WPC* 6B'+ϭN8+'#x1Zr0M@ OlWWU!Pnv< >>b;MqrXBZƖ&(3X t+g^H&֥ZsY r84az#(z`z RC'mߵA㿰|ИP3w3|g]?ZjM}9npGF!(ȬaS{pȷqncS!(HSEfy-&GQS\"k-ghf}u~;R_Q+9X:~, 5'Kq)Nۤ \U@ `ZBc$F<) _˪6j4%|6Gzo+XwhHkBn|<&ǬK6ȏloQngyؼġ6Yl n ZnZ4 M8ZұEOq\:O)3# % 0 D 0(B 0 ?  nTN^ w4 mEfa>bDDDDtL!z&&&&&&&& BZ)Z)Z)Z)Z)Z)U Fw)UF)))UF*U@I*HP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0.X(#$  0  ($ 8 {$  =-V-XXdd=    1    _Thestayputprovision,withanexceptionnotapplicable  here,states:  8  8`   [_D]uring_Ԁthependencyofanyproceedings 2 conductedpursuantto[IDEA1415],unless X theStateorlocaleducationalagencyandthe . parentsotherwiseagree,thechildshall   remaininthethencurrenteducational   placementofsuchchild,...untilallsuch `  proceedingshavebeencompleted.6  ` x` x 20U.S.C.1415(j). (d:2{$ !    =--XXdd=    0    {$  =-V-XXdd=    4    _Inacaseinvolvingthefeeshiftingprovisionsofthe  AmericanswithDisabilitiesAct,42U.S.C.12205,andtheFair  HousingActAmendments,id.3613(c)(2), theSupremeCourt \ concludedthatthechangeinthelegalrelationshipmustbeoneto 2 whichajudicialimprimaturattaches.Buckhannon,532U.S.at605. X WeappliedthatrationaletoaclaimbroughtundertheFeesAct,42 . U.S.C.1988.SeeNew_Engl_._Reg'l_ԀCouncilofCarpentersv.   _Kinton_,284F.3d9,30(1stCir.2002).Twoofoursistercircuits   haveadopted_Buckhannon_'sreasoninginconnectionwiththeIDEA's `  feeshiftingprovision.SeeJohnT.v.Del.County_Intermed_.Unit, 6   ___F.3d___,___(3dCir.2003)[2003WL194874,at*8*10];_J.C._  \  v._Reg'l_ԀSch.Dist.10,278F.3d119,12324(2dCir.2002).But  2  seeTDv.LaGrangeSch.Dist.No.102,222F.Supp.2d1062,1065   (N.D.Ill.2002)(positingthat"thereexistcriticaldistinctions   inthetextandstructureoftheIDEAandtheADAand_FHAA_Ԁthat d  persuademethattheCourt'srulingin_Buckhannon_wasnotmeantto :  extendtotheIDEA").Theseappealsdonotrequireustoresolve `  thisconflict,andwethereforeexpressnoopinionastowhether 6 the_Buckhannon_ruleappliesinIDEAcases.<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@  {$  =-V-XXdd=    5    _Wesay"often"becausetheruleisnotinvariable.See,  e.g.,Foremanv.DallasCounty,193F.3d314,323(5thCir.1999)  (statingthatTROscanneverconstitutemeritsbasedrelief).X.s u-6Xy File3|xUTABLE Aq:\template\OPINIONS\SELYA.WPT- - j {$  =-V-XXdd=    3    _Thedistrictjudge"thesamejudgewhoearlierhaddismissed  theFirstSuitwithoutanawardofattorneys'fees"referredthe  SchoolDistrict'smotiontodismisstoamagistratejudge.See28 \ U.S.C.636(b)(1)(B);Fed.R.Civ.P.72(b).Hethereafter 2 acceptedandadoptedthemagistratejudge'sdetailedreportand X recommendation.Forsimplicity'ssake,wedonotdistinguish . betweenthetwojudicialofficers.Rather,wetakean   institutionalviewandrefertothedeterminationsbelowasthose   ofthedistrictcourt.  {$  =-V-XXdd=    7    _TheSchoolDistrictdidnotseektosecuretheparents'  agreementtoanalternativeinterimplacement.See20U.S.C.  1415(j)(quotedsupranote1)(permittingsuchconsensual \ arrangements).Suchanagreementwouldhaveavertedanyliability 2 forcompensatoryeducation.SeeW.B.v._Matula_,67F.3d484,500 X (3dCir.1995);seealsoDoev.DefendantI,898F.2d1186,1189 . (6thCir.1990).   {$  =-V-XXdd=    6    _Thisresultisnotalteredbecausethecriticaldecisiontook  placeonamotionforaTRO.Thecourtbelowmusthavebeen  cognizantofthedelayscharacteristicofadministrativeand \ judicialproceedingsundertheIDEA.SeeBurlingtonSch.Comm.v. 2 Mass._Dep't_ԀofEduc.,471U.S.359,370(1985)(describingsuch X proceedingsas"ponderous").Thus,thedenialoftheSchool . District'smotionwaseffectivelyafinaljudgmentonthemeritsof   the"dangerousness"claimthattheSchoolDistricthadbrought.   SeeCoalitionforBasicHumanNeedsv.King,691F.2d597,60001 `  (1stCir.1982).  {$  =-V-XXdd=    2    _Weneednotdwellonthewithdrawal,asitisirrelevantto  theappellants'compensatoryeducationclaim.Cf.Zobrestv.  