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Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòE.g.óó,€òòLos€Angeles€Mem'l€Coliseum€Comm'nóó€v.€òòNFLóó,€726€F.2dÐ ° Ð1381,€1388„90€(9th€Cir.€1984);€òòN.€Am.€Soccer€Leagueóó€v.€òòNFLóó,€670Ð xÈ ÐF.2d€1249,€1256„58€(2d€Cir.€1982);€òòSmithóó€v.€òòPro€Football,€Inc.óó,€Ð @ Ð593€F.2d€1173,€1185„86€(D.C.€Cir.€1978);€òòMackeyóó€v.€òòNFLóó,€543€F.2dÐ X Ð606,€620€(8th€Cir.€1976). dÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòCf.óó€òòVictorian€House,€Inc.óó€v.€òòFisher€Camuto€Corp.óó,€769€F.2dÐ ° Ð466,€469„70€(8th€Cir.€1985),€and€òòGreenville€Publ'g€Co.,€Inc.óó€v.Ð xÈ ÐòòDaily€Reflector,€Inc.óó,€496€F.2d€391,€399„400€(4th€Cir.€1974)€(bothÐ @ Ðcases€standing€for€the€proposition€that€antitrust€immunity€coveringÐ X Ðan€action€between€a€corporation€and€its€agent€does€not€extend€toÐ Ð  Ðaction€of€the€agent€acting€in€its€own€behalf). ¬Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThere€is€some,€although€not€a€lot€of,€circuit€case€law€thatÐ ° Ðlooks€in€this€direction.€€òòCity€of€Mt.€Pleasantóó€v.€òòAssociated€Elec.Ð xÈ ÐCoop.,€Inc.óó,€838€F.2d€268,€274„77€(8th€Cir.€1988);€òòsee€alsoóó€òòChicagoÐ @ ÐProf'l€Sportsóó,€95€F.3d€at€598òòóó. ¨Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€criteria€suggested€in€these€cases€are€so€general€and€soÐ ° Ðvarious€(unity€of€interest,€lack€of€existing€competition,€extent€ofÐ xÈ Ðcontrol),€as€to€emphasize€the€lack€of€any€developed€body€of€law.€Ð @ ÐòòSeeóó€òòSearch€Int'l,€Inc.óó€v.€òòSnelling€&€Snellingóó,€168€F.€Supp.€2d€621,Ð X Ð624„26€(N.D.€Tex.€2001);€òòSt.€Martinóó€v.€òòKFC€Corp.óó,€935€F.€Supp.€898,Ð Ð  Ð906€(W.D.€Ky.€1996);€òòHallóó€v.€òòBurger€King€Corp.óó,€912€F.€Supp.€1509,Ð ˜è Ð1548€(S.D.€Fla.€1995);òòóó€òòWilliamsóó€v.€òòNevadaóó,€794€F.€Supp.€1026,€1030„Ð ` ° Ð32€(D.€Nev.€1992),€òòÔ_Ôaff'dÔ_Ôóó,€999€F.2d€445€(9th€Cir.€1993)€(perÐ ( x ÐÔ_ÔcuriamÔ_Ô). ]Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔWhereas€section€2€requires€monopoly€power€or€a€prospect€ofÐ ° Ðit,€significant€market€power€is€enough€to€trigger€section€1's€ruleÐ xÈ Ðof€reason€approach;€similarly,€something€less€than€monopoly€powerÐ @ Ðis€required€to€condemn€mergers€under€section€7's€"substantiallyÐ X Ðlessen€competition"€test.€€òòColumbia€Metal€Culvert€Co.óó€v.€òòKaiserÐ Ð  ÐAluminum€&€Chem.€Co.óó,€579€F.2d€20,€27€n.11€(3d€Cir.€1978).€€ ôÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIndeed,€by€June€1999,€players'€economic€expert,€Roger€Ô_ÔNollÔ_Ô,Ð ° Ðhad€concluded€that€the€relevant€market€was€limited€to€U.S.€DivisionÐ xÈ ÐI€soccer;€he€did€not€attempt€to€define€any€alternative€market,€norÐ @ Ðdid€he€suggest€that€MLS€might€exercise€market€power€in€some€broaderÐ X Ðmarket.€€€€ ÍÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIt€is€well„settled€that€a€party€claiming€that€an€instructionÐ ° Ðshould€have€been€given€forfeits€the€objection€if€the€instruction€itÐ xÈ Ðtenders€is€itself€objectionable.€€òòSeeóó€òòÔ_ÔSavardÔ_Ôóó€v.€òòMarine€Contracting,Ð @ ÐInc.óó,€471€F.2d€536,€540€(2d€Cir.€1972).€ æÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòE.g.óó,€òòNCAAóó€v.€òòBd.€of€Regentsóó,€468€U.S.€85,€100„103€(1984);Ð ° ÐòòMcCormackóó€v.€òòNCAAóó,€845€F.2d€1338,€1344€(5th€Cir.€1988);€òòLos€AngelesÐ xÈ ÐMem'l€Coliseumóó,€726€F.2d€at€1387;€òòN.€Am.€Soccer€Leagueóó,€670€F.2d€atÐ @ Ð1258„59;€òòSmithóó,€593€F.2d€at€1177„81;€òòMackeyóó,€543€F.2d€at€619„20. Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòSeeóó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔDesirÔ_Ôóó,€273€F.3d€39,€45„46€(1st€Cir.Ð ° Ð2001);€òòFrontier€Ref.,€Inc.óó€v.€òòGorman„Ruppóó,€136€F.3d€695,€704€(10thÐ xÈ ÐCir.€1998);€òòRhone„Poulenc€Ô_ÔRorerÔ_Ô,€Inc.óó€v.€òòHome€Ô_ÔIndemÔ_Ô.€Co.óó,€32€F.3dÐ @ Ð851,€863€(3d€Cir.€1994). ]Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔPlayers€also€introduced€the€league's€1993€business€plan,€inÐ ° Ðwhich€MLS€asserted€that€it€would€be€able€to€maintain€its€salaryÐ xÈ Ðstructure€because€"[Ô_Ôi]tÔ_Ô€is€not€anticipated€that€there€will€be€anyÐ @ Ðother€significant€domestic€professional€league€to€compete€forÐ X Ðplayers'€services."€€Another€document€allowed€in€evidence,€aÐ Ð  ÐDecember€1994€offering€memorandum,€said€"MLS€believes€it€will€beÐ ˜è Ðable€to€maintain€this€salary€structure€because€of€theÐ ` ° Ðcompetitiveness€of€the€salary€and€benefit€package€and€the€lack€ofÐ ( x Ðcomparable€alternatives€in€the€United€States€to€players." çÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔFor€example,€on€cross„examination€Farnsworth€admitted€thatÐ ° Ðhe€could€not€be€certain€whether€his€player€had€actually€everÐ xÈ Ðreceived€an€offer€from€MLS.€€Similarly,€he€€admitted€he€could€notÐ @ Ðbe€sure€whether€the€MLS€player€he€was€recruiting€actually€had€anÐ X Ðoffer€to€play€in€MLS€the€following€season. gÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòScalesóó,€594€F.2d€558,€563€(6th€Cir.),€òòcert.Ð ° Ðdeniedóó,€441€U.S.€946€(1979);€Fed.€R.€Evid.€611(a);€òòsee€alsoóó€6Ð xÈ ÐòòWeinstein's€Federal€Evidenceóó€ðð€1006.08[4]€(2001). zÝ ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòE.g.óó,€òòDoctor's€Hosp.€of€Jefferson,€Inc.óó€v.€òòS.E.€Med.Ð ° ÐAlliance,€Inc.óó,€123€F.3d€301,€311€(5th€Cir.€1997);€òòBill€BeasleyÐ xÈ ÐFarms,€Inc.óó€v.€òòHubbard€Farmsóó,€695€F.2d€1341,€1343€(11th€Cir.€1983);€Ð @ ÐòòAlexanderóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔNat'lÔ_Ô€Farmers€Org.óó,€687€F.2d€1173,€1182€(8th€Cir.Ð X Ð1982);€òòJoe€Westbrook,€Inc.óó€v.€òòChrysler€Corp.óó,€419€F.€Supp.€824,€845Ð Ð  Ð(N.D.€Ga.€1976).€ ‹Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€plaintiffs€comprise€eight€named€MLS€players€and€aÐ ° Ðcertified€injunctive€class€of€600€past,€present,€and€future€MLSÐ xÈ Ðplayers.€€The€operator/investors€named€in€the€suit€include:€KraftÐ @ ÐSoccer,€LP;€Anschutz€Soccer,€Inc.;€Anschutz€Chicago€Soccer,€Inc.;Ð X ÐSouth€Florida€Soccer,€LLC;€Team€Columbus€Soccer,€LLC;€Team€KansasÐ Ð  ÐCity€Soccer,€LLC;€Los€Angeles€Soccer€Partners,€LP;€Empire€SoccerÐ ˜è ÐClub,€LP;€and€Washington€Soccer,€LP.€ ¼Ý ƒu³$ÝÓ  Óà  àÓÓòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔA€less€vivid€but€closer€parallel€is€a€situation€in€whichÐ ° Ðdealers€or€franchises,€by€control€or€coercion,€make€theÐ xÈ Ðmanufacturer€or€franchiser€impose€on€them€restrictions€that€theÐ @ Ðdealers€or€franchisees€select.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔTopcoÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔAssocsÔ_Ô.óó,Ð X Ð405€U.S.€596€(1972);€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔSealyÔ_Ôóó,€388€U.S.€350€(1967);Ð Ð  ÐòòGeneral€Ô_ÔLeasewaysÔ_Ôóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔNat'lÔ_Ô€Truck€Leasing€Ô_ÔAss'nÔ_Ôóó,€744€F.2d€588€(7thÐ ˜è ÐCir.€1984);€òòsee€alsoóó€XII€Ô_ÔHovenkampÔ_Ô,€òòAntitrust€Lawóó€ðð€2033b€(1999).8‡‡Áû6BlockquoteÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓE1ܰÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°œXEÓÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓE1ܰÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°œXEÓÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTRY,3Ø'Xà3Ø' Letter 3Ø' Letterÿ3Ø'TÑÑ ? ÑÙ*ƒ !ÙÔ€X£ÞXXXÔÔ€°l"°XX£ÞÔò òÓ  ÓÓ  ÓUnited€States€Court€of€AppealsÔ€„Ñ„°°l"ÔÐ ° ÐFor€the€First€Circuitó óÔ€ „®t„„„ÑÔÔ€ X %X„ „®tÔÐ „Ô ÐÓ÷ÓÌßA€') °°` dE<¹` AßÐ º  ÐÔ€ X+MXX X %ÔÌNo.€01„1296Ð ‘ á ÐÌà@Ø Ø ìàIAIN€FRASER;€STEVE€Ô_ÔTRITTSCHUHÔ_Ô;€SEAN€BOWERS;ˆÐ ! q Ðà@ppìàMARK€Ô_ÔSEMIOLIÔ_Ô;€Ô_ÔRHETTÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔHARTYÔ_Ô;€DAVID€SCOTT€VAUDREUIL;ˆÐ é 9 Ðà@ä ä ìàMARK€DODD;€and€MARK€DOUGHERTY,ˆÐ ±   ÐÌà@ˆˆìàPlaintiffs,€Appellants,ˆÐ A‘  ÐÌà@tt)ìàv.ˆÐ Ñ!  ÐÌà@¬¬ìàMAJOR€LEAGUE€SOCCER,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ô;€KRAFT€SOCCER,€L.P.;ˆÐ a±  Ðà@DDìàÔ_ÔANSCHUTZÔ_Ô€SOCCER,€INC.;€Ô_ÔANSCHUTZÔ_Ô€CHICAGO€SOCCER,€INC.;€ˆÐ )y  Ðà@ ìàSOUTH€FLORIDA€SOCCER,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ô;€TEAM€COLUMBUS€SOCCER,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ô;ˆÐ ñA Ðà@   ìàTEAM€KANSAS€CITY€SOCCER,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ô;€LOS€ANGELES€SOCCER€PARTNERS,ˆÐ ¹  ÐL.P.;€EMPIRE€SOCCER€CLUB,€L.P.;€WASHINGTON€SOCCER,€L.P.;Ð Ñ Ðà@  ìàand€UNITED€STATES€SOCCER€FEDERATION,€INC.,ˆÐ I™ ÐÌà@ÄÄìàDefendants,€Appelleesà@@°°*ìà.ˆÐ Ù) ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<h` AßÐ i¹ ÐÌà@œ œ ìàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€UNITED€STATES€DISTRICT€COURTˆÐ @ ÐÌà@0 0 ìàFOR€THE€DISTRICT€OF€MASSACHUSETTSˆÐ Ð  ÐÌà@44ìà[Hon.€George€A.€Ô_ÔO'TooleÔ_Ô,€Jr.,€òòU.S.€District€Judgeóó]ˆÐ `° ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<ï` AßÐ ð@  ÐÌà@„„'ìàBeforeˆÐ Ç" ÐÌÓ  Óà@@((ìà€Ô_ÔBoudinÔ_Ô,€òòChief€Judgeóó,Ð W §$ ÐÌCoffin,€òòSenior€Circuit€Judgeóó,Ð ç!7& ÐÌand€Ô_ÔWoodlockÔ_Ô,׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú*Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òòDistrict€Judgeóó.Ð w#Ç( ÐÌßA€') °°` dE<%` AßÐ %W * ÐÌÓ  ÓÓ  Óà  àòòJeffrey€L.€Kessleróó€with€whom€òòJames€W.€Quinnóó,€òòBruce€S.€Meyeróó,Ð Þ%.!, ÐòòMichael€A.€Ô_ÔRonaÔ_Ôóó,€òòAllan€L.€Garciaóó,€òòÔ_ÔTamirÔ_Ô€M.€Youngóó,€òòWeil,€Ô_ÔGotshalÔ_Ô€&Ð ¦&ö!- ÐÔ_ÔMangesÔ_Ô€Ô_ÔLLPÔ_Ôóó,€òòPaul€B.€Ô_ÔGalvaniÔ_Ôóó,€òòRopes€&€Grayóó€and€òòRichard€A.€Ô_ÔBerthelsenÔ_ÔóóÐ n'¾". Ðwere€on€brief€for€appellants.Ð 6(†#/ Ðà  àòòMichael€A.€Ô_ÔCardozaÔ_Ôóó€with€whom€òòSteven€C.€Ô_ÔKraneÔ_Ôóó,€òòLee€M.Ð þ(N$0 ÐGoldsmithóó,€òòBrooke€H.€Ô_ÔSpiglerÔ_Ôóó,€òòDaniel€L.€Goldbergóó,€òòDaniel€S.€Ô_ÔSavrinÔ_ÔóóÐ Æ)%1 Ðand€òòBingham€Dana€Ô_ÔLLPÔ_Ôóó€were€on€brief€for€appellees€Major€LeagueÐ Ž*Þ%2 ÐSoccer,€Ô_ÔL.L.C.Ô_Ô,€et€al.Ð V+¦&3? Ðà  àòòJohn€Paul€Robbinsóó€with€whom€òòMcLaughlin€&€Stern,€Ô_ÔLLPÔ_Ôóó€andÐ ° ÐòòMorgan,€Brown€&€Joyóó€were€on€brief€for€appellee€United€States€SoccerÐ xÈ ÐFederation,€Inc.Ð @ ÐÌÌÔ*‹ƒ'ddd Xdd Xdd X°(#°(#‹ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ,( dd ÔÔ+  ÔÐ ˜è˜è ‹‹ÐÓ) ÓÐ SIüL À:â@37334„„‰À:â@‰‹‹SÐÌMarch€20,€2002Ð Ä  ÐÐ RHCŒ Ü " À:â@37334 À:â@ ‹‹RÐÐ(üL   (ÐÓ  ÓÙ* !ÙØØÌÌÓ  ÓÐ   d  ÐÔ_ÔòòóóÑ  ÑÓÓÑ8€?+M?XXdÈXXdÈ8ÑÑ€@ÑÓ*°,X°` ¨ ƒX°œX*Óà ` àBOUDIN,€òòChief€Judgeóó.€à ° àProfessional€soccer€players€suedÐ ° ÐMajor€League€Soccer,€LLC€("MLS"),€nine€independentÐ @ Ðoperator/investors€in€MLS,€and€the€United€States€Soccer€Federation,Ð Ð  ÐInc.€("USSF"),€alleging€violations€of€Sherman€Act€sections€1€and€2,Ð ` ° Ð15€U.S.C.€ðððð€1„2,€and€Clayton€Act€section€7,€òòid.óó€ðð€18,€and€seekingÐ ð @ Ðinjunctive€relief€and€monetary€damages.׃Q×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€district€courtÐ € Ð  Ðgranted€summary€judgment€for€defendants€on€the€section€1€andÐ `  ÐClayton€Act€counts.€€After€a€twelve„week€long€trial€on€the€sectionÐ  ð  Ð2€count,€the€jury€returned€a€special€verdict€leading€to€judgment€inÐ 0€  Ðfavor€of€defendants.