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ÍÝ ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àòòSeeóó€òòBurger€Kingóó,€471€U.S.€at€480€n.22€(stating€thatÐ ° Ðcommercial€activities€carried€out€on€a€party's€behalf€"mayÐ xÈ Ðsometimes€be€ascribed€to€the€party,"€but€declining€to€"resolve€theÐ @ Ðpermissible€bounds€of€such€attribution");€òòGrand€Ô_ÔEntm'tÔ_Ô€Group,€Ltd.Ð X Ðóóv.€òòStar€Media€Sales,€Inc.óó,€988€F.2d€476,€483€(3d€Cir.€1993)Ð Ð  Ð(stating€that€"[Ô_Ôa]ctivitiesÔ_Ô€of€a€party's€agent€may€count€toward€theÐ ˜è Ðminimum€contacts€necessary€to€support€jurisdiction");òòóó€òòÔ_ÔSherÔ_Ôóó€v.Ð ` ° ÐòòJohnsonóó,€911€F.2d€1357,€1362€(9th€Cir.€1990)€(stating€that€theÐ ( x Ðactions€of€an€agent€are€attributed€to€the€principal€for€personalÐ ð @ Ðjurisdiction€purposes);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDonatellióó,€893€F.2d€at€466€(notingÐ ¸   Ðthe€general€rule€that€"jurisdiction€over€a€partner€confersÐ € Ð  Ðjurisdiction€over€the€partnership");€òòLewisóó€v.€òòÔ_ÔFresneÔ_Ôóó,€252€F.3d€352,Ð H ˜  Ð359€(5th€Cir.€2001)€(same).(2C$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝHÁ ÛÝ ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` à"The€transmission€of€facts€or€information€intoÐ ° ÐMassachusetts€via€telephone€or€mail€would€of€course€constituteÐ xÈ Ðevidence€of€a€jurisdictional€contact€directed€into€the€forumÐ @ Ðstate."€€òòMass€Sch.€of€Lawóó,€142€F.3d€at€36;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòBurger€Kingóó,Ð X Ð471€U.S.€at€476€(stating€that€"it€is€an€inescapable€fact€of€modernÐ Ð  Ðcommercial€life€that€a€substantial€amount€of€business€is€transactedÐ ˜è Ðsolely€by€mail€and€wire€communications€across€state€lines"€and€thatÐ ` ° Ðdefendants€may€not€defeat€jurisdiction€merely€by€showing€that€theyÐ ( x Ðnever€physically€entered€the€forum). µÝ ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àAs€described€in€the€Restatement€(Second),€"RatificationÐ ° Ðis€the€affirmance€by€a€person€of€a€prior€act€which€did€not€bind€himÐ xÈ Ðbut€which€was€done€or€professedly€done€on€his€account,€whereby€theÐ @ Ðact,€as€to€some€or€all€persons,€is€given€effect€as€if€originallyÐ X Ðauthorized€by€him."€€Restatement€(Second)€of€Agency,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€82.€Ð Ð  Ѐ(ÿÿ$’’MSY/A<< cÿÿ ƒÝ ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àWhen€"Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔthe€assertion€of€jurisdiction€is€bound€up€with€theÐ ° Ðclaim€on€the€merits,"€but€there€exists€"the€possibility€ofÐ xÈ Ðpermitting€a€dubious€case€to€proceed€beyond€the€pleading€stage,€andÐ @ Ðeven€to€trial,€though€the€court€eventually€will€be€found€to€lackÐ X Ðjurisdiction,"€we€have€noted€that€the€"likelihood"€standard€may€beÐ Ð  Ðappropriate.€€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C #ÔòòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€146;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòÔ_ÔBoitÔ_Ôóó,€967Ð ˜è ÐF.2d€at€677„78.€€ d Ý ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àDaynard€focuses€on€the€district€court's€attributedÐ ° Ðcontacts€holding€rather€than€on€the€district€court's€conclusionÐ xÈ Ðthat€the€Scruggs€defendants'€direct€contacts€are€insufficient.€€TheÐ @ ÐScruggs€defendants€emphasize€this,€noting€that€Daynard€has€notÐ X Ðargued€that€their€direct€contacts€alone€are€sufficient€to€permitÐ Ð  Ðpersonal€jurisdiction.€€We€agree€that€Daynard€does€not€advance€thisÐ ˜è Ðargument,€but€note€that€many€of€those€facts,€insufficient€toÐ ` ° Ðestablish€jurisdiction€based€on€the€Scruggs€defendants'€directÐ ( x Ðcontacts,€are,€of€course,€relevant€to€the€imputed€contacts€analysisÐ ð @ Ðas€well.€€One€cannot€make€a€sensible€inquiry€into€whether€contactsÐ ¸   Ðimputed€to€the€Scruggs€defendants€support€personal€jurisdictionÐ € Ð  Ðwithout€viewing€those€same€contacts€in€the€context€of€all€of€theÐ H ˜  Ðother€alleged€facts€of€the€case. Ñ  Ñ nÝ ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àScruggs€denies€that€he€participated€in€any€such€meetingÐ ° Ðin€Boston€for€these€purposes.€ ²Ý ƒK$ÝÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÓ  ÓÓ=€wTЋdÐd=Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dЋd=Óà ` àÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔIt€was€not€until€November€1997,€after€Daynard€hadÐ ° Ðprovided€years€of€services€and€the€firms€were€expecting€to€reapÐ xÈ Ðsignificant€financial€rewards€from€at€least€the€Mississippi€andÐ @ ÐFlorida€litigation,€that€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C#ÔScruggs€responded€to€Daynard's€secondÐ X Ðletter,€after€he€ignored€the€first€letter,€and€disavowed€the€5%€feeÐ Ð  Ðarrangement.€€Daynard€asserts€that,€even€at€this€point,€ScruggsÐ ˜è Ðdisputed€only€the€extent€of€Daynard's€compliance€with€theÐ ` ° Ðagreement,€not€the€existence€of€the€agreement.€€Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÓ  ÓÑ  ÑØØÑ€ÑÓ*°,X°` ¨ ƒX°œX*ÓÓÓÓÓÑ8€ .C XXdÈdÈ8ÑÓ=€wT‹Ð‹dÐd=ÓÝ ƒÿÝÝ  ÝÔ‡ ‹.CX‹‹ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔà@k k ìàò òÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C`#ÔÔ‡ L£?JX ‹.CÔÔ#†LDFJJ L£?A#ÔÔ‡LDFJJLDFÔUnited€States€Court€of€AppealsÔ#†‹wT‹JLDF·#ÔÔ‡X­X‹‹wTԈР° Ðà@ ìàÔ#†‹wT‹XX­Y#ÔÔ‡RÐo Q‹‹wTÔFor€the€First€Circuitó óÔ#†‹wT‹ QRÐoÃ#ÔÔ#†‹wT‹‹‹wTù#ԈР^® Ðà@   ìà____________________ˆÐ ªú ÐÌÌÔ‡ ‹.CX‹‹wTÔNo.€01„2595Ð ª ú ÐÌÌÓ  ÓRICHARD€A.€DAYNARD,Ð  R ÐÓÕÓÌà@ ìàÔ#†‹wT‹X ‹.C”#ÔÔ‡ ‹.CX‹‹wTÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔPlaintiff,€Appellant,ˆÐ ’â  ÐÌà@tt)ìàv.ˆÐ "r  ÐÌÓ  ÓNESS,€MOTLEY,€LOADHOLT,€RICHARDSON€&€POOLE,€P.A.;€Ð ²  ÐRONALD€L.€MOTLEY,€Ð zÊ  ÐÌDefendants,€Ð  Z ÐÌà@@ÜÜ ìàSCRUGGS,€MILLETTE,€BOZEMAN€&€DENT€P.A.;€Ð šê ÐRICHARD€F.€SCRUGGS,Ð b² ÐÌDÔ#† ‹.CXX X.Cn#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔÔ#†X­XX X.CO#ÔÔ‡ X.CXXX­Ôefendants,€Appellees.Ð òB ÐÔ#†X­XX X.C_#ÔÔ#†‹wT‹XX­#ÔÔ‡ ‹.CX‹‹wTÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔÌÔ#†X­XX X.Cî#ÔÓäÓÔ‡ X.CXXX­ÔÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C #ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔà@<< ìà____________________ˆÐ ‚Ò ÐÌÔ% €T ÔÌà@œ œ ìàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€UNITED€STATES€DISTRICT€COURTˆÐ Ú* ÐÌà@0 0 ìàFOR€THE€DISTRICT€OF€MASSACHUSETTSˆÐ jº ÐÌà@œ œ ìà[Hon.€William€G.€Young,€òòU.S.€District€Judgeóó]ˆÐ úJ Ðà@<< ìà____________________ˆÐ   ÐÌà ` àà ¨ àà  àà X àà ° àÌà@„„'ìàBeforeˆÐ "j# ÐÓ  ÓÌLynch,€òòCircuit€Judgeóó,€Ð ª#ú% ÐCampbell€and€Bownes,€òòSenior€Circuit€Judgesóó.òòóóÐ r$Â& ÐÌÓ­ Óà@<< ìà____________________ˆÐ &R!( ÐÌÓ* °X°,X°` ¨ ƒX*Óà  àòòEdward€J.€Barshakóó€with€whom€òòDarrel€C.€Waughóó€and€òòSugarman,Ð ’'â"* ÐRogers,€Barshak€&€Cohen,€P.C.óó€were€on€brief€for€appellant.Ð Z(ª#+ Ðà  àòòStephen€M.€Prignanoóó€with€whom€òòMark€A.€Pogueóó€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C¢#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔÔ#†X­XX X.C`#ÔÔ‡ X.CXXX­Ôand€òòEdwards€&Ð ")r$, ÐAngell,€LLPóó€were€on€brief€for€appellees.€€Ó.°,X°` ¨ ƒX°X… .ÓÐ ê):%- Ðà@<< ìà____________________ˆÐ ²*&. ÐÌÓ  Óà @` àà @¨ àà @ àà @X àà @° àMay€10,€2002Ð B,’'0 ÐÓ Óà@<< ìà____________________ˆÐ   -Z(1 ÐÓŸÓØØÑ 0XÑÑ€=@¸ÑÑ8€ .C XXdÈ XXdÈ8ÑÑ€_P¸(Ñà ` àò òòòÔ#†X­XX X.C #ÔÔ#†‹wT‹XX­Ñ #ÔóóÔ€ ‹.CX‹‹wTÔLYNCH,€òòCircuit€Judgeó óóó.€€The€issue€on€appeal€is€whether€aÐ ° Ðfederal€district€court€sitting€in€Massachusetts€has€specificÐ à Ðpersonal€jurisdiction€over€a€suit€brought€by€Richard€A.€Daynard,€aÐ  p ÐMassachusetts€law€professor,€for€fees€in€the€tobacco€litigation,Ð °  Ðagainst€the€Mississippi€law€firm€of€Scruggs,€Millette,€Bozeman€&Ð @  ÐDent,€and€Richard€Scruggs,€a€senior€partner€("Scruggs€defendants").€Ð Ð   ÐAt€the€heart€of€Daynard's€claim€is€the€argument€that€the€court€mayÐ `°  Ðreach€the€Scruggs€defendants€based€in€large€part€on€contactsÐ ð@  Ðimputed€from€the€South€Carolina€law€firm€of€Ness,€Motley,€Loadholt,Ð €Ð  ÐRichardson€&€Poole,€and€Ronald€Motley€("Motley€defendants"),€all€ofÐ ` Ðwhom€purportedly€acted€on€behalf€of€both€firms€in€engaging€DaynardÐ  ð Ðto€work€on€litigation€against€the€tobacco€industry.€€We€conclude,Ð 0€ Ðcontrary€to€the€district€court,€that€the€Scruggs€defendants€areÐ À Ðsubject€to€specific€personal€jurisdiction€based€on€their€contactsÐ P  Ðwith€Massachusetts,€particularly€those€contacts€properly€attributedÐ à0 Ðto€them€from€the€Motley€defendants,€who€are€also€defendants€in€thisÐ pÀ Ðlitigation.€€Ð P  Ðà ` àDaynard€is€a€law€professor€at€Northeastern€UniversityÐ à" Ðspecializing€in€litigation€against€the€tobacco€industry.€€He€suedÐ  !p$ Ðthe€Motley€and€Scruggs€defendants,€claiming€that,€pursuant€to€anÐ °"& Ðoral€agreement,€he€is€entitled€to€a€portion€of€the€fees€that€theseÐ @$( Ðfirms€have€received€or€will€receive€from€their€successful€tobaccoÐ Ð% !* Ðlitigation.€Ð `'°", Ðà ` àThe€Motley€defendants,€based€on€their€MassachusettsÐ ð(@$. Ðcontacts,€concede€personal€jurisdiction,€but,€central€to€this€case,Ð €*Ð%0 Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants€do€not.€€Daynard€does€not€challenge€theÐ ,`'2 Ðdistrict€court's€conclusion€that€the€Scruggs€defendants'€own€directÐ ° Ðcontacts€with€Massachusetts€are,€by€themselves,€insufficient€toÐ @ Ðpermit€personal€jurisdiction.€€Instead,€he€challenges€the€districtÐ Ð  Ðcourt's€ruling€that€personal€jurisdiction€does€not€exist€based€onÐ ` ° Ðthe€imputation€of€some€of€the€Motley€defendants'€contacts,€whichÐ ð @ Ðwere€purportedly€made€on€behalf€of€both€law€firms,€to€the€ScruggsÐ € Ð  Ðdefendants.€€The€district€court€reasoned€that€the€Motley€defendantsÐ `  Ðwere€not€the€Scruggs€defendants'€agents,€and,€even€if€they€were,Ð  ð  Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants€did€not€exert€"substantial€influence"€overÐ 0€  Ðthe€Motley€defendants'€in„forum€activities.€€The€district€courtÐ À Ðreasoned€that€it€could€not,€consistent€with€the€Due€Process€ClauseÐ P  Ðof€the€Fourteenth€Amendment,€attribute€the€Motley€defendants'Ð à0 Ðcontacts€to€the€Scruggs€defendants€for€purposes€of€personalÐ pÀ Ðjurisdiction.€€Ð P Ðà ` àDaynard€appeals€this€decision€arguing€that€the€districtÐ à Ðcourt€erred€by€relying€on€a€general€jurisdiction€case,€òòDonatellióó€v.Ð  p ÐòòNational€Hockey€Leagueóó,€893€F.2d€459€(1st€Cir.€1990),€to€derive€theÐ °  Ð"substantial€influence"€requirement.€€Daynard€argues€that€he€needÐ @" Ðnot€show,€for€specific€jurisdiction€purposes,€that€the€ScruggsÐ Ð $ Ðdefendants€exerted€substantial€influence€over€the€MotleyÐ `"°& Ðdefendants'€in„forum€activities€in€order€to€impute€the€MotleyÐ ð#@( Ðdefendants'€contacts€to€the€Scruggs€defendants.€€Daynard€assertsÐ €%Ð * Ðthat€the€defendants€were€engaged€in€a€tobacco€litigation€jointÐ '`", Ðventure€and€that,€on€this€basis,€attribution€is€proper.