CatalinaFoothillsSch.Dist.,509U.S.1,4n.3(1993)(holding \ thataschooldistrict'sresponsibilityforprovidingappropriate 2 educationalservicesisnotdischargedmerelybecausetheparents X voluntarilywithdrewtheirchildfromaplacement);Doev. . BrooklineSch.Comm.,722F.2d910,916(1stCir.1983)(suggesting   thatafterwithdrawalfromapublicschool,ahandicappedstudent   stillmaypursuefundingforanappropriateplacementduringthat `  period).IfitiseventuallydeterminedthatS.R.wouldnothave 6   receivedaFAPEhadheremainedatMarshwoodunderthestayput  \  placement"amatteronwhichwetakenoview"hiswithdrawal  2  wouldnotforeclosehisclaimforcompensatoryeducation. p {$  =-V-XXdd=    8    _Theappellants'complaintintheSecondSuitalsocontained  claimsundertheRehabilitationAct,29U.S.C.794,andMaine's  specialeducationlaws,Me.Rev.Stat.tit.20A,70018207. \ Thedistrictcourtneveraddressedtheseclaims,andthepartiesdo 2 notdiscussthemonappeal.Wethereforetakenoviewastotheir X justiciability. d.Courier New Regular<4 9Z+.Courier New Regular.Courier New Regular(E Z(Times New Roman !  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !     .{X.X2.{UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals  #2XX2#2w-X2XFortheFirstCircuit#. 2w-##.XVX .Y#   A') ` dE<` A   No.011714   @ MAINESCHOOLADMINISTRATIVEDISTRICTNO.35, K  @<< Plaintiff,Appellee,  G  @tt)v.   @| | MR.ANDMRS.R.,ONTHEIROWNBEHALF O  @0 0 ANDONBEHALFOFTHEIRSON,S.R., %u  @Defendants,Appellants. ! A') ` dE<|` A } No.021312 b @| | MR.ANDMRS.R.,ONTHEIROWNBEHALF ^ @0 0 ANDONBEHALFOFTHEIRSON,S.R., 4 @Plaintiffs,Appellants,  @tt)v. < @ MAINESCHOOLADMINISTRATIVEDISTRICTNO.35, 8 @<< Defendant,Appellee.  @<< ____________________ j    @@*APPEALSFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT !f" FORTHEDISTRICTOFMAINE !<#   @ [Hon.GeneCarter,U.S.DistrictJudge] #% @ [Hon.DavidM.Cohen,U.S.MagistrateJudge] n$& @*A') ` dE<&` A &j!( @'Before &O"*   @@((Selya,CircuitJudge, (#, Farris,*SeniorCircuitJudge, W*%. andHoward,CircuitJudge. ,S'0 A') ` dE<-` A -(2 _ -)3?L       RichardL._O'Meara_,withwhomAmyM._Sneirson_andMurray,  Plumb&Murraywereonbrief,forappellants.    EricR._Herlan_,withwhomDrummond_Woodsum_Ԁ&_MacMahon_wereon \ brief,forappellee. 2 *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +       SI h `e@37675`e@SFebruary24,2003  >   RHC  " `e@37675 `e@ R( h   (* !_______________ ,'1 *OftheNinthCircuit,sittingbydesignation.  d-(2   81V1XXdd8*,X` XX* ` SELYA,CircuitJudge. TheIndividualswithDisabilities  EducationAct(IDEA),20U.S.C.14001487(1997),obligates x schooldistrictstofurnishafreeappropriatepubliceducation $t (_FAPE_)tochildrenwithdisabilities.Seeid.1401(8),   1411(b)(2)(C),1412(a)(1),1413(_i_)(1),1415(b)(1).Thatisthe |  goodnews.ThebadnewsisthattheIDEAisnotselfexecuting, ( x  andparents,schoolofficials,bureaucrats,andjudgesalikehave $  struggledtomasteritsintricacies.    ` Theseconsolidatedappealsillustratethepoint.Taken ,|  together,theypresenttwolooselyrelatedquestions.Thefirst ( concernswhetherparentswhosuccessfullyresistaschool  district'seffort,inanindependentlegalaction,tooverturna 0 stayputplacementonthegroundoftheallegeddangerousnessofa , childwithdisabilitiesareconsideredprevailingpartieswithin  thepurviewoftheIDEA'sfeeshiftingprovision.Thesecond 4 concernsthecircumstancesunderwhichalearningdisabledchild 0 who,byreasonofhisage,isnolongercoveredbytheIDEAmay   nonethelessbeentitledtosomerelieftocompensatehimforthe 8!" deprivationofa_FAPE_Ԁduringanearlierperiod.Thedistrictcourt "4$ answeredthesequestionsinwaysthat_pretermitted_Ԁtheappellants' $& claimsforattorneys'feesandcompensatoryeducation.Concluding, <&!( aswedo,thatthecourterred,wereversethejudgmentsbelowand '8#* remandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion. )$,  @+&. _ I.BACKGROUND    ` Wesketchtherelevantfacts.Theappellants,Mr.and x Mrs.R.,aretheparentsofS.R.S.R.,whowasborninDecemberof $t 1980,suffersfromDown'sSyndrome.Hehashadspecialeducational   needsthroughouthisformativeyears.Duringthetimesmaterial |  hereto,MaineSchoolAdministrativeDistrictNo.35(theSchool ( x  District)hashadtheresponsibilityofministeringtotheseneeds. $   ` Generallyspeaking,theIDEAobligedtheSchoolDistrict   tofurnishS.R.withaFAPEsufficienttoconfersomeeducational ,|  benefit.SeeBd.ofEduc.v.Rowley,458U.S.176,207(1982); ( RolandM.v.ConcordSch.Comm.,910F.2d983,992(1stCir.1990).  Federallawdirectsschooldistrictstocarryoutsuchaduty 0 throughthedevelopmentandimplementationofanannual , individualizededucationprogram(IEP).See20U.S.C.1401(11),  1412(a)(4),1414(d);seealso34C.F.R.300.34050.S.R.was 4 eligibleforsuchspecialeducationservicesthroughthe20002001 0 schoolyear(whenheturnedtwentyyearsofage).See20U.S.C.   1412(a)(1)(B)(i)(ii)(linkingeligibilityforspecialeducation 8!" servicestostatelaw);Me.Rev.Stat.tit.20A,5201(1) "4$ (grantingeverystudenttherighttopubliceducationthroughthe $& schoolyearencompassinghisorhertwentiethbirthday). <&!