€€Players€now€appeal€the€disposition€of€allÐ À Ðthree€counts.€€We€begin€with€a€statement€of€the€background€facts.Ð P  Ðà@<< ìàI.€€BACKGROUND€FACTSˆÐ à0 Ðà ` àDespite€professional€soccer's€popularity€abroad,€theÐ pÀ Ðsport€has€achieved€only€limited€success€in€this€country.€€SeveralÐ P Ðminor€leagues€have€operated€here€(four€such€leagues€exist€today),Ð à Ðbut€before€the€formation€of€MLS,€only€one€other€U.S.€professionalÐ  p Ðleague„„the€North€American€Soccer€League€("NASL")„„had€everÐ °  Ðobtained€Division€I,€or€top„tier,€status.€€Launched€in€1968,€theÐ @" ÐNASL€achieved€some€success€before€folding€in€1985;€MLS€attributesÐ Ð $ Ðthe€NASL's€demise€in€part€to€wide€disparities€in€the€financialÐ `"°& Ðresources€of€the€league's€independently€owned€teams€and€a€lack€ofÐ ð#@( Ðcentralized€control.€Ð €%Ð * Ðà ` àIn€1988,€the€USSF,€the€national€governing€body€of€soccerÐ ° Ðin€the€United€States,€36€U.S.C.€ðð€220501€òòet€seq.óó,€was€awarded€theÐ @ Ðright€to€host€the€1994€World€Cup€soccer€tournament€in€the€U.S.€byÐ Ð  Ðthe€Federation€Internationale€de€Football€Association€("FIFA"),Ð ` ° Ðsoccer's€international€governing€body.€€In€consideration€for€theÐ ð @ Ðcoveted€sponsorship€rights,€the€USSF€promised€to€establish€a€viableÐ € Ð  ÐDivision€I€professional€soccer€league€in€the€U.S.€as€soon€asÐ `  Ðpossible.Ð  ð  Ðà ` àThe€USSF€decided€as€early€as€1988€to€sanction€only€oneÐ 0€  ÐDivision€I€professional€league.€€The€concern€was€that€sanctioningÐ À Ðrival€leagues€would€dilute€revenues,€drive€up€costs,€and€therebyÐ P  Ðdim€the€long„term€prospects€for€Division€I€soccer€in€the€U.S.€Ð à0 ÐIndeed,€MLS€contends€no€other€country€has€sanctioned€more€than€oneÐ pÀ ÐDivision€I€league€within€its€borders,€although€arrangements€inÐ P Ðother€countries€could€be€variously€described.€Ð à Ðà ` àJust€before€World€Cup€USA€play€began,€in€early€DecemberÐ  p Ð1993,€three€organizations€presented€competing€plans€to€develop€aÐ °  ÐDivision€I€professional€soccer€league€to€the€USSF€National€Board€ofÐ @" ÐDirectors.€€The€three€competing€organizers€were:€League€OneÐ Ð $ ÐAmerica;€the€American€Professional€Soccer€League€("APSL"),€anÐ `"°& Ðexisting€Division€II€league;€and€Major€League€Professional€SoccerÐ ð#@( Ð("MLPS"),€the€precursor€to€MLS,€headed€by€the€USSF's€own€president,Ð €%Ð * ÐAlan€Rothenberg.€Ð '`", Ðà ` àAt€its€December€5,€1993,€meeting€the€USSF€boardÐ  (ð#. Ðtentatively€selected€MLPS€as€the€exclusive€Division€I€professionalÐ 0*€%0 Ðsoccer€league€in€the€U.S.,€based€upon€its€relatively€strongÐ À+'2 Ðcapitalization,€higher€proposed€spending,€business€plan€andÐ ° Ðmanagement.€€The€board€also€reaffirmed€its€intention€to€sanctionÐ @ Ðonly€one€Division€I€league.€€But€in€January€1995,€the€USSFÐ Ð  Ðannounced€that€it€would€consider€sanctioning€additional€leaguesÐ ` ° Ðwhich€could€meet€rigorous€new€financial€and€operating€standardsÐ ð @ Ðbeginning€with€the€1998€season.€Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àIn€the€wake€of€a€successful€World€Cup€USA,€MLS€wasÐ `  Ðofficially€formed€in€February€1995€as€a€limited€liability€companyÐ  ð  Ð("LLC")€under€Delaware€law.€€The€league€is€owned€by€a€number€ofÐ 0€  Ðindependent€investors€(a€mix€of€corporations,€partnerships,€and€oneÐ À Ðindividual)€and€is€governed€by€a€management€committee€known€as€theÐ P  Ðboard€of€governors.€€Some€of€the€investors€are€passive;€others€areÐ à0 Ðalso€team€operators€as€explained€below.€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àMLS€has,€to€say€the€least,€a€unique€structure,€even€forÐ P Ða€sports€league.€€MLS€retains€significant€centralized€control€overÐ à Ðboth€league€and€individual€team€operations.€€MLS€owns€all€of€theÐ  p Ðteams€that€play€in€the€league€(a€total€of€12€prior€to€the€start€ofÐ °  Ð2002),€as€well€as€all€intellectual€property€rights,€tickets,Ð @" Ðsupplied€equipment,€and€broadcast€rights.€€MLS€sets€the€teams'Ð Ð $ Ðschedules;€negotiates€all€stadium€leases€and€assumes€all€relatedÐ `"°& Ðliabilities;€pays€the€salaries€of€referees€and€other€leagueÐ ð#@( Ðpersonnel;€and€supplies€certain€equipment.€Ð €%Ð * Ðà ` àAt€issue€in€this€case€is€MLS's€control€over€playerÐ '`", Ðemployment.€€MLS€has€the€"sole€responsibility€for€negotiating€andÐ  (ð#. Ðentering€into€agreements€with,€and€for€compensating,€Players."€€InÐ 0*€%0 Ða€nutshell,€MLS€recruits€the€players,€negotiates€their€salaries,Ð À+'2 Ðpays€them€from€league€funds,€and,€to€a€large€extent,€determinesÐ ° Ðwhere€each€of€them€will€play.€€For€example,€to€balance€talent€amongÐ @ Ðteams,€it€decides,€with€the€non„binding€input€of€team€operators,Ð Ð  Ðwhere€certain€of€the€league's€"marquee"€players€will€play.€€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àHowever,€MLS€has€also€relinquished€some€control€over€teamÐ ð @ Ðoperations€to€certain€investors.€€MLS€contracts€with€theseÐ € Ð  Ðinvestors€to€operate€nine€of€the€league's€teams€(the€league€runsÐ `  Ðthe€other€three).€These€investors€are€referred€to€asÐ  ð  Ðoperator/investors€and€are€the€co„defendants€in€this€action.€€EachÐ 0€  Ðoperator/investor€has€the€"exclusive€right€and€obligation€toÐ À Ðprovide€Management€Services€for€a€Team€within€its€Home€Territory"Ð P  Ðand€is€given€some€leeway€in€running€the€team€and€reaping€theÐ à0 Ðpotential€benefits€therefrom.Ð pÀ Ðà ` àSpecifically,€the€operator/investors€hire,€at€their€ownÐ P Ðexpense€and€discretion,€local€staff€(including€the€general€managersÐ à Ðand€coaches€of€their€respective€teams),€and€are€responsible€forÐ  p Ðlocal€office€expenses,€local€promotional€costs€for€home€games,€andÐ °  Ðone„half€the€stadium€rent€(the€same€portion€as€MLS).€€In€addition,Ð @" Ðthey€license€local€broadcast€rights,€sell€home€tickets,€and€conductÐ Ð $ Ðall€local€marketing€on€behalf€of€MLS;€agreements€regarding€theseÐ `"°& Ðmatters€do€not€require€the€prior€approval€of€MLS.€€And€they€controlÐ ð#@( Ða€majority€of€the€seats€on€MLS's€board,€the€very€same€body€whichÐ €%Ð * Ðruns€the€league's€operations.€€Among€other€things,€the€board€isÐ '`", Ðresponsible€for€hiring€the€commissioner€and€approving€nationalÐ  (ð#. Ðtelevision€contracts€and€marketing€decisions,€league€rules€andÐ 0*€%0 Ðpolicies€(including€team€player€budgets),€and€sales€of€interests.€Ð À+'2 Ðà ` àThe€operator/investors€also€play€a€limited€role€inÐ ° Ðselecting€players€for€their€respective€teams.€€While€the€operatingÐ @ Ðagreements€provide€that€the€operator/investors€will€not€bidÐ Ð  Ðindependently€for€players€against€MLS,€they€may€trade€players€withÐ ` ° Ðother€MLS€teams€and€select€players€in€the€league's€draft.€€SuchÐ ð @ Ðtransactions,€however,€must€follow€strict€rules€established€by€theÐ € Ð  Ðleague.€€Most€importantly,€no€team€may€exceed€the€maximum€playerÐ `  Ðbudget€established€by€the€management€committee.€Ð  ð  Ðà ` àIn€return€for€the€services€of€the€operator/investors,€MLSÐ 0€  Ðpays€each€of€them€a€"management€fee"€that€corresponds€(in€largeÐ À Ðpart)€to€the€performance€of€their€respective€team.€€The€managementÐ P  Ðfee€equals€the€sum€of€one„half€of€local€ticket€receipts€andÐ à0 Ðconcessions;€the€first€$1,125,000€of€local€broadcast€revenues,Ð pÀ Ðincreasing€annually€by€a€percentage€rate,€plus€a€30%€shareÐ P Ð(declining€to€10%€by€2006)€of€any€amount€above€the€base€amount;€allÐ à Ðrevenues€from€overseas€tours;€a€share€of€one„half€the€net€revenuesÐ  p Ðfrom€the€MLS€Championship€Game€and€a€share€of€revenues€from€otherÐ °  Ðexhibition€games.€Ð @" Ðà ` àThe€remaining€revenues€of€the€league€are€distributed€inÐ Ð $ Ðequal€portions€to€all€investors.€€Thus,€while€the€investors€quaÐ `"°& Ðinvestors€share€equally€in€the€league's€profits€and€losses,€theÐ ð#@( Ðindividual€team€operators€qua€operators€fare€differently€dependingÐ €%Ð * Ðat€least€in€part€on€the€financial€performance€of€their€respectiveÐ '`", Ðteams.€€It€bears€mentioning,€however,€that€neither€the€league€nor,Ð  (ð#. Ðâ âapparently,€any€of€its€teams€has€yet€made€a€profit.Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àAlthough€the€league€retains€legal€title€to€the€teams,€theÐ ° Ðâ âoperator/investors€may€transfer€their€operating€rights,€withinÐ @ Ðcertain€limits,€and€retain€much€of€the€value€created€by€theirÐ Ð  Ðindividual€efforts€and€investments.€€Investors€may€transfer€theirÐ ` ° Ðownership€stakes€and€operating€rights€to€other€current€investorsÐ ð @ Ðwithout€obtaining€prior€consent;€transfers€to€outside€investors,Ð € Ð  Ðhowever,€require€a€two„thirds€majority€vote€of€the€board.€€For€itsÐ `  Ðpart,€MLS€may€terminate€any€operating€agreement€on€its€ownÐ  ð  Ðinitiative€if,€by€a€two„thirds€vote€of€the€board,€anÐ 0€  Ðoperator/investor€is€determined€to€have€failed€to€act€in€the€bestÐ À Ðinterests€of€the€league.€€If€so,€it€must€still€pay€suchÐ P  Ðoperator/investor€fair€market€value€for€its€operating€rights€andÐ à0 Ðownership€interest.€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àThe€league€began€official€play€in€1996.€€The€followingÐ P ÐFebruary€of€1997,€eight€named€players€sued€MLS,€the€USSF,€and€theÐ à Ðoperator/investors€under€various€antitrust€theories.€€TheÐ  p Ðinjunctive€class€was€certified€in€January€of€1998.€€òòFraseróó€v.€òòMajorÐ °  ÐLeague€Soccer,€LLCóó,€180€F.R.D.€178€(D.€Mass.€1998).€€In€count€I,Ð @" Ðthe€players€claimed€MLS€and€its€operator/investors€violated€ShermanÐ Ð $ ÐAct€section€1€by€agreeing€not€to€compete€for€player€services.€€InÐ `"°& Ðcount€III,׃A×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€the€players€claimed€MLS€monopolized€or€attempted€toÐ ð#@( Ðmonopolize,€or€combined€or€conspired€with€the€USSF€to€monopolize,Ð €%Ð * Ðthe€market€for€the€services€of€Division€I€professional€soccerÐ '`", Ðplayers€in€the€U.S.,€in€violation€of€Sherman€Act€section€2,€byÐ  (ð#. Ðpreventing€any€other€entity€from€being€sanctioned€as€a€Division€IÐ ° Ðprofessional€soccer€league€in€the€United€States€or€otherwiseÐ @ Ðcompeting€against€MLS.€€In€count€IV,€the€players€claimed€that€theÐ Ð  Ðcombination€of€assets€of€the€operator/investors€in€MLSÐ ` ° Ðsubstantially€lessened€competition€and€tended€to€create€monopoly€inÐ ð @ Ðviolation€of€Clayton€Act€section€7.Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àIn€February€1998,€before€the€close€of€discovery,€MLS€andÐ `  Ðits€operator/investors€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€counts€I€andÐ  ð  ÐIV;€players€cross„moved,€seeking€to€block€MLS€from€asserting€aÐ 0€  Ðsingle€entity€defense€on€count€I.€€On€April€19,€2000,€the€districtÐ À Ðcourt€granted€MLS€summary€judgment€on€both€counts,€holding€that€MLSÐ P  Ðand€its€operator/investors€comprised€a€single€entity€and€as€such,Ð à0 Ðcould€not€conspire€in€violation€of€section€1.€€òòFraseróó€v.€òòMajorÐ pÀ ÐLeague€Soccer,€LLCóó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€130,€135„39€(D.