€€Ð  (ð#. Ðà ` àWe€conclude€that€òòDonatellióó's€substantial€influence€testÐ 0*€%0 Ðis€not€controlling€in€this€case,€where€Daynard€alleges€that€theÐ À+'2 Ðdefendants€were€in€a€joint€venture,€or€at€least€held€themselves€outÐ ° Ðto€be€in€a€type€of€agency€relationship.€€We€need€not€determineÐ @ Ðwhether€the€defendants€were€actually€engaged€in€a€joint€ventureÐ Ð  Ðbetween€themselves,€however.€€The€facts,€as€asserted€by€Daynard€andÐ ` ° Ðconstrued€in€the€light€of€whether€he€has€made€a€prima€facieÐ ð @ Ðjurisdictional€showing,€suffice€to€show€a€relationship€between€theÐ € Ð  Ðtwo€defendants€sufficient€to€impute€some€of€the€Motley€defendants'Ð `  Ðcontacts€to€the€Scruggs€defendants.€€These€same€facts€show€that€theÐ  ð  ÐScruggs€defendants€held€themselves€out€to€be€in€some€form€of€anÐ 0€  Ðagency€relationship€with€the€Motley€defendants€and,€by€acceptingÐ À Ðand€encouraging€Daynard's€services,€and€agreeing€to€compensate€himÐ P  Ðon€the€basis€of€a€share€of€the€fees,€ratified€the€MotleyÐ à0 Ðdefendants'€in„forum€activities€giving€rise€to€this€lawsuit.€€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àTraditional€common€law€concepts,€embodied€in€the€law€ofÐ P ÐMassachusetts,€Mississippi,€and€South€Carolina,€confirm€theÐ à Ðfundamental€fairness€of€requiring€the€Scruggs€defendants€to€answerÐ  p Ðin€Massachusetts.€€We€conclude€that€the€Scruggs€defendants'Ð °  Ðcontacts€with€Massachusetts,€particularly€those€contacts€of€theÐ @" ÐMotley€defendants€properly€attributed€to€the€Scruggs€defendants,Ð Ð $ Ðsuffice€to€permit€personal€jurisdiction€over€the€Scruggs€defendantsÐ `"°& Ðconsistent€with€the€Massachusetts€long„arm€statute€and€theÐ ð#@( ÐFourteenth€Amendment€of€the€Constitution.€Ð €%Ð * Ðò òÓ  ÓI.ó óÐ '`", ÐÓ»&Óà ` àIn€this€case€there€are€many€disputed,€and€as€of€yetÐ ð(@$. Ðunresolved,€facts.€€We€do€not€resolve€these€disputed€facts€becauseÐ €*Ð%0 Ðwe€"must€accept€the€plaintiff's€(properly€documented)€evidentiaryÐ ,`'2 Ðproffers€as€true€for€the€purpose€of€determining€the€adequacy€of€theÐ ° Ðprima€facie€jurisdictional€showing."€€òòFoster„Miller,€Inc.óó€v.Ð @ ÐòòBabcock€&€Wilcox€Canadaóó,€46€F.3d€138,€145€(1st€Cir.€1995).€€We€useÐ Ð  ÐDaynard's€version€of€the€facts€(although€we€provide€a€briefÐ ` ° Ðdescription€of€the€defendants'€competing€version),€drawn€from€hisÐ ð @ Ðcomplaint,€ò òó óboth€sides'€subsequent€affidavits,€and€the€products€ofÐ € Ð  Ðjurisdictional€discovery,€including€Daynard's€deposition€ofÐ `  ÐScruggs.€Ð  ð  Ðò òÔ&  ÔA.€Daynard's€Allegationsó óà X àÐ 0€  Ðà ` àDaynard€is€a€resident€and€citizen€of€the€Commonwealth€ofÐ ` ÐÔ'0q*ÔMassachusetts.€€He€is,€and€has€been€for€over€thirty€years,€a€lawÐ  ð Ðprofessor€at€Northeastern€University€School€of€Law,€located€inÐ 0€ ÐMassachusetts.€€For€much€of€that€time,€he€has€focused€hisÐ À Ðprofessional€and€academic€efforts€on€defeating€the€tobacco€industryÐ P  Ðin€court.€€Daynard€is€Chair€of€the€Tobacco€Product€LiabilityÐ à0 ÐProject,€President€of€the€Tobacco€Control€Resources€Center,€and€aÐ pÀ Ðfrequent€advocate€for,€and€consultant€to,€those€opposing€theÐ P  Ðtobacco€industry.€Ð à" Ðà ` àFor€many€years€there€was€a€consensus€that€the€potentialÐ  !p$ Ðfor€recovery€against€the€tobacco€industry€was€negligible.€€Indeed,Ð °"& Ðthe€tobacco€industry,€until€1997,€boasted€that€it€had€never€paid€aÐ @$( Ðcent€to€a€tort€plaintiff.€€As€of€2002,€the€situation€is€drasticallyÐ Ð% !* Ðdifferent.€€Lawyers€have€sued€the€tobacco€companies€on€behalf€ofÐ `'°", Ðmany€states€and€recovered€astronomical€sums€for€those€states,€withÐ ð(@$. Ðconsequently€large€fees€for€themselves.€€During€the€past€severalÐ €*Ð%0 Ðyears,€almost€every€state€has€sued€the€tobacco€industry,€seeking,Ð ,`'2 Ðamong€other€things,€reimbursement€for€the€medical€costs€incurred€asÐ ° Ða€result€of€smoking„related€health€harms.€€The€defendant€law€firmsÐ @ Ðin€this€case€have€been€responsible€for€instituting,€litigatiÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔng,€andÐ Ð  Ðsettling€litigation€against€the€tobacco€industry€on€behalf€ofÐ ` ° Ðforty„six€different€states.€€This€settlement€was€accomplished,€inÐ ð @ Ðpart,€in€what€is€known€as€the€Master€Settlement€Agreement.€€òòSeeóóÐ € Ð  ÐNational€Association€of€Attorneys€General,€Master€SettlementÐ `  ÐAgreement,€òòatóó€http://www.naag.org/tobac/cigmsa.rtf€(Nov.€23,€1998);Ð  ð  ÐòòGreenlessóó€v.€òòAlmondóó,€277€F.3d€601,€603€(1st€Cir.€2002)€(describingÐ 0€  Ðthe€tobacco€litigation€and€settlement).€€Daynard€says€thisÐ À Ðsettlement€will€result€in€a€distribution€of€billions€of€dollars€toÐ P  Ðthe€two€firms.€òòóóÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C21#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔÐ à0 Ðà ` àDaynard€says€that€his€efforts€were€central€to€many€ofÐ pÀ Ðthese€titanicÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C_4#Ô€recoveries.€€He€quotes€reputable€authorities€statingÐ P Ðthat€he€is€the€"recognized€leader"€in€tobacco€litigation€on€behalfÐ à Ðof€the€public€health€and€the€"foremost€authority"€on,€€and€"drivingÐ  p Ðforce"€behind,€anti„tobacco€legal€theory€and€strategy.€€In€fact,Ð °  ÐDaynard€quotes€one€authority€stating€that€without€Daynard's€tobaccoÐ @" Ðwork,€the€state„initiated€tobacco€litigation€would€not€even€exist.€Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àThe€parties€agree€that€Charles€Patrick,€then€a€partner€atÐ `"°& ÐNess€Motley,€came€to€Boston,€Massachusetts€in€the€fall€of€1993€toÐ ð#@( Ðmeet€with€Daynard.€€Daynard€says€that,€at€the€time€Patrick€traveledÐ €%Ð * Ðto€Boston€to€retain€his€services,€Ness€Motley€and€Scruggs€MilletteÐ '`", Ðwere€engaged€in€a€tobacco€litigation€joint€venture.€€Indeed,Ð  (ð#. Ðthroughout€his€dealings€with€Ness€Motley€and€Scruggs€Millette,Ð 0*€%0 ÐDaynard€understood€the€two€firms€to€be€in€a€joint€venture€that€atÐ À+'2 Ðfirst€encompassed€the€Mississippi€tobacco€litigation€and€thenÐ ° Ðbroadened€to€include€tobacco€litigation€nationwide.€€DaynardÐ @ Ðinsists€that€Patrick€was€acting€on€behalf€of€both€firms€and€thatÐ Ð  ÐPatrick€retained€him€to€advance€the€objectives€of€the€firms'€jointÐ ` ° Ðventure.Ð ð @ Ðà ` àShortly€after€this€initial€meeting€in€Boston,€DaynardÐ € Ð  Ðtraveled€to€Ness€Motley's€South€Carolina€offices,€where€he€met€withÐ `  Ðmembers€of€the€firm,€including€Ronald€Motley.€€At€these€meetings,Ð  ð  ÐDaynard€identified€and€explained€legal€theories€for€recovery€onÐ 0€  Ðbehalf€of€state€governments.€€After€these€meetings,€DaynardÐ À Ðcontinued€to€communicate€regularly,€by€phone€and€fax,€with€membersÐ P  Ðof€Ness€Motley,€providing€them€advice€on€similar€matters.Ð à0 Ðà ` àAs€a€result€of€Ness€Motley's€retention€of€him,Ð pÀ Ðpurportedly€on€behalf€of€both€firms,€Daynard€also€beganÐ P Ð"communicat[ing]€regularly"€with€the€Mississippi€law€firm€ScruggsÐ à ÐMillette€and€providing€the€firm€with€"advice€and€assistance."€Ð  p ÐBeginning€in€the€fall€of€1993,€members€of€both€firms€came€to€BostonÐ °  Ðto€meet€with€and€receive€advice€from€Daynard,€in€furtherance€of€hisÐ @" Ðengagement€by€them.׃`×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€According€to€his€affidavit,€Daynard€"had€manyÐ Ð $ Ðconversations,€meetings€and€written€communications€in€Boston€withÐ `"°& Ðmembers€of€the€defendant€firms,€in€which€[he]€provided€advice€andÐ ð#@( Ðundertook€specific€projects€for€their€use€in€the€tobaccoÐ €%Ð * Ðâ âlitigation."€€Ð '`", Ðà ` àDaynard€asserts€that€his€legal€theories,€strategies,Ð ° Ðâ âevidence,€and€arguments€"subsequently€formed€a€central€component"Ð @ Ðof€the€firms'€litigation€brought€on€behalf€of€several€statesÐ Ð  Ðagainst€the€tobacco€industry.€€In€addition,€Daynard€introduced€NessÐ ` ° ÐMotley€firm€members€to€experienced€tobacco€litigators€and€toÐ ð @ Ðpleading€and€discovery€files€from€other€tobacco€cases.Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àInitially,€Ness€Motley€compensated€Daynard€ò òó óbased€onÐ `  Ðhourly€feesò ò€ó ófor€his€services€rendered.€€As€Daynard's€relationshipÐ  ð  Ðwith€the€two€firms€progressed,€he€had€"several€conversations"€withÐ €Ð  Ð"both€Mr.€Motley€and€Mr.€Scruggs€in€which€they€stated€that€theyÐ ` Ðwould€appropriately€compensate€[Daynard]€.€.€.€and€that€the€finalÐ  ð Ðform€of€compensation€would€be"€in€the€form€of€a€share€of€the€feesÐ 0€ Ðthe€firms€obtained€from€handling€the€states'€tobacco€litigation.€Ð À ÐRonald€Motley€advised€Daynard€that€he€would€be€compensated€for€hisÐ P  Ðassistance€as€a€member€of€the€Ness€Motley€"team."€€After€thisÐ à0 Ðcommunication,€Daynard€says€that€he€received€no€furtherÐ pÀ Ðcompensation€from€Ness€Motley.€€As€to€payment€by€Scruggs€Millette,Ð P  Ðthe€parties€agree€that€Scruggs€Millette€never€compensated€Daynard.€Ð à" Ðà ` àWhen€the€state€tobacco€litigation€commenced,€DaynardÐ  !p$ Ðcontinued€to€work€with€both€firms,€educating€their€attorneys€on€theÐ °"& Ðrelevant€issues,€counseling€them€based€on€his€experience€in€otherÐ @$( Ðtobacco€litigation,€providing€them€with€relevant€documents€andÐ Ð% !* Ðinformation,€and€introducing€them€to€potential€witnesses€andÐ `'°", Ðcontacts.€€He€developed€litigation€strategies€and€worked€onÐ ð(@$. Ðpleadings€and€other€documents€for€the€firms.€€Many€of€theseÐ €*Ð%0 Ðservices€were€performed€in€Boston.€€òòSeeóó€òòDaynardóó€v.€òòNess,€Motley,Ð ,`'2 ÐLoadholt,€Richardson€&€Poole,€P.A.óó,€188€F.€Supp.€2d€115,€118€(2002)Ð ° Ð(stating€that€"Daynard€performed€his€research€and€writing,€met€withÐ @ ÐNess€Motley€partners,€and€allegedly€formed€a€compensation€contractÐ Ð  Ðin€Massachusetts");€òòid.óó€at€119.€€Daynard€also€spoke€at€conferencesÐ ` ° Ðof€state€governmental€officials€where€he€arranged€for€Ness€MotleyÐ ð @ Ðand€Scruggs€Millette€to€participate,€thereby€advancing€theirÐ € Ð  Ðongoing€litigation€and€providing€them€with€legitimacy€in€the€eyesÐ `  Ðof€potential€state€clients.€€Ð  ð  Ðà ` àNess€Motley€recognized€and€encouraged€Daynard's€effortsÐ 0€  Ðby€assigning€him€specific€projects,€by€requesting€his€informationÐ À Ðand€assistance,€by€transporting€him€to€selected€meetings€andÐ P  Ðproceedings,€and€by€accepting€his€work€product.€€At€some€point€inÐ à0 Ð1996,€when€Daynard€became€concerned€that€some€Ness€Motley€attorneysÐ pÀ Ðwere€trying€to€minimize€his€role€in€the€litigation,€Mr.€MotleyÐ P Ðassured€Daynard€that€this€was€not€the€case.Ð à Ðà ` àIn€July€of€1996,€when€Daynard€reported€to€Ness€Motley€onÐ  p Ðthe€time€he€had€expended€to€complete€a€research€project€that€NessÐ °  ÐMotley€had€requested,€the€firm,€consistent€with€its€own€and€theÐ @" ÐScruggs€defendants'€past€assurances,€informed€Daynard€that€it€wouldÐ Ð $ Ðcompensate€him€for€his€work€by€paying€him€a€share€of€the€feesÐ `"°& Ðgenerated€if€the€litigation€was€successful,€an€arrangement€to€whichÐ ð#@( ÐDaynard€agreed.