(  ` ItwouldservenousefulpurposetodiscussS.R.'searly '8#* scholasticexperiences.Rather,webeginwiththe19992000school )$, year(whichencompassedS.R.'snineteenthbirthday).In @+&. furtheranceofitsresponsibilitiesundertheIDEA,theSchool  DistrictpreparedanIEPforthatyear.Underit,S.R.spent \ morningsatMarshwoodHighSchoolandafternoonsataworksite X trainingprogram(wherehealsoreceivedsomespecialeducation   services). `   ` Duringthe19992000schoolyear,S.R.displayeda  \  varietyofbehavioralproblems,includingverbaloutburstsand   assaultiveconduct.Believingthattheseproblemsstemmedfrom d  S.R.'s"ineffectiveandfrustrating"IEP,Mr.andMrs.R. `  repeatedlyrequestedmodifications.OfficialsoftheSchool   Districtmetwiththefamilymanytimestoaddressthese h remonstrances,discussS.R.'scurrentIEP,andponderhisfuture d curriculum.   ` InJuneof2000,theSchoolDistrictprofferedanewIEP l forthe20002001schoolyear.Underthisproposal,S.R.wastobe h relegatedtoaworksitetrainingprogramfortheentireschool  day.Hisvocationaltrainingwouldbeaugmentedwithmonthly p  speechtherapy,signlanguagelessons,behavioralconsultations, !l" andsocialskillsinstruction. "$  ` S.R.'sparentsrejectedthisproposal.Theytook t$& especialumbrageatthefactthatthedraftIEPcompletelyremoved  &p!( S.R.fromamainstreamacademicsetting.Concludingthatthis '#* circumstanceviolatedtheirson'srighttoreceiveeducational x)$, servicesintheleastrestrictiveenvironmentpossible,see20 $+t&. U.S.C.1412(a)(5),theparentssoughtahearingbeforetheMaine  DepartmentofEducation,seeid.1415(f).Theparents \ simultaneouslyinvokedtheIDEA'sstayputprovision,id. X 1415(j),sothatS.R.wouldremaininhis19992000educational   placementpendingaresolutionofhis20002001IEP. #  1      ׀TheSchool `  DistrictdefendedthedraftIEP,and,accordingly,resistedthe  \  parents'administrativepetition.    ` TheSchoolDistrictthentookamoreunusualstep:it d  initiatedacivilactionintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfor `  theDistrictofMaine(theFirstSuit)seekingtobarS.R.from   returningtoMarshwoodHighbecausehispresencetherewouldpose h (orsotheSchoolDistrictalleged)asubstantialriskofdangerto d himselforothers.Coincidentwiththefilingofitscomplaint,  theSchoolDistrictmovedfortemporaryandpreliminaryinjunctive l relief.Afterreviewingthemotionpapersandthefamily's h objection,thedistrictcourtrefusedtoissueatemporary  restrainingorder(TRO).Theeffectofthatrulingwastoleave p  thestayputorder(and,thus,S.R.'splacementatMarshwoodHigh)  intact.TheSchoolDistrictchosenottopursuethematter \ further,but,rather,movedtodismissitscomplaint.SeeFed.R. X Civ.P.41(a).Theparentsdidnotobjectbutassertedan   entitlementtoattorneys'feesandcosts.See20U.S.C. `  1415(i)(3)(B).ThedistrictcourtgrantedtheSchoolDistrict's  \  motionforvoluntarydismissalbutdeniedtheparents'requestfor   remunerationonthegroundthattheywerenotaprevailingparty. d  Me.Sch.Admin.Dist.No.35v.Mr.&Mrs.R.,Civ.No.00242(D. `  Me.Apr.9,2001).Theparentsfiledatimelyappeal.    ` Meanwhile,theadministrativehearinganenttheadequacy h oftheproposed20002001IEPwentforwardonaparalleltrack.In d adecisiondatedOctober31,2000,thehearingofficerapprovedthe  conceptofatotallynonscholasticplacementbutdeterminedthat l theIEPwasinadequateinotherrespects.Consequently,heordered h theSchoolDistricttoprepareanamendedIEP.Theparents  exercisedtheirrighttojudicialreviewofthisdecision,see20 p  U.S.C.1415(i)(2)(A);theycommencedanactioninthefederal !l" districtcourt(theSecondSuit)inwhichtheysoughttooverturn "$ thehearingofficer'sapprovalofS.R.'sworksiteplacement.The t$& SchoolDistrictfiledacrosscomplaintchallengingotherpartsof  &p!