WPC7x dAh # w TO/$Wج"˿q N.:U z.P"qrJI+U'*@[xy3S^YOwo="t3R1 D]QY&ĿP()Q ڳ@;pp{Gz}cG;.Fq 8*0 lW!q(K5Lh/wc}#<w>E0XKדX^F{3|tqe{DZ+y;%V)n!||A nQFzjn]}Bd`e6f١ZH~iUcOm;j5 C< >L%@SVVq7Hʀly^{lܻknOYMCuERߒEya~)5ʵXø2qרɞ񁵹.nո#p[H!Bv#tUF5 %{ 0: ^ w 4   m 0D 0K nT# Nw y UN E f a N ^ UBUb|  1 72q 1u 72 0cJz?D# 0U% 0% 0& 0' 0( Bj) 0) 0d* 0>+ 0, 0C, 0,- 0. 0. 0/ 0v0 0A1 0 2 02 0@3 03 04 0s5 0A6 0 7 07 08 0[9 00: 0<H: 0: 0>B; 0v; 0`; 0`V< 0`< 0`= 0`v= 08= 0> 02> 0? 0:@ 0YH@ 0_@ 0 A 0j B 0tC B*D D/"E D+QE 0|E D/G 0/G 06G 03H 0:;I 0^uI 0<I 0NJU6]JU>JU*JJKbPq6S 0wW 0XXX 1Z 72[:[]` 1` 72baaggEjU8q(rHP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0<4 9Z+.Courier New RegularX($USUS.,kz/s M/s:i+003|x:U(#$  0  (v:2?x$ !USUS.,    =YXXdd=    0  <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@ e vr Z6Times New Roman RegularTABLE AL:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- - AdjuntasBoudinBownesPierasAdjuntaMonroigAcevedoF.Supp PDP NPPL.P.R.A.w]henTiradopreverdictSherwin i]fScarfoCabletronF.R.D.BendectinApplewhiteReicholdChemsHendricksonaffirmanceseverances--E.D.PaappealabilityC.J.S.McDaniel ABCOLeichterLichtSemenoffe]achBintliffSafecon]othingRocafortEng'gMulvihillFliteLogue DoreSoberal i]tO'Rourkeinartfulp]laintiffsRoldanPlumeyCerezoKmart JNOVtrifurcatedCreightonElrodBrantiFinkelJirauBernalAgraitconclusoryfactfinderBrittonG.M.D.Int'lremittiturCorreachildrensQuirosAmiraultMaxxamMejiasduplicativeSheekprobationalKendrickrelitigatingTriplettmisallocationrelitigationKerotestParklanenonmutualdefendant[sD.P.R.GrellaFaigin suaspontemeritlessC.I.R.SunnenestopestoppingFelicianoLoudermillGaban Soba W]eAgostoGorchevBeattyMachsStachuraPiphusDavetMaccaroneAss'nLaGuardiaHarwoodC]ollateralFugazyMetromediat]hisSec'yc]ompensatoryL.L.C.RennieE]speciallyp]rejudiceZdanokRigoberto t]heCorderoPembaurv.Gertz S.Ctrelitigateestopped   ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    2    _Alleightytwoplaintiffsallegedpoliticaldiscrimination e anddueprocessviolations.Thirtythreeoftheeightytwo ; plaintiffsaddedathirdclaimofpoliticalharassmenttotheir  lawsuit.Thepoliticaldiscriminationanddueprocessclaimsarose  fromthedischargesthemselves,whilethepoliticalharassment X claimsallegedshoddytreatmentinthemonthsprecedingthe . terminations.0CEMU]emu}AutoList1(1)(1)(a)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;3$2#  0  .3  0     ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    3    _Thefactspresentedhereareintendedtoconveyageneral e impressionofthecase.Weprovideadditionalfactsinsubsequent ; sectionsofthediscussionwheretheyarepertinenttothelegal  analysis.   ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    4    _ArticleXoftheLayOffPlanprovides: e 8  Ifthelayoffisduetolackoffunds,itmustbe  evaluatedifitispossibletogeneratesavingsthrough  meansotherthanrequiringtheeliminationofpermanent X positions.Ifthecrisisistemporary,toconsider . reducingtheworkdayandgrantingunpaidleaves.To i  consider,additionally,ifitisfeasibletoretrain ?  employeesinotherfunctionsorrelocatethemtoother   positionswithinoroutsidetheMunicipality.     ArticleX,LayoffPlanforMunicipalityofAdjuntasEmployees  2  (March1997). 5  ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    11    _Inthecaseatbar,theapplicationofcollateralestoppel e is nonmutualinthesensethatthesixtytwoplaintiffs ; benefittingfromthepredeterminationofliabilitywerenot  partiesinthetrialofthefirsttwentyplaintiffs,wherethe  liabilityquestionwasoriginallylitigated.*+ (_2623  ..*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5   d*;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      (&H2  (&H3  (&H4 XXX (&H5  (&H6  20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK^<6X9`(Courier NewKS_\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K^<6X9`(Courier NewKS_\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/K^<6X9`(Courier NewKS_\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7S(X7  ?`%2A`Arial?  S_\  `&Times New RomanS7T(X7&  d dR)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7V(X7  ?`%2A`Arial?  