€€As€a€result€of€this€promise,€Daynard€ceasedÐ €%Ð * Ðsubmitting€descriptions€of€his€hourly€work€and€requests€for€paymentÐ '`", Ðto€Ness€Motley.Ð  (ð#. Ðà ` àDaynard€says€that,€at€a€meeting€in€late€August€of€1996,Ð 0*€%0 ÐScruggs€Millette€and€Ness€Motley€"confirmed"€their€agreement€toÐ À+'2 Ðcompensate€him€in€the€form€of€a€share€of€the€fees.€€On€August€25Ð ° Ðthrough€August€27,€1996,€Daynard,€Motley,€and€Scruggs€were€inÐ @ ÐChicago,€Illinois,€participating€in€meetings€related€to€the€stateÐ Ð  Ðtobacco€litigation.€€Scruggs€and€Motley€scheduled€a€meeting€withÐ ` ° ÐDaynard€during€that€period€to€discuss€Daynard's€specific€share€ofÐ ð @ Ðany€fee€award.€€Although€Motley€was€ultimately€not€able€to€attendÐ € Ð  Ðthe€meeting,€Daynard€met€with€Scruggs.€€Daynard€says€he€askedÐ `  ÐScruggs€"whether€he€was€speaking€for€both€himself€and€Mr.€Motley"Ð  ð  Ðand€Scruggs€stated€that€he€was,€that€Daynard€could€rely€on€this,Ð 0€  Ðand€that€he€was€acting€with€at€least€"apparent€authority"€forÐ À ÐMotley.€€Scruggs€promised€Daynard€5%€of€any€fees€ultimatelyÐ P  Ðrecovered,€in€any€state€tobacco€litigation€in€which€any€of€theÐ à0 Ðdefendants€were€counsel,€as€compensation€for€Daynard's€past€andÐ pÀ Ðcontinuing€assistance.€€Daynard€says€he€accepted€the€5%€agreementÐ P Ðand€that€he€and€Scruggs€shook€hands€on€it.€€Based€on€the€conduct€ofÐ à Ðthe€Scruggs€and€Motley€defendants€during€the€course€of€the€tobaccoÐ  p Ðlitigation,€Daynard€says€that€he€reasonably€believed€Scruggs€to€beÐ °  Ðacting€with€apparent€authority€for€both€firms.€Ð @" Ðà ` àRelying€on€this€5%€figure,€and€"ongoing€assurances€andÐ Ð $ Ðrepresentations,"€Daynard€continued€to€work€for€the€two€firms.€€ForÐ `"°& Ðexample,€Scruggs€requested€that€Daynard€be€available€during€theÐ ð#@( Ðtrial€in€the€Mississippi€litigation€and€agreed€to€compensateÐ €%Ð * ÐDaynard€for€the€cost€of€paying€a€substitute€teacher€to€cover€hisÐ '`", ÐNortheastern€University€teaching€obligations.€€Daynard€agreed€byÐ  (ð#. Ðâ âcommitting€$15,000€of€his€own€personal€funds€to€buy€himself€out€ofÐ 0*€%0 Ðhis€teaching€obligations€so€that€he€could€be€present€full„timeÐ ° Ðduring€the€trial.Ð @ Ðâ âà ` àAlmost€a€year€after€the€alleged€handshake€on€the€5%Ð Ð  Ðcompensation€figure,€and€after€the€Mississippi€state€litigation€hadÐ ` ° Ðreached€a€tentative€settlement,€Daynard€wrote€a€letter€to€ScruggsÐ ð @ Ðconfirming€the€fee€arrangement€and€identifying€certain€expensesÐ € Ð  Ðthat€Daynard€had€incurred€associated€with€the€MississippiÐ `  Ðlitigation.€€Scruggs€never€responded.€€A€few€months€later,€DaynardÐ  ð  Ðwrote€another€letter,€this€time€to€both€Scruggs€and€Motley,Ð 0€  Ðreferring€to€the€5%€fee€arrangement.€€At€this€point,€both€firmsÐ À Ðwere€expecting€to€reap€significant€attorney's€fees€from€theÐ P  ÐMississippi€settlement€and€also€from€the€Florida€settlement.€Ð à0 ÐJoseph€Rice€of€Ness€Motley€and€Richard€Scruggs€both€responded€toÐ pÀ Ðthis€second€letter€and€both€disavowed€the€5%€fee€arrangement.€Ð P ÐNeither€firm€has€paid€Daynard€any€of€the€legal€fees€it€has€receivedÐ à Ðto€date.€€Daynard€alleges€that€the€firms€based€their€refusal€to€payÐ  p Ðhim€the€5%€on€his€failure€to€support€certain€national€tobaccoÐ °  Ðliability€legislation,€a€requirement€he€says€the€defendants€neverÐ @" Ðmentioned€in€any€previous€communication.Ð Ð $ Ðò òÓÓÔ& ð ÔB.€State€Court€Proceedings,€Federal€District€Court€Proceedings,€Ð `"°& Ѐ€€and€the€Defendants'€Side€of€the€StoryÐ P# ' ÐÌó óÓ4`Óà ` àOn€December€27,€2000,€Daynard€sued€the€Motley€defendantsÐ 0%€ ) ÐÔ'ð`"F`Ôand€the€Scruggs€defendants€in€the€Superior€Court€for€SuffolkÐ À&"+ ÐCounty,€Massachusetts,€seeking,€among€other€things,€compensation€inÐ P( #- Ðthe€form€of€what€Daynard€says€is€his€rightful€share€of€feesÐ à)0%/ Ðgenerated€from€settlements€with€several€states,€not€includingÐ p+À&1 ÐMassachusetts.€€Daynard€claims€that€Ness€Motley€and€ScruggsÐ ° ÐMillette€have€already€received€millions€and€will€receive€over€twoÐ @ Ðbillion€dollars€of€the€fees€generated€from€the€settlement,€5%€ofÐ Ð  Ðwhich€he€claims€is€rightfully€his.€€With€the€consent€of€the€MotleyÐ ` ° Ðdefendants,€the€Scruggs€defendants€removed€the€case€to€federalÐ ð @ Ðdistrict€court€on€January€18,€2001.€€òòSeeóó€28€U.S.C.€ðð€1441€(1994ò òó ó).€Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àIn€their€answer,€the€Motley€defendants€conceded€theÐ `  ÐMassachusetts€court's€personal€jurisdiction,€but€told€a€story€onÐ  ð  Ðthe€merits€very€different€from€Daynard's.€€The€Motley€defendantsÐ 0€  Ðadmit€that,€in€1993,€Patrick€of€Ness€Motley€met€Daynard€inÐ À ÐMassachusetts,€and€that€the€firm€continued€to€meet€with€andÐ P  Ðcommunicate€with€Daynard.€€Furthermore,€they€agree€that€DaynardÐ à0 Ðprovided€them€with€documents€related€to€the€tobacco€litigation,Ð pÀ Ðidentified€some€potential€witnesses,€and€did€some€general€work€onÐ P Ðthe€state€tobacco€litigation.€€The€Motley€defendants€admit€that€theÐ à Ðfirm€made€specific€requests€of€Daynard€and€provided€him€withÐ  p Ðtransportation€to€certain€meetings€and€proceedings.€€They€say€thatÐ °  Ðthey€paid€Daynard€for€this€work.Ð @" Ðà ` àBut€the€Motley€defendants€downplay€Daynard's€expertise,Ð Ð $ Ðsay€that€his€assistance€was€neither€invaluable€nor€substantial,€andÐ `"°& Ðclaim€that€his€theories€never€formed€a€central€component€of€theirÐ ð#@( Ðtobacco€litigation.€€Furthermore,€they€deny€that€either€they€orÐ €%Ð * ÐScruggs€ever€met€with€Daynard€in€Chicago€and€agreed€upon€the€5%Ð '`", Ðfigure.€€They€deny€that€any€agreement€as€alleged€by€DaynardÐ  (ð#. Ðexisted.€€The€Motley€defendants'€position€is€that€they€have€alreadyÐ 0*€%0 Ðpaid€Daynard€any€money€they€ever€owed€him.Ð À+'2 Ðà ` àOn€May€30,€2001,€the€Motley€defendants€moved€for€summaryÐ ° Ðjudgment.€€The€district€court€denied€this€motion€in€part€onÐ @ ÐSeptember€13,€2001ò òó ó,€and€issued€its€conclusions€in€a€writtenÐ Ð  Ðmemorandum€on€December€3,€2001.€€òòDaynardóó€v.€òòNess,€Motley,€Loadholt,Ð ` ° ÐRichardson€&€Poole,€P.A.óó,€178€F.€Supp.€2d€9€(D.€Mass.€2001).€€TheÐ ð @ Ðdistrict€court€addressed€those€issues€reserved€in€the€September€13Ð € Ð  Ðhearing€and€in€the€December€3€memorandum€in€a€second€memorandum€andÐ `  Ðorder,€in€which€it€denied€the€Motley€defendants'€motion€for€summaryÐ  ð  Ðjudgment.€€òòDaynardóó,€188€F.€Supp.€2d€115.€€Ð 0€  Ðà ` àThe€Scruggs€defendants€pursued€a€different€legalÐ À Ðstrategy.€€On€April€20,€2001,€they€moved€to€dismiss€Daynard'sÐ P  Ðcomplaint€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€or€for€failure€to€stateÐ à0 Ða€claim,€and€moved€in€the€alternative€for€summary€judgement.€€òòSeeóóÐ pÀ ÐFed.€R.€Civ.€P.€12(b)(2),€12(b)(6),€and€56.€€Scruggs€stated€that€heÐ P Ðnever€agreed€to€share€any€fees€with€Daynard€and€that€Ð à ÐÓÓà0 ` àà ° àà ` à[i]t€has€always€been€my€understanding€that€ProfessorÐ  p ÐDaynard€acted€as€a€volunteer€in€all€of€his€endeavors€withÐ è8 Ðrespect€to€the€litigation,€or€was€otherwise€compensatedÐ °  Ðby€Ness€Motley€as€a€consultant€on€a€limited€basis,€andÐ xÈ! Ðthat€his€activities€were€designed€primarily€to€promoteÐ @" Ðhis€own€agenda€with€respect€to€tobacco€control.Ð X#` (#` (# ЀÌÓ#pÓà ` àAs€to€personal€jurisdiction,€Scruggs€states€that€neitherÐ ˜!è% Ðhe€nor€his€firm€has€ever€had€any€offices,€real€estate,€bankÐ (#x' Ðaccounts,€or€other€property€in€Massachusetts.€€Furthermore,€none€ofÐ ¸$ ) Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants€has€ever€practiced€law€in€Massachusetts.Ð H&˜!+ ÐDaynard€does€not€deny€this.€€In€addition,€Scruggs€says€that€he€hasÐ Ø'(#- Ðnever€traveled€to€Massachusetts€in€connection€with€any€fee€sharingÐ h)¸$/ Ðarrangement€with€Daynard€or€in€connection€with€any€of€Daynard'sÐ ø*H&1 Ðwork€under€the€alleged€arrangement.€€He€denies€that€he€or€his€firmÐ ˆ,Ø'3 Ðhad€any€role€in€contacting€or€retaining€Daynard€in€Massachusetts.€Ð ° ÐHe€further€states€that€the€Scruggs€defendants€did€not€request,€orÐ @ Ðeven€have€knowledge€of,€the€Motley€defendants'€meetings€withÐ Ð  ÐDaynard.€€Scruggs€also€denies€that€the€Scruggs€defendants€or€theÐ ` ° ÐMississippi€joint€venture,€to€the€extent€that€it€existed,€ever€gaveÐ ð @ Ðthe€Motley€defendants€any€directions€with€respect€to€Daynard.Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àAlthough€Scruggs€concedes€that€"Daynard€did€at€timesÐ `  Ðconsult€with€me€concerning€the€tobacco€litigation€in€general,"€heÐ  ð  Ðsays€that€"these€instances€were€extremely€infrequent€and€were€notÐ 0€  Ðrequested€or€solicited€by€me"€and€that€the€"'assistance'€.€..Ð À Ðconsisted€of€nothing€more€than€information€already€made€availableÐ P  Ðto€the€general€public."Ð à0 Ðà ` àWith€respect€to€any€relationship€between€Scruggs€MilletteÐ pÀ Ðand€Ness€Motley,€Scruggs€stated,€in€a€second€affidavit,€thatÐ P ÐScruggs€Millette€was€part€of€a€written€joint€venture€agreement€inÐ à Ðthe€Mississippi€litigation,€but€that€Ness€Motley€was€not€a€party€toÐ  p Ðthat€agreement.€€He€says€that€"[p]rior€to€April€of€1999,€there€wasÐ °  Ðsimply€no€arrangement€[between€Scruggs€Millette€and€Ness€Motley]Ð @" Ðwith€respect€to€the€sharing€of€attorney's€fees€in€the€nationwideÐ Ð $ Ðtobacco€litigation."€€Scruggs€also€noted€that€there€was€noÐ `"°& Ðagreement€that€"either€Scruggs€Millette€or€Ness€Motley€could€exertÐ ð#@( Ðcontrol€over€tobacco€litigation€in€states€where€those€firms€wereÐ €%Ð * Ðnot€counsel€of€record."Ð '`", Ðà ` àThe€district€court,€after€one€hearing€on€May€31,€2001,Ð  (ð#. Ðand€after€granting€Daynard€limited€jurisdictional€discovery€on€theÐ 0*€%0 Ðissue€of€the€relationship€between€the€defendants€from€1992€to€1998,Ð À+'2 Ðheld€another€hearing€on€September€13,€2001,€in€which€it€dismissedÐ ° ÐDaynard's€complaint€against€the€Scruggs€defendants€for€lack€ofÐ @ Ðpersonal€jurisdiction.€€At€that€September€13€hearing,€the€districtÐ Ð  Ðcourt€stated€what€it€labeled€the€"bottom€line€of€[its]€reasoning"Ð ` ° Ðfor€finding€that€it€lacked€personal€jurisdiction€over€the€ScruggsÐ ð @ Ðdefendants:€Ð € Ð  ÐÓÓà0 ` à[W]hile€the€facts€are€sufficient€to€show€a€joint€ventureÐ `  Ðwith€respect€to€the€Mississippi€litigation,€as€the€FirstÐ Ø(  ÐCircuit€has€defined€the€term€substantial€influence€in€theÐ  ð  ÐDonatelli€versus€National€Hockey€League€case,€there€isÐ h¸  Ðinsufficient€evidence€in€this€case€that€the€MississippiÐ 0€  Ðlaw€firm€or€Mr.€Scruggs€exercised€a€substantial€influenceÐ øH  Ðover€the€Ness€firm€such€as€would€subject€Scruggs€or€theÐ À ÐMississippi€firm€to€personal€jurisdiction€inÐ ˆØ ÐMassachusetts.ÐP ` (#` (# ÐÌÓ ÓSoon€after€that,€the€court€entered€final€judgment€in€favor€of€theÐ à0 ÐScruggs€defendants,€thus€permitting€an€immediate€appeal€to€thisÐ pÀ Ðcourt.