( theadministrativedecision. '#*  ` InDecemberof2001,S.R.reachedhistwentiethbirthday. x)$, ThefollowingJune,hegraduatedfromMarshwoodHigh.Uponthe $+t&. occurrenceofthatevent,theSchoolDistricttooktheposition  thattheparents'appealfromtheadministrativedecisionhad \ becomemoot.Intheirreply,theparentsgainsaidthiscontention. X TheypointedoutthatS.R.haddroppedoutofhisspecialeducation   programatMarshwoodHighduringthe20002001schoolyearand `  assertedthathewasentitledtocompensatoryeducationtooffset  \  theinadequateIEPthattheSchoolDistricthadproposed. #  2      ׀After   someskirmishing(thedetailsofwhichneednotconcernus),the d  districtcourtruledthatthesuitwasnot"procedural[ly]moot[]" `  becausetheparentshadraisedtheclaimforcompensatoryeducation   inatimelyfashion.n  #  3      ׀Me.Sch.Admin.Dist.No.35v.Mr.&Mrs. h R.,176F.Supp.2d15,2425(D.Me.2001).Thecourt d neverthelessdismissedthecaseforwhatittermed"substantive  mootness,"declaringthat"S.R.[had]received,forallthat \ appearsintherecord,theveryreliefheandhisparentsinitially X soughtinthisaction,byvirtueofthe...'stayput'ruling."   Id.at25.Thesecondappealfollowed.Weconsolidateditwith `  theearlierappeal(whichhadbeenstayed)forbriefingand  \  argument.Wenowresolvebothappeals.    II.ANALYSIS  d   ` Theparents"wehenceforthshallrefertothemasthe ,|  appellants"pressaheadontwofronts.Theyassignerrortothe ( lowercourt'sdeterminationthattheywerenotprevailingparties  intheFirstSuit.Theyalsoprotestthedistrictcourt's 0 dismissaloftheSecondSuitasmoot,pointingtothependencyof , theircompensatoryeducationclaim.Weaddressthesepoints  sequentially. 4 @  A.TheAttorneys'FeeClaim.  0  ` Inmostcivillitigation,thepartiesareresponsiblefor   payingtheirownattorneys'fees.SeeBuckhannonBd.&CareHome, T!" Inc.v.W.Va.Dep'tofHealth&HumanRes.,532U.S.598,602 #P$ (2001);GayOfficersActionLeaguev.PuertoRico,247F.3d288, $& 293(1stCir.2001).Despitethisgeneralrule,Congresssometimes X&!( choosestoallowforfeeshiftinginparticularsituations,andit (T#* chosetodosoinconnectionwiththeIDEA.Thestatuteprovides )%, inrelevantpart: \+&. 8 ` Inanyactionorproceedingbroughtunder  [section1415oftheIDEA],thecourt,inits  discretion,mayawardreasonableattorneys' \ feesaspartofthecoststotheparentsofa 2 childwithadisabilitywhoistheprevailing X party..` x` x 20U.S.C.1415(i)(3)(B).Becausethisprovisionemploysthe   phrase"prevailingparty""atermofart"itmustbeinterpreted 6   andappliedinthesamemannerasotherfederalfeeshifting  2  statutesthatusethesamephraseology.SeeNewHampshirev.   Adams,159F.3d680,684(1stCir.1998)(explainingthat,in :  construingtheIDEA'sfeeshiftingprovision,"casesdecidedunder 6 kindredfederalfeeshiftingstatutes,suchastheFeesAct,42  U.S.C.1988,furnishpersuasiveauthority"); H.R.Rep.No.105 > 95,at105106(1997),reprintedin1997U.S.C.C.A.N.78,103104 : (statingthatsection1415(i)(3)(B)shouldbeconstruedinkeeping  withHensleyv.Eckerhart,461U.S.424,440(1983),aFeesAct B case);seealsoBuckhannon,532U.S.at603(classifying > "prevailingparty"asatermofart).   ` Forpurposesofafederalfeeshiftingstatute,a F ! prevailingpartyisanypartywho"succeed[s]onanysignificant !B# issue...whichachievessomeofthebenefitsplaintiffssought #% inbringingsuit."Hensley,461U.S.at433.Theparty'ssuccess J% ' cannotbeahollowvictory;itmustmateriallyalterthelitigants' &F")  legalrelationshipbymodifyingoneparty'sbehaviorinawaythat (#+ directlybenefitstheother. #  4      ׀SeeFarrarv.Hobby,506U.S.103,   11112(1992);GayOfficers,247F.3dat293.Thus,thechange \ effectedmustbematerial;apurelytechnicalordeminimisvictory X cannotconferprevailingpartystatus.Tex.StateTeachers'Ass'n   v.GarlandIndep.Sch.Dist.,489U.S.782,792(1989);Stantonv. `  S.BerkshireReg'lSch.Dist.,197F.3d574,576(1stCir.1999).  \   ` Itfollowsfromtheforegoingthatacourtfacedwiththe   needtodecidewhetheralitigantis(orisnot)aprevailingparty d  mustmakeaqualitativeinquiryintotheimportoftheresult `  obtained.GayOfficers,247F.3dat293,295;seealsoChristopher   P.v.Marcus,915F.2d794,804(2dCir.1990)("[I]tishelpfulto h identifythereliefsoughtbytheplaintiffandcompareitwiththe d reliefobtainedasaresultofthesuit.").Where,ashere,  prevailingpartystatusturnsonaquestionoflaw,weafford l plenaryreview.GayOfficers,247F.3dat29293;Domeganv.  Ponte,972F.2d401,406(1stCir.1992).Withthisparadigmin \ mind,weturntotheassignmentoferror. X  ` Theappellantsaskforattorneys'feesreferableonlyto   theFirstSuit.Theirpositionisstraightforward:theSchool `  Districtcommencedacivilactionandtheappellantssuccessfully  \  defendedagainstit(i.e.,theSchoolDistrictdidnotreceiveany   ofthereliefthatitsoughtand,eventually,threwinthetowel). d  TheSchoolDistrictrejoinsthatthisvictorywasmerely `  interlocutory"asinglebattleinthewaroverthe20002001IEP   "andthereforeisinsufficienttosupportprevailingpartystatus. h Wetestthesehypotheses. d  ` Ingeneral,thematerialityrequirementdemandsthata  partysucceedonthemeritsofaclaimordefense.Adams,159F.3d l at684.Butapartymaybeconsidered"prevailing"evenwithout h obtainingafavorablefinaljudgmentonall(oreventhemost  crucial)ofherclaims.Buckhannon,532U.S.at603;RomeSch. p  Comm.v.Mrs.B.,247F.3d29,32(1stCir.2001);seegenerally !l" WilliamH.Danne,Jr.,Annotation,WhoIsPrevailingPartyfor "$ PurposesofObtainingAttorney'sFeesUnder615(i)(3)(B)of t$& IndividualswithDisabilitiesEducationAct,153A.L.R.Fed.1  &p!( (1999)(collectingcases).Thus,interlocutoryordersthatconfer '#*  substantiveinjunctivereliefoftenhavebeenviewedassufficient x)$, tocarrytheweightofafeeaward.  #  5      ׀E.g.,Haleyv.Pataki,106   F.3d478,483(2dCir.1997);Pearsonv.Fair,980F.2d37,45(1st \ Cir.1992)(collectingcases). X  ` Ontheotherhand,interlocutoryordersthatservemerely   tomaintainthestatusquousuallyaredeemedinsufficienttobuoy `  afeeaward.SeeLSO,Ltd.v.Stroh,205F.3d1146,1161(9thCir.  \  2000).Consequently,asuccessfulinvocationoftheIDEA'sstay   putprovision,onaninterlocutorybasis,ordinarilywillnot d  conferprevailingpartystatus.See,e.g.,J.O.v.OrangeTownship `  Bd.ofEduc.,287F.3d267,274(3dCir.2002);Bd.ofEduc.v.   StevenL.,89F.3d464,469(7thCir.1996). h  ` Thiscase,however,isnotcutfromtheusualcloth.We d aredealingherenotwithastayputorderissued,onan  interlocutorybasis,inthecourseofongoingjudicialreview. l Rather,theFirstSuitwasanindependent,freestandingcivil h action,institutedbytheSchoolDistrict,inwhichitsoughtto  enjointheoperationofthestayputprovision.Thatquestfor p  injunctivereliefwasthesoleobject"theraisond'tre"ofthe !l" FirstSuit. "$  ` Tobesure,theSchoolDistrictprobablysawtheFirst t$& Suitasapieceofalargerdisputebetweenitandtheappellants  &p!( overthe20002001IEP.Butaparty'ssubjectiveviewofacause '#* ofactioncountsforverylittleindeterminingprevailingparty  status.SeeTex.StateTeachers'Ass'n,489U.S.at791;Nadeauv. \ Helgemoe,581F.2d275,280(1stCir.1978).Bythesametoken,it X isimmaterialwhethertheSchoolDistrictultimatelywithdrewits   complaintbecauseitthoughtthattheadministrativedecisionhad `  renderedtherequestmoot.SeeWatsonv.CountyofRiverside,300  \  F.3d1092,109596(9thCir.2002);Biscigliav.KenoshaUnified   Sch.Dist.No.1,45F.3d223,230(7thCir.1995).Wesearch, d  therefore,formoreobjectiveindicia. `   ` WedeemitimportanttoemphasizethattheSchool   District,nottheappellants,broughttheFirstSuit.The h appellantswerehaledintocourtasdefendantsandwonaclearcut d victoryonthesoleissueinthecase(anissuethathadbeen  framedbytheSchoolDistrict).Atriumphantdefendantmayqualify l asaprevailingpartyforthepurposeofobtainingafeeaward. h See,e.g.,Weyantv.Okst,198F.3d311,316(2dCir.1999)  (collectingcases);seealsoBurkev.Guiney,700F.2d767,771 p  (1stCir.1983).Itfollowsinexorablythatadefendantwho !l" prevailsontheonlyclaimthatjustifiesthepresenceofthecase "$ inafederalcourthasalegitimatebasisforassertingthatsheis t$& theprevailingparty.SeePerlmanv.Zell,185F.3d850,859(7th  &p!( Cir.1999). '#*  ` Thisconclusionisreinforcedbyourawarenessthatthe x)$, SchoolDistrictcouldhaveappealedthestayputorderaspartand $+t&. parcelofjudicialreviewoftheIEP,see20U.S.C.  1415(i)(2)(A),buteschewedthatcourse.Itelectedinsteadto \ pursueanindependentcauseofactionbyinvokingastatutethat X permitstemporarychangesinachild'splacementifaschool   districtcandemonstrate"bysubstantialevidencethatmaintaining `  thecurrentplacementofsuchchildissubstantiallylikelyto  \  resultininjurytothechildortoothers."Id.1415(k)(2)(A).   Thisstatutedoesnotcarveoutanexceptiontosection1415(j)'s d  stayputprovision.SeeHonigv.Doe,484U.S.305,32425(1988); `  TimothyW.v.Rochester,N.H.,Sch.Dist.,875F.2d954,972(1st   Cir.1989);cf.OrangeTownship,287F.3dat27273(implyingthat h sections1415(j)and1415(k)(2)areindependentintermsof d prevailingpartydeterminations).Indeed,arestrainingorder  undersection1415(k)(2)requirestheproponenttoproffer l substantialevidencethattheaffectedchild'scurrentplacement h posesasignificantandunreasonablelikelihoodofinjuryeitherto  himselfortoothers.20U.S.C.1415(k)(2)(A),(C).Themerits p  oftheIEPdisputearealmostwhollyirrelevant.Cf.Honig,484 !l" U.S.at32425(emphasizingthedichotomybetweeninjunctionsfor "$ safetyandstayputplacements). t$&  ` Infine,theSchoolDistrictchosetomakeS.R.'salleged  &p!