€Mass.€2000).€€OnÐ P Ðthe€section€7€claim,€the€court€held€that€the€creation€of€MLS€"didÐ à Ðnot€reduce€competition€in€an€existing€market€because€when€theÐ  p Ðcompany€was€formed€there€was€no€active€market€for€Division€IÐ °  Ðprofessional€soccer€in€the€United€States."€€òòId.óó€at€141.Ð @" Ðà ` àSubsequently,€at€a€June€2000€status€conference€on€theÐ Ð $ Ðremaining€section€2€claims,€players€indicated€(apparently€for€theÐ `"°& Ðfirst€time)€that€they€intended€to€introduce€evidence€that€MLSÐ ð#@( Ðprohibited€all€competition€for€players€among€the€MLSÐ €%Ð * Ðoperators/investors€as€part€of€their€section€2€claim€as€well.€€TheÐ '`", Ðcourt,€however,€prohibited€players€from€introducing€evidence€on€theÐ  (ð#. Ðoperation€of€MLS„„except€to€the€extent€it€provided€the€jury€withÐ 0*€%0 Ðuseful€background€information„„finding€this€version€of€players'Ð À+'2 Ðmonopoly€conduct€argument€precluded€by€its€earlier€section€1Ð ° Ðsummary€judgment€decision.€€€Ð @ Ðà ` àA€three„month€jury€trial€commenced€in€September€2000€onÐ Ð  Ðplayers'€remaining€section€2€claims.€€At€the€close€of€evidence,€theÐ ` ° Ðcourt€dismissed€the€section€2€claims€against€theÐ ð @ Ðoperator/investors,€and€that€ruling€is€not€appealed€now,€leavingÐ € Ð  Ðonly€MLS€and€the€USSF€as€defendants.€€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€50.€€TheÐ `  Ðcourt€then€submitted€a€15„question€special€verdict€form€to€theÐ  ð  Ðjury.€€On€December€11,€2000,€the€jury€returned€its€verdict€afterÐ 0€  Ðanswering€only€the€first€two€questions.€€It€found€that€players€hadÐ À Ðfailed€to€prove€what€they€had€alleged,€namely,€that€the€relevantÐ P  Ðgeographic€market€is€the€United€States€and€that€the€relevantÐ à0 Ðproduct€market€is€limited€to€Division€I€professional€soccerÐ pÀ Ðplayers.€€The€court€thereafter€entered€judgment€dismissing€countÐ P ÐIII€and€denied€players'€Rule€50€motions.€€Players€then€filed€thisÐ à Ðappeal.€Ð  p Ðà@Ô Ô ìàII.€€SHERMAN€ACT€SECTION€1ˆÐ °  Ðà ` àSome€have€urged€that€sports€leagues€in€general€be€treatedÐ @" Ðas€single€entities„„individual€sports€teams,€after€all,€mustÐ Ð $ Ðcollaborate€to€produce€a€product.€€òòCf.óó€òòChicago€Prof'l€Sports€Ltd.Ð `"°& ÐP'shipóó€v.€òòNBAóó,€95€F.3d€593,€599„600€(7th€Cir.€1996);€òòNFLóó€v.€òòN.€Am.Ð ð#@( ÐSoccer€Leagueóó,€459€U.S.€1074€(1982)€(Rehnquist,€J.,€dissenting€fromÐ €%Ð * Ðthe€denial€of€certiorari).€€However,€this€approach€has€not€beenÐ '`", Ðadopted€in€this€circuit,€òòSullivanóó€v.€òòNFLóó,€34€F.3d€1091,€1099€(1stÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âCir.€1994),€and€we€must€work€with€the€framework€of€existing€circuitÐ 0*€%0 Ðlaw.€€Single€entity€status€for€ordinarily€organized€leagues€hasÐ ° Ðbeen€rejected€in€several€other€circuits€as€well.׃B×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð @ Ðâ âà ` àEven€so,€the€district€court€concluded€that€underÐ Ð  ÐòòCopperweld€Corp.óó€v.€òòIndependence€Tube€Corp.óó,€467€U.S.€752€(1984),Ð ` ° ÐMLS€and€its€operator/investors€were€uniquely€integrated€and€didÐ ð @ Ðcomprise€a€single€entity.€€òòCopperweldóó€established€that€a€parent€andÐ € Ð  Ðits€wholly€owned€subsidiary€are€not€subject€to€attack€under€sectionÐ `  Ð1€for€agreements€between€them.€€They€are€treated€for€section€1Ð  ð  Ðpurposes€as€a€single€economic€actor.€€But€what€the€Supreme€CourtÐ 0€  Ðhas€never€decided€is€how€far€òòCopperweldóó€applies€to€more€complexÐ À Ðentities€and€arrangements€that€involve€a€high€degree€of€corporateÐ P  Ðand€economic€integration€but€less€than€that€existing€in€òòCopperweldóóÐ à0 Ðitself.Ð pÀ Ðà ` àWhile€MLS€defends€the€district€court's€single€entityÐ P Ðruling,€players€say€that€this€view€is€form€over€substance€and€theÐ à Ðsubstance€is€simply€a€conspiracy€among€òòde€factoóó€team€owners€to€fixÐ  p Ðplayer€salaries,€which€they€claim€to€be€a€òòper€seóó€violation€of€theÐ °  Ðantitrust€laws.€€We€disagree€completely€with€this€latterÐ @" Ðcharacterization.€€We€also€find€that€the€case€for€applying€singleÐ Ð $ Ðentity€status€to€MLS€and€its€operator/investors€has€not€beenÐ `"°& Ðestablished€but€that€in€this€case€the€jury€verdict€makes€a€remandÐ ð#@( Ðâ âon€the€section€1€claim€unnecessary.Ð €%Ð * Ðà ` àIf€ordinary€investors€decided€to€set€up€a€company€thatÐ ° Ðâ âwould€own€and€manage€all€of€the€teams€in€a€league,€it€is€hard€toÐ @ Ðsee€why€this€arrangement€would€fall€outside€òòCopperweldóó's€safeÐ Ð  Ðharbor.€€Certainly€the€potential€for€competition€within€the€firm€isÐ ` ° Ðnot€enough:€after€all,€a€railroad€could€in€theory€provideÐ ð @ Ðalternative€routes€between€the€same€cities€and€a€grocery€couldÐ € Ð  Ðlocate€competing€branches€of€its€chain€quite€near€one€another;€yetÐ `  Ðno€law€requires€competition€within€a€company.€€It€is€commonÐ  ð  Ðpractice,€but€hardly€essential,€that€the€teams€in€a€sports€leagueÐ 0€  Ðhave€independent€owner/managers.Ð À Ðà ` àFurther,€MLS€is€manifestly€more€than€an€arrangement€forÐ P  Ðindividual€operator/investors€by€which€they€can€cap€playerÐ à0 Ðsalaries.€€In€many€ways,€MLS€does€resemble€an€ordinary€company:€€itÐ pÀ Ðowns€substantial€assets€(teams,€player€contracts,€stadium€rights,Ð P Ðintellectual€property)€critical€to€the€performance€of€the€league;Ð à Ða€substantial€portion€of€generated€revenues€belongs€to€it€and€is€toÐ  p Ðbe€shared€conventionally€with€both€operator/investors€and€passiveÐ °  Ðinvestors.€€And€the€fact€that€MLS€was€structured€with€the€aim€ofÐ @" Ðachieving€results€that€might€not€otherwise€be€possible€does€notÐ Ð $ Ðautomatically€condemn€it.Ð `"°& Ðòòóóà ` àFocusing€on€the€operator/investors'€role€as€stockholders,Ð ð#@( Ðthe€district€court€stressed€that€both€sides€of€the€supposedÐ €%Ð * Ðconspiracy€€were€parts€of€the€same€corporate€entity;€and€it€notedÐ '`", Ðthat€"unlike€MLS,€NFL€football€clubs€do€not€exist€as€part€of€anÐ  (ð#. Ðoverarching€corporate€structure."€€òòFraseróó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€138Ð 0*€%0 Ðn.10.€€And,€as€òòCopperweldóó€itself€shows,€its€protection€is€not€lostÐ À+'2 Ðmerely€because€there€are€separate€legal€entities„„here,€theÐ ° Ðoperator/investors„„or€because€one€posits€arrangements€between€themÐ @ Ðand€MLS€that€could€not€be€made€by€existing€competitors€withoutÐ Ð  Ðviolating€the€antitrust€laws.Ð ` ° Ðà ` àNevertheless,€it€is€hard€to€treat€the€corporateÐ ð @ Ðintegration€as€conclusive.€€The€challenge€here€is€primarily€to€theÐ € Ð  Ðoperator/investors'€role€as€team€managers,€not€as€ordinaryÐ `  Ðstockholders,€and€to€restrictions€imposed€on€them€in€that€roleÐ  ð  Ðpreventing€competition€for€player€services.€€That€a€stockholder€mayÐ 0€  Ðbe€insulated€by€òòCopperweldóó€when€making€ordinary€governanceÐ À Ðdecisions€does€not€mean€automatic€protection€when€the€stockholderÐ P  Ðis€also€an€entrepreneur€separately€contracting€with€the€company.׃C×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Рà0 ÐAbove€all,€there€are€functional€differences€between€this€case€andÐ pÀ ÐòòCopperweldóó€that€are€significant€for€antitrust€policy.Ð P Ðà ` àFirst,€there€is€a€diversity€of€entrepreneurial€interestsÐ à Ðthat€goes€well€beyond€the€ordinary€company.€€MLS€and€itsÐ  p Ðoperator/investors€have€separate€contractual€relationships€givingÐ °  Ðthe€operator/investors€rights€that€take€them€part€way€along€theÐ @" Ðpath€to€ordinary€sports€team€owners:€they€do€some€independentÐ Ð $ Ðhiring€and€make€out„of„pocket€investments€in€their€own€teams;€theyÐ `"°& Ðretain€a€large€portion€of€the€revenues€from€the€activities€of€theirÐ ð#@( Ðteams;€and€each€has€limited€sale€rights€in€its€own€team€that€relateÐ €%Ð * Ðto€specific€assets€and€not€just€shares€in€the€common€enterprise.€Ð ° ÐOne€might€well€ask€why€the€formal€difference€in€corporate€structureÐ @ Ðshould€warrant€treating€MLS€differently€than€the€National€FootballÐ Ð  ÐLeague€or€other€traditionally€structured€sports€leagues.€€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àThis€contrasts€with€òòCopperweldóó's€observation€that€theÐ ð @ Ðparent€and€its€wholly€owned€subsidiary€in€that€case€shared€aÐ € Ð  Ð"complete€unity€of€interests."€€469€U.S.€at€771.€€The€phrase€is€notÐ `  Ðself„executing€and,€in€addition,€it€could€be€taken€to€explainÐ  ð  ÐòòCopperweldóó's€result€without€being€an€outer€limit€of€the€defense.€Ð 0€  ÐòòChicago€Prof'l€Sportsóó,€95€F.3d€at€598.€€Still,€the€existence€ofÐ À Ðdistinct€entrepreneurial€interests€possessed€by€separate€legalÐ P  Ðentities€distinguishes€òòCopperweldóó;€it€further€indicates€thatÐ à0 Ðcertain€functions€have€already€been€disaggregated€and€assigned€toÐ pÀ Ðdifferent€entities;€and€it€makes€the€potential€for€actualÐ P Ðcompetition€closer€to€feasible€realization.€Ð à Ðà ` àSecond,€in€this€case€the€analogy€to€a€single€entity€isÐ  p Ðweakened,€and€the€resemblance€to€a€collaborative€ventureÐ °  Ðstrengthened,€by€the€fact€that€the€operator/investors€are€not€mereÐ @" Ðservants€of€MLS;€effectively,€they€control€it,€having€the€majorityÐ Ð $ Ðof€votes€on€the€managing€board.€€The€problem€is€especially€seriousÐ `"°& Ðwhere,€as€here,€the€stockholders€are€themselves€potentialÐ ð#@( Ðcompetitors€with€MLS€and€with€each€other.€€Here,€it€is€MLS€that€hasÐ €%Ð * Ðtwo€roles:€€one€as€an€entrepreneur€with€its€own€assets€andÐ '`", Ðrevenues;€the€other€(arguably)€as€a€nominally€vertical€device€forÐ  (ð#. Ðproducing€horizontal€coordination,€òòi.e.óó,€limiting€competition€amongÐ 0*€%0 Ðoperator/investors.Ð À+'2 Ðà ` àFrom€the€standpoint€of€antitrust€policy,€this€prospect€ofÐ ° Ðhorizontal€coordination€among€the€operator/investors€through€aÐ @ Ðcommon€entity€is€a€distinct€concern.€€Whatever€efficiencies€may€beÐ Ð  Ðthought€likely€where€a€single€entrepreneur€makes€decisions€for€aÐ ` ° Ðcorporate€entity€(or€set€of€connected€entities),€the€presumption€isÐ ð @ Ðrelaxed„„and€may€in€some€contexts€be€reversed„„where€separateÐ € Ð  Ðentrepreneurial€interests€can€collaborate;€the€fixing€of€aboveÐ `  Ðmarket€prices€by€sellers€is€the€paradigm.׃T×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€does€not€make€MLSÐ  ð  Ða€mere€front€for€price€fixing,€but€it€does€distinguish€òòCopperweldóóÐ 0€  Ðby€introducing€a€further€danger€and€a€further€argument€for€testingÐ À Ðit€under€section€1's€rule€of€reason.Ð P  Ðà ` àTo€sum€up,€the€present€case€is€not€òòCopperweldóó€butÐ à0 Ðpresents€a€more€doubtful€situation;€MLS€and€its€operator/investorsÐ pÀ Ðcomprise€a€hybrid€arrangement,€somewhere€between€a€single€companyÐ P Ð(with€or€without€wholly€owned€subsidiaries)€and€a€cooperativeÐ à Ðarrangement€between€existing€competitors.€€And,€of€course,€there€isÐ  p Ðnot€one€kind€of€hybrid€but€a€range€of€possibilities€(imagine€theÐ °  Ðoperator/investors€with€their€separate€entrepreneurial€interestsÐ @" Ðbut€without€their€control€of€MLS).€€The€question€is€what€legalÐ Ð $ Ðapproach€to€take.