€Ð P Ðà ` àThe€district€court€supported€its€September€13€conclusionÐ à Ðin€a€December€21,€2001,€memorandum.€€òòDaynardóó€v.€òòNess,€Motley,Ð  p ÐLoadholt,€Richardson€&€Poole,€P.A.óó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€55€(D.€Mass.Ð °  Ð2001).€€In€that€memorandum,€the€district€court€addressed€twoÐ @" Ðtheories€on€which€Daynard€might€show€personal€jurisdiction€over€theÐ Ð $ ÐScruggs€defendants.€€òòId.óó€at€60„76.€€First,€the€district€courtÐ `"°& Ðconcluded€that€it€did€not€have€personal€jurisdiction€over€theÐ ð#@( ÐScruggs€defendants€based€on€their€own€direct€contacts€withÐ €%Ð * ÐMassachusetts.€€òòId.óó€at€68.€€Second,€the€district€court€concludedÐ '`", Ðthat€it€lacked€jurisdiction€over€the€Scruggs€defendants€based€onÐ  (ð#. Ðcontacts€imputed€from€the€Motley€defendants.€€òòId.óó€at€76.€€TheÐ 0*€%0 Ðdistrict€court€reasoned€that€the€Scruggs€defendants€"likely€wereÐ À+'2 Ðnot€in€a€joint€venture"€with€the€Motley€defendantsòòóó,׃O×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€that€theÐ ° ÐMotley€defendants€did€not€act€as€the€Scruggs€defendants'€agent,׃E°×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð @ Ðòòóóand€that€the€"substantial€influence"€requirement€articulated€inÐ Ð  ÐòòDonatellióó,€893€F.2d€at€469,€472,€precluded€jurisdiction€under€theÐ ` ° ÐDue€Process€Clause,€U.S.€Const.€amend.€XIV.€€òòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.Ð ð @ Ð2d€at€74„76.€€Daynard€appeals€the€district€court's€holding€that€itÐ € Ð  Ðlacks€personal€jurisdiction€under€an€imputed€or€attributed€contactsÐ `  Ðâ âtheory.׃^` ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð  ð  Ðò òÓ  ÓÔ&  Ôâ âII.ó óÐ ° ÐÓ+ŠÓò òA.€Burden€of€Proof€and€Standard€of€Reviewó óÐ à Ðà ` àTo€hear€a€case,€a€court€must€have€personal€jurisdictionÐ pÀ Ðover€the€parties,€"that€is,€the€power€to€require€the€parties€toÐ  P Ðobey€its€decrees."€òòóó€òòUnited€Statesóó€v.€òòSwiss€Am.€Bank,€Ltd.óó,€191€F.3dÐ  à Ð30,€35€(1st€Cir.€1999).€€The€plaintiff€bears€the€burden€of€provingÐ  p  Ðthe€court's€personal€Ô' °7ŠÔjurisdiction€over€the€defendant.€€òòFoster„Ð °  ÐMilleróó,€46€F.3d€at€145;€òòBoitóó€v.€òòGar„Tec€Prods.,€Inc.óó,€967€F.2d€671,Ð @  Ð674„75€(1st€Cir.€1992).€€The€district€court,€faced€with€a€motion€toÐ Ð  Ðdismiss€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction,€Fed.€R.€Civ.€P.Ð `° Ð12(b)(2),€may€choose€from€among€several€methods€for€determiningÐ ð@ Ðwhether€the€plaintiff€has€met€this€burden.€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3dÐ €Ð Ðat€145òòóó;€òòBoitóó,€967€F.2d€at€674„75.€€"The€most€conventional€of€theseÐ ` Ðmethods,"€known€as€the€"prima€facie"€method,€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3dÐ  ð Ðat€145,òòóó€"permits€the€district€court€'to€consider€only€whether€theÐ 0€ Ðplaintiff€has€proffered€evidence€that,€if€credited,€is€enough€toÐ À Ðsupport€findings€of€all€facts€essential€to€personal€jurisdiction,'"Ð P   Ðòòid.óó€(quoting€òòBoitóó,€967€F.2d€at€675).׃B×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ð à0" Ðà ` àThe€district€court€applied€the€prima€facie€method.€Ð p!À$ ÐòòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€at€61.€€We€review€the€district€court'sÐ #P& Ðchoice€of€method€de€novo.€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€147.€€TheÐ $à( Ðparties€do€not€object€to€the€district€court's€choice€of€the€primaÐ  &p!* Ðfacie€method.€€Daynard€states€in€his€brief€that€the€district€courtÐ °'#, Ðemployed€the€prima€facie€approach€and€the€Scruggs€defendants€agree,Ð ° Ðmaking€no€attempt€to€challenge€the€applicability€of€this€approach.€Ð @ ÐTherefore,€the€Scruggs€defendants€have€waived€any€objection€to€theÐ Ð  Ðapplication€of€the€prima€facie€method.€€òòCashmere€&€Camel€Hair€Mfrs.Ð ` ° ÐInst.óó€v.€òòSaks€Fifth€Ave.óó,€No.€00„2341,€2002€U.S.€App.€LEXIS€5361,Ð ð @ Ðat€*10€(1st€Cir.€Apr.€1,€2002);€òòOrtizóó€v.€òòGaston€County€Dyeing€Mach.Ð € Ð  ÐCo.óó,€277€F.3d€594,€598€(1st€Cir.€2002).€€Under€these€circumstances,Ð `  Ðwe€accept€the€prima€facie€method.׃\×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р ð  Ðà ` àAccordingly,€Daynard€has€the€burden€of€making€a€primaÐ 0€  Ðfacie€showing€of€personal€jurisdiction€over€the€Scruggs€defendants.€Ð À ÐWe€"must€accept€the€plaintiff's€(properly€documented)€evidentiaryÐ P  Ðproffers€as€true€for€the€purpose€of€determining€the€adequacy€of€theÐ à0 Ðprima€facie€jurisdictional€showing."€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€atÐ pÀ Ð145.€€We€take€these€facts€"as€true€(whether€or€not€disputed)€andÐ P Ðconstrue€them€in€the€light€most€congenial€to€the€plaintiff'sÐ à Ðjurisdictional€claim."€€òòMass.€Sch.€of€Law€at€Andover,€Inc.óó€v.€òòAm.Ð  p ÐBar€Ass'nóó,€142€F.3d€26,€34€(1st€Cir.€1998);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòSawtelleóó€v.Ð °  ÐòòFarrellóó,€70€F.3d€1381,€1385„86€(1st€Cir.€1995).€€"We€then€add€toÐ @" Ðthe€mix€facts€put€forward€by€the€defendants,€to€the€extent€thatÐ Ð $ Ðthey€are€uncontradicted."€€òòMass.€Sch.€of€Lawóó,€142€F.3d€at€34.€€WeÐ `"°& Ðreview€the€district€court's€application€of€the€prima€facie€standardÐ ð#@( Ðde€novo.€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€147.€€Ð €%Ð * Ðò òÔ& p ÔB.€Background€Lawó óÐ ° Ðà ` à"In€determiningÔ'p°AšÔ€whether€a€non„resident€defendant€isÐ à Ðsubject€to€its€jurisdiction,€a€federal€court€exercising€diversityÐ  p Ðjurisdiction€'is€the€functional€equivalent€of€a€state€court€sittingÐ °  Ðin€the€forum€state.'"€€òòSawtelleóó,€70€F.3d€at€1387€(quotingÐ @  ÐòòTicketmaster„New€York,€Inc.óó€v.€òòAliotoóó,€26€F.3d€201,€204€(1st€Cir.Ð Ð   Ð(1994)).€€"A€district€court€may€exercise€authority€over€a€defendant€Ð `°  Ðby€virtue€of€either€general€or€specific€[personal]€jurisdiction."€Ð ð@  ÐòòMass.€Sch.€of€Lawóó,€142€F.3d€at€34.€€General€jurisdiction€existsÐ €Ð  Ðwhen€the€defendant€has€engaged€in€"continuous€and€systematicÐ ` Ðactivity"€in€the€forum,€even€if€the€activity€is€unrelated€to€theÐ  ð Ðsuit.€€òòUnited€Elec.,€Radio€&€Mach.€Workersóó€v.€òò163€Pleasant€St.Ð 0€ ÐCorp.óó,€960€F.2d€1080,€1088€(1st€Cir.€1992).€€This€is€not€such€aÐ À Ðcase€and€no€party€suggests€that€it€is.€€"In€the€absence€of€generalÐ P  Ðjurisdiction,€a€court's€power€depends€upon€the€existence€ofÐ à0 Ðspecific€jurisdiction."€€òòMass.€Sch.€of€Lawóó,€142€F.3d€at€34.€€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àTo€establish€personal€jurisdiction,€Daynard€must€showÐ P  Ðthat€the€Massachusetts€long„arm€statute€grants€jurisdiction€and,€ifÐ à" Ðit€does,€that€the€exercise€of€jurisdiction€under€the€statute€isÐ  !p$ Ðconsistent€with€the€constitution.€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€144.€Ð °"& Ðà ` àDaynard's€complaint€pleads€that€personal€jurisdictionÐ @$( Ðexists€under€subsections€(a),€(c),€and€(d)€of€the€MassachusettsÐ Ð% !* Ðlong„arm€statute.€€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.€223A,€ðð€3€(2000).׃L×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€TheÐ `'°", Ðrelevant€provision€is€ðð3(a).€€The€question€under€this€subsectionÐ ° Ðis€whether€the€Scruggs€defendants€"act[ed]€directly€or€by€an€agent,Ð @ Ðas€to€a€cause€of€action€.€.€.€arising€from€the€[defendants']€.€.€.Ð Ð  Ðtransacting€any€business€in"€Massachusetts.€€òòId.óó€ðð€3(a).€€We€mayÐ ` ° Ðsidestep€the€statutory€inquiry€and€proceed€directly€to€theÐ ð @ Ðconstitutional€analysis,€however,€because€the€Supreme€JudicialÐ € Ð  ÐCourt€of€Massachusetts€has€interpreted€the€state's€long„arm€statuteÐ `  Ð"as€an€assertion€of€jurisdiction€over€the€person€to€the€limitsÐ  ð  Ðallowed€by€the€Constitution€of€the€United€States."€€òò"Automatic"Ð 0€  ÐSprinkler€Corp.€of€Am.óó€v.€òòSeneca€Foods€Corp.óó,€361€Mass.€441,€280Ð À ÐN.E.2d€423,€424€(1972);€òòaccordóó€òòTatroóó€v.€òòManor€Care,€Inc.óó,€416€Mass.Ð P  Ð763,€625€N.E.2d€549,€553€(1994);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòSawtelleóó,€70€F.3d€at€1388Ð à0 Ð("[W]hen€a€state's€long„arm€statute€is€coextensive€with€the€outerÐ pÀ Ðlimits€of€due€process,€the€court's€attention€properly€turns€to€the€Ð P Ð.€.€.€constitutional€standards.")òòóó.Ð à Ðà ` à"The€Due€Process€Clause€protects€an€individual's€libertyÐ  p Ðinterest€in€not€being€subject€to€the€binding€judgments€of€a€forumÐ °  Ðwith€which€he€has€established€no€meaningful€'contacts,€ties,€orÐ ° Ðrelations.'"€€òòBurger€King€Corp.óó€v.€òòRudzewiczóó,€471€U.S.€462,€471„72Ð @ Ð(1985)€(quoting€òòInt'l€Shoe€Co.óó€v.€òòWashingtonóó,€326€U.S.€310,€319Ð Ð  Ð(1945)òòóó).€€"[D]ue€process€requires€only€that€in€order€to€subject€aÐ ` ° Ðdefendant€to€a€judgment€òòinóó€òòpersonamóó,€if€he€be€not€present€withinÐ ð @ Ðthe€territory€of€the€forum,€he€have€certain€minimum€contacts€withÐ € Ð  Ðit€such€that€maintenance€of€the€suit€does€not€offend€'traditionalÐ `  Ðnotions€of€fair€play€and€substantial€justice.'"€€òòInt'l€Shoeóó,€326Ð  ð  ÐU.S.€at€316€(quoting€òòMillikenóó€v.€òòMeyeróó,€311€U.S.€457,€463€(1940));Ð 0€  Ðòòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòNoonanóó€v.€òòWinston€Co.óó,€135€F.3d€85,€90€(1st€Cir.€1998).€Ð À ÐIn€a€contract€case,€we€evaluate€the€parties'€"prior€negotiationsÐ P  Ðand€contemplated€future€consequences,€along€with€the€terms€of€theÐ à0 Ðcontract€and€the€parties'€actual€course€of€dealing"€to€determineÐ pÀ Ðwhether€the€defendants€purposefully€established€minimum€contacts.€Ð P ÐòòBurger€Kingóó,€471€U.S.€at€479.€€€òòóóÐ à Ðà ` àThe€more€difficult€question€in€this€case€is€whether€anyÐ  p Ðof€the€Motley€defendants'€contacts€may€be€imputed€to€the€ScruggsÐ °  Ðdefendants€for€purposes€of€establishing€"minimum€contacts."€€WeÐ @" Ðconclude€that€some€of€these€contacts€may€be€imputed.€€The€nextÐ Ð $ Ðquestion€is€whether€the€sum€of€any€imputed€and€direct€contactsÐ `"°& Ðpermits€the€court€to€exercise€personal€jurisdiction€over€theÐ ð#@( ÐScruggs€defendants€consistent€with€the€Constitution.€€We€concludeÐ €%Ð * Ðthat€these€contacts€suffice€under€Supreme€Court€law,€òòe.g.óó,€òòBurgerÐ '`", ÐKingóó,€471€U.S.€at€471„87;€òòInt'l€Shoeóó,€326€U.S.€310,òòóó€and€the€law€ofÐ  (ð#. Ðthis€circuit,€òòe.g.óó,€òòNoonanóó,€135€F.3d€at€90;€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3dÐ 0*€%0 Ðat€144òòóó.Ð À+'2 Ðò òC.€Imputed€ContactsÐ ° Ðó óà ` àDaynard€alleges€that€the€relationship€between€the€MotleyÐ à Ðdefendants€and€the€Scruggs€defendants€is€such€that€some€of€theÐ  p ÐMotley€defendants'€contacts€with€Massachusetts€should€be€imputed€toÐ °  Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants.€€As€the€district€court€recognized,€whetherÐ @  Ðthe€defendants€were€in€all€respects€joint€venturers€is€not€aloneÐ Ð   Ðdispositive,€òòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€at€74,€although€the€partiesÐ `°  Ðfocus€much€of€their€energies€on€disputing€this€particular€issue.