( dangerousnessacontestedissueinandofitselfandtotryto '#* changehisplacementaccordingly.Thatistosay,theinjunctive x)$, actionthatitbroughtundersection1415(k)(2)(theFirstSuit) $+t&. attemptedtoworkanautarkicmaterialalterationinthelegal  relationsbetweentheparties.Defeatingthatattempt,onceand \ forall,gavetheappellantssolidgroundonwhichtobase X prevailingpartystatus. #  6          ` Thisresultsquareswithcommonlyacceptednotionsof `  materialityinthefeeshiftingcontext.Thematerialityofa  \  judicialoutcomedependsinpartonwhethertheresultispurely   proceduralorwhetheritactuallyaccomplishessomething d  substantiveforthewinningparty.SeeAdams,159F.3dat68586; `  Krichinskyv.KnoxCountySch.,963F.2d847,84950(6thCir.   1992);seealsoHanrahanv.Hampton,446U.S.754,759(1980). h Becausethedistrictcourtdeniedinjunctivereliefonthebasis d thattheSchoolDistricthadnotadducedsufficientproofto  satisfythesection1415(k)(2)standard,itisreadilyevidentthat l theappellantssuccessfullydefendedtheFirstSuitonthemerits. h  ` Thisthesisisconfirmedbyconsideringwhatwouldhave  happenedhadtheappellantsnotappearedincourttoopposethe p  SchoolDistrict'saction.Inthatevent,thecourtmostlikely !l" wouldhaveenteredadefaultjudgmentandchangedS.R.'splacement.  Bydefending,theappellantsnotonlydeprivedtheSchoolDistrict \ ofthebenefitthatitsoughtinbringingsuitbutalsoblockedit X fromimplementingacourseofactioninimicaltoS.R.'sinterests.   Theappellants'victorywas,therefore,material.SeeFarrar,506 `  U.S.at11112;Stanton,197F.3dat576.  \   ` Forthesereasons,weconcludethattheappellantswere   theprevailingpartiesintheFirstSuit,andthatthedistrict d  courterredasamatteroflawinholdingtothecontrary. `  Accordingly,wereversethedistrictcourt'sorderandremandthe   FirstSuitsothatthecourtmaydeterminewhetherspecial h circumstancesexistthatmightbaranaward,and,ifnot,the d amountofattorneys'feesandcoststowhichtheappellantsare  entitled.  l @@ @  B.TheCompensatoryEducationClaim.  h  ` Weturnnowtothejusticiabilityoftheappellants' 0 compensatoryeducationclaim.Itisblackletterlawthat,ina   federalcourt,justiciabilityrequirestheexistenceofanactual 8!" caseorcontroversy.U.S.Const.art.III,2,cl.1.Evenifan "4$ actualcaseorcontroversyexistsattheinceptionoflitigation, $& acasemayberenderedmoot(and,therefore,subjecttodismissal) <&!( ifchangedcircumstanceseliminateanypossibilityofeffectual '8#* relief.CMMCableRep.,Inc.v.OceanCoastProps.,Inc.,48F.3d )$, 618,62021(1stCir.1995). @+&.  ` Inasuitseekingonlyinjunctiverelief,thisordinarily  meansthatoncetheactsoughttobeenjoinedoccurs,thesuitmust \ bedismissedasmoot.E.g.,OakvilleDev.Corp.v.FDIC,986F.2d X 611,613(1stCir.1993).If,however,aplaintiffseeks   alternativeredress(suchasmoneydamages)inadditionto `  injunctiverelief,theoccurrenceofthewatershedeventmaynot  \  renderthecontroversymoot.CMMCableRep.,48F.3dat621;   CurtisIndus.,Inc.v.Livingstone,30F.3d96,9798(8thCir. d  1994).Wereviewdenovoalowercourt'sdismissalofanactionon `  thegroundofmootness.SeeVerhoevenv.BrunswickSch.Comm.,207   F.3d1,5(1stCir.1999);N.H.RighttoLifePoliticalAction h Comm.v.Gardner,99F.3d8,12(1stCir.1996). d  ` Inthisinstance,thequestionofmootnessdependsonthe  viabilityoftheappellants'compensatoryeducationclaim.Weknow l thatachildeligibleforspecialeducationservicesundertheIDEA h maybeentitledtofurtherservices,incompensationforpast  deprivations,evenafterhisorhereligibilityhasexpired.See, p  e.g.,Adams,159F.3dat682n.1;Pihlv.Mass.Dep'tofEduc.,9 !l" F.3d184,18889&n.8(1stCir.1993).Suchachild'sclaimfor "$ compensatoryeducationbeginstoaccruewhenhisorherIEPisso t$& inappropriatethatthechildisreceivingnorealeducational  &p!( benefit.M.C.v.Cent.Reg'lSch.Dist.,81F.3d389,396(3dCir. '#* 1996);Murphyv.TimberlaneReg'lSch.Dist.,22F.3d1186,1195 x)$, (1stCir.1994).Thepresenceofanactionableclaimfor $+t&. compensatoryeducationwillinsulateanIDEAcaseagainsta  mootnesschallengeevenafterthechild'seligibilityforspecial \ educationservicesends.Indep.Sch.Dist.No.284v.A.C.,258 X F.3d769,77475(8thCir.2001);cf.ThomasR.W.v.Mass.Dep'tof   Educ.,130F.3d477,480(1stCir.1997)(statingthenegativeof `  thesameproposition).  \   ` Orderlyproceduresuggeststhatwebifurcateour   discussionofthisissue.Wefirstmustdeterminewhetherthe d  appellantstimelyassertedtheirclaimforcompensatoryeducation. `  Ifso,wethenmustaddressthequestionofwhetherS.R.arguably   sufferedadeprivationofservicesthatwouldgiverisetosucha h claim. d  ` 1.Timeliness. Thedistrictcourtconcludedthatthe  appellantshadadvancedthecompensatoryeducationclaimina  timelymanner.SeeMe.Sch.Admin.Dist.,178F.Supp.2dat24 4 25.Weaffirmthatholdingonthebasisofthedistrictcourt's 0 lucidanalysisoftherecordanditsperspicaciousreasoning.See   id.Weaddonlythat,oncetheendofS.R.'seligibilityfor 8!" specialeducationservicesloomed,theappellantsacted "4$ expeditiouslytomakeknowntheirdesirethattheSchoolDistrict $& offsettheinadequaciesofthe20002001schoolyearbyproviding <&!( compensatoryeducation.Nomorewasexigible.SeeThomasR.W., '8#*  130F.3dat480. )$,  ` Inarelatedvein,werejecttheSchoolDistrict's   importuningthatthecompensatoryeducationclaimwasbarredbya \ failuretoexhaustadministrativeremedies.Theappellants' X objectionstotheIEPrelatedonlytoS.R.'sfinalyearinschool.   S.R.waswithintheeligibleagelimitswhenthatyearbegan;by `  thetimethatyearended,theadministrativerecordhadbeenclosed  \  forquitesometimeandthecasewaspendingbeforethedistrict   court.Althoughparentsordinarilymustexhausttheir d  administrativeremediesbeforeappealingtoafederalcourt,see `  Frazierv.FairhavenSch.Comm.,276F.3d52,59,63(1stCir.   2002),theappellants'failuretoraiseathennonexistent h compensatoryeducationclaimbeforethehearingofficerisnot d fataltojudicialreview.Seeid.at59;Pihl,9F.3dat19091.  Parentsarenotexpectedtohavethegiftofprophecy. l  ` 2.Mootness. Weturnnexttothedistrictcourt's h holdingthatthecompensatoryeducationclaimwassubstantively 0 moot.Me.Sch.Admin.Dist.,178F.Supp.2dat25.Incomingto   thisconclusion,thecourtfocusedontheappellants'challengeto 8!" theworksiteplacement.Wethinkthatthisfocuswastoonarrow. "4$  ` S.R.'splacementataworksiteratherthaninaschool $& wasonlyapartoftheoverallIEP.Therecordshowsbeyondhope <&!( ofcontradictionthattheappellantssoughtfromthebeginningan '8#* appropriateIEPforthe20002001schoolyear"anewIEPthatdid )$, notmerelyreplicateS.R.'sunsuccessful19992000IEP.The @+&. hearingofficerrespondedtotheseexpressedconcerns,dissecting  theSchoolDistrict'ssuggestedIEP,approvingpartsofit \ (includingtheworksiteplacement)anddisapprovingotherparts. X Althoughtheappellantsonlysoughtjudicialreviewofthe   placementdecision,notoftheordertoaddotherfeaturestothe `  IEP,thefactremainsthatS.R.neverenjoyedthebenefitsthat  \  wouldhaveflowedfromtheimplementationofthoseotherfeatures.   Inshort,whileS.R.wasnotrelegatedtoaworksiteforthe2000 d  2001schoolyear,hemaynothavereceivedanappropriateIEPfor `  thatyear(and,thus,maynothavereceivedtheFAPEtowhichhe   wasentitled). h  ` TheSchoolDistrictattemptstocastdoubtuponthe d factualantecedentsoftheappellants'position.Theattempt  fails.Therecordfullysupportstheappellants'asseveration l that,allalong,theysoughtthedevelopmentofanappropriateIEP, h differentfromboththepreviousIEP(19992000)andtheproposed  IEP(20002001).Indeed,theircriticismsofthe19992000IEP p  werevociferous.Soviewed,theappellantshaveacolorableclaim !l" thatthecontinuationofthisbenightedplacementintothe2000 "$ 2001schoolyeardeprivedS.R.ofthecompendiumofservices t$& reasonablynecessarytoconstituteaFAPE.SeeRolandM.,910F.2d  &p!( at992. '#*  ` Letusbeperfectlyclear.Werecognizethat x)$, compensatoryeducationisnotanappropriateremedyforapurely $+t&. proceduralviolationoftheIDEA.Ericksonv.AlbuquerquePub.  