Ð `"°& Ðà ` àThe€law€at€this€point€could€develop€along€either€or€bothÐ ð#@( Ðof€two€different€lines.€€One€would€expand€upon€òòCopperweldóó€toÐ €%Ð * Ðdevelop€functional€tests€or€criteria€for€shielding€(or€refusing€toÐ ° Ðshield)€such€hybrids€from€section€1€scrutiny€for€intra„enterpriseÐ @ Ðarrangements.€€This€would€be€a€complex€task€and€add€a€new€layer€ofÐ Ð  Ðanalysis;€but€where€the€analysis€shielded€the€arrangement€it€wouldÐ ` ° Ðserve€to€cut€off€similarly€difficult,€intrusive€scrutiny€of€suchÐ ð @ Ðintra„enterprise€activities€under€extremely€generalized€rule€ofÐ € Ð  Ðreason€standards.׃F×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€It€would€also€prevent€claims,€clearlyÐ `  Ðinappropriate€in€our€view,€under€òòper€seóó€rules€or€precedents€dealingÐ  ð  Ðwith€arrangements€between€existing€independent€competitors.Ð 0€  Ðà ` àThe€other€course€is€to€reshape€section€1's€rule€of€reasonÐ À Ðtoward€a€body€of€more€flexible€rules€for€interdependent€multi„partyÐ P  Ðenterprises.€€Sports€leagues€are€a€primary€example€but€so€areÐ à0 Ðcommon€franchising€arrangements€and€joint€ventures€that€performÐ pÀ Ðspecific€services€for€competitors€(òòe.g.óó,€a€common€purchasingÐ P Ðentity,€òòseeóó€òòNorthwest€Wholesale€Stationers,€Inc.óó€v.€òòPac.€StationeryÐ à Ðand€Printing€Co.óó,€472€U.S.€284€(1985)).€€Certainly€the€trend€ofÐ  p Ðsection€1€law€has€been€to€soften€òòper€seóó€rules€and€to€recognize€theÐ °  Ðneed€for€accommodation€among€interdependent€enterprises.׃K°×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×òòóóÐ @" Ðà ` àThe€same€choice€of€approach€presents€itself€in€franchiseÐ Ð $ Ðcases.€€There,€too,€we€have€a€close€but€not€complete€integration€ofÐ `"°& Ðseparate€entities€under€separate€entrepreneurial€control.òòóó€Ð ð#@( ÐTraditionally,€vertically€imposed€arrangements€restrictingÐ ° Ðcompetition€among€franchisees€have€been€tested€(and€often€upheld)Ð @ Ðunder€the€rule€of€reason.€€òòE.g.óó,€òòAm.€Motor€Innsóó€v.€òòHoliday€Inns,Ð Ð  ÐInc.óó,€521€F.2d€1230,€1241„43€(3d€Cir.€1975);€òòsee€alsoóó€1€Glickman,Ð ` ° ÐòòFranchisingóó€ðð€4.03[2]€(2001);€XII€Hovenkamp,€òòAntitrust€Lawóó€ðð€2033Ð ð @ Ð(1999)òòóó.€€Yet€since€òòCopperweldóó,€several€district€court€decisionsÐ € Ð  Ðhave€avoided€the€section€1€inquiry€by€deeming€franchiser€andÐ `  Ðfranchisee€part€of€a€single€entity.׃G×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€òòóóÐ  ð  Ðà ` àOnce€one€goes€beyond€the€classic€single€enterprise,Ð 0€  Ðincluding€òòCopperweldóó€situations,€it€is€difficult€to€find€an€easyÐ À Ðstopping€point€or€even€decide€on€the€proper€functional€criteria€forÐ P  Ðhybrid€cases.€€To€the€extent€the€criteria€reflect€judgments€that€aÐ à0 Ðparticular€practice€in€context€is€defensible,€assessment€underÐ pÀ Ðsection€1€is€more€straightforward€and€draws€on€developed€law.€Ð P ÐIndeed,€the€best€arguments€for€upholding€MLS's€restrictions„„thatÐ à Ðit€is€a€new€and€risky€venture,€constrained€in€some€(perhaps€great)Ð  p Ðmeasure€by€foreign€and€domestic€competition€for€players,€thatÐ °  Ðunquestionably€creates€a€new€enterprise€without€combining€existingÐ @" Ðcompetitors„„have€little€to€do€with€its€structure.Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àIn€all€events,€we€conclude€that€the€single€entity€problemÐ `"°& Ðneed€not€be€answered€definitively€in€this€case.€€The€case€forÐ ð#@( Ðexpanding€òòCopperweldóó€is€debatable€and,€more€so,€the€case€forÐ ° Ðapplying€the€single€entity€label€to€MLS.€€But€even€if€we€assumeÐ @ Ðthat€section€1€applies,€it€is€clear€to€us€that€the€venture€cannotÐ Ð  Ðbe€condemned€by€òòper€seóó€rules€and€presents€at€best€a€debatable€caseÐ ` ° Ðunder€the€rule€of€reason.€€More€significantly,€as€structured€byÐ ð @ Ðplaintiffs€themselves,€this€case€would€have€been€lost€at€trialÐ € Ð  Ðbased€on€the€jury's€rejection€of€plaintiffs'€own€market€definition.Ð `  Ðà ` àThe€rejection€of€the€òòper€seóó€rule€is€straightforward.€Ð  ð  ÐAlthough€players€portray€MLS€as€a€sham€for€horizontal€price€fixing,Ð 0€  Ðthe€extent€of€real€economic€integration€is€obvious.€€Further,€MLSÐ À Ðand€its€investors€did€not€compete€previously;€the€arrangement€wasÐ P  Ðformed€as€a€risky€venture€against€a€background€of€prior€failure,Ð à0 Ðòòcf.óó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòJerrold€Elecs.€Corp.óó,€187€F.€Supp.€545,€556„68Ð pÀ Ð(E.D.€Pa.€1960),€òòaff'dóó,€365€U.S.€567€(1961);€and€the€outcome€hasÐ P Ðbeen€to€add€new€opportunities€for€players„„a€Division€I€soccerÐ à Ðleague€in€the€United€States„„and€to€raise€salaries€for€soccerÐ  p Ðplayers€here€above€existing€levels.€€Ð °  Ðà ` àThe€possibility€that€a€less€integrated€and€restrictiveÐ @" Ðsalary€regime€might€make€some€individual€salaries€even€higher€isÐ Ð $ Ðhardly€conclusive.€€Without€the€restrictions,€MLS€might€not€existÐ `"°& Ðor,€if€it€did,€might€have€larger€initial€losses€and€a€shorter€life.€Ð ð#@( ÐThis€would€hardly€enhance€competition.€€Thus,€the€effects€of€theÐ €%Ð * ÐMLS€arrangement€are€simply€too€uncertain€to€warrant€application€ofÐ '`", Ðthe€òòper€seóó€rule.€€òòNCAAóó€v.€òòBd.€of€Regentsóó,€468€U.S.€at€100„103.€€AsÐ  (ð#. Ðin€any€other€non„òòper€seóó€case,€players€would€have€to€show€that€MLSÐ 0*€%0 Ðexercised€significant€market€power€in€a€properly€defined€market,Ð À+'2 Ðthat€the€practices€in€question€adversely€affected€competition€inÐ ° Ðthat€market€and€that€on€balance€the€adverse€effects€on€competitionÐ @ Ðoutweighed€the€competitive€benefits.€€òòSeeóó€òòAugusta€News€Co.óó€v.Ð Ð  ÐòòHudson€News€Co.óó,€269€F.3d€41,€49€(1st€Cir.€2001).Ð ` ° Ðà ` àHere,€the€jury€said€that€neither€the€United€States€norÐ ð @ ÐDivision€I€delimited€the€relevant€market„„findings€that€imply€thatÐ € Ð  ÐMLS€faced€significant€competition€for€player€services€both€fromÐ `  Ðoutside€the€United€States€and€from€non„Division€I€teams.€€ThatÐ  ð  Ðinference€at€a€minimum€creates€uncertainty€as€to€whether€the€juryÐ 0€  Ðcould€have€found€market€power€under€section€1.€€However,€theÐ À Ðpeculiar€assemblage€of€evidence,€including€MLS„authored€materialsÐ P  Ðsuggesting€that€it€expected€to€exercise€some€control€over€playerÐ à0 Ðsalaries€(òòseeóó€Part€III€below),€makes€it€impossible€to€rule€outÐ pÀ Ðabstractly€the€possibility€of€a€jury€finding€of€MLS€market€power€inÐ P Ða€broader€market.Ð à Ðà ` àMLS€has€urged€that€the€jury€verdict€rejecting€the€UnitedÐ  p ÐStates/Division€I€market€urged€by€plaintiffs€should€be€preclusive.€Ð °  ÐThe€argument€purportedly€rests€on€the€doctrine€of€collateralÐ @" Ðestoppel.€€We€agree€with€the€plaintiffs€that€collateral€estoppelÐ Ð $ Ðgoes€no€further€than€to€preclude€them€at€a€new€trial€from€urgingÐ `"°& Ðthe€market€already€rejected€by€the€jury.€€òòRestatement€(Second)€ofÐ ð#@( ÐJudgmentsóó€ðððð€27„28€(1982).€€In€theory,€there€may€be€a€broaderÐ €%Ð * Ðmarket€which€plaintiffs€might€show€(without€contradicting€the€juryÐ '`", Ðfindings)€in€which€unrestricted€salary€competition€between€the€MLSÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âoperator/investors€might€result€in€somewhat€higher€player€salaries.€Ð 0*€%0 ÐIn€that€event,€assuming€that€the€single€entity€defense€failed,€aÐ ° Ðbasis€for€liability€might€exist.Ð @ Ðâ âà ` àHowever,€we€have€been€given€no€reason€to€think€that€anyÐ Ð  Ðother€market€would€have€been€alleged€and€made€the€subject€of€proofÐ ` ° Ðif€the€section€1€claim€had€gone€to€trial€along€with€the€section€2Ð ð @ Ðclaims.€€In€their€complaint,€the€plaintiffs'€main€theory€underÐ € Ð  Ðcount€I€was€that€MLS€operated€as€a€price„fixing€or€group€boycottÐ `  Ðconspiracy€for€which€no€market€power€needed€to€be€shown.€€AÐ  ð  Ðrelevant€market€was€nevertheless€alleged€in€count€I,€apparentlyÐ 0€  Ðbecause€the€plaintiffs€recognized€that€a€pro„competitive€purposeÐ À Ðmight€be€urged€and€a€rule€of€reason€balancing€might€be€required.€Ð P  ÐThat€relevant€market€was€described€by€count€I,€as€in€the€section€2Ð à0 Ðand€section€7€counts,€as€competition€for€Division€I€soccer€playersÐ pÀ Ðin€the€United€States.€€òòSeeóó€Plaintiffs'€First€Amended€Complaint€ððððÐ P Ð32,€59,€70,€78.Ð à Ðà ` àProof€of€such€a€market€was€the€consistent€theme€ofÐ  p Ðplaintiffs'€section€2€trial€evidence.€€To€be€sure,€had€the€sectionÐ °  Ð1€claim€been€put€to€trial,€the€plaintiffs€could€haveòòóó€sought€toÐ @" Ðamend€their€complaint€to€allege€a€different€market,€but€there€is€noÐ Ð $ Ðobvious€reason€to€think€that€they€would€have€done€so.€€The€UnitedÐ `"°& ÐStates/Division€I€theory€alleged€in€the€complaint€was€the€mostÐ ð#@( Ðfavorable€for€each€of€their€claims€and€the€easiest€to€define;€andÐ €%Ð * Ðthe€focus€on€a€single€market€theory€would€have€allowed€theÐ '`", Ðplaintiffs€to€focus€their€proof€on€a€single€market€definition.€Ð  (ð#. Ðâ âPlaintiffs€did€have€some€incentive€to€allege€a€broader€market€underÐ 0*€%0 Ðsections€1€and€7,׃H×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×òòóó€but€that€incentive€existed€when€they€filed€theirÐ ° Ðâ âcomplaint€as€well.€Ð @ Ðà ` àEven€if€the€players€had€sought€to€amend€their€complaintÐ Ð  Ðafter€summary€judgment,€we€have€great€doubt€whether€such€anÐ ` ° Ðamendment€would€have€been€permitted.€€òòSeeóó€òòAcosta-Mestreóó€v.€òòHiltonÐ ð @ ÐInt'l€of€P.R.,€Inc.óó,€156€F.3d€49,€51„52€(1st€Cir.€1998).€€€TheÐ € Ð  Ðdistrict€court€granted€summary€judgment€in€April€2000„„more€thanÐ `  Ðthree€years€after€the€initial€complaint€was€filed,€more€than€oneÐ  ð  Ðyear€after€discovery€was€largely€complete,€and€barely€five€monthsÐ 0€  Ðbefore€beginning€of€trial.€€At€that€point€in€the€proceedings,Ð À Ðadding€a€new€market€theory€would€have€substantially€altered€theÐ P  Ðcontours€of€the€case„„potentially€requiring€new€discovery€andÐ à0 Ðexpert€analyses€based€on€the€new€alleged€market.׃I@×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòóóÐ pÀ Ѐ€€€€€à ` àWe€thus€have€every€reason€to€think€that€if€the€section€1Ð P Ðclaim€had€not€been€dismissed€on€summary€judgment€it€would€have€beenÐ à Ðpresented€at€trial€with€the€same€market€analysis€alleged€in€theÐ  p Ðcomplaint.€€It€follows€that€had€the€district€court€allowed€theÐ °  Ðsection€1€claim,€it€too€would€have€been€defeated€by€the€jury'sÐ @" Ðfinding€that€the€market€alleged€in€the€complaint€had€not€beenÐ Ð $ Ðproved.€€Accordingly,€any€error€in€dismissing€the€claim€based€on€aÐ ° Ðsingle€entity€theory€was€harmless€so€long€as€the€jury€verdictÐ @ Ðstands,€a€matter€we€address€in€the€next€section.€€The€outcome,€asÐ Ð  Ðthe€plaintiffs€shaped€their€own€case,€would€have€been€the€same.€Ð ` ° ÐòòLiberty€Mut.€Ins.€Co.óó€v.€òòMetro.€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€260€F.3d€54,€62€(1stÐ ð @ ÐCir.€2001).Ð € Ð  ÐÓ  ÓIII.€SHERMAN€ACT€SECTION€2Ð `  ÐÓ ®Óà ` àAt€trial,€players€alleged€three€possible€violations€ofÐ  ð  Ðsection€2:€that€MLS€monopolized€the€market€for€Division€IÐ 0€  Ðprofessional€soccer€in€the€U.S.;€that€it€attempted€to€monopolizeÐ À Ðthat€market;€and€that€it€conspired€with€the€USSF€to€monopolize€theÐ P  Ðsame€market.