€Ð ð@  ÐThe€basic€question€is€whether€the€relationship€between€the€ScruggsÐ €Ð  Ðdefendants€and€the€Motley€defendants,€however€one€labels€it,€isÐ ` Ðsufficient€to€attribute€any€of€the€Motley€defendants'€contacts€toÐ  ð Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants€for€the€purpose€of€reaching€the€ScruggsÐ 0€ Ðdefendants€under€the€Massachusetts€long„arm€statute€as€cabined€byÐ À Ðthe€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€We€concludeÐ P  Ðthat€the€relationship€was€sufficient€for€that€purpose.€€Daynard€hasÐ à0 Ðput€forth€evidence€that,€if€credited€and€accepted€as€true,€isÐ pÀ Ðenough€to€support€personal€jurisdiction€over€the€ScruggsÐ P  Ðdefendants.Ð à" Ðà ` àDaynard€alleges€that€the€Motley€defendants€and€theÐ  !p$ ÐScruggs€defendants€were€part€of€a€formal,€written€joint€ventureÐ °"& Ðbetween€themselves.€€He€also€says€that€he€believed€the€parties€toÐ @$( Ðbe€joint€venturers€because€they€"consistently€purported€to€be"€inÐ Ð% !* Ðsuch€a€relationship.€€Daynard€argues€that€at€the€time€CharlesÐ `'°", ÐPatrick€of€Ness€Motley€came€to€Massachusetts€to€retain€him,€NessÐ ð(@$. ÐMotley€and€Scruggs€Millette€were€engaged€in€a€form€of€tobaccoÐ €*Ð%0 Ðlitigation€joint€venture.€€Daynard€says€that€Patrick€was€acting€forÐ ,`'2 Ðboth€firms€when€Patrick€retained€him€and€that€Patrick€retained€himÐ ° Ðto€advance€the€objectives€of€the€joint€venture.€€Throughout€hisÐ @ Ðdealings€with€Ness€Motley€and€Scruggs€Millette,€he€understood€theÐ Ð  Ðtwo€firms€to€be€in€a€joint€venture€that€at€first€encompassed€theÐ ` ° ÐMississippi€tobacco€litigation€and€then€broadened€to€includeÐ ð @ Ðtobacco€litigation€nationwide.€€€Ð € Ð  ÐÓÓò òà ` àÔ& ð Ô1.€Applicability€of€òòDonatellióó's€"substantial€Ð `  Ðà ` à€€€influence"€test.€Ð P  ÐÌó óÓ3»Óà ` àFirst,€there€is€the€threshold€question€of€whether€theÐ à0  Ðdistrict€court€properly€applied€Ô'ðT»ÔòòDonatellióó,€893€F.2d€459,€as€theÐ pÀ  Ðgoverning€test.€€The€parties€devote€the€majority€of€their€attentionÐ P Ðto€this€issue,€but€it€is€not€dispositive€of€the€personalÐ à Ðjurisdiction€question.€€The€district€court€concluded€that€even€ifÐ  p Ðthe€Motley€defendants€acted€as€the€Scruggs€defendants'€agents,Ð ° Ð"there€was€no€substantial€influence€as€required€by€Due€Process."€Ð @ ÐòòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€at€76.€€The€district€court€derived€thisÐ Ð  Ð"substantial€influence"€requirement€from€òòDonatellióó,€893€F.2d€atÐ `° Ð469,€a€general€jurisdiction€case.€€The€district€court€was€in€error.€Ð ð@! ÐIt€read€òòDonatellióó€as€applying€an€exclusive€test€and€as€applying€inÐ € Ð# Ðthe€present,€very€different€context.€€This€over„reads€òòDonatellióó.€€Ð "`% Ðà ` àThe€question€before€us€is€whether€Daynard€must€meet€theÐ  #ð' Ðsubstantial€influence€test€in€order€to€comply€with€jurisdictionalÐ 0%€ ) ÐDue€Process€requirements.€€Although€òòDonatellióó€aids€our€inquiry,€weÐ À&"+ Ðconclude€that€its€substantial€influence€test€is€not€the€exclusiveÐ P( #- Ðtest€for€attribution€of€conduct.€€It€does€not€control€the€matterÐ à)0%/ Ðbefore€us€here,€where€the€questions€are€whether€the€ScruggsÐ p+À&1 Ðdefendants€were€in€an€actual€or€apparent€agency€relationship,€or€atÐ ° Ðleast€held€themselves€out€to€be€in€a€joint€venture€or€other€agencyÐ @ Ðrelationship€with€the€Motley€defendants,€and€whether€the€ScruggsÐ Ð  Ðdefendants€ratified€the€Motley€defendants'€conduct.€€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àIn€òòDonatellióó,€this€court€held€that€Ð ð @ ÐÓÓà0 ` àan€unincorporated€association€which€does€not€itselfÐ € Ð  Ðconduct€significant€activities€in,€or€enjoy€affiliatingÐ H ˜  Ðcircumstances€with,€a€state€cannot€be€subject€to€theÐ `  Ðgeneral€personal€jurisdiction€of€the€state's€courts€onÐ Ø(  Ðthe€basis€of€a€member's€contacts€within€the€state€unlessÐ  ð  Ðthe€member€carries€on€the€in„forum€activities€under€theÐ h¸  Ðassociation's€substantial€influence.Ð0€ ` (#` (# ÐÌÓÄÃÓòòId.óó€at€472.€€Donatelli€sued€the€National€Hockey€League€("NHL")€inÐ À ÐRhode€Island,€challenging€the€NHL's€draft€and€its€failure€toÐ P  Ðdeclare€him€a€free€agent.€€òòóóJurisdiction€in€Rhode€Island€over€theÐ à0 ÐNHL€was€premised€on€the€fact€that€a€member€team€of€the€NHL€hadÐ pÀ Ðcontacts€with€Rhode€Island.€€His€suit€was€unrelated€to€either€theÐ P ÐNHL's€contacts€with€Rhode€Island€or€its€member's€contacts€withÐ à ÐRhode€Island.€€òòId.óó€at€462.€€The€òòDonatellióó€court€rejected€the€theoryÐ  p Ðthat€the€NHL€could€be€subject€to€general€personal€jurisdiction€inÐ °  ÐRhode€Island€simply€because€one€of€its€members€was€subject€toÐ @" Ðgeneral€jurisdiction€in€that€state.€€òòId.óó€at€472.€€It€concludedÐ Ð $ Ðthat,€in€these€circumstances,€a€showing€of€"substantial€influence"Ð `"°& Ðwas€necessary€in€order€to€attribute€one's€contacts€to€the€otherÐ ð#@( Ðconsistent€with€the€requirement€of€purposeful€availment.€€òòId.óó€atÐ €%Ð * Ð469.€€Ð '`", Ðà ` àòòDonatellióó's€substantial€influence€test€does€not€controlÐ  (ð#. Ðthe€entire€universe€of€cases€in€which€one€party's€contacts€might€beÐ 0*€%0 Ðattributed€to€another.€€By€its€terms,€òòDonatellióó€applies€"in€theÐ À+'2 Ðworld€of€unincorporated€associations."€€òòId.óó€at€468.€€Indeed,€asÐ ° ÐòòDonatellióó€itself€observed,€the€substantial€influence€test€does€notÐ @ Ðcontrol€where€one€seeks€to€attribute€contacts€from€partner€toÐ Ð  Ðpartnership€or€from€subsidiary€to€corporate€parent.€€òòId.óó€at€465„67.€Ð ` ° ÐIn€the€partnership€context,€"the€activities€of€the€partner€areÐ ð @ Ðgenerally€attributed€to€the€partnership€and€jurisdiction€over€theÐ € Ð  Ðpartnership€follows€from€the€partner's€contacts,€if€sufficient,Ð `  Ðregardless€of€the€absence€of€independent€contacts€between€theÐ  ð  Ðpartnership€òòquaóó€entity€and€the€forum."€€òòId.óó€at€466.€€òòDonatellióó'sÐ 0€  Ðsubstantial€influence€test€does€not€apply€here,€where€the€questionÐ À Ðis€whether€an€actual€or€implied€agency€relationship,€sufficient€toÐ P  Ðattribute€contacts,€existed€between€the€parties.€€We€conclude€that,Ð à0 Ðsimilar€to€some€cases€involving€actual€partnerships,€theÐ pÀ Ðrelationship€between€the€defendants€here€invokes€certain€principlesÐ P Ðof€the€law€of€agency,€partnership,€and€joint€venture€and€that€theseÐ à Ðprinciples€permit€imputing€contacts€without€the€need€to€showÐ  p Ðsubstantial€influence.€€Ð °  Ðà ` àIn€addition,€although€we€do€not€decide€whetherÐ @" ÐòòDonatellióó's€approach€to€attribution€is€necessarily€limited€toÐ Ð $ Ðgeneral€jurisdiction€cases,€we€note,€as€stated€several€times€in€theÐ `"°& ÐòòDonatellióó€opinion,€òòóóincluding€in€the€above€quoted€passage,€thatÐ ð#@( ÐòòDonatellióó€"focus[ed]€...€upon€.€.€.€general€as€opposed€toÐ €%Ð * Ðspecific€Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔjurisdiction."€€òòId.óó€at€463;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòid.óó€at€461€(statingÐ '`", Ðthe€issue€on€appeal€as€whether€"an€unincorporated€association€isÐ  (ð#. Ðsubject€to€the€general€personal€jurisdiction€of€every€court€havingÐ 0*€%0 Ðjurisdiction€over€one€of€its€members")€(internal€quotation€marksÐ À+'2 Ðomitted).€€This€is€important€because,€as€òòDonatellióó€states€clearlyÔ#† ‹.CXX X.CóÒ#Ô,Ð ° Ðthe€standard€for€general€jurisdiction€is€more€strict€than€theÐ @ Ðstandard€for€specific€jurisdiction.€€òòId.óó€at€463.€€GeneralÐ Ð  Ðjurisdiction€requires€that€the€defendant's€activities€in€the€forumÐ ` ° Ðbe€"continuous€and€systematic,"€òòUnited€Elec.,€Radio€&€Mach.Ð ð @ ÐWorkersóó,€960€F.2d€at€1088,€whereas€specific€jurisdiction€requiresÐ € Ð  Ða€lesser€showing.€Ð `  Ðà ` àThe€problem€òòDonatellióó€addresses€is,€in€some€ways,€moreÐ  ð  Ðlikely€to€occur€in€general€jurisdiction€cases.€€In€generalÐ 0€  Ðjurisdiction€cases,€the€suit€does€not€arise€out€of€or€relate€to€theÐ À Ðdefendant's€forum€contacts.€€òòHelicopteros€Nacionales€de€Colombia,Ð P  ÐS.A.óó€v.€òòHallóó,€466€U.S.€408,€414€n.9€(1984).€òòóó€òòDonatellióó€addressesÐ à0 Ðthe€potentially€unjust€scenario€in€which€an€association,€with€noÐ pÀ Ðdirect€contacts€with€a€forum,€is€haled€into€a€forum€based€on€one€ofÐ P Ðits€members'€continuous€and€systematic€activities€in€the€forum,€toÐ à Ðanswer€a€lawsuit€unrelated€to€either€the€member's€or€theÐ  p Ðassociation's€in„forum€activities.€€893€F.2d€at€469.€€SomethingÐ °  Ðmore€is€needed€to€say€that€the€association€has€purposefully€availedÐ @" Ðitself€of€the€benefits€of€in„forum€activity.€€ò òó óOtherwise,€theÐ Ð $ Ðassociation€is€subject€to€a€suit€in€that€forum,€unrelated€toÐ `"°& Ðanything€the€association€has€done€in€the€forum,€by€merely€engagingÐ ð#@( Ðin€a€limited€relationship€with€a€member,€that€through€its€ownÐ €%Ð * Ðactivities€engages€in€continuous€and€systematic€activities€in€aÐ '`", Ðforum.€€òòÐ  (ð#. Ðà ` àDonatellióó€resolves€this€problem€by€holding€that,€inÐ 0*€%0 Ðgeneral€jurisdiction€cases,€the€association€must€"exercise[]Ð À+'2 ÐÑ=@¸Ñâ =âÑ  Ñâ =âÑ  Ñsubstantial€influence€over€the€member's€decision€to€carry€on€theÐ ° Ðin„forum€activities€which€constitute€the€relevant€'minimumÐ @ Ðcontacts.'"€€òòId.óó€€This€requirement€ò òó óensures€that€the€associationÐ Ð  Ðpurposefully€availed€itself€of€the€benefits€of€the€forum,€becauseÐ ` ° Ðit€links€the€member's€in„forum€activity€with€the€association'sÐ ð @ Ðrelationship€with€that€member.€€Ð € Ð  Ðà ` àThis€problem,€however,€is€less€likely€to€arise€inÐ `  Ðspecific€jurisdiction€cases€such€as€this€one.€€Here€a€directÐ  ð  Ðconnection€is€alleged€between€the€in„forum€activities€of€the€agentÐ 0€  Ð(the€Motley€defendants)€and€the€agent's€relationship€with€theÐ À Ðprincipal€(the€Scruggs€defendants).€€When€the€cause€of€actionÐ P  Ðrelates€to€both€the€association's€activities€giving€rise€to€theÐ à0 Ðsuit€òòandóó€to€the€member's€in„forum€activities,€the€same€risk€ofÐ pÀ Ðunfairness€is€not€necessarily€present.€€In€the€present€case,Ð P ÐDaynard's€suit€relates€to€the€Scruggs€defendants'€alleged€promiseÐ à Ðto€pay€him€a€share€of€the€fees€and€to€the€Motley€defendants'Ð  p Ðactivities€in€Massachusetts,€claimed€to€have€been€ratified€byÐ °  ÐScruggs.€€òòDonatellióó€is€not€controlling€in€this€context.€€ItÐ @" Ðaddresses€a€question€different€from€the€inquiry€here,€which€isÐ Ð $ Ðwhether€there€was€an€agency€relationship€between€the€defendants€andÐ `"°& Ðwhether€the€Scruggs€defendants€ratified€the€Motley€defendants'Ð ð#@( Ðactivities€in€Massachusetts€giving€rise€to€Daynard's€suit.€Ð €%Ð * Ðà ` àBut€that€does€not€end€the€matter.€€We€must€stillÐ '`", Ðdetermine€whether€the€relationship€between€the€defendants€permitsÐ  (ð#. Ðimputing€a€sufficient€quantum€of€the€Motley€defendants'€connectionsÐ 0*€%0 Ðto€the€Scruggs€defendants.€Ð À+'2 Ðò òà ` àÔ& p Ô2.€Implied€agency€and€ratification.