Sch.,199F.3d1116,112223(10thCir.1999).Incontrast,a \ substantiveviolationmaygiverisetoaclaimforcompensatory X relief.SeeRomeSch.Comm.,247F.3dat31;Pihl,9F.3dat188,   18990(collectingcases).Here,theprospectivereliefthatthe `  appellantssoughtatthecommencementoftheseproceedingswasboth  \  proceduralandsubstantive.Thus,aclaimforcompensatory   educationarguablylies"andtheircaseisnotmoot. d   ` Inanefforttoblunttheforceofthisreasoning,the `  SchoolDistrictcomplainsthattheappellantsforcedit,through   theinvocationofthestayputprovision,tomaintainS.R.'s h contested19992000IEPthroughoutthe20002001schoolyear(or d nearlyso).Thatistrueasfarasitgoes"butitdoesnot  advancetheSchoolDistrict'scause.Theappellantsneversought l astayputplacementasreliefonthemeritsbeforeeitherthe h hearingofficerorthedistrictcourt.Forthem,thestayput  placementwasmerelythelesseroftwoevils. #  7      ׀SeeBurrv.Ambach, p  863F.2d1071,1076(2dCir.1988)(describingthestayput !l" provisionasprotectionagainstanevenworseplacementduringthe "$ pendencyofreviewproceedings).Conferringblanketimmunityfrom t$& compensatoryeducationclaimsduringthecourseofastayput  placementwouldrewardschooldistrictsformisfeasanceor \ nonfeasanceinprovidingappropriateeducationalservices.Cf. X JeffersonCountyBd.ofEduc.v.Breen,853F.2d853,85758(11th   Cir.1988)(awardingcompensatoryeducationtodeterschool `  districtsfromunnecessarilyprolonginglitigation);Doev.  \  BrooklineSch.Comm.,722F.2d910,916(1stCir.1983)(condemning   arulethatwouldallowapartywhoshirksitsdutiesduringa d  stayputplacementtoescapeliabilityforitslaxity). Thecase `  law,thoughsparse,suggeststhatcourtsshouldrefusetoconfer   anysuchblanketimmunity.See,e.g.,W.B.v.Matula,67F.3d484, h 500(3dCir.1995);M.C.v.VoluntownBd.ofEduc.,56F.Supp.2d d 243,250n.7(D.Conn.1999).Wesohold:claimingtobecaught  betweenarockandahardplaceisnoexcuseforderelictionof l duty.TheIDEAchargesschooldistrictswithmakingreasonable h effortsbothtoworkwithparentsandtosatisfytheneedsof  specialeducationstudents.Thatentailstheresponsibilityto p  findapaththatrunsbetweentherockandthehardplace.Knee !l" jerkcompliancewithastayputprovisiondoesnotnegatethat "$ responsibility. t$&  ` TheSchoolDistrictalsosubmitsthattheappellants  &p!( failedtoallegespecificfactsinsupportoftheirclaimfor '#*  compensatoryeducation.Theysuggestthattheappellantsneededto x)$, showpreciselywhatservicesS.R.shouldhavereceived(butdid  not)duringthe20002001schoolyear.Thissetsthebartoohigh. \   ` TheIDEAconstructsaframeworkthatensuresprocedural X dueprocessintheIEPcontext.See20U.S.C.1415.Itdoesnot   attempttodelineatethespecificsubstanceofanyparticular `  child'sIEP.Thatisasitshouldbe:IEPsarebytheirvery  \  natureidiosyncratic,andtheappropriatecontentofaparticular   child'sIEPforagivenyearcanonlybedeterminedbythose d  assignedtoevaluatethechildanddeveloptheIEP(withthehelp `  oftheparents).Seeid.1401(11),1412(a)(4),1414(d);34   C.F.R.300.34050.Inmountingachallengetoacurrentor h proposedIEP,themostthatparentscanbeexpectedtodoisto d pointoutareasinwhichtheIEPisdeficient.SeeRowley,458  U.S.at20809;Erickson,199F.3dat1123;RolandM.,910F.2dat l 992. h  ` Thesetenetsholdtruevisvisclaimsforcompensatory  education.SeeCent.Reg'lSch.Dist.,81F.3dat397(notingthat p  "achild'sentitlementtospecialeducationshouldnotdependupon !l" thevigilanceoftheparents"). Theappellants,whopointedto "$ manyproblemsinboththe19992000IEPandtheproposed20002001 t$& IEP,didtheirpart.Consequently,werejecttheSchoolDistrict's  &p!( suggestionthattheappellants'compensatoryeducationclaimwas '#*  insufficientlyprecise. x)$,  ` NoneofthisisequivalenttosayingthatS.R.is   entitledtocompensatoryeducation.Weholdonlythatthe \ appellants'claimforcompensatoryeducationdeservestobe X consideredonthemeritsandthatthedistrictcourtshouldnot   havejettisoneditasmoot.Accordingly,theorderofdismissal `  mustbereversedandthecompensatoryeducationissueremandedto  \  thedistrictcourt.Ifthedistrictcourtdoesnotbelievethat   therecordissufficienttopermitittomakethehighlynuanced d  judgmentsnecessarytoresolvetheclaimforcompensatory `  education,itmayremandthematterforfurtheradministrative   adjudication. h  III.CONCLUSION  d  ` Weneedgonofurther. #  8      ׀Weholdthattheappellantswere , prevailingpartiesintheFirstSuit;thattheclaimfor  compensatoryeducationwasproperlyraised,andremainedviable,in 4 theSecondSuit;andthat,therefore,thedistrictcourterredin 0 itsadjudicationofappellants'claims.Hence,wereversethe   judgmentsbelowandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwith 8!" thisopinion. "4$  $&  ` Reversedandremanded.Costsaretaxedinfavorofthe  appellants.