€€The€jury€found€that€players€had€failed€to€establishÐ à0 Ðthe€relevant€market€as€alleged;€it€reached€no€other€issue€in€theÐ pÀ Ðcase.€€The€court€thereafter€entered€judgment€for€the€defendants€onÐ P Ðall€three€section€2€claims.Ð à Ðà ` àòòMonopolization€and€attempted€monopolization€claimsóó.€€AtÐ  p Ðthe€outset,€players€contend€that€the€district€court€erred€byÐ °  Ðrefusing€to€allow€them,€in€their€monopolization€and€attemptedÐ @" Ðmonopolization€claims,€to€argue€that€elimination€of€competition€forÐ Ð $ Ðplayers€was€an€anticompetitive€means€of€monopolization.€€TheÐ `"°& Ðdistrict€court€did€so€on€the€ground€that€this€argument€would€simplyÐ ð#@( Ðresurrect€the€section€1€claim€that€had€already€been€rejected€by€itsÐ €%Ð * Ðsingle€entity€ruling;€section€2€remained€available€to€attack€theÐ '`", Ðexclusivity€arrangement€between€MLS€and€the€USSF,€which€was€theÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âgravamen€of€the€complaint's€section€2€count.€€Players€respond€thatÐ 0*€%0 Ðthe€same€conduct€may€constitute€an€element€of€both€antitrustÐ ° Ðclaims.Ð @ Ðâ âà ` àTo€show€monopolization,€players€had€to€prove€that€MLS€hadÐ Ð  Ðengaged€in€an€act€that€helped€create€or€maintain€its€allegedÐ ` ° Ðmonopoly.€€III€Areeda€&€Hovenkamp,€òòAntitrust€Lawóó€ðð€650a€(rev.€ed.Ð ð @ Ð1996).€€In€section€2€cases,€the€wrongful€act€is€usually€oneÐ € Ð  Ðdesigned€to€exclude€competitors€from€the€market€(e.g.,€predatoryÐ `  Ðprice,€exclusive€dealing).€€òòSeeóó€òòAspen€Skiing€Co.óó€v.€òòAspen€HighlandsÐ  ð  ÐSkiing€Corp.óó,€472€U.S.€585,€605€&€n.32€(1985).€€If€MLS€and€itsÐ 0€  Ðoperator/investors€are€viewed€as€a€single€competitor,€then€theÐ À Ðleague's€centralized€hiring€structure€hardly€constitutes€anÐ P  Ðexclusionary€act,€even€if€it€results€in€below„market€wages€forÐ à0 Ðplayers.€€òòSeeóó€òòKartellóó€v.€òòBlue€Shield€of€Mass.,€Inc.óó,€749€F.2d€922,Ð pÀ Ð927€(1st€Cir.€1984).€€After€all,€suppressing€player€salaries€oughtÐ P Ðto€spur,€rather€than€impair,€competition€from€rival€leagues.Ð à Ðà ` àHowever,€if€the€operator/investors€are€viewed€insteadÐ  p Ðmore€as€individual€potential€competitors„„an€issue€that€we€(unlikeÐ °  Ðthe€district€court)€have€not€decided„„it€is€not€difficult€to€seeÐ @" Ðhow€an€agreement€among€them€not€to€compete„„a€mirror€image€ofÐ Ð $ Ðplayers'€section€1€claim„„might€create€a€monopsony€and€eliminateÐ `"°& Ðcompetition€among€them.€€òòSeeóó€III€Areeda€&€Hovenkamp,€òòsupraóó,€at€ððÐ ð#@( Ð703a.€€Such€an€act€would€arguably€"exclude"€competition€forÐ €%Ð * Ðpurposes€of€section€2,€even€if€it€did€not€harm€individualÐ '`", Ðcompetitors.€€Anyway,€"exclusion"€is€only€a€gloss€on€the€statutoryÐ  (ð#. Ðterm€"monopolize";€and€"merger€to€monopoly,"€benign€as€to€theÐ 0*€%0 Ðmerged€competitors,€is€a€feasible€section€2€claim,€òòseeóó€òòGolden€GrainÐ À+'2 ÐMacaroni€Co.óó€v.€òòFTCóó,€472€F.2d€882,€886€(9th€Cir.€1972),€even€if€itÐ ° Ðis€more€often€challenged€under€Clayton€Act€section€7,€whichÐ @ Ðrequires€much€less.€€€Ð Ð  Ðà ` àNonetheless,€the€jury's€findings€remain€as€an€obstacle.€Ð ` ° ÐAttempt€and€monopolization€both€require€a€showing€that€a€market€hasÐ ð @ Ðbeen€or€may€well€be€subject€to€monopoly€power,€òòSpectrum€Sports,Ð € Ð  ÐInc.óó€v.€òòMcQuillan,€Inc.óó,€506€U.S.€447,€457„58€(1993);€the€onlyÐ `  Ðmarket€alleged€by€the€players€was€rejected€by€the€jury;€and€thisÐ  ð  Ðdooms€the€players'€section€2€claims€regardless€of€which€practice„„Ð 0€  Ðthe€exclusive€arrangement€with€the€USSF€or€the€agreement€not€toÐ À Ðcompete€for€players„„is€alleged€to€satisfy€the€exclusionary€actÐ P  Ðelement€of€the€cause€of€action.€€This€assumes,€however,€that€theÐ à0 Ðjury€verdict€stands.€€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àòòóóNot€surprisingly,€players€next€shift€their€focus€to€theÐ P Ðjury€verdict.€€They€say€the€jury's€market€findings€were€tainted€byÐ à Ðseveral€trial€errors.€€We€review€the€jury€instructions€òòde€novoóó,Ð  p ÐòòPonceóó€v.€òòAshford€Presbyterian€Cmty.€Hosp.óó,€238€F.3d€20,€24€(1stÐ °  ÐCir.€2001),€and€the€court's€evidentiary€rulings€for€abuse€ofÐ @" Ðdiscretion€òòóóunless€(as€is€occasionally€true)€an€issue€of€abstractÐ Ð $ Ðlaw€is€presented,€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòSpositoóó,€106€F.3d€1042,€1046Ð `"°& Ð(1st€Cir.€1997).Ð ð#@( Ðà ` àFirst,€players€say€the€court's€instructions€to€the€juryÐ €%Ð * Ðon€how€to€define€the€relevant€market€were€inaccurate€andÐ '`", Ðmisleading.€€Players€claim€the€instructions€left€the€jury€unable€toÐ  (ð#. Ðweigh€the€significance€of€evidence€showing€that€some€MLS€playersÐ 0*€%0 Ðhad€employment€opportunities€in€other€leagues.€€For€example,€MLSÐ À+'2 Ðoffered€testimony€that€its€players€had€played€in€67€differentÐ ° Ðforeign€leagues,€prior€to€or€after€playing€for€MLS;€plaintiffsÐ @ Ðcountered€that€the€opportunities€were€more€limited€and€lessÐ Ð  Ðattractive€than€MLS€claimed.€€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àSpecifically,€plaintiffs€complain€that€the€district€courtÐ ð @ Ðrefused€to€give€two€requested€instructions:€€first,€that€the€juryÐ € Ð  Ðin€defining€the€relevant€market€"should€consider€whether€anyÐ `  Ðeffective€competition€significantly€restrains€MLS's€ability€toÐ  ð  Ðcontrol€wages€for€its€players";€and€second,€that€the€jury€shouldÐ 0€  Ðinclude€in€the€relevant€market€only€those€leagues€which€areÐ À Ð"sufficiently€attractive€and€practically€available€to€a€largeÐ P  Ðenough€number€of€MLS€players€to€prevent€MLS€from€having€the€powerÐ à0 Ðto€pay€wages€below€competitive€market€levels."Ð pÀ Ðà ` àThe€first€problem€is€that€the€plaintiffs€did€not€preserveÐ P Ðthese€two€requests€by€making,€as€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.€51€requires,€aÐ à Ðpost„instruction€objection€"stating€distinctly€the€matter€objectedÐ  p Ðto€and€the€grounds€of€the€objection."€€Plaintiffs€did€not€repeatÐ °  Ðthese€two€requests€in€the€same€words;€instead€they€objected€afterÐ @" Ðthe€charge€that€the€instructions€had€overemphasized€the€concept€ofÐ Ð $ Ðsubstitutability€at€the€expense€of€"other€factors"€that€have€beenÐ `"°& Ðidentified€in€the€case€law,€which€plaintiffs'€brief€in€this€courtÐ ð#@( Ðsays€includes€"the€ability€of€other€leagues€to€constrain€the€powerÐ €%Ð * Ðof€MLS€to€depress€plaintiffs'€wages."Ð '`", Ðà ` àUnfortunately,€plaintiffs'€counsel€did€not€spell€out€theÐ  (ð#. Ðlast€quoted€objection€at€the€post„charge€conference.€€To€refer€onlyÐ 0*€%0 Ðto€"other€factors"€obviously€does€not€tell€the€judge€just€whatÐ À+'2 Ðpreviously€requested€instruction€has€been€omitted€or€identify€theÐ ° Ðfactors€claimed€to€be€insufficiently€stressed.€€òòDavisóó€v.€òòRennieóó,Ð @ Ð264€F.3d€86,€100€(1st€Cir.€2001).€€Accordingly,€the€failure€to€giveÐ Ð  Ðthe€two€instructions€in€question€is€reviewed€only€for€"plainÐ ` ° Ðerror";€especially€in€a€civil€case€this€is€a€very€hard€test€to€meetÐ ð @ Ðbecause€over€and€above€plain€error,€it€requires€a€showing€both€ofÐ € Ð  Ðprejudice€and€a€miscarriage€of€justice€or€something€of€thisÐ `  Ðmagnitude.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€101.Ð  ð  Ðà ` àAs€it€happens,€the€district€court€gave€standardÐ 0€  Ðinstructions€on€market€definition€which,€to€a€considerable€extent,Ð À Ðtracked€the€ABA's€model€jury€instructions€in€civil€antitrust€cases.€Ð P  ÐABA€Sample€Jury€Instructions€in€Civil€Antitrust€Cases,€at€C„6€to€C„Ð à0 Ð13€(1999).€€It€defined€monopoly€power€as€"the€power€to€pay€lowerÐ pÀ Ðthan€competitive€wages€for€the€services€being€acquired€withoutÐ P Ðhaving€the€sellers€of€those€services„„the€players„„turn€to€anotherÐ à Ðleague€or€team€for€employment";€and€it€explained€that€theÐ  p Ðgeographic€market€was€the€geographic€area€"to€which€players€canÐ °  Ðturn,€as€a€practical€matter,€for€alternate€opportunities€forÐ @" Ðemployment€as€professional€soccer€players."€€òòAccordóó€òòUnited€StatesóóÐ Ð $ Ðv.€òòPhiladelphia€Nat'l€Bankóó,€374€U.S.€321,€357„61€(1963);€òòTampaÐ `"°& ÐElec.€Co.óó€v.€òòNashville€Coal€Co.óó,€365€U.S.€320,€327€(1961).Ð ð#@( Ðà ` àThe€district€court€could€permissibly€have€enlarged€on€theÐ €%Ð * Ðissue,€explaining€(for€example)€that€a€foreign€league€would€be€moreÐ '`", Ðlikely€part€of€the€market€as€the€number€of€players€who€could€turnÐ  (ð#. Ðto€it€increased.€€But€how€much€to€elaborate€is€largely€theÐ 0*€%0 Ðdiscretion€of€the€district€court,€òòInterstate€Litho€Corp.óó€v.€òòBrownóó,Ð À+'2 Ð255€F.3d€19,€29€(1st€Cir.),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€122€S.€Ct.€666€(2001),Ð ° Ðand€in€some€respects,€the€players'€more€detailed€formulation€couldÐ @ Ðitself€be€misleading:€€MLS€could€be€constrained€so€long€as€enoughÐ Ð  Ðindividual€players€had€òòanóó€alternative€foreign€league€even€if€anÐ ` ° Ðòòindividualóó€foreign€league€would€òòby€itselfóó€attract€or€be€availableÐ ð @ Ðto€only€a€small€number€of€players.׃J×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àNext,€players€claim€the€court€erred€in€permitting€AlanÐ `  ÐRothenberg,€one€of€the€founders€of€MLS€and€former€president€of€theÐ  ð  ÐUSSF,€to€testify€about€a€legal€opinion€received€by€the€USSF€whileÐ 0€  Ðshielding€the€opinion€from€discovery€or€questioning.€€On€direct€andÐ À Ðthen€on€cross„examination,€Rothenberg€disclosed€without€detail€thatÐ P  Ðthe€USSF€board€had€obtained€a€legal€opinion€that€it€was€lawful€toÐ à0 Ðgrant€exclusive€Division€I€certification€to€a€single€league.€€AtÐ pÀ Ðtrial,€the€players€sought€to€discover€the€opinion€or€have€allÐ P Ðreferences€to€it€struck.€€The€court€denied€both€requests,€findingÐ à Ðthat€Rothenberg€had€not€waived€the€attorney„client€privilege€byÐ  p Ðmaking€his€brief€references.Ð °  Ðà ` àIt€is€true,€as€MLS€asserts,€that€the€statement€was€firstÐ @" Ðadduced€on€direct€examination€by€plaintiffs,€and€its€repetition€onÐ Ð $ Ðcross€added€nothing€new.€€On€the€other€hand,€plaintiffs€did€not€askÐ `"°& Ðthe€witness€whether€a€legal€opinion€had€been€sought€or€about€itsÐ ð#@( Ðcontents.€€The€witness,€himself€a€lawyer,€more€or€less€volunteeredÐ €%Ð * Ðthis€information.€€Possibly,€the€district€judge€felt€that€theÐ '`", Ðdisclosure,€even€if€not€directly€invited,€was€legitimate€becauseÐ ° Ðotherwise€the€witness„„who€had€been€asked€whether€antitrustÐ @ Ðconcerns€had€been€raised€by€the€USSF€board„„would€have€been€forcedÐ Ð  Ðto€leave€the€impression€that€they€had€been€raised€but€not€seriouslyÐ ` ° Ðaddressed€or€resolved.Ð ð @ Ðà ` àWe€think€that€if€defense€counsel€had€adduced€thisÐ € Ð  Ðdisclosure€in€the€first€instance€it€would€be€unfair€to€allow€theÐ `  Ðlegal€opinion€to€be€used€affirmatively€without€allowing€plaintiffsÐ  ð  Ðto€examine€it€or,€at€the€very€least,€requiring€a€severe€limitingÐ 0€  Ðinstruction€(which€plaintiffs€did€not€request).