ó óÐ ° Ðà ` àFor€purposes€of€personal€jurisdictionÔ'p°–åÔ,€the€actions€of€anÐ à Ðagent€may€be€attributed€to€the€principal.׃R×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòóóWhether€or€not€an€agentÐ  p Ðis€initially€authorized€to€act€on€behalf€of€a€principal,€theÐ °  Ðagent's€actions€may€be€attributed€to€the€principal,€for€purposes€ofÐ @  Ðpersonal€jurisdiction,€if€the€principal€later€ratifies€the€agent'sÐ Ð   Ðconduct.€€òòMyersóó€v.€òòBennett€Law€Officesóó,€238€F.3d€1068,€1073€(9thÐ `°  ÐCir.€2001);€òòWessels,€Arnold€&€Hendersonóó€v.€òòNat'l€Med.€Waste,€Inc.óó,Ð ð@  Ð65€F.3d€1427,€1433€(8th€Cir.€1995)€(attributing€contacts€whereÐ €Ð  Ðprincipal€"supported,€accepted,€and€followed€through€on€the€effortsÐ ` Ðinitiated"€by€the€agent,€regardless€of€whether€the€agent€hadÐ  ð Ðauthority€to€act€on€the€principal's€behalf).€€First,€we€addressÐ 0€ Ðwhether€the€defendants€were€in€any€sort€of€agency€relationship.Ð À ÐSecond,€we€discuss€whether€the€Scruggs€defendants€initiallyÐ P  Ðauthorized,€or€later€ratified,€the€Motley€defendants'€actions.€Ð à0 Ðà ` àWe€disagree€with€the€district€court's€conclusion€thatÐ pÀ Ð"the€defendants€were€not€in€any€sort€of€agency€relationship."€Ð P  ÐòòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€at€74;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòid.óó€at€76.€€TraditionalÐ à" Ðcommon€law€concepts€support€the€conclusion€that€the€ScruggsÐ ° Ðdefendants'€relationship€with€the€Motley€defendants€suffices€toÐ @ Ðbring€the€parties€within€the€rule€that€permits€imputation€ofÐ Ð  Ðcontacts€for€jurisdictional€purposes.€€ò òó óÐ ` ° Ðà ` àÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔSection€16€of€the€Uniform€Partnership€Act,€which€isÐ ð @ Ðcodified€in€the€laws€of€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C^í#ÔMassachusetts,€Mississippi,€and€SouthÐ € Ð  ÐCarolina,€recognizes€òòóóthe€common€law€doctrine€of€partnership€byÐ `  Ðestoppel€„„€or,€in€this€case,€jÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔoint€venture€by€estoppel.€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C²î#Ô€Unif.Ð  ð  ÐP'ship€ActÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€ðð€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C3ï#Ô16(1),€6€U.L.A.€125,€501€(1995);€Mass.€Gen.€Laws€ch.Ð 0€  Ð108A,€ðð€16€(2000ò òó ó);€Miss.€Code€Ann.€ðð€79„12„31€(2001);€S.C.€CodeÐ À ÐAnn.€ðð€33„41„380€(2001ò òó ó).Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€€The€Uniform€Partnership€Act€states:Ð P  ÐÓÓà0 ` àWhen€a€person€.€.€.€represents€himself,€or€consents€toÐ à0 Ðanother€representing€him€to€any€one,€as€a€partner€.€.€.Ð ¨ø Ðhe€is€liable€to€any€such€person€to€whom€suchÐ pÀ Ðrepresentation€has€been€made,€who€has,€on€the€faith€ofÐ 8ˆ Ðsuch€representation,€given€credit€to€the€actual€orÐ P Ðapparent€partnership,€and€if€he€has€made€suchÐ È Ðrepresentation€or€consented€to€its€being€made€in€a€publicÐ à Ðmanner€he€is€liable€to€such€person,€whether€theÐ X¨ Ðrepresentation€has€or€has€not€been€made€or€communicatedÐ  p Ðto€such€person€so€giving€credit€by€or€with€the€knowledgeÐ è8 Ðof€the€apparent€partner€making€the€representation€orÐ °  Ðconsenting€to€its€being€made.Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CEð#ÔÐxÈ!` (#` (# ÐÌÓžðÓUnif.€P'ship€Act,€òòsupraóó,Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€ðð€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.Cpô#Ô16(1);€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòStandard€Oil€Co.óó€v.Ð  X# ÐòòHendersonóó,€265€Mass.€322,€163€N.E.€743,€745€(1928)€(stating€theÐ ˜!è% Ðcommon€law€doctrine€of€partnership€by€estoppel).€€Ð (#x' Ðà ` àPartnerships€and€joint€ventures€aside,€a€theory€of€agencyÐ ¸$ ) Ðby€estoppel€is€similarly€availing€to€Daynard.€€òòóóUnder€theÐ H&˜!+ ÐRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency,Ð Ø'(#- ÐÓÓà0 ` à[a]€person€who€is€not€otherwise€liable€as€a€party€to€aÐ h)¸$/ Ðtransaction€purported€to€be€done€on€his€account,€isÐ 0*€%0 Ðnevertheless€subject€to€liability€to€persons€who€haveÐ ø*H&1 Ðchanged€their€positions€because€of€their€belief€that€theÐ À+'2 Ðtransaction€was€entered€into€by€or€for€him,€if€Ðˆ,Ø'3` (#` (# Їà ` à(a)à0 ¨ àhe€intentionally€or€carelessly€caused€suchÐ ° Ðbelief,€or€ÐxȨ (#¨ (# ÐÌà ` à(b)à0 ¨ àknowing€of€such€belief€and€that€others€mightÐ X Ðchange€their€positions€because€of€it,€he€did€notÐ Ð  Ðtake€reasonable€steps€to€notify€them€of€theÐ ˜è Ðfacts.€Ð` °¨ (#¨ (# ÐÌÓ„öÓòòóóRestatement€(Second)€of€Agency€ðð€8B€(1958);€òòaccordóó€H.G.€ReuschleinÐ ð @ Ð&€W.A.€Gregory,€òòThe€Law€of€Agency€and€Partnershipóó€ðð€25,€at€65„66Ð € Ð  Ð(2d€ed.€1990)€(noting€that€"[c]onduct€which€leads€a€third€party€toÐ `  Ðbelieve€that€the€agent€has€authority€and€thus€creates€apparentÐ  ð  Ðauthority€to€those€persons€who€act€upon€it,€frequently€causes€theÐ 0€  Ðprincipal€to€be€liable€to€those€who€have€changed€their€position€inÐ À Ðreliance€to€their€detriment");€L.€Lakin€&€M.€Schiff,€òòThe€Law€ofÐ P  ÐAgencyóó€38€(1984)€(stating€an€"equitable€principle€of€agency€byÐ à0 Ðestoppel"€similar€to€that€of€the€Restatement€(Second)).€€€Ð pÀ Ðà ` àEven€if€the€defendants'€relationship€were€to€fallÐ P Ðslightly€outside€of€the€confines€of€these€specific€doctrines,€theÐ à Ðquestion€before€us€is€whether€a€sufficient€relationship€existsÐ  p Ðunder€the€Due€Process€Clause€to€permit€the€exercise€ofÐ °  Ðjurisdiction,€not€whether€a€partnership,€joint€venture,€or€otherÐ @" Ðparticular€agency€relationship€between€the€two€defendants€exists.€Ð Ð $ ÐWe€think€it€consistent€with€the€Due€Process€Clause€to€attribute€toÐ `"°& Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants€the€Motley€defendants'€retention€of,€andÐ ð#@( Ðcertain€interactions€with,€Daynard€where,€as€Daynard€alleges,€theyÐ €%Ð * Ðhave€led€Daynard€and€the€public€to€believe€they€were€jointÐ '`", Ðventurers.€€That€is€a€different€issue€from€whether,€in€a€disputeÐ  (ð#. Ðbetween€the€two€firms,€a€joint€venture€agreement€could€be€enforced.Ð 0*€%0 Ðà ` àWe€take€the€facts€alleged€and€produced€by€Daynard€in€theÐ À+'2 Ðlight€most€favorable€to€his€jurisdictional€assertion.€€Even€if€theÐ ° Ðparties€were€not€joint€venturers,€they€held€themselves€out€toÐ @ ÐDaynard€to€be€part€of€a€joint€venture€or€other€agency€relationshipÐ Ð  Ðand€are€subject,€for€personal€jurisdiction€purposes,€to€theÐ ` ° Ðdoctrine€of€estoppel.€òòóó€Daynard,€throughout€his€dealings€with€theÐ ð @ Ðdefendants,€understood€them€to€be€joint€venturers.€€He€says€theÐ € Ð  Ðparties€"consistently€purported€to€be€joint€venturers"€and€that€heÐ `  Ðreasonably€relied€on€this€understanding.€€The€question€is€whetherÐ  ð  Ðhe€had€a€basis€for€this€belief€grounded€in€the€Scruggs€defendants'Ð 0€  Ðown€conduct€or€conduct€undertaken€with€their€consent.€Ð À Ðà ` àIn€support€of€his€understanding,€Daynard€states€that€heÐ P  Ðbelieved€the€firms€to€be€in€a€joint€venture€based€on€theirÐ à0 Ðstatements€and€conduct.€€Daynard€states€that€Patrick€was€acting€forÐ pÀ Ðboth€firms€when€Patrick€retained€him€and€that€Patrick€retained€himÐ P Ðto€advance€the€objectives€of€the€joint€venture.€€He€says€thatÐ à Ðduring€this€first€meeting,€Patrick€described€the€tobacco€litigationÐ  p Ðas€stemming€from€a€meeting€between€Scruggs€and€the€MississippiÐ °  Ðattorney€general,€which€then€resulted€in€Scruggs€"br[inging]€theÐ @" ÐMotley€firm€into€their€plans."€€Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àDaynard€supports€his€claim€with€documentary€evidence€ofÐ `"°& Ða€joint€venture€that€he€unearthed€through€jurisdictional€discovery.€Ð ð#@( ÐAround€October€1994,€the€Scruggs€defendants€entered€into€a€"JointÐ €%Ð * ÐVenture€Agreement"€with€several€firms€to€pursue€tobacco€litigationÐ '`", Ðon€behalf€of€the€state€of€Mississippi.€€The€Motley€defendants€claimÐ  (ð#. Ðto€have€abided€by€this€agreement€and€their€firm's€name€was€listedÐ 0*€%0 Ðon€the€agreement,€although€they€never€signed€the€agreement.€€In€aÐ À+'2 Ðletter€from€Joseph€Rice€of€Ness€Motley€to€Richard€Scruggs,€RiceÐ ° Ðstated:€"As€we€have€discussed€several€times,€we€have€not€signed€theÐ @ ÐMississippi€Joint€Venture€Agreement€solely€because€we€don't€want€toÐ Ð  Ðbe€governed€by€Mississippi€Tax€Law.€€We€are€agreeable€to€all€termsÐ ` ° Ðin€the€agreement€and,€as€you€know,€we€have€acted€under€theÐ ð @ Ðagreement€from€the€beginning."€€In€the€agreement,€Ness€Motley€firmÐ € Ð  Ðmembers,€including€Mr.€Motley,€were€listed€as€members€of€several€ofÐ `  Ðthe€"teams"€and€"committees"€forming€the€"Litigation€ManagementÐ  ð  ÐStructure"€outlined€in€the€agreement.€€Mr.€Motley€was€a€co„chairmanÐ 0€  Ðof€the€"Public€Relations€Team,"€which€also€included€Steve€BozemanÐ À Ðfrom€Scruggs€Millette.€€Indeed,€Ness€Motley€was€counsel€of€recordÐ P  Ðin€the€Mississippi€case.€€In€addition,€Daynard€notes€that€"the€twoÐ à0 Ðdefendant€firms€were€parties€to€a€'Resolution'€which€recited€thatÐ pÀ Ðthey€had€both€'made€and€entered€into€that€certain€Joint€VentureÐ P ÐAgreement'€concerning€the€Mississippi€litigation."Ð à Ðà ` àScruggs€says€that€Ness€Motley€did€not€sign€the€jointÐ  p Ðventure€agreement,€that€Ness€Motley€did€not€perform€under€theÐ °  Ðagreement's€terms,€and€that€the€litigation€team€did€not€function€asÐ @" Ðoutlined€in€the€agreement.€€He€says€Ness€Motley€did€not€make€theÐ Ð $ Ðcapital€contributions€specified€in€the€agreement,€that€there€was€aÐ `"°& Ðdistinction€between€being€counsel€of€record€and€being€a€party€toÐ ð#@( Ðthe€joint€venture€agreement,€and€that€Ness€Motley's€failure€to€signÐ €%Ð * Ðthe€agreement€caused€"great€concern."€€Scruggs€says€that,€uponÐ '`", Ðreceiving€the€letter€from€Rice,€stating€that€Ness€Motley€had€"actedÐ  (ð#. Ðunder€the€agreement€from€the€beginning,"€he€called€Rice€and€toldÐ 0*€%0 Ðhim€that€"this€wasn't€good€enough"€and€that€"nobody€else"Ð À+'2 Ðconsidered€Ness€Motley€to€have€performed€under€the€agreement.€€Ð ° Ðà ` àScruggs€concedes,€however,€that€the€profits€from€theÐ @ ÐMississippi€litigation,€outlined€in€this€agreement,€were€eventuallyÐ Ð  Ðdivided€with€Ness€Motley,€but€he€says€that€the€division€was€underÐ ` ° Ðthe€terms€of€a€1999€agreement.€€Scruggs€states€that€hisÐ ð @ Ð"understanding€with€Ness€Motley€was€always€that€at€the€end€of€theÐ € Ð  Ðday,€we€would€attempt€to€negotiate€a€fee€and€expense€sharingÐ `  Ðarrangement,€each€trusting€the€goodwill€of€the€other€to€reach€aÐ  ð  Ðsuccessful€negotiation,€but€without€any€guarantee€that€we€would."€Ð 0€  ÐIn€addition,€Scruggs€admits€that€"[t]here€was€a€general€cooperativeÐ À Ðeffort€between€[Scruggs€Millette€and€Ness€Motley]€to€advanceÐ P  Ðlitigation€against€the€tobacco€industry."