(#- ÐÓ"eÓà ` àThe€district€court€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€ofÏRaytheon,€MetLife,€and€the€Trust€with€respect€to€Sullivan's€claimÐ H+˜&1 Ðthat€MetLife's€termination€of€his€disability€benefits€was€arbitraryÏand€capricious.€€The€parties€agree€that€MetLife€had€discretion€toÏdetermine€Sullivan's€eligibility€for€benefits.€€Where€a€benefitsÏplan€grants€discretionary€authority€to€the€plan€administrator,€weÏreview€the€administrator's€decisions€to€determine€whether€they€areÏarbitrary€and€capricious.€€òòSeeóó€òòPari„Fasanoóó€v.€òòITT€Hartford€Life€&Ð € Ð  ÐAccident€Ins.€Co.óó,€230€F.3d€415,€418€(1st€Cir.€2000);€òòTerryóó€v.Ð `  ÐòòBayer€Corp.óó,€145€F.3d€28,€40€(1st€Cir.€1998).€€"This€standard€meansÐ  ð  Ðthat€[the€administrator's]€decision€will€be€upheld€if€it€was€withinÏ[the€administrator's]€authority,€reasoned,€and€'supported€byÏsubstantial€evidence€in€the€record.'"€òòDoyleóó€v.€òòPaul€Revere€LifeÐ P  ÐIns.€Co.óó,€144€F.3d€181,€184€(1st€Cir.€1998)€(quoting€òòAssociatedÐ à0 ÐFisheries€of€Maine,€Inc.óó€v.€òòDaleyóó,€127€F.3d€104,€109€(1st€Cir.Ð pÀ Ð1997)).€€Substantial€evidence€exists€if€it€is€"reasonablyÏsufficient€to€support€a€conclusion."€€òòId.óó€€Ð à Ðà ` àThere€is€evidence€in€the€record€that€is€reasonablyÏsufficient€to€support€MetLife's€conclusion€that€Sullivan€was€notÏdisabled€from€all€occupations€for€which€he€was€fit€to€perform€byÏhis€training€and€experience.€€Network€Medical€Review€completed€aÏreview€of€Sullivan's€claim€file€in€SeptemberñOñ,ñOñ€1996.€€Based€onÏSullivan's€copious€medical€records,€NMR€concluded:€"The€medicalÏevidence,€both€subjective€and€objective,€would€support€a€sedentaryÏwork€environment€for€Mr.€Sullivan.€.€.€.€[A]€sedentary€workÏenvironment€would€not€significantly€exacerbate€this€claimant'sÏdiscomfort€or€pain,€and€would€not€cause€further€worsening€of€hisÏmedical€conditions."€€MetLife€asked€NMR€to€review€Sullivan's€fileÐ À+'2 Ðagain€after€providing€NMR€with€two€additional€medical€reportsñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃)×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€ofÐ ° Ðhis€capabilities.€€In€its€second€report€dated€October€23,€1996,€NMRÏstated:€"Our€initial€assessment€concluded€that€Mr.€Sullivan'sÏphysical€restrictions€prevented€him€from€performing€his€ownÏoccupation,€but€not€from€performing€any€occupation.€€The€newÏinformation€does€not€provide€evidence€that€would€alter€thisÏconclusion."€€Ìà ` àThe€evaluation€of€Sullivan's€own€physician€reflects€aÏsimilar€assessment€of€his€capabilities.€€In€JanuaryñPñ,ñPñ€1996,€Dr.€ÏMaureen€Norman€completed€an€evaluation€of€his€condition€atÏMetLife's€request.€€While€Dr.€Norman€indicated€on€her€report€formÏthat€Sullivan€was€disabled€from€his€own€occupation€as€a€securityÏguard,€she€also€indicated€that€she€could€not€determine€whether€heÏwas€totally€disabled€from€any€occupation.€€Dr.€Norman€also€reportedÏthat€Sullivan€was€a€candidate€for€"vocational€rehabilitationÏ(retraining€for€a€different€occupation)"€and€physicalÏrehabilitation.€€Ìà ` àIn€trying€to€prove€that€he€is€totally€disabled€within€theÏmeaning€of€the€LTD€plan,€Sullivan€relies€on€the€medical€opinion€ofÏDr.€George€Hazel,€a€physician€asked€to€evaluate€him€in€October,Ï1994€for€the€DIA€in€connection€with€his€claim€for€workers'Ïcompensation.€€In€that€report,€Dr.€Hazel€stated€that€"at€theÏpresent€time€[Sullivan]€is€medically€disabled€and€that€theÏdisability€is€permanent€and€the€level€of€activity€[of]€the€patientÐ  (ð#. Ðis€significantly€restricted."€€However,€Dr.€Hazel€also€noted€thatÏSullivan€had€"numerous€unassociated€somatic€complaints€which€makesÏevaluation€difficult."€€For€this€reason,€NMR€declined€to€find,Ïbased€on€Dr.