€€The€case€law€isÐ À Ðmixed€as€to€whether€there€is€a€waiver€of€the€privilege€where€thereÐ P  Ðis€a€very€limited€disclosure€as€to€the€ultimate€opinion€without€aÐ à0 Ðdisclosure€of€contents€and€the€answer€may€depend€upon€context.׃L×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀РpÀ ÐBut€on€our€facts,€it€is€fairly€arguable€that€the€plaintiffs€openedÐ P Ðthe€door€to€the€response€and,€if€so,€could€not€use€their€ownÐ à Ðconduct€to€force€the€waiver.Ð  p Ðà ` àSo€viewed,€the€district€court's€decision€is€tested€underÐ °  Ðan€abuse€of€discretion€standard,€and€we€are€unwilling€to€say€thatÐ @" Ðthe€decision€here€was€an€abuse.€€Whatever€discomfort€we€feel„„andÐ Ð $ Ðthere€is€some„„is€assuaged€by€our€grave€doubt€that€Rothenberg'sÐ `"°& Ðdisclosure€of€the€opinion€as€to€lawfulness€could€have€had€anyÐ ð#@( Ðeffect€on€a€jury€verdict€that€plaintiffs€had€failed€to€prove€theÐ €%Ð * Ðrelevant€market€they€alleged.€€Plaintiffs€make€a€stab€at€showingÐ '`", Ðprejudice€by€equating€the€failure€to€prove€the€relevant€market€withÐ ° Ðlawfulness;€but€although€this€might€be€plausible€in€the€abstract,Ð @ Ðthe€notion€that€the€jury€decided€an€essentially€factual€issue,€asÐ Ð  Ðto€which€there€was€a€mass€of€conflicting€evidence,€on€the€basis€ofÐ ` ° Ða€brief€reference€to€a€legal€opinion€seems€to€us€highly€remote.Ð ð @ Ðà ` àNext,€players€say€the€court€erred€in€excluding€two€piecesÐ € Ð  Ðof€documentary€evidence€that€supported€their€claims€of€marketÐ `  Ðdefinition€and€market€power.€€The€first€is€a€September€1994Ð  ð  Ðcorrespondence€between€Clark€Hunt,€a€prospective€MLSÐ 0€  Ðoperator/investor,€and€Mark€Abbott,€an€executive€working€on€theÐ À Ðformation€of€MLS,€regarding€assumptions€made€in€a€financial€modelÐ P  Ðdisseminated€by€the€league's€organizers.€€Hunt€later€became€anÐ à0 Ðoperator/investor€in€the€league€through€a€firm€he€helped€form,Ð pÀ Ðwhich€was€a€defendant€below;€Abbott€became€a€senior€league€officer.Ð P Ðà ` àIn€his€letter,€Hunt€urged€that€the€team€player€salaryÐ à Ðbudget€be€reduced€by€$70,000,€with€the€"bulk€of€the€reduction"Ð  p Ðcoming€from€the€"bottom€12€players€on€each€team€whose€onlyÐ °  Ðalternative€is€to€play€in€one€of€the€other€U.S.€professionalÐ @" Ðleagues€or€one€of€the€lower€division€foreign€leagues."€€Hunt€alsoÐ Ð $ Ðsuggested€that€salary€growth€should€also€be€limited€to€five€percentÐ `"°& Ða€year,€reasoning€that€"[u]ntil€there€is€significant€domestic„basedÐ ð#@( Ðcompetition€for€MLS€players,€the€rate€of€salary€growth€should€beÐ €%Ð * Ðrelatively€easy€to€contain."€€In€response,€Abbott€cautioned€that€"aÐ '`", Ðreduction€of€$70,000€in€player€salaries€per€team€[would]€impact€theÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âquality€of€players€we€are€able€to€attract."€€At€the€same€time,€heÐ 0*€%0 Ðagreed€that,€"for€modeling€purposes€the€player€salaries€should€beÐ ° Ðheld€to€[a]€5%€[increase]€per€year."Ð @ Ðâ âà ` àThe€court€excluded€the€correspondence,€finding€itÐ Ð  Ðirrelevant€since€it€was€not€"made€by€someone€who€matters€to€theÐ ` ° Ðcase"€and€the€transcript€then€reveals€a€four„page€colloquy€in€whichÐ ð @ Ðthe€parties€argue€about€the€issue€with€the€judge.€€Plaintiffs'€mainÐ € Ð  Ðbasis€for€urging€admission€of€the€Hunt€letter€was€that€it€tended€toÐ `  Ðshow€Hunt's€own€intent€to€monopolize,€the€suggestion€being€thatÐ  ð  Ðthis€view€should€also€be€attributed€to€the€firm€that€Hunt€formedÐ 0€  Ð(apparently€later)€which€became€an€operator/investor€and€defendantÐ À Ðin€the€case.€€On€this€appeal,€plaintiffs€switch€grounds€and€urgeÐ P  Ðthat€the€Hunt€letter€and€Abbott's€reply€as€well€were€evidence€ofÐ à0 Ðplaintiffs'€proposed€market€definition.Ð pÀ Ðà ` àWhether€the€evidence€should€have€been€admitted€to€showÐ P Ðintent€on€the€attempt€to€monopolize€claim€is€a€nice€issue€butÐ à Ðirrelevant€here€since€the€jury€resolved€the€case€on€marketÐ  p Ðdefinition€grounds.€€Plaintiffs'€present€claim€that€the€evidenceÐ °  Ðshould€have€been€admitted€to€bolster€their€market€theory€and€showÐ @" Ðthe€existence€of€monopoly€power€founders€because€it€was€neverÐ Ð $ Ðoffered€for€that€purpose.€€òòSeeóó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòJoselynóó,€206€F.3dÐ `"°& Ð144,€154€(1st€Cir.€2000).€€Further,€although€no€hearsay€objectionÐ ð#@( Ðwas€made,€an€interesting€question€remains€whether€Hunt's€statementÐ €%Ð * Ðas€a€prospective€investor€is€properly€admissible€for€either€purposeÐ '`", Ðas€an€admission€of€the€defendant€firm€that€Hunt€later€helped€form.€Ð  (ð#. Ðâ âFed.€R.€Evid.€801(d)(2).€€Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àAs€to€Abbott's€letter,€it€appears€from€the€transcriptÐ ° Ðâ âthat€the€court€was€prepared€to€consider€admitting€the€letterÐ @ Ðwithout€the€Hunt€document€but€plaintiffs'€counsel€understandablyÐ Ð  Ðdemurred.€€Abbott's€statements€are€quite€tame€(the€first€suggestsÐ ` ° Ða€lack€of€market€power€as€to€quality€players€and€the€second€wasÐ ð @ Ð"for€modeling€purposes").€€Plaintiffs'€further€suggestion„„thatÐ € Ð  ÐAbbott€was€adopting€on€behalf€of€MLS€whatever€was€said€in€the€HuntÐ `  Ðletter„„is€a€stretch€that€the€language€of€the€letter€does€notÐ  ð  Ðsupport.Ð 0€  Ðà ` àFurther,€any€error€was€harmless.€€Players€were€allowed€toÐ À Ðintroduce€numerous€other€documents,€authored€by€MLS€itself,Ð P  Ðexpressing€virtually€the€same€opinions.€€òòóóFor€example,€players€wereÐ à0 Ðallowed€to€introduce€a€November€1995€offering€memorandum,€in€whichÐ pÀ ÐMLS€admits€that€it€"does€not€view€[the€Division€I€and€Division€IIÐ P Ðor€indoor€soccer€leagues]€as€significant€competition."׃M×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€And€atÐ à Ðtrial,€players'€economic€expert,€Roger€Noll,€relied€on€theseÐ  p Ðdocuments€to€support€his€testimony€and€conclusions.€€The€excludedÐ °  Ðcorrespondence€was€thus€redundant€and€could€hardly€have€changed€theÐ @" Ðoutcome.Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àThe€next€piece€of€evidence€is€a€March€1994€internalÐ `"°& Ðmemorandum€written€by€two€employees€of€the€investment€firmÐ ð#@( ÐDonaldson,€Lufkin€&€Jenrette€("DLJ").€€MLS's€promoters€hadÐ ° Ðapproached€DLJ€to€act€as€its€financial€advisor.€€In€the€memo,€theÐ @ ÐDLJ€employees€conclude€that€MLS€has€favorable€prospects€forÐ Ð  Ðsuccess,€noting,€òòinter€aliaóó,€that€the€league€will€"be€able€toÐ ` ° Ðoperate€with€a€strict€salary€cap,"€and€that€there€"is€a€plentifulÐ ð @ Ðsupply€of€good€American€players€that€have€limited€professionalÐ € Ð  Ðopportunities€to€play€elsewhere."€€Ð `  Ðà ` àThe€court€excluded€the€memo,€first,€on€hearsay€grounds,Ð  ð  Ðsince€it€was€unclear€whether€an€agency€relationship€existed€at€theÐ 0€  Ðtime€the€memo€was€drafted€and€whether€its€contents€were€within€theÐ À Ðscope€of€the€agency,€Fed.€R.€Evid.€801(d)(2)(D);€and€second,€onÐ P  Ðrelevance€grounds,€since€the€views€were€not€attributable€to€MLS.€Ð à0 ÐOn€appeal,€plaintiffs€simply€do€not€respond€to€the€claim€that€atÐ pÀ Ðthe€time€the€statement€was€made,€DLJ€was€an€independent€contractorÐ P Ðand€not€an€agent€of€MLS.€€òòSeeóó€òòMerrickóó€v.€òòFarmers€Ins.€Groupóó,€892Ð à ÐF.2d€1434,€1440€(9th€Cir.€1990).Ð  p Ðà ` àIn€all€events,€the€other€documents€discussed€above€whichÐ °  Ðwere€introduced€into€evidence€contained€virtually€identicalÐ @" Ðstatements€penned€by€MLS€itself€attesting€to€MLS's€early€view€thatÐ Ð $ Ðcompetition€in€the€market€was€limited.€€òòóóAnd€the€DLJ€memo,€whileÐ `"°& Ðhelpful€to€players'€cause,€was€hardly€dispositive;€it€addressedÐ ð#@( Ðonly€the€opportunities€of€American€soccer€players€and€said€nothingÐ €%Ð * Ðabout€the€40%€of€MLS€players€who€have€foreign€or€dual€citizenshipÐ '`", Ðand€yet€are€part€of€plaintiffs'€class.€€By€contrast,€MLS's€ownÐ  (ð#. Ðstatements€which€were€introduced€were€more€helpful€to€plaintiffs.€Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àòòóóNext,€players€claim€the€court€erred€in€permitting€aÐ À+'2 Ðdefense€witness,€Neil€Farnsworth,€co„owner€of€a€Seattle€Division€IIÐ ° Ðprofessional€soccer€team,€to€testify€that€he€was€competing€with€MLSÐ @ Ðfor€two€specific€players,€while€refusing€to€identify€the€players€byÐ Ð  Ðname€on€"confidentiality"€grounds.€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àAt€trial,€Farnsworth€testified€that:Ð ð @ ÐÝ‚·ÁûÿÝÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓQ1ܰÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°,X°` ¨ ƒXQÓÝ  ÝÝ‚·Áû<ÝÝ  Ýà8 4 àà8Œ 4¤4¤àWe€compete€with€MLS€for€players€everyÐ € Ð  Ðday.€€We€have€a€situation€right€now€whereÐ H ˜  ÐI€have€one€player€that€is€being€courtedÐ `  Ðby€MLS.€€He's€rejected€one€offer€by€MLSÐ Ø(  Ðnow€to€stay€with€us.݃·Áû<êÝŒÐ ð Œ LŒ L ÐŒÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓ0°,X°` ¨ ƒXܰ‚,` ‹X0ÓÝ  ÝÝ‚·ÁûÿÝÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓQ1ܰÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°,X°` ¨ ƒXQÓÝ  ÝÝ‚·Áûã ÝÝ  Ýà 4 àà Œ à.€.€.€Ýƒ·Áûã ‘ ݌Р0€  ÐŒÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓ0°,X°` ¨ ƒXܰ‚,` ‹X0ÓÝ  ÝÝ‚·ÁûÿÝÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓQ1ܰÜ` ¸ hÀpÈ xÐ (#°,X°` ¨ ƒXQÓÝ  ÝÝ‚·Áûz ÝÝ  Ýà8 4 àà8Œ 4¤4¤àWe€also€have€a€player€from€MLS€that€hasÐ À Ðplayed€in€MLS€for€probably€four€yearsÐ ˆØ Ðthat€has€contacted€us€for€next€seasonÐ P  Ðexpressing€an€interest€to€play€for€us€andÐ h Ðthen€play€indoor€in€addition€to€playingÐ à0 Ðfor€us,€instead€of€playing€for€MLS.€€Ýƒ·Áûz ( ݌ШøŒ LŒ L ÐŒÓ ÓÓÓÓ XÓÓ XÓÓ0°,X°` ¨ ƒXܰ‚,` ‹X0ÓÝ  Ýà ` àOn€cross„examination€by€players'€counsel,€FarnsworthÐ 8ˆ Ðrevealed€certain€details€about€the€player€from€his€own€team,Ð È Ðincluding€his€salary,€but€he€refused€to€identify€either€that€playerÐ X¨ Ðor€his€MLS€recruit€by€name,€claiming€he€wanted€to€keep€theÐ è8 Ðinformation€confidential.€€Players'€objections€were€denied;€theÐ xÈ! Ðdistrict€court€ruled€that€the€players'€privacy€was€at€stake,€andÐ  X# Ðtherefore,€that€their€names€were€properly€excludable€under€Fed.€R.Ð ˜!è% ÐEvid.€403.€€The€court€also€refused€players'€request€to€instruct€theÐ (#x' Ðjury€to€ignore€the€testimony.€€Ð ¸$ ) Ðà ` àPlayers€claim€the€district€court€infringed€their€right€toÐ H&˜!+ Ðcross„examine€Farnsworth€and€to€test€the€truth€of€his€assertions.€Ð Ø'(#- ÐòòóóTo€be€sure,€the€court€has€the€authority€to€"protect€witnessesÐ h)¸$/ Ðagainst€cross„examination€that€does€little€to€impair€theirÐ ø*H&1 Ðcredibility€but€that€may€damage€their€reputation,€invade€theirÐ ˆ,Ø'3 Ðprivacy,€and€assault€their€personality.€€Rule€403€would€permit€theÐ ° Ðprotection€of€even€total€strangers€to€the€action."€€22€Wright€&Ð @ ÐGraham,€òòFederal€Practice€and€Procedureóó€ðð€5215€(1978)€(citationÐ Ð  Ðomitted);€òòseeóó€Fed.€R.€Evid.€611(a).€€But€this€power€is€limited€toÐ ` ° Ðsituations€in€which€the€probative€value€of€the€evidence€isÐ ð @ Ð"substantially€outweighed"€by€the€danger€of€unfair€prejudice.€€Fed.Ð € Ð  ÐR.€Evid.€403.