Ð à0 Ðà ` àDaynard€then€says€that€after€Motley€hired€him,€he€beganÐ pÀ Ða€course€of€dealing€with€the€defendants€in€which€he€provided€bothÐ P Ðfirms€with€legal€advice,€including€advice€to€members€of€the€ScruggsÐ à Ðfirm€physically€present€in€Boston,€as€well€as€assistance€providedÐ  p Ðfrom€Boston€by€phone€and€fax.€€Daynard€also€cites€severalÐ °  Ðconversations€with€both€Scruggs€and€Motley€in€which€they€agreed€toÐ @" Ðpay€him€a€share€of€the€fees€obtained€by€òòbothóó€firms,€Scruggs'sÐ Ð $ Ðstatement€that€Scruggs€had€at€least€apparent€authority€to€promiseÐ `"°& Ðthe€5%,€and€Motley's€statement€that€he€would€be€compensated€as€partÐ ð#@( Ðof€the€"team."Ð €%Ð * Ðà ` àDaynard€cites€a€popular€book€about€the€tobaccoÐ '`", Ðlitigation,€which€he€says€describes€Ness€Motley€and€ScruggsÐ  (ð#. ÐMillette€as€joint€venturers€beginning€in€1993,€as€evidence€that€theÐ 0*€%0 Ðfirms€were€engaged€in€a€well€publicized€joint€venture€or€at€leastÐ À+'2 Ðheld€themselves€out€to€be€so€engaged.€€òòSeeóó€M.€Orey,€òòAssuming€theÐ ° ÐRisk:€The€Mavericks,€the€Lawyers,€and€the€Whistle„Blowers€Who€BeatÐ @ ÐBig€Tobaccoóó€265€(1999)€(stating€that€Scruggs,€Motley,€and€twoÐ Ð  Ðothers,€were€the€"nucleus"€of€a€tobacco€litigation€"team,"€whichÐ ` ° Ð"drafted€a€joint„venture€agreement€that€spelled€out€in€elaborateÐ ð @ Ðdetail€the€duties€each€of€the€lawyers€would€perform").€ò òó ó€He€notes,Ð € Ð  Ðas€additional€evidence€of€public€perception,€that€in€the€TexasÐ `  Ðtobacco€litigation,€other€lawyers€sent€the€firms€checks€madeÐ  ð  Ðpayable€to€"Ness€Motley/Scruggs."€€At€least€four€such€checks€appearÐ 0€  Ðin€the€record.€Ð À Ðà ` àFinally,€in€support€of€his€claim€that€the€defendants€heldÐ P  Ðthemselves€out€to€be€joint€venturers,€Daynard€presents€a€1998Ð à0 Ðletter€to€Hawaii's€attorney€general,€from€Joseph€Rice€of€NessÐ pÀ ÐMotley,€stating€that€"Ness,€Motley€has€an€arrangement€with€RichardÐ P ÐScruggs€to€work€jointly€on€all€of€the€state€cases€against€theÐ à ÐTobacco€Industry."€€Noting€that€"[w]e€have€no€formal,€writtenÐ  p Ðagreement,"€he€said€"Ness,€Motley€and€Dick€Scruggs€have€been€doingÐ °  Ðbusiness€together€for€almost€ten€years€and€have€never€had€anyÐ @" Ðdifferences.€€We€fully€anticipate€sitting€down€in€hindsight€andÐ Ð $ Ðdetermining€what€the€division€of€any€recoveries€would€be€betweenÐ `"°& Ðthe€two€law€firms."€€Ð ð#@( Ðà ` àScruggs€said€that€he€considered€Rice's€statement€thatÐ €%Ð * Ð"Ness,€Motley€has€an€arrangement€with€Richard€Scruggs€to€workÐ '`", Ðjointly€on€all€of€the€state€cases€against€the€Tobacco€Industry"€toÐ  (ð#. Ðbe€"a€bit€of€an€overstatement."€€On€the€other€hand,€Rice's€letterÐ 0*€%0 Ðto€Hawaii's€attorney€general€said€"I€am€sending€a€copy€of€thisÐ À+'2 Ðletter€to€Dick€so€he€may€respond€likewise,€if€he€has€any€questionsÐ ° Ðor€any€additions."€€Scruggs€did€not€write€anything€to€contradictÐ @ ÐRice's€characterization€and€stated,€in€his€deposition,€thatÐ Ð  Ð"[t]here€was€no€reason€to€contradict€it."€€€Scruggs€conceded€thatÐ ` ° Ð"[t]here€was€a€general€cooperative€effort€between€[Scruggs€MilletteÐ ð @ Ðand€Ness€Motley]€to€advance€litigation€against€the€tobaccoÐ € Ð  Ðindustry."€Although€this€letter€may€not€go€to€Daynard'sÐ `  Ðunderstanding€of€the€firms'€relationship,€and€although€it€wasÐ  ð  Ðwritten€by€Rice€of€Ness€Motley,€not€by€any€of€the€ScruggsÐ 0€  Ðdefendants,€Scruggs's€silence€carries€at€least€some€weight.Ð À Ðà ` àThe€facts€as€alleged€by€Daynard€are€sufficient€to€makeÐ P  Ðthe€jurisdictional€showing€that,€in€Boston,€Patrick€of€Ness€MotleyÐ à0 Ðhired€Daynard,€that€Daynard€reasonably€understood€Patrick€to€beÐ pÀ Ðacting€on€behalf€of€a€joint€venture€or€other€agency€relationshipÐ P Ðbetween€Ness€Motley€and€Scruggs€Millette,€and€that€Daynard€reliedÐ à Ðon€this€understanding€by€providing€his€services€to€both€defendants.Ð  p Ðà ` àMany€of€these€same€facts€support€the€conclusion€that€theÐ °  ÐScruggs€defendants€subsequently€ratified€the€Motley€defendants'Ð @" Ðconduct.€€Even€if€Patrick,€when€he€hired€Daynard,€was€actingÐ Ð $ Ðwithout€actual€authority€from€the€Scruggs€defendants,€Daynard€saysÐ `"°& ÐPatrick€purported€to€act€as€an€agent€for€both€firms€when€PatrickÐ ð#@( Ðretained€Daynard,€and€that€Scruggs€effectively€ratified€thatÐ €%Ð * Ðrepresentation.€Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CԀР'`", Ðà ` à"A€person€may€ratify€a€prior€act€done€by€another€withoutÐ  (ð#. Ðactual€or€apparent€authority.€.€.€.€by€...€conduct€that€isÐ 0*€%0 Ðjustifiable€only€on€the€assumption€that€the€person€so€consents."€Ð À+'2 ÐRestatement€(Third)€of€Agency€ðð€4.01€(Tentative€Draft€No.€2,Ð ° Ð2001).׃W×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C/*#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ"The€sole€requirement€for€ratification€is€a€manifestationÐ @ Ðof€assent€or€other€conduct€indicative€of€consent€by€the€principal.Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C6,#Ô"€Ð Ð  ÐÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔRestatement€(Third)€of€Agency,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€4.01,€cmt.€b;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C-#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔInnÐ ` ° ÐFoods,€Inc.óó€v.€òòEquitable€Coop.€Bankóó,€45€F.3d€594,€597€(1st€Cir.Ð ð @ Ð1995)Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C¸-#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€(stating€that€"[u]nder€Massachusetts€law,€ratification€of€anÐ € Ð  Ðagent's€acts€may€be€express€or€implied").Ô#† ‹.CXX X.Ct.#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C1/#ÔThe€Scruggs€defendants,Ð `  Ðon€the€facts€alleged,€engaged€in€such€conduct.€€Ð  ð  Ðà ` àAfter€Ness€Motley€retained€Daynard,€and€as€a€result€ofÐ 0€  Ðthis€employment,€Daynard€asserts€that€he€began€providingÐ À Ðinformation€directly€to€the€Scruggs€defendants.€€Daynard€says€thatÐ P  Ðhe€"communicated€regularly"€with€the€Scruggs€defendants,€that€theyÐ à0 Ðcame€to€Boston€to€receive€his€advice,€and€that€he€"had€manyÐ pÀ Ðconversations,€meetings€and€written€communications€in€Boston€withÐ P Ðmembers€of€the€defendant€firms,€in€which€[he]€provided€advice€andÐ à Ðundertook€specific€projects€for€their€use€in€the€tobaccoÐ  p Ðlitigation."€€Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔEven€if€the€Scruggs€defendants€did€not€come€toÐ °  ÐBoston,€we€think€there€is€adequate€other€evidence€of€ratification,Ð @" Ðaccepting€Daynard's€allegations.€Ð Ð $ Ðà ` àÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C2#ÔDaynard€says€that€he€had€"several€conversations"€withÐ `"°& Ð"both€Mr.€Motley€and€Mr.€Scruggs€in€which€they€stated€that€theyÐ ð#@( Ðwould€appropriately€compensate€[Daynard]€.€.€.€and€that€the€finalÐ €%Ð * Ðform€of€compensation€would€be"€in€the€form€of€a€share€of€the€feesÐ ° Ðthe€firms€obtained€from€handling€the€state€tobacco€litigation.€Ð @ ÐDaynard€says€Ronald€Motley€advised€him€that€he€would€be€compensatedÐ Ð  Ðfor€his€assistance€as€a€member€of€the€Ness€Motley€"team."€€Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔFurtherÐ ` ° Ðevidence€of€ratification€comes€from€Daynard's€version€of€theÐ ð @ ÐChicago€meeting,€where€Scruggs€said€he€acted€with€at€least€apparentÐ € Ð  Ðauthority€for€both€firms€and€reached€an€agreement.€€Daynard€saysÐ `  Ðthat€Scruggs€shook€hands€on€a€deal€to€pay€him€5%€of€these€fees.€Ð  ð  ÐÔ#† ‹.CXX X.CÞ5#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔThese€assurances€and€reassurances€that€Daynard€would€be€paid€aÐ 0€  Ðportion€of€the€recovered€fees€were€an€integral€part€of€the€ongoingÐ À Ðrelationship€existing€between€Daynard,€the€Motley€defendants,€andÐ P  Ðthe€Scruggs€defendants.€Ð à0 Ðà ` àFinally,€Daynard€asserts€that€in€reliance€on€hisÐ pÀ Ðarrangements€with€the€Scruggs€defendants€and€at€their€request,€heÐ P Ðhad€to€commit€out„of„pocket€expenses€of€$15,000€to€retain€someoneÐ à Ðto€meet€his€teaching€obligations.€€Again,€there€is€no€evidence€thatÐ  p ÐScruggs€disavowed€any€contractual€relationship€as€he€acceptedÐ °  ÐDaynard's€assistance.€€To€be€sure,€Scruggs€says€Daynard€was€aÐ @" Ðvolunteer,€but€reasonable€inferences€support€Daynard's€version.€Ð Ð $ ÐÔ#† ‹.CXX X.C7#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔà ` àThe€Scruggs€defendants€had€many€opportunities€to€disavowÐ `"°& Ða€relationship€with€Daynard€or€to€clarify€the€relationship.€€ForÐ ð#@( Ðexample,€they€could€have€rejected€his€assistance€or€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CL;#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔaccepted€itÐ €%Ð * Ðonly€on€certain€conditions.€€Instead,€according€to€Daynard,Ô#† ‹.CXX X.Cp<#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€theyÐ '`", Ðrepeatedly€encouraged€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C =#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔand€accepted€his€assistance€and€duringÐ  (ð#. Ðseveral€conversations€agreed€to€pay€him€in€the€form€of€a€share€ofÐ 0*€%0 Ðthe€fees€generated.€€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C=#ÔWhen€Daynard€wrote€his€first€letter€to€ScruggsÐ À+'2 Ðin€July€1997€confirming€the€fee€arrangement,€Scruggs€remainedÐ ° Ðsilent.Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ׃f×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C?#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C™?#Ô€Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔÐ @ Ðà ` àBy€knowingly€accepting€the€benefits€of€the€transactionÐ Ð  Ðinitiated€in€Massachusetts,€the€Scruggs€defendants€ratifiedÐ ` ° ÐPatrick's€act€of€hiring€and€retaining€Daynard€on€behalf€of€bothÐ ð @ Ðfirms,€which€ultimately€gave€rise€to€this€law€suit.€€òòSeeóó€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CÝ?#ÔòòÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔInn€Foodsóó,Ð € Ð  Ð45€F.3d€at€597€n.7€(noting€that€"benefits€received€are€certainlyÐ `  Ðstrong€evidence€that€the€principal€acquiesced€in€the€agent'sÐ  ð  Ðtransaction")Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CqA#Ô;Ô‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€Restatement€(Third)€of€Agency,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€4.01,€cmt.Ð 0€  Ðd.Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C‰B#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CC#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔIn€addition,€by€repeatedly€agreeing€to€compensate€Daynard€forÐ À Ðongoing€work€conducted€in€Massachusetts,€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.CbC#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔagreeing€to€pay€Daynard€aÐ P  Ðshare€of€the€fees€and€later€shaking€hands€on€the€5%€figure,€andÐ à0 Ðaccepting€his€coming€from€Boston€to€Mississippi€to€assist€at€trial,Ð pÀ ÐScruggs,€acting€on€behalf€of€his€firm€and,€according€to€Daynard,Ð P Ðthe€Ness€Motley€firm€as€well,€ratified€the€arrangement€in€which€theÐ à ÐMotley€defendants€agreed€to€pay€Daynard€for€his€ongoing€services€asÐ  p Ða€member€of€the€team.òòóóÔ#† ‹.CXX X.CD#ÔÔ‡ X.CXX ‹.CÔ€Ô#† ‹.CXX X.C[F#ÔÐ °  Ðò òD.€The€Remaining€Constitutional€AnalysisÐ @" Ðó óà ` àThe€easier€question€in€the€case€is€the€remainingÐ  !p$ Ðconstitutional€one.€€Given€the€Scruggs€defendants'€direct€contactsÐ °"& Ðwith€Massachusetts€and€their€contacts€imputed€from€the€MotleyÐ @$( Ðdefendants,€do€the€Scruggs€defendants€have€"minimum€contacts"€withÐ ° ÐMassachusetts€"such€that€the€maintenance€of€the€suit€does€notÐ @ Ðoffend€'traditional€notions€of€fair€play€and€substantialÐ Ð  Ðjustice.'"?€€òòInt'l€Shoeóó,€326€U.S.€at€316€(quoting€òòMillikenóó,€311Ð ` ° ÐU.S.€at€463).€€The€answer€is€yes.Ð ð @ Ðòòóóà ` àFor€specific€jurisdiction,€this€circuit€divides€theÐ € Ð  Ðconstitutional€analysis€into€three€categories:€relatedness,Ð `  Ðpurposeful€availment,€and€reasonableness:òòóóÐ  ð  ÐÓÓà0 ` àà ° àà ` àFirst,€the€claim€underlying€the€litigation€must€directlyÐ 0€  Ðarise€out€of,€or€relate€to,€the€defendant's€forum„stateÐ øH  Ðactivities.€€Second,€the€defendant's€in„state€contactsÐ À Ðmust€represent€a€purposeful€availment€of€the€privilege€ofÐ ˆØ Ðconducting€activities€in€the€forum€state,€therebyÐ P  Ðinvoking€the€benefits€and€protections€of€that€state'sÐ h Ðlaws€and€making€the€defendant's€involuntary€presenceÐ à0 Ðbefore€the€state's€courts€foreseeable.€€Third,€theÐ ¨ø Ðexercise€of€jurisdiction€must,€in€light€of€the€GestaltÐ pÀ Ðfactors,€be€reasonable.€€Ð8ˆ` (#` (# ÐÌÓjJÓòòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€144òòóó;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòNoonanóó,€135€F.3d€at€90.€Ð È ÐThe€Supreme€Court,€speaking€on€the€subject€of€specific€personalÐ X¨ Ðjurisdiction€in€contract€cases,€has€"emphasized€that€parties€whoÐ è8 Ð'reach€out€beyond€one€state€and€create€continuing€relationships€andÐ xÈ! Ðobligations€with€citizens€of€another€state'€are€subject€toÐ  X# Ðregulation€and€sanctions€in€the€other€State€for€the€consequences€ofÐ ˜!è% Ðtheir€activities."€€òòBurger€Kingóó,€471€U.S.€at€473€(quoting€òòTravelersÐ (#x' ÐHealth€Ass'nóó€v.€òòVirginiaóó,€339€U.S.€643,€647€(1950)).€€Ð ¸$ ) Ðà ` àò ò1.€Relatedness.€ó óÐ H&˜!+ Ðà ` àAs€to€the€first€requirement,€that€"the€claim€underlyingÐ ((x#- Ðthe€litigation€must€directly€arise€out€of,€or€relate€to,€theÐ ¸)%/ Ðdefendant's€forum„state€activities,"€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€at€144,Ð H+˜&1 Ðthe€district€court€correctly€concluded,€based€merely€on€the€ScruggsÐ ° Ðdefendants'€direct€contacts€with€the€forum,€that€the€alleged€Ð @ ÐÓÓà0 ` àbreach€of€contract€in€this€case€"arose"€from€a€course€ofÐ Ð  Ðdealing€between€the€parties.€€The€contract€was€in€theÐ ˜è Ðform€of€a€working€relationship€„„€started€inÐ ` ° ÐMassachusetts€„„€that€called€for€interaction€betweenÐ ( x ÐMassachusetts,€South€Carolina,€and€Mississippi.€€DrawingÐ ð @ Ðall€inferences€in€favor€of€Daynard,€he€arguably€meets€theÐ ¸   Ðrelatedness€requirement,€€Ð€ Ð ` (#` (# ÐÌÓDRÓòòDaynardóó,€184€F.€Supp.€2d€at€66.€€It€is€clear€that€€Daynard's€breachÐ `  Ðof€contract€claim€"arise[s]€out€of,€or€relate[s]€to,"€the€ScruggsÐ  ð  Ðdefendants'€Massachusetts€activities.€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€atÐ 0€  Ð144.€€Daynard's€lawsuit€is€based€on€his€claim€that€the€defendantsÐ À Ðowe€him€money€for€his€work€pursuant€to€an€agreement€initiated€byÐ P  Ðthe€defendants€while€physically€present€in€Massachusetts€andÐ à0 Ðperformed,€in€part,€in€Massachusetts.€€This€relationshipÐ pÀ Ðcontemplated€ongoing€interaction€between€Daynard,€in€Massachusetts,Ð P Ðand€the€defendants,€in€Mississippi€and€South€Carolina.€ò òó ó€Daynard'sÐ à Ðsuit€arises€out€of€these€Massachusetts€activities,€which€wereÐ  p Ðinstrumental€to€the€formation€of€the€disputed€oral€contract.€€òòSeeóóÐ °  ÐòòMcGeeóó€v.€òòInt'l€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€355€U.S.€220,€223€(1957)€(upholdingÐ @" Ðjurisdiction€over€a€suit€"based€on€a€contract€which€had€substantialÐ Ð $ Ðconnection€with€th[e]€State");€òòHahnóó€v.€òòVt.€Law€Sch.óó,€698€F.2d€48,Ð `"°& Ð51„52€(1st€Cir.€1983).€Ð ð#@( Ðà ` àò ò2.€Purposeful€availment.€€ó óÐ €%Ð * Ðà ` àòòóó"Second,€the€defendant's€in„state€contacts€must€representÐ `'°", Ða€purposeful€availment€of€the€privilege€of€conducting€activities€inÐ ð(@$. Ðthe€forum€state,€thereby€invoking€the€benefits€and€protections€ofÐ €*Ð%0 Ðthat€state's€laws€and€making€the€defendant's€involuntary€presenceÐ ,`'2 Ðbefore€the€state's€courts€foreseeable."€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€atÐ ° Ð144.€"The€cornerstones€upon€which€the€concept€of€purposefulÐ @ Ðavailment€rest[s]€are€voluntariness€and€foreseeability."€€òòSawtelleóó,Ð Ð  Ð70€F.3d€at€1391€(citing€òòTicketmasteróó,€26€F.3d€at€207).€€Ð ` ° Ðà ` àThe€district€court's€reasoning€on€purposeful€availmentÐ ð @ Ðconsidered€only€the€Scruggs€defendants'€direct€contacts€and€foundÐ € Ð  Ðthem€insufficient.€€We€need€not€address€this€conclusion€as€DaynardÐ `  Ðhas€not€challenged€it€on€appeal.€€We€note,€however,€that,€as€theÐ  ð  Ðdistrict€court€recognized,€Scruggs€did€have€some€contacts€withÐ 0€  ÐMassachusetts,€however€minimal.€€The€Scruggs€defendants,€accordingÐ À Ðto€Daynard,€engaged€in€telephone€and€fax€communications€with€him€inÐ P  ÐMassachusetts.׃U×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€addition,€Daynard€says€the€Scruggs€defendantsÐ à0 Ðalso€had€conversations€with€him,€in€which€they€agreed€to€pay€him€aÐ pÀ Ðshare€of€the€fees€as€compensation€for€work€performed€inÐ P ÐMassachusetts.€€He€also€says€that€Scruggs€firm€members€came€toÐ à ÐBoston€to€receive€his€advice,€although€Scruggs€denies€this.€€Ð  p Ðà ` àCombined€with€Patrick's€physical€presence€inÐ °  ÐMassachusetts€to€negotiate€the€agreement€which€ultimately€gave€riseÐ @" Ðto€this€litigation,€and€the€ongoing€relationship€between€the€MotleyÐ Ð $ Ðdefendants€and€Daynard€„„€properly€attributed€to€the€ScruggsÐ `"°& Ðdefendants€„„€we€can€properly€say€that€the€Scruggs€defendantsÐ ð#@( ÐÑ_P¸*Ñâ _âÑ  Ñâ _âÑ  Ñ"engaged€in€.€.€.€purposeful€activity€related€to€the€forum€thatÐ ° Ðwould€make€the€exercise€of€jurisdiction€fair,€just,€or€reasonable,"Ð @ ÐòòRushóó€v.€òòSavchukóó,€444€U.S.€320,€329€(1980).€€òòSeeóó€òòBurger€Kingóó,€471Ð Ð  ÐU.S.€at€479€(holding€that€"prior€negotiations€and€contemplatedÐ ` ° Ðfuture€consequences,€along€with€the€terms€of€the€contract€and€theÐ ð @ Ðparties'€actual€course€of€dealing"€must€be€evaluated€to€determineÐ € Ð  Ðwhether€the€defendant€purposefully€established€minimum€contacts).€Ð `  ÐòòóóPatrick's€action€alone€is€probably€sufficient€to€supportÐ  ð  Ðjurisdiction€over€the€Motley€defendants€and,€when€imputed,€theÐ 0€  ÐScruggs€defendants€as€well.€€òòSeeóó€òòid.óó€at€475€n.18€(noting€that€"[s]oÐ À Ðlong€as€it€creates€a€'substantial€connection'€with€the€forum,€evenÐ P  Ða€single€act€can€support€jurisdiction")€(quoting€òòMcGeeóó,€355€U.S.€atÐ à0 Ð223);€R.C.€Casad€&€W.B.€Richman,€1€òòJurisdiction€in€Civil€Actions:Ð pÀ ÐTerritorial€Basis€and€Process€Limitations€on€Jurisdiction€of€StateÐ P Ðand€Federal€Courtsóó€ðð€4„2,€at€413€(3d€ed.€1998)€(stating€that€"ifÐ à Ðthe€defendant€or€its€agent€was€physically€present€in€the€state€toÐ  p Ðnegotiate€the€service€contract,€cases€have€found€that€the€defendantÐ °  Ðtransacted€business€there").€€Even€in€cases€where€the€defendant€wasÐ @" Ðnot€physically€present€in€the€forum,€where€the€defendant€initiatedÐ Ð $ Ðthe€transaction€by€mailing€or€calling€the€plaintiff€in€the€forumÐ `"°& Ðand€when€the€defendant€contemplated€that€the€plaintiff€would€renderÐ ð#@( Ðservices€in€the€forum,€all€as€alleged€by€Daynard€here,€many€courtsÐ €%Ð * Ðhave€found€jurisdiction.€€Casad€&€Richman,€òòsupraóó,€ðð€4„2,€at€414.€Ð '`", Ðà ` àò ò3.€Reasonableness.€ó óÐ  (ð#. Ðà ` à"Third,€the€exercise€of€jurisdiction€must,€in€light€ofÐ €*Ð%0 Ðthe€Gestalt€factors,€be€reasonable."€€òòFoster„Milleróó,€46€F.3d€atÐ ,`'2 Ð144;€òòseeóó€òòalsoóó€òòWorld„Wide€Volkswagen€Corp.óó€v.€òòWoodsonóó,€444€U.S.€286,Ð ° Ð292€(1980)€(listing€factors).€€The€Gestalt€factors€support€theÐ @ Ðconclusion€that€jurisdiction€is€reasonable.Ð Ð  Ðà ` àThe€burden€on€the€Scruggs€defendants€of€appearing€inÐ ` ° ÐMassachusetts,€given€that€they€routinely€represent€clients€outsideÐ ð @ Ðtheir€home€state,€is€not€by€any€means€unusual.€In€addition,Ð € Ð  ÐDaynard's€interest€in€bringing€his€action€in€this€forum,€given€theÐ `  Ðtraditional€deference€accorded€to€a€plaintiff's€choice€of€forum,Ð  ð  Ðweighs€in€favor€of€personal€jurisdiction.€€This€is€particularlyÐ 0€  Ðtrue€in€light€of€Massachusetts's€stake€in€being€able€"to€provide€aÐ À Ðconvenient€forum€for€its€residents€to€redress€injuries€inflicted€byÐ P  Ðout„of„forum€actors."€€òòSawtelleóó,€70€F.3d€at€1395.€€Massachusetts'sÐ à0 Ðadjudicatory€interest€is€likely€to€weigh€in€favor€of€exercisingÐ pÀ Ðpersonal€jurisdiction€because€the€district€court€has€alreadyÐ P Ðdecided€that,€as€between€Daynard€and€the€Motley€defendants,Ð à ÐMassachusetts€law€governs€the€dispute€over€the€oral€fee„splittingÐ  p Ðarrangement.€€òòDaynardóó,€188€F.€Supp.€2d€at€118„23.€€Finally,Ð °  Ðefficient€administration€of€justice€favors€jurisdiction€inÐ @" ÐMassachusetts,€where€this€action€is€already€proceeding€against€theÐ Ð $ ÐMotley€defendants.Ð `"°& Ðò òÔ&  ÔE.€Conclusionó óÐ ð#@( Ðà ` àWe€conclude€that€the€Scruggs€defendants'€contactsÐ Ð% !* ÐÔ'ð#rÔproperly€imputed€from€the€Motley€defendants,€against€the€backdropÐ `'°", Ðof€the€Scruggs€defendants'€direct€contacts€with€Massachusetts,Ð ð(@$. Ðconstitute€"minimum€contacts"€with€Massachusetts€"such€that€theÐ €*Ð%0 Ðmaintenance€of€the€suit€does€not€offend€'traditional€notions€ofÐ ,`'2 Ðfair€play€and€substantial€justice.'"€€òòInt'l€Shoeóó,€326€U.S.€at€316Ð ° Ð(quoting€òòMillikenóó,€311€U.S.€at€463).€€Again,€we€emphasize€that€weÐ @ Ðreach€this€conclusion€under€the€prima€facie€approach,€takingÐ Ð  ÐDaynard's€properly€documented€evidentiary€proffers€"as€trueÐ ` ° Ð(whether€or€not€disputed)€and€constru[ing]€them€in€the€light€mostÐ ð @ Ðcongenial€to€[Daynard's]€jurisdictional€claim."€€òòMass.€Sch.€of€Lawóó,Ð € Ð  Ð142€F.3d€at€34.€€Nothing€in€the€opinion€precludes€the€ScruggsÐ `  Ðdefendants,€in€the€prospective€district€court€proceedings,€fromÐ  ð  Ðchallenging€these€facts,€if€they€wish,€and€renewing€theirÐ 0€  Ðjurisdictional€challenge,€if€appropriate.Ð À Ðò òÓ  ÓÔ& p ÔIII.Ð P  ÐÓ+wÓó óà ` àFor€these€reasons,€Ô'pP7wÔwe€òòreverseóó€the€dismissal€of€theÐ 0€ ÐScruggs€defendants€for€lack€of€personal€jurisdiction€and€òòremandóó€toÐ À Ðthe€district€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€thisÐ P  Ðopinion.€