S_\  `&Times New RomanS7T(X7R)2dxd0KS.SampleK^<6X9`(Courier NewKS_\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK^<6X9`(Courier NewKS_\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  (O$<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial      ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    5    _Thereisapotentialargument,disavowedbydefendantshere,  thatRule21(entitled"MisjoinderandNonJoinderofParties")is  notapplicabletocaseswheretherehasbeennoimproperjoinderof  partiesattheoutset.However,theprevailingruleinoursister  circuitsisthatafindingofmisjoinderisnotaprerequisiteto rX severingpartiesorclaimsunderRule21.AstheSecondCircuit H. observedinWyndhamAssoc.v.Bintliff,398F.2d614(2dCir.   1968):   8  Rule21...providesthat"Anyclaimagainstaparty    maybeseveredandproceededwithseparately."We v \  believethatthisprovisionauthorizestheseveranceof L 2  anyclaim,evenwithoutafindingofimproperjoinder, "  wheretherearesufficientotherreasonsfororderinga   severance.    Id.at618;seeSafecoIns.Co.v.CityofWhiteHouse,36F.3d z`  540,54546(6thCir.1994)(characterizingthisprincipleasthe P6 majorityrule). X  ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    6    _Wheredefendantscontinuetoassertqualifiedimmunityafter  undergoingtrialona1983claim,aposttrialgrantofimmunity  wouldstillconferabenefitbyshieldingthemfromanyliability  formonetarydamagesawardedbythejury.SeeRoldanPlumeyv.  CerezoSuarez,115F.3d58,65(1stCir.1997). g  ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    12    _AccordingtoWright,Miller&Cooper: e 8  Thebasicargumentsagainstnonmutualpreclusionmaybe  seenfromtwoaspects....[T]henonpartywhoseeksto  invokenonmutualpreclusionhasneverhadtobearthe X burdensoflitigatingtheissues,andaccordingly . presentsamuchweakerclaimthanapartywhohasborne i  theseburdensoraprivywhohasatleastruntheriskof ?  defeat....[T]he[second]argumentissimplythatthe   riskofproliferatingtheconsequencesofamistaken    judgmentcannotbejustifiedabsentthefullrangeof  \  needsthatrequirepreclusionbetweenpartiesandthose  2  inprivitywiththem.m    18AFederalPractice&Procedure4464(2ded.2002).(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (# e    ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    9    _InCityofNewportv.FactConcerts,Inc.,458U.S.247 e (1981),theSupremeCourtruledthatmunicipalitiesareimmunefrom ; punitivedamagesunder42U.S.C.1983.Seeid.at271.(CEKQW]cioAutoList21)1)1)1)1)1)1)1)i1)  * ' Turner0Turner .      ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    8    _PuertoRicolawgrantscareeremployeesapropertyinterest e intheirgovernmentpositions:"Regularcareeremployeesarethose ; whohaveenteredthesystemafterundergoingtherecruitment  procedureestablishedinthissubtitle,includingtheprobational  period.Theseemployeesshallbeentitledtopermanentstatusand X mayonlyberemovedfromtheirpositionsforjustcauseafterdue . filingofcharges."21P.R.LawsAnn.4554(b)(1991).  0CEMU]emu}AutoList3(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)(1)n(1)   ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    7    _Theindividualdamageawardsforeachplaintiffaretoo  lengthytolisthere.Asageneralmatter,therewassome  uniformityamongthedamageawards.Forcategory(1),alltwenty  plaintiffsreceived$75,000incompensatorydamagesfromDefendant  Veraand$75,000fromDefendantGonzalez.Everyplaintiffalso rX received$15,000inpunitivedamagesfromDefendantVeraand H. $15,000inpunitivedamagesfromDefendantMonroig.     Categories(2),(3),and(4)producedsomevariation.Forthe   eightplaintiffsallegingpoliticalharassment,thejuryfoundthat   fourhadfailedtoprovepoliticalharassment,andawardedno    damagesinthiscategory.Twoplaintiffsreceived$50,000,andthe v \  othertworeceived$75,000.Finally,theawardsforpainand L 2  sufferingrangedfrom$75,000to$150,000,andtheawardsforlost "  earningsranthegamutfromzerodamagesawardedto$55,000(all   awardsinthiscategoryreflectedvaryingpercentagereductionsfor    requiredmitigationofdamages).  Ѐ      ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    10    _Plaintiffsargueonappealthat"[t]hedueprocessaward e effectivelywasthemonetaryequivalentofreinstatement.Should ; thatawardbetakenawayorsignificantlyreducedbythiscourt,  plaintiffswillnothavebeenmadewholefortheirdueprocess  injuries."Ourdecisiontoaffirmthatawardmootsplaintiffs' X crossappealfromthedistrictcourt'sdenialofreinstatement.   ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    1    _Defendantsdonotchallengethelegalavailabilityof e municipalliabilityinthiscase.InCorderov.DeJesusMendez, ; 867F.2d1(1stCir.1989),weacknowledgedtheSupremeCg7/# C Court's  holdinginPembaurv.CityofCincinnati,475U.S.469(1986)that  "municipalityliabilityunder1983attacheswhere...a X deliberatechoicetofollowacourseofactionismadefromamong . variousalternativesbytheofficialorofficialsresponsiblefor i  establishingfinalpolicywithrespecttothesubjectmatterin ?  question."Id.at48384(emphasisadded).TheCorