WPC y|&1$;6 !>/XkYM 2-$|0{, 7Ὦ(wfzcۗ8;_E~W7v%a<ҧeSf8%Hݎ>8[tV3.1Wˌqv/qQ|Դs2{QT`F)I)pQLcS)gE0m^z?2 1}=t(vf?"tV4cHZz4Q@ q۶7tT2PӀ"G1R^$ ˞`ℸR+ic'h l1PWv\K` jyӀMLS*!\VYdE;U|Kt~Ic\nLߓM"yGZ_eK/WLݠ^(M!Nam'$A(#0 % 0D 0(;U:c 0UNcnTN UF U >M ^ w 4   E f a m  N N ^ U 0Y UB b  _l ` BHP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0X(#$  0  ($<6X9`("Courier NewTT(d:2$ !    =EXdd=    0  vr Z6Times New Roman Regular<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@Q 9Z+.Courier New Regular<\( 9Z+&Courier Regular=E.s u-y File3|x TABLE AU L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<@9Z+Courier <6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- -  $  =NXdd=    1    _XNXXXApetitionerinacriminalcasehas90daystopetitionthe  UnitedStatesSupremeCourtafterreceivingafinaljudgmentfrom  thehighestcourtofhisstate.S.Ct.R.13(1).BecauseDavid \ receivedtwoadversejudgmentsfromtheSJC,hehasaskedthatthe 2 limitationsperiodbetolled180days.#XNXXXN# XNXXXN U $  =NXdd=    2    _XNXXXThestatefurtherarguesthatthereferenceto"Statepost  convictionorothercollateralreview"necessarilyexcludesthe  federalcertiorariprocess,sothattheresultwouldbethesame \ evenifDavidhadfiledforcertiorari.Duncanv.Walker,533U.S. 2 167(2001),onwhichthestateheavilyrelies,isarguably X distinguishableandtherearelanguageandpolicyargumentsonthe . otherside,buttheissueneednotberesolvedinthiscase.#XNXXXN# XNXXXN _   =NXdd=    3    XNXXXSeee.g.,Dunlapv.UnitedStates,250F.3d1001,100406  (6thCir.),cert.denied,122S.Ct.649(2001);Taliani,189F.3d  at598;Miller,145F.3dat61718(3dCir.1998).  $  =NXdd=    4    _XNXXXUnsurprisingly,casesinvolvingcapitalpunishmentare  sometimestreateddifferently.E.g.,Rousev.Lee,No.0112,slip  op.at1217(4thCir.Jan.7,2003)(excusingonedaydelaydueto \ attorneyerrorinhabeascasewherepetitionerfaceddeathpenalty 2 andwouldnothaveanyotheravenueofpostconvictionreview).#XNXXXN# XNXXXN  $  =NXdd=    5    _InAEDPACongressadoptedaformofactualinnocencetestas  onecomponentofitsthresholdrequirementsforallowingasecond  orsuccessivehabeaspetition;butitalsoprovidedthatthis \ secondpetitionisallowedonlywherethefactualpredicateforthe 2 claimofconstitutionalerrorcouldnothavebeendiscovered X previouslythroughtheexerciseofduediligence.28U.S.C. . 2244(b)(2)(B).  ' ' Turner0Turner .    d !  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !X~XXXXX~     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals0  FortheFirstCircuit  0 XNX   A') ` dE< ` A    XNXX XNNo.012289 K  @#STEPHENDAVID,  G  @Petitioner,Appellant,   @tt)v. O  @$TIMOTHYHALL, K  @ Respondent,Appellee.  A') ` dE<R` A S @ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT 8 @0 0 FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS 4 @44[Hon.GeorgeA._O'Toole_,Jr.,U.S.DistrictJudge]  A') ` dE<;` A < @'Before !q   @@((Boudin,ChiefJudge,  TorruellaandLipez,CircuitJudges. y! A') ` dE<!` A !K$       RobertL._Sheketoff_forpetitioner. "0&   _Cathryn_ԀA._Neaves_,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Criminal #' Bureau,withwhomThomasF.Reilly,AttorneyGeneral,wasonbrief $( forrespondent. b% ) *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  '4#,'4# o SIH(#- c@37656c@SFebruary5,2003 )n$/  RHC)D%0" c@37656 c@ R(H(#1  (  * !    ,'3? _XNXX XN  8NXXdd8*,X` XX* ` BOUDIN,ChiefJudge. Inthiscase,whichraises   questionsconcerninghabeascorpus,therelevantdatesare x important.OnApril13,1992,petitionerStephenDavidpledguilty $t inaMassachusettsstatecourttoseconddegreemurderandwas   sentencedtolifeimprisonment.Thecrimewasdescribedinthe |  pleacolloquy:brieflystated,Davidandothers,campingatatent ( x  cityinQuincy,Massachusetts,killedoneoftheirnumber(Abraham $  Champlain)bybeatingandotherwisemistreatinghimoverthecourse   ofseveraldaysandleavinghimtodieofhisinjuriesandexposure ,|  tocold.Themembersofthegroup,includingDavid,hadconsumed ( alcohol.   ` Nodirectappealwastakenfromtheconviction.Instead, 0 morethanthreeyearsafterhispleaandsentencing,Davidfiledin , thetrialcourttwosuccessivemotionstowithdrawhisguiltyplea  andobtainanewtrial,whichunderstatelawisapermissibleform 4 ofcollateralattackafteraguiltyplea.Constantinev. 0 Commonwealth,435Mass.1011,1012,760N.E.2d733,735(2002).   Bothmotionswererejectedbythetrialcourtandtheintermediate 8!" appellatecourtand,inbothcases,theSupremeJudicialCourt "4$ deniedreview.ThefirstmotionwasfiledonoraboutJuly17, $& 1995,andSJCreviewwasdeniedonDecember29,1997;thesecond <&!( wasfiledonMay5,1998,andSJCreviewwasdeniedonJune29, '8#* 2000.Daviddidnotseekcertiorarioneitherrulingfromthe )$, UnitedStatesSupremeCourt. @+&.  ` OnMarch29,2001,Davidfiledthepresenthabeas  proceedinginthefederaldistrictcourt.Inhispetition,David \ assertsthat,forseconddegreemurder,Massachusettslawrequired X thatheknowthathisactionshada"plainandstronglikelihood"   ofcausingChamplain'sdeath.Commonwealthv.Sneed,413Mass. `  387,388n.1,597N.E.2d1346,1347n.1(1992).And,heasserts,  \  thetrialjudgecommittedconstitutionalerrorbymisadvisingDavid   atthepleacolloquythatanintenttocauseinjurywassufficient. d  SeeHendersonv.Morgan,426U.S.637,64346(1976).Healso `  assertsthat,duetohisintoxication,ajurycouldnothavefound   thathehadtheintentrequiredunderstatelaw. h  ` Infact,atthepleacolloquy,thetrialjudgeusedboth d phrases,sayingthatanintenttoinjurewasenoughandthatthere  hadtobeknowledgeof"aplainandstronglikelihood"ofdeath. l Butwhethertheinstructionwasconfusing(thestatecourtssaid h no)and,ifso,whetheritconstitutedaconstitutionalviolation  areissuesnotbeforeus.Thisissobecauseinopposingthewrit, p  theCommonwealthpledthatregardlessofitsmerits,David's !l" petitioncametoolateunderthedeadlinesfixedforhabeas "$ petitionsbytheAntiterrorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof t$& 1996("AEDPA"),28U.S.C.2241etseq.(2000).  &p!(  ` AEDPA,whichbecameeffectiveonApril24,1996,fixesa '#* oneyearlimitationsperiodforfederalhabeaspetitionsbystate x)$, prisoners.28U.S.C.2244(d)(1).Statutoryexceptionsexist $+t&. wherethestateimpededrelief,newconstitutionalrightswere  createdbytheSupremeCourt,ornewlydiscoveredfactsunderpin \ theclaim,id.2244(d)(1)(B)(D),butDaviddoesnotclaimto X fallwithinanyoftheseexceptions.Absentanexception,AEDPA's   oneyearlimitrunsfromthetimethatthestatecourtjudgmentof `  convictionbecamefinalbytheconclusionofdirectrevieworthe  \  expirationofthetimeforseekingit.Id.2244(d)(1)(A).   However,defendantslikeDavid,convictedpriortoAEDPA,canfile d  theirpetitionswithinoneyearofAEDPA# XNXXXNt #XNXX XN'seffectivedate. `  Gaskinsv.Duval,183F.3d8,9(1stCir.1999).    ` AmagistratejudgerecommendeddismissalofDavid's h petitiononthegroundthatitwasbarredbyAEDPA'stimelimit. d AEDPAexcludesfromtheoneyearperiod"[t]hetimeduringwhicha  properlyfiledapplicationforStatepostconvictionorother l collateralreviewwithrespecttothepertinentjudgmentorclaim h ispending...."28U.S.C.2244(d)(2).Themagistratejudge  excludedfromthecalculationthedaysinwhichthetwostatenew p  trialmotionswerepending(measuringfromthedatesoftheir !l" filingstotheultimateSJCdispositions).Evenwiththis "$ exclusion,David'spetitionwasfiled399daysafterAEDPA's t$& enactmentand,therefore,morethanthe365daysallowed.The  &p!