€Hazel's€evaluation,€that€Sullivan€was€totally€disabledÏunder€the€LTD€plan.€€In€reviewing€Dr.€Hazel's€report,€NMR€alsoÏnoted€that€some€of€the€symptoms€described€by€Dr.€Hazel€wereÏdependent€on€subjective€factors€such€as€Sullivan's€willingness€toÏcooperate€with€the€exam.€€€Ìà ` àBased€on€this€evidence,€we€cannot€conclude€that€MetLife'sÏdecision€to€terminate€Sullivan's€disability€benefits€was€arbitraryÏand€capricious.€€The€reports€from€NMR,€while€acknowledging€thatÏSullivan's€work€environment€should€be€structured€to€avoidÏaggravating€his€disability,€indicate€that€Sullivan€is€capable€ofÏworking€in€some€occupation€for€which€he€is€trained.€€òòSeeóó€òòDoyleóó,€144Ð P ÐF.3d€at€186€(affirming€denial€of€long„term€benefits€where€theÏevidence€indicated€the€plaintiff€"was€not€'totally€disabled€fromÏany€occupation'€because€he€retained€a€'sedentary'€work€capacity€andÏa€potential€for€further€rehabilitation").€€Moreover,€the€reportÏmost€favorable€to€Sullivan's€claim€of€total€disability,€Dr.€Hazel'sÏassessment,€evaluated€his€capacity€in€the€context€of€his€claim€forÏworkers'€compensation€benefits€and€did€not€consider€whetherÏSullivan€was€totally€disabled€from€every€occupation€for€which€heÏwas€fit€by€training€or€experience.ñRñ׃×ñRññRñ׃*×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Therefore,€MetLife's€decisionÐ '`", Ðto€terminate€Sullivan's€disability€benefits€under€the€LTD€plan€wasÏnot€arbitrary€and€capricious.Ìò òÓ  ÓIV.€Penalties€for€Failure€to€Provide€Plan€Documentsó óÐ Ð  ÐÓizÓà ` àFinally,€Sullivan€appeals€the€district€court's€decisionÏnot€to€impose€penalties€against€MetLife€pursuant€to€29€U.S.C.€ððÏ1132(c)(1)ñRñ׃ ×ñRññRñ׃+ ×ñRñÝ ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€for€failing€to€provide€documents€about€the€long€termÐ Ð   Ðdisability€plan.€€The€district€court€noted€that€there€was€disputedÏevidence€about€whether€Sullivan€did€or€did€not€receive€theÏdocuments,€but€found€that€"whether€or€not€he€had€the€planÏdocuments,€Sullivan€exercised€his€rights€under€the€plan€andÏprovided€the€type€of€[medical]€information€that€was€required€for€aÏdecision€to€be€made."€€Because€MetLife€"carefully€analyzed€theÏmedical€evidence€and€relied€on€it,"€the€district€court€concludedÏthat€Sullivan€had€not€been€prejudiced€even€if€Raytheon€had€notÏfurnished€the€documents€he€requested.€€We€review€the€court'sÏdetermination€for€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòSeeóó€òòRodriguez„Abreuóó€v.Ð pÀ ÐòòChase€Manhattan€Bank,€N.A.óó,€986€F.2d€580,€588€(1st€Cir.€1993).Ð P  Ðà ` àAs€the€district€court€found,€Sullivan€has€offered€noÏevidence€that€MetLife€acted€in€bad€faith€in€not€providing€him€withÐ  !p$ Ðthe€documents€in€a€more€timely€fashion.€€Additionally,€Sullivan€hasÏnot€demonstrated€that€he€was€prejudiced€by€any€delay€in€receivingÏthe€documents.€€We€agree€with€Sullivan€that€showings€of€bad€faithÏand€prejudice€are€not€necessary€for€a€court€to€award€penaltiesÏunder€ðð€1132(c)(1).€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€588€("[P]rejudice€and€bad€faith€areÐ ð @ Ðnot€prerequisites€for€imposition€of€penalties.").€€However,€theÏdistrict€court€did€not€require€Sullivan€to€prove€that€RaytheonÏacted€in€bad€faith€or€that€he€was€prejudiced.€€Instead,€the€courtÏappropriately€cited€the€absence€of€those€factors€among€the€reasonsÏfor€its€decision€not€to€award€penalties.€òòóó€Accordingly,€we€find€noÐ À Ðabuse€of€discretion€in€the€district€court's€ruling.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€atÐ P  Ð588„89€(finding€no€abuse€of€discretion€where€the€district€courtÏconsidered€the€absence€of€prejudice€and€bad€faith€in€declining€toÏaward€penalties).Ìò òòòà ` àAffirmedóóó ó.Ô#†XÅžXX XÖä'#Ô