Ð `  Ðà ` àAlthough€much€discretion€resides€in€the€trial€judge€inÐ  ð  Ðstriking€this€balance,€òòGasperinióó€v.€òòCtr.€for€Humanities,€Inc.óó,€149Ð 0€  ÐF.3d€137,€143€(2d€Cir.€1998),€the€denial€of€the€names€certainlyÐ À Ðlimited€plaintiffs'€ability€to€cross„examine€Farnsworth€and€it€isÐ P  Ðunclear€to€us€just€what€substantial€privacy€interest€was€at€stake:€Ð à0 Ðif€anything,€the€players€would€want€to€shield€their€names€from€MLS,Ð pÀ Ðbut€the€league€knew€whom€it€was€courting€from€Farnsworth's€team€andÐ P Ðthe€possible€defector€presumably€would€in€due€course€useÐ à ÐFarnsworth's€overtures€in€bargaining€with€MLS.Ð  p Ðà ` àNonetheless,€even€without€the€names,€players€were€able€toÐ °  Ðtest€Farnsworth's€testimony,׃N×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€other€witnesses„„includingÐ @" Ðcurrent€and€former€players€and€soccer€officials„„testified€toÐ Ð $ Ðplayer€movement€between€leagues.€€For€example,€Ivan€Gazidas,€MLS'sÐ `"°& Ðvice€president€of€operations€and€player€relations,€testified€atÐ ð#@( Ðlength€concerning€the€competition€MLS€faced€to€attract€the€talentsÐ €%Ð * Ðof€several€named€players€from€other€leagues.€€Farnsworth'sÐ '`", Ðanecdotal€testimony,€while€somewhat€helpful€to€MLS,€was€by€no€meansÐ ° Ðthe€most€powerful€evidence€adduced€at€trial€to€demonstrate€inter„Ð @ Ðleague€competition.€€Accordingly,€we€find€the€error€was€harmless.Ô‡ X %XX X+MÔÐ Ð  ÐÔ#† X+MXX X %¨#Ôà ` àòòóóFinally,€players€claim€the€court€erred€in€admitting€inÐ ` ° Ðevidence€a€chart€summarizing€the€testimony€of€two€defense€witnessesÐ ð @ Ðand€later€permitting€the€jury€to€take€the€chart€with€them€into€theÐ € Ð  Ðjury€room€for€deliberations.€€The€summary€chart€listed€67Ð `  Ðprofessional€soccer€leagues€of€different€divisions€from€46Ð  ð  Ðcountries;€at€trial,€the€two€witnesses€testified€that€MLS€playersÐ 0€  Ðhad€experience€in€each€of€the€leagues€and€marked€the€chartÐ À Ðaccordingly.€€Both€sides€used€demonstratives€at€trial€which€wereÐ P  Ðadmitted€into€evidence;€while€players€complain€generally€about€theÐ à0 Ðuse€of€the€demonstratives,€this€summary€chart€is€the€only€item€theyÐ pÀ Ðsingle€out€on€appeal.Ð P Ðà ` àIn€admitting€the€summaries,€the€district€court€reasonedÐ à Ðthat€the€demonstratives€would€"help€the€jury€to€think€about€aÐ  p Ðcomplex€case."€€At€the€same€time,€it€recognized€the€risks€involved,Ð °  Ðòòseeóó€òòAir€Safetyóó€v.€òòRoman€Catholic€Archbishopóó,€94€F.3d€1,€7€n.14€(1stÐ @" ÐCir.€1996),€and€emphasized€in€its€instructions€to€the€jury€thatÐ Ð $ Ðsummaries€do€not€"present€any€independent€evidence."€€It€furtherÐ `"°& Ðcautioned€them€that€the€summaries€are€"admitted€for€yourÐ ð#@( Ðconvenience€and€not€to€substitute€for€the€full€testimony€of€theÐ €%Ð * Ðwitnesses."€€Ð '`", Ðà ` àIt€is€hard€to€imagine€an€issue€on€which€a€trial€judgeÐ  (ð#. Ðenjoys€more€discretion€than€as€to€whether€summary€exhibits€will€beÐ 0*€%0 Ðhelpful.€€Nothing€precludes€their€use€with€respect€to€oralÐ À+'2 Ðtestimony.׃O×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Here€the€issues€involved€in€the€case€and€the€testimonyÐ ° Ðwere€complicated€and€the€jury€was€properly€cautioned€as€to€theÐ @ Ðlimited€role€of€summaries.€€Although€the€court€admitted€the€chartsÐ Ð  Ðas€"evidence,"€its€instruction€made€clear€that€they€were€merelyÐ ` ° Ðaids€and€that€the€testimony€controlled.€€We€find€no€abuse€ofÐ ð @ Ðdiscretion€and€need€not€concern€ourselves€with€whether,€as€MLSÐ € Ð  Ðclaims,€the€objection€was€somehow€waived.€€€€Ð `  Ðà ` àòòConspiracy€to€monopolizeóó.€€In€their€third€and€finalÐ  ð  Ðsection€2€claim,€players€allege€that€MLS€conspired€with€the€USSFÐ 0€  Ð"to€prevent€any€other€entity€from€being€sanctioned€as€a€Division€IÐ À Ðprofessional€soccer€league€in€the€United€States€or€otherwiseÐ P  Ðcompeting€against€MLS."€€The€court€decided€that€players€wereÐ à0 Ðrequired€to€prove€the€existence€of€their€relevant€market€on€theÐ pÀ Ðconspiracy€to€monopolize€claim;€it€directed€the€jury€to€end€itsÐ P Ðinquiry€on€all€section€2€claims€if€it€found€players€had€failed€toÐ à Ðprove€the€existence€of€their€market.Ð  p Ðà ` àAt€trial€and€now€on€appeal,€players€say€claims€ofÐ °  Ðcombination€or€conspiracy€to€monopolize€do€not€require€proof€of€aÐ @" Ðrelevant€market.€€For€these€purposes€plaintiffs€are€notÐ Ð $ Ðdistinguishing€between€the€concept€of€a€relevant€market€and€theÐ `"°& Ðconcepts€of€monopoly€or€market€power:€€they€are€arguing€that€theÐ ð#@( Ðprospect€that€the€alleged€conspiracy€if€successful€would€achieveÐ €%Ð * Ðmonopsony€power€in€a€real€economic€market€was€irrelevant€to€theirÐ '`", Ðclaim.€€Instead,€they€say€they€were€required€to€prove€only€theÐ  (ð#. Ðexistence€of€the€conspiracy;€an€overt€act€in€furtherance€of€it;€andÐ ° Ðspecific€intent€to€monopolize.€€òòE.g.óó,€òòSalco€Co.óó€v.€òòGen.€Motors€Co.óó,Ð @ Ð517€F.2d€567,€576€(10th€Cir.€1975).Ð Ð  Ðà ` àConspiracy€to€monopolize€claims€are€not€often€the€subjectÐ ` ° Ðof€much€attention,€since€almost€any€such€claim€could€be€proved€moreÐ ð @ Ðeasily€under€section€1's€ban€on€conspiracies€in€restraint€of€trade.€Ð € Ð  ÐIIIA€Areeda€&€Hovenkamp,€òòAntitrust€Lawóó€ðð€809€(1996).€€However,€aÐ `  Ðmajority€of€courts€that€have€touched€the€issue€have€said,€inÐ  ð  Ðgeneral€terms€and€often€without€analysis,€that€proof€of€a€relevantÐ 0€  Ðmarket,€and€hence,€market€power,€is€not€required€in€a€conspiracy€toÐ À Ðmonopolize€claim.€€òòE.g.óó,òòóó€òòSalcoóó,€517€F.2d€at€576òòóó;€òòseeóó€IIIA€Areeda€&Ð P  ÐHovenkampòòóó,€òòsupraóó,€at€ðð€809€&€n.2€(collecting€cases);€òòóóABA€SampleÐ à0 ÐJury€Instructions€in€Civil€Antitrust€Cases,€òòsupraóó,€at€C„100€n.3.€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àOn€the€other€side,€there€are€also€a€number€of€decisionsÐ P Ðthat€say€that€a€relevant€market€is€necessary.׃P×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú16Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€That€is€also€theÐ à Ðview€of€the€more€persuasive€commentary,€including€the€mostÐ  p Ðrespected€of€the€antitrust€treatises.€€IIIA€Areeda€&€Hovenkampòòóó,Ð °  Ðòòsupraóó,€at€ðð€809;€òòaccordóó€Comment,€òòThe€Relevant€Market€Concept€inÐ @" ÐConspiracy€to€Monopolize€Cases€under€Section€2€of€the€Sherman€Actóó,Ð Ð $ Ð44€U.€Chi.€L.€Rev.€805€(1977).€€Although€we€lean€toward€this€viewÐ `"°& Ðas€a€general€matter,€a€black€or€white€rule€is€not€inevitable:€Ð ð#@( Ðthere€may€in€principle€be€some€cases€in€which€one€could€argue€thatÐ €%Ð * Ða€conspiracy€claim€should€be€provable€without€a€showing€that€theÐ ° Ðalleged€market€is€a€real€economic€market.€€This€case€is€not€amongÐ @ Ðthem.Ð Ð  Ðà ` àHere€the€"conspiratorial€agreement"€is€a€garden€varietyÐ ` ° Ðexclusive€dealing€arrangement€limited€to€three€years.€€SuchÐ ð @ Ðagreements€are€not€inherently€unlawful;€they€are€judged€primarilyÐ € Ð  Ðby€considering,€in€addition€to€competitive€or€efficiencyÐ `  Ðjustifications,€any€actual€or€threatened€adverse€effects€onÐ  ð  Ðcompetition.€€òòTampa€Elec.€Co.óó,€365€U.S.€at€327;€òòU.S.€Healthcare,Ð 0€  ÐInc.óó€v.€òòHealthsource,€Inc.óó,€986€F.2d€589,€594€(1st€Cir.€1993).€Ð À ÐPredicted€effects€turn,€obviously,€on€the€establishment€of€a€marketÐ P  Ðin€which€the€exclusive€dealing€arrangement€may€affect€prices€orÐ à0 Ðcompetitors.€€Absent€threatened€effects,€there€is€normally€no€basisÐ pÀ Ðfor€condemning€an€exclusive€dealing€arrangement.Ð P Ðà ` à€All€implemented€exclusive€dealing€contracts€involve€bothÐ à Ða€nominal€conspiracy€(the€agreement)€and€acts€in€furtheranceÐ  p Ð(whatever€dealings€take€place).€€To€tell€a€jury€that€it€may€condemnÐ °  Ðsuch€contracts„„without€proof€of€any€threatened€effect€on€theÐ @" Ðmarket„„would€create€not€only€confusion€for€the€jury€but€invite€anÐ Ð $ Ðend€run€around€the€threatened€effects€required€by€the€case€law€forÐ `"°& Ðexclusive€dealing€under€both€section€1€and€the€attempt€andÐ ð#@( Ðmonopolization€requirements€of€section€2.€€IIIA€Areeda€&€Hovenkamp,Ð €%Ð * Ðòòsupraóó,€at€ðð€809.Ð '`", Ðà ` àThe€point€is€summed€up€neatly€in€the€Areeda„HovenkampÐ  (ð#. Ðtreatise:Ð 0*€%0 ÐÓÓà8 ` àWhere€the€agreements€involved€would€also€beÐ À+'2 Ðheld€to€offend€ðð1€without€the€necessity€ofÐ ˆ,Ø'3 Ðproving€power,€the€failure€to€require€it€forÐ ° Ðthe€ðð2€conspiracy€offense€is€understandable.€Ð xÈ ÐòòHowever,€in€those€instances€where€[market]Ð @ Ðpower€is€a€prerequisite€to€holding€anÐ X Ðagreement€to€be€an€unreasonable€restraint€ofÐ Ð  Ðtrade„„a€joint€venture,€for€example„„it€wouldÐ ˜è Ðmake€no€sense€to€hold€the€same€agreementÐ ` ° Ðoffensive€to€ðð2€without€proof€of€poweróó.€€ToÐ ( x Ðrequire€power€under€ðð1€before€condemning€aÐ ð @ Ðparticular€agreement€is€necessarily€to€sayÐ ¸   Ðthat€the€arrangement€is€socially€desirable,€orÐ € Ð  Ðat€least€not€harmful,€in€the€absence€of€power.€Ð H ˜  ÐThat€policy€conclusion€cannot€sensibly€beÐ `  Ðavoided€or€negated€by€the€simple€trick€ofÐ Ø(  Ðcalling€the€agreement€a€conspiracy€toÐ  ð  Ðmonopolize.Ðh¸ ` x` x ÐÌÓÓIIIA€Areeda€&€Hovenkampòòóó,€òòsupraóó,€at€ðð€809€(emphasis€added).Ð øH  ÐÓŸ?ÓÓÓà ` àWhere€parties€agree€to€achieve€an€admittedly€unlawfulÐ ˆØ Ðresult,€such€as€a€murder€or€burglary,€there€is€case€law€to€theÐ h Ðeffect€that€the€prosecutor€need€not€show€that€the€plan€was€feasibleÐ ¨ø Ðand€that€impossibility€(at€least€in€some€situations)€is€not€aÐ 8ˆ Ðdefense.€€2€LaFave€&€Scott,€òòSubstantive€Criminal€Lawóó€ðð€6.5(b)Ð È Ð(1986);€òòDevelopments€in€the€Law„„Criminal€Conspiracyóó,€72€Harv.€L.Ð X¨ ÐRev.€922,€944„45€(1959).€€This€is€presumably€the€source€of€theÐ è8 Ðantitrust€case€law€relied€on€by€plaintiffs.€€But€the€rationale€ofÐ xÈ! Ðthis€classic€view€is€that€the€conspiracy€should€be€punished€becauseÐ  X# Ðthe€demonstrated€intent€to€break€the€law€shows€that€theÐ ˜!è% Ðconspirators€are€dangerous€even€if€this€particular€venture€wasÐ (#x' Ðimpractical.€€2€LaFave€&€Scott,€òòsupraóó,€at€ðð€6.5(b).Ð ¸$ ) Ðà ` àPerhaps€this€view€is€equally€justified€in€antitrust€casesÐ H&˜!+ Ðwhere€the€evidence€shows€that€the€conspirators€were€aiming€at€aÐ Ø'(#- Ðdemonstrably€illegal€result,€say,€a€world€wide€monopoly€of€goldÐ h)¸$/ Ðproduction€or€a€naked€horizontal€allocation€of€markets.€€In€ourÐ ø*H&1 Ðcase,€there€is€no€dispute€that€defendants€aimed€at€being€the€onlyÐ ˆ,Ø'3 ÐDivision€I€soccer€league€in€the€United€States€at€least€for€threeÐ ° Ðyears€and€that€they€enlisted€the€USSF€to€achieve€this€end.€€But€theÐ @ Ðillegality€of€such€an€arrangement€is€far€from€clear.€€To€ignore€theÐ Ð  Ðquestion€whether€this€is€a€relevant€market€in€the€economic€sense€isÐ ` ° Ðto€assume€that€the€end€aimed€at€is€illegal.€€Here,€the€jury€foundÐ ð @ Ðthat€control€of€U.S./Division€I€soccer€would€òònotóó€comprise€aÐ € Ð  Ðmonopoly.Ð `  Ðà ` àIn€sum,€there€may€be€contexts€in€which€the€existence€òòvelóóÐ  ð  Ðòònonóó€of€a€relevant€market€is€beside€the€point€in€a€conspiracy€toÐ 0€  Ðmonopolize€case,€but€this€case€is€not€one€of€them.