( districtcourtadoptedtherecommendation. '#*  ` Davidthensoughtacertificateofappealability("COA"), x)$, 28U.S.C.2253(c),whichthedistrictcourtdenied.Thiscourt $+t&. thengrantedtheCOAandaskedthepartiestobriefseveralissues:  David'sclaimthat180daysshouldbeaddedtotheexcludedperiod \ forthetimeinwhichhecouldhavesoughtcertiorariintheUnited X StatesSupremeCourt; #  1      # XNXXXN#XNXX XNԀhisalternativerequestthatthetimeperiod   be"equitablytolled"becauseofhisattorney'serrorinfiling `  late;andhisclaimthattheConstitution'sSuspensionClause  \  overridestheAEDPAlimitwhenthepetitionerassertsthatheis   actuallyinnocentoftheunderlyingoffense.Wenowaddressthese d  issuesinthesameorder. `   ` David'sfirstargumentthat180daysshouldbeaddedto   theexcludedperiodiseasilyanswered.# XNXXXN%#XNXX XNԀCongressexcludedfrom h theoneyearperiodthetimeduringwhich"aproperlyfiled d applicationforStatepostconvictionorothercollateralreview  ...ispending...."Id.2244(d)(2).Thereasonis l obvious.Duringtheperiodwhenthestatecourtsarereviewingthe h claims,afederalpetitionwouldlikelybedismissedorheldas  prematureandwouldatbestsimplybehelduntilstateremedies p  wereexhausted.28U.S.C.2254(b)(1)(A). !l"  ` Nothinginthelanguageorpolicyofthisexclusion "$ warrantsaddingtotheexcludedperiodanadditionalperiodduring t$& whichthepetitionercouldhave,butdidnot,seekcertiorariin  &p!( theSupremeCourtfromthedenialofcollateralremedies.Oncethe  SJCdeniedreviewastothefirstnewtrialmotion,nothingwas \ pendingineitherstateorfederalcourtnorwasanyfurtheraction X evertakeninanycourtwithrespecttothatmotion.Thesameis   trueforthesecondmotion.Thus,tosaythatDavid'scollateral `  attackproceedingswerependinginanycourtduringthe90day  \  periodsaftertheSJCdenialsisatoddswithordinaryusage. #  2      # XNXXXNC(#XNXX XN    ` Ifanythingmorewereneeded,itissuppliedbythe d  contrastinglanguageofacompanionAEDPAprovision.Inthe `  ordinarypostAEDPAcase,theoneyearperiod(exceptionsaside)   runsfromthelateroftwodates:"thedate...thejudgment h becamefinalbytheconclusionofdirectreviewortheexpiration d ofthetimeforseekingsuchreview."28U.S.C.2244(d)(1)(A)  (emphasissupplied).Thus,ifDavidhadbeenconvictedaftertrial l andfoughthisconvictionthroughtheSJC,hewouldautomatically h havegottenthebenefitoftheadditional90daysforseeking  certiorarithatis,thosedayswouldhavebeenexcludedfromthe p  oneyearperiodbyvirtueoftheunderscoredlanguage.Nosuch !l" languageappearsinthecollateralattackprovisionapplicable "$ here. t$&  ` Davidsaysthathehadnodirectreviewremedyunder  statelawbecauseofhisguiltypleasothat,tocreateequalityof \ opportunity,theunderscoredlanguageshouldbereadintothe X collateralattackprovisionorthecollateralattackshouldbe   equatedinthiscasewithdirectreview.Thisargumenthasthe `  matterbackwards.Congressdidnotaimatequality:it  \  specificallyprovidedamoregenerousexclusionoftimewhere   directreviewwasinvolvedand,consistentwiththespiritof d  AEDPA,tookastricterviewastostatepostconvictionremedies. `   ` Davidnextarguesthattherunningofthelimitations   periodshouldbeequitablytolledbecausethefailuretofilethe h petitionwithintherequiredperiodwasduetoerrorbyDavid's d counsel.Thefactualpremiseisanaffidavitfromcounselstating  thathecouldhavefiledthepetitionearlierbutdidnotthink l thiswasrequired."Equitabletolling"isanumbrellatermforthe h notionthatastatuteoflimitationsunlessitstimelimitis  "jurisdictional"maybeextendedforequitablereasonsnot p  acknowledgedinthestatutecreatingthelimitationsperiod.See, !l" e.g.,Delaneyv.Matesanz,264F.3d7,1314(1stCir.2001). "$  ` Section2244doesnotdescribeitstimelimitsas t$& jurisdictional,eitherinitsowntermsorotherwise,nordoesthe  &p!