€€The€exclusivityÐ À Ðagreement€sought€by€MLS€might€be€unlawful€if€it€threatened€adverseÐ P  Ðcompetitive€effects€but€not€otherwise;€and€this€in€turn€requiredÐ à0 Ðproof€that€someone€who€was€the€only€purchaser€of€Division€I€soccerÐ pÀ Ðplayer€services€in€the€United€States€would€control€prices€in€anÐ P Ðeconomic€market.€€€€€Ð à ÐÓ  ÓIV.€CLAYTON€ACT€SECTION€7Ð  p ÐÓ—JÓà ` àIn€their€final€argument,€players€say€that€the€districtÐ °  Ðcourt€erred€in€dismissing€their€claim€that€the€formation€of€MLSÐ @" Ðviolated€section€7€of€the€Clayton€Act.€€Count€IV€of€the€complaintÐ Ð $ Ðalleged€that,€"[i]f€not€for€this€combination€of€assets€and€purchaseÐ `"°& Ðof€stock,€MLS€Member€Teams€would€compete€with€each€other€forÐ ð#@( Ðplayers,€like€teams€in€all€other€major€professional€sports€leaguesÐ €%Ð * Ðin€the€United€States."€€Section€7€prohibits,€with€certain€commerce„Ð '`", Ðrelated€conditions,€stock€or€asset€acquisitions€whose€effect€"mayÐ  (ð#. Ðbe€substantially€to€lessen€competition,€or€to€tend€to€create€aÐ 0*€%0 Ðmonopoly."€€15€U.S.C.€ðð€18.€Ð À+'2 Ðà ` àThe€district€court€granted€summary€judgment€to€theÐ ° Ðdefendants€on€the€ground€that€"[t]here€can€be€no€ðð€7€liabilityÐ @ Ðbecause€the€formation€of€MLS€did€not€involve€the€acquisition€orÐ Ð  Ðmerger€of€existing€business€enterprises,€but€rather€the€formationÐ ` ° Ðof€an€entirely€new€entity€which€itself€represented€the€creation€ofÐ ð @ Ðan€entirely€new€market."€€òòFraseróó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€140.€€AccordingÐ € Ð  Ðto€the€district€court:Ð `  ÐÓÓà8 ` àThe€relevant€test€under€ðð€7€looks€to€whetherÐ  ð  Ðcompetition€in€òòexistingóó€markets€has€beenÐ h¸  Ðreduced.€.€.€.€Where€there€is€no€existingÐ 0€  Ðmarket,€there€can€be€no€reduction€in€the€levelÐ øH  Ðof€competition.€€There€are€no€negative€numbersÐ À Ðin€this€math;€there€is€nothing€lower€thanÐ ˆØ Ðzero.€€Competition€that€does€not€exist€cannotÐ P  Ðbe€decreased.€€The€creation€of€MLS€did€notÐ h Ðreduce€competition€in€an€existing€marketÐ à0 Ðbecause€when€the€company€was€formed€there€wasÐ ¨ø Ðno€active€market€for€Division€I€professionalÐ pÀ Ðsoccer€in€the€United€States.€Ð8ˆ` x` x ÐÌÓJPÓòòId.óó€at€140„41€(citing€òòSCM€Corp.óó€v.€òòXerox€Corp.óó,€645€F.2d€1195€(2dÐ È ÐCir.€1981)).Ð X¨ Ðà ` àBoth€sides€make€much€of€the€district€court's€reference€toÐ è8 Ða€"new€market."€€Players€say€that€this€contradicts€the€jury'sÐ xÈ! Ðfinding€that€United€States/Division€I€soccer€is€not€a€separateÐ  X# Ðmarket€and,€anyway,€there€is€no€implied€immunity€from€section€7€forÐ ˜!è% Ðcombinations€that€lessen€competition€in€a€new€market.€€DefendantsÐ (#x' Ðsay€that€the€district€court€merely€held€the€players€to€the€marketÐ ¸$ ) Ðthey€themselves€alleged€and€was€entitled€to€do€so€on€summaryÐ H&˜!+ Ðjudgment.Ð Ø'(#- Ðà ` àThe€district€court€was€saying€no€more€than€that,€afterÐ h)¸$/ Ðthe€failure€of€the€NASL€and€prior€to€the€formation€of€MLS,€thereÐ ø*H&1 Ðwas€no€enterprise€engaged€in€providing€Division€I€soccer€in€theÐ ˆ,Ø'3 ÐUnited€States€and€thus€that€a€combination€that€added€Division€IÐ ° Ðsoccer€in€this€country€could€hardly€reduce€competition€where€noneÐ @ Ðbefore€existed.€€This€is€plainly€correct€insofar€as€the€creation€ofÐ Ð  ÐMLS€added€a€new€entrant€without€subtracting€any€existingÐ ` ° Ðcompetitors.€€To€this€extent,€the€most€common€threat€addressed€byÐ ð @ Ðsection€7„„the€merger€of€two€or€more€entities€currently€competingÐ € Ð  Ðwith€one€another,€òòe.g.óó,€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòPhiladelphia€Nat'l€Bankóó,Ð `  Ð374€U.S.€321€(1963);€òòBrown€Shoe€Co.óó€v.€òòUnited€Statesóó,€370€U.S.€294Ð  ð  Ð(1962)òòóó„„is€not€present€in€this€case.€Ð 0€  Ðà ` àThe€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€section€7€alsoÐ À Ðreaches€mergers€that€combine€an€existing€competitor€with€aÐ P  Ðpotential€competitor€commonly€perceived€to€be€a€strong€potentialÐ à0 Ðentrant€where€the€number€of€such€entrants€is€limited.€€òòUnitedÐ pÀ ÐStatesóó€v.€òòMarine€Bancorp.,€Inc.óó,€418€U.S.€602,€624„25€(1974);Ð P ÐòòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòFalstaff€Brewing€Corp.óó,€410€U.S.€526,€531„32Ð à Ð(1973).€€In€such€cases,€the€notion€is€that€the€gobbling€up€of€theÐ  p Ð"perceived€potential€entrant"€removes€an€òòexistingóó€constraint€onÐ °  Ðcompetition€and€thus€reduces€òòpresentóó€competitive€pressure€that€mayÐ @" Ðcurrently€be€constraining€price.€€òòFalstaffóó,€410€U.S.€at€532.Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àThe€players€make€no€attempt€to€show€that€this€form€ofÐ `"°& Ðexisting€competitive€constraint€was€eliminated€by€the€formation€ofÐ ð#@( ÐMLS.€€Rather,€their€explicit€theory€is€that,€if€MLS€were€heldÐ €%Ð * Ðunlawful€under€section€7,€its€operator/investors€would€enter€theÐ '`", Ðmarket€independently,€thus€increasing€the€amount€of€competitionÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âover€and€above€the€level€provided€by€MLS€itself.€€Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àAt€the€outset,€the€question€arises€whether€section€7€canÐ ° Ðâ âbe€used€to€prevent€a€merger€that€itself€increases€competition€whereÐ @ Ðit€can€be€confidently€predicted€that€prevention€will€or€probablyÐ Ð  Ðwill€increase€competition€òòeven€moreóó.€€The€classic€hypothetical€isÐ ` ° Ðthe€merger€of€an€existing€competitor€with€a€non„competing€companyÐ ð @ Ðwhose€interest€in€entry€is€unknown€and€so€exerts€no€currentÐ € Ð  Ðpressure€on€the€market€as€a€perceived€potential€entrant.€€Yet€whenÐ `  Ðits€private€files€are€examined€incident€to€a€court€suit,€plans€areÐ  ð  Ðdiscovered€for€independent€entry€if€the€merger€is€disallowed.€€Ð 0€  Ðà ` àThe€Supreme€Court€has€expressly€reserved€the€questionÐ À Ðwhether€section€7€can€be€read€to€reach€such€a€case.€€òòMarineÐ P  ÐBancorp.óó,€418€U.S.€at€639;€òòFalstaffóó,€410€U.S.€at€537.€€To€ourÐ à0 Ðknowledge€only€one€circuit€has€expressly€applied€section€7€soÐ pÀ Ðbroadly,€òòYamaha€Motor€Co.óó€v.€òòFTCóó,€657€F.2d€971,€978„80€(8th€Cir.Ð P Ð1981),€òòcert.€denied€sub€nom.€Brunswick€Corp.óó€v.€òòFTCóó,€456€U.S.€915Ð à Ð(1982),òòóó€and€the€district€court€apparently€rejected€this€view,Ð  p ÐòòFraseróó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€at€141.Ð °  Ðà ` àIt€is€uncertain€how€the€Supreme€Court€will€ultimatelyÐ @" Ðresolve€the€issue.€€Plaintiffs'€view€bumps€up€against€the€mostÐ Ð $ Ðstraightforward€reading€of€the€phrase€"may€.€.€.€lessenÐ `"°& Ðcompetition"€in€which€"competition"€is€understood€to€refer€to€theÐ ð#@( Ðexisting€level€of€competition€prior€to€the€merger€in€question.€Ð €%Ð * ÐFurther,€it€is€often€hard€enough€to€determine€whether€a€merger€willÐ '`", Ðreduce€competition€in€relation€to€a€known€baseline,€namely,Ð  (ð#. Ðexisting€market€conditions.€€If€a€new€combination€will,€as€here,Ð 0*€%0 Ðinitially€enhance€competition,€one€might€hesitate€at€a€further€andÐ À+'2 Ðeven€more€difficult€conjecture€that€prohibiting€the€transactionÐ ° Ðwould€lead€to€even€more€competition€further€down€the€line.Ð @ ÐÒe°Òà ` àOn€the€other€hand,€the€antitrust€statutes€are€not€alwaysÐ Ð  Ðread€literally,€as€òòCopperweldóó€itself€demonstrates,€òòsee€alsoóó€òòStandardÐ ` ° ÐOil€Co.óó€v.€òòUnited€Statesóó,€221€U.S.€1€(1911)€(rule€of€reason€readÐ ð @ Ðinto€restraint€of€trade).€€The€Antitrust€Division,€often€aÐ € Ð  Ðsignificant€influence€on€the€development€of€antitrust€case€law,Ð `  Ðseemingly€supports€a€generous€reading€of€Section€7€to€embrace€soÐ  ð  Ðcalled€"actual€potential€competition."€òòóóDep't€of€Justice€Non„Ð 0€  ÐHorizontal€Merger€Guidelines€ðð€4.112,€49€Fed.€Reg.€26,824,€26,834Ð À Ð(1984);€òòaccordóó€V€Areeda€&€Turner,€òòAntitrust€Lawóó€ðð€1118€(1980).€€AndÐ P  Ðthere€might€be€cases€where€the€facts€might€compel€the€conclusionÐ à0 Ðthat€turning€down€a€pro„competitive€merger€(compared€to€the€statusÐ pÀ Ðquo)€would€produce€an€even€more€competitive€realignment.Ð P Ðà ` àThat€is€not€this€case.€€Here,€there€is€no€possible€way€toÐ à Ðpredict€just€what€would€happen€if€the€current€version€of€MLS€wereÐ  p Ðprecluded.€€Players€assert€that,€had€the€operator/investors€notÐ °  Ðformed€MLS,€they€would€have€entered€the€market€as€a€traditionallyÐ @" Ðstructured€league.€€But€as€the€district€court€noted,€it€is€"notÐ Ð $ Ðinevitable€that€the€league€would€be€formed€and€would€operate€theÐ `"°& Ðsame€way€as€previous€sports€leagues."€€òòFraseróó,€97€F.€Supp.€2d€atÐ ð#@( Ð142.€€More€importantly,€it€is€quite€possible€these€investors€wouldÐ €%Ð * Ðhave€found€the€alternative€structures€unattractive€and€simplyÐ '`", Ðabandoned€their€effort€altogether„„hardly€a€pro„competitive€outcome.Ð  (ð#. Ðà ` àEven€the€alternative€result€suggested€by€players„„thatÐ 0*€%0 Ðanother,€more€traditionally€structured€league€like€the€APSL€wouldÐ À+'2 Ðhave€received€the€Division€I€sanction€instead„„appears€on€theÐ ° Ðsurface€no€more€pro„competitive.€€The€evidence€indicates€that€theÐ @ ÐAPSL€was€not€as€well€financed€or€well€managed€as€MLS€(hence€theÐ Ð  ÐUSSF's€decision€to€certify€MLS€and€not€the€APSL),€thus€increasingÐ ` ° Ðthe€risk€that€the€new€Division€I€league€would€fail€in€the€long€run.€Ð ð @ ÐIn€addition,€elevating€the€APSL€to€Division€I€status€would€notÐ € Ð  Ðnecessarily€increase€competition€significantly,€since€the€APSL,€anÐ `  Ðexisting€minor€league,€may€have€already€been€in€the€relevant€market.Ð  ð  Ðà ` àIt€might€be€argued€that€these€objections€present€issuesÐ 0€  Ðthat€a€jury€ought€to€consider;€but€there€is€one€final€objection€thatÐ À Ðthe€jury€did€effectively€consider.€€Even€advocates€of€a€broaderÐ P  Ðreading€of€section€7€concede€that€striking€down€a€combination€thatÐ à0 Ðdoes€not€threaten€present€competition€could€be€justified,€in€theÐ pÀ Ðhope€of€obtaining€more€competition€in€the€future,€only€in€alreadyÐ P Ðconcentrated€markets.€€"In€the€absence€of€significant€market€powerÐ à Ðin€the€hands€of€existing€firms,€.€.€.€the€loss€through€merger€of€aÐ  p Ðpotential€entrant€would€not€affect€present€or€future€competition."€Ð °  ÐV€Areeda€&€Turner,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€1119a.€€Ð @" Ðà ` àThus,€even€on€the€broader€reading€of€section€7€andÐ Ð $ Ðallowing€room€for€conjectures€about€future€effects,€it€would€haveÐ `"°& Ðbeen€necessary€for€players€to€prove€that€MLS€operates€within€aÐ ð#@( Ðrelevant€economic€market€that€is€presently€concentrated.€€In€theirÐ €%Ð * Ðsection€7€count,€the€players€alleged€the€same€relevant€UnitedÐ '`", ÐStates/Division€I€market€as€in€their€section€1€and€section€2€counts.€Ð  (ð#. ÐFor€reasons€already€discussed€in€connection€with€the€section€1Ð 0*€%0 Ðclaim,€the€jury's€rejection€of€this€relevant€market€would€also€haveÐ À+'2 Ðdoomed€the€section€7€claim€based€on€enhancing€future€competition€ifÐ ° Ðit€too€had€been€presented.Ð @ Ðà ` àòòAffirmedóó.