( Commonwealthinvokethatlabel.SeeMillerv.N.J.StateDept.of '#* Corrections,145F.3d616,61718(3dCir.1998).Still,section x)$, 2244(d)comprisessixparagraphsdefiningitsoneyearlimitations $+t&. periodindetailandadoptingveryspecificexceptions.Congress  likelydidnotconceivethatthecourtswouldaddnewexceptions \ anditisevenmoredoubtfulthatitwouldhaveapprovedofsuchan X effort.Talianiv.Chrans,189F.3d597,598(7thCir.1999).   AEDPAreflectsCongress'viewthatthecourtswerebeingtoo `  generouswithhabeasreliefandthatthewholesystemneededtobe  \  tightenedup.SeeH.R.Rep.No.104518,at111(1996).    ` Nevertheless,manycircuitshaveheldorassumedthat d  equitabletollingisavailable, #  3      ׀andwewillproceedhereonthat `  arguendoassumption.The"exclusion"inferenceagainstsucha   readingofsection2244ismatched,assuchrubricsoftenare,by h acounterinference:thatCongressactsagainstthebackgroundof d existingdecisionaldoctrineunlessitnegatesthedoctrine.Young  v.UnitedStates.122S.Ct.1036,1040(2002).Thiscourt, l althoughithasneverdecidedwhetherequitabletollingis h permittedundersection2244,Lattimorev.Dubois,311F.3d46,55  (1stCir.2002),haselsewherebeenwillingtoreadAEDPA p  creatively.SeeEvicciv.CommissionerofCorrections,226F.3d !l" 26,28(1stCir.2000). "$  ` Ifequitabletollingisavailabletoextendsection t$& 2244(d)'slimitationsperiod,itcanonlydosoforthemost  &p!( exceptionalreasons.OneofAEDPA'smainpurposeswastocompel '#* habeaspetitionstobefiledpromptlyafterconvictionanddirect  review,tolimittheirnumber,andtopermitdelayedorsecond \ petitionsonlyinfairlynarrowandexplicitlydefined X circumstances.28U.S.C.2244(d)(1)(A)(D);H.R.Rep.No.104   518,supraat111.Tobypasstheserestrictionsforreasonsother# XNXXXN.#XNXX XN `  thanthosegiveninthestatutecouldbedefended,ifatall,only  \  forthemostexigentreasons.    ` Here,themagistratejudgethought,andthedistrict d  court,agreed,thatamistakebycounselinreadingthestatuteor `  computingthetimelimitis,atmost,aroutineerror.Indeed,it   wouldnotevenconstitute"excusableneglect"underFed.R.App.P. h 4(a)(5).SeeMirpuriv.ACTMfg.,212F.3d624,63031(1stCir. d 2000).EvenapartfromAEDPA,theSupremeCourthassaidthat"the  principlesofequitabletolling...donotextendtowhatisat l bestagardenvarietyclaimofexcusableneglect."Irwinv.Dep't h ofVeteransAffairs,498U.S.89,96(1990). #  4      ׀Ifcarelessnesswere  anescapehatchfromstatutesoflimitations,theywouldhardly p  everbarclaims. !l"  ` David'sfinalargumentisthatthelimitationsperiod,if "$ otherwiseapplicabletohimandunmitigatedherebyequitable t$& tolling,violatestheConstitution.ArticleI,section9,clause  &p!( 2,providesthatthe"writofhabeascorpusshallnotbe  suspended,"saveincasesofrebellionorinvasion.Davidargues \ thatanystatutorylimitationsperiodthatpreventshimfrom X presentingaclaimpredicatedon"actualinnocence"amountstoan   unconstitutionalsuspensionofthewrit.CompareDelaneyv. `  Matesanz,264F.3d7,12(1stCir.2001)(upholdingtheoneyear  \  limitonly"asageneralmatter").    ` AssumingarguendothattheSuspensionClauseextends d  beyondthenarrowhistoricalofficeofthewrit,cf.McCleskeyv. `  Zant,499U.S.467,478(1991),itcouldonlybeviolatedby   enactmentsthatmakethewrit"inadequateorineffectivetotest h thelegalityof(theapplicant's)detention."Swainv.Pressley, d 430U.S.372,381(1977).Here,theargumentmadebyDavidwas  availabletohimfromApril1992onwardand,excludingthetimefor l exhaustingremedies,hehadampletimeafterAEDPAinwhichto h bringhisclaimwithinthestatutorydeadline.Inthese  circumstances,thelimitationisnotevenarguably p  unconstitutional.Molov.Johnson,207F.3d773,775(5thCir. !l" 2000).# XNXXXNOD#XNXX XN "$  ` # XNXXXN+P#XNXX XNItwouldbeanothermatterifDavid'sconstitutional t$& claimregardingthemisstatementoftheelementsofthemurdercame  &p!( tolightonlyafterthelimitationsperiodhadexpired.But '#* Congresshasprovidedthatinsuchacaseapetitionermaybring x)$, hisclaima# XNXXXNP#Ԁyearfromthe"dateonwhichthefactualpredicateof $+t&. theclaim...couldhavebeendiscoveredthroughtheexerciseof  duediligence."28U.S.C.2244(d)(1)(D).Here,anyerroratthe \ pleacolloquywasimmediatelyapparent,sothisalternative X startingdatehasnorelevanceforDavid.    ` NothingischangedherebyDavid'sclaimofactual `  innocence,aclaimitselfderivedfromhismistakencolloquy  \  argument.Ingeneral,defendantswhomaybeinnocentare   constrainedbythesameexplicitstatutoryorrulebaseddeadlines d  asthoseagainstwhomtheevidenceisoverwhelming:pretrial `  motionsmustbefiledontime,timelyappealsmustbelodged,and   habeasclaimsmustconformtoAEDPA.Inparticular,thestatutory h oneyearlimitonfilinginitialhabeaspetitionsisnotmitigated d byanystatutoryexceptionforactualinnocenceeventhough  Congressclearlyknewhowtoprovidesuchanescapehatch.  #  5       l  ` Thereisastrongpublicinterestinthepromptassertion h ofhabeasclaims.Normally,thegrantofhabeasreliefleavesthe  statefreetoretrythepetitioner,butthisbecomesincreasingly p  hardtodoasmemoriesfade,evidencedispersesandwitnesses !l" disappear.Adefendantwhocouldnothavefiledhispetition "$ earlierisatleastasympatheticfigure;onewhohasaknown t$& claim,deferspresentingit,andthenaskstobeexcusedforthe  delayisunlikelytogetcutmuchslack.Acoupleofcaseshave \ conjecturedthatactualinnocencemightoverridetheoneyear X limit,e.g.,Wyzkowskiv.Dept.ofCorrections,226F.3d1213,   121819(11thCir.2000);buttousthesedictaareintensionwith `  thestatuteandarenotpersuasive.  \   ` Theactualinnocencerubricaphrasecourtsuse   differentlyindifferentcontexts,seeCalderonv.Thompson,523 d  U.S.538,55966(1998)hasbeenfirmlydisallowedbytheSupreme `  Courtasanindependentgroundofhabeasrelief,save(possibly)in   extraordinarycircumstancesinacapitalcase.Herrerav.Collins, h 506U.S.390,417(1993).Bycontrast,theCourthasusedan d actualinnocencetestasasafetyvalvewhereanissuewasnot  timelypresentedintheoriginaltrial,Schlupv.Delo,513U.S. l 298(1995),butwearenothereconcernedwithaclaimforfeited h underthecauseandprejudicestandard.   ` Asithappens,Davidhasnotmadeoutapredicateshowing p  of"actualinnocence,"ifthephraseistakentomeanthatnojury !l" wouldlikelyconvictDavidbasedonthecurrentlyknownevidence. "$ ThisissoevenifthejurywashereinstructedexactlyasDavid t$& saysMassachusettslawrequires.Intheend,thedefensewould  &p!( dependlargelyonwhetherthejurybelievedDavid'sownself '#*  servingtestimonyabouthisownmentalstateaconclusionwhich, x)$, givenhisactiveparticipationinChamplain'smistreatmentover  severaldays,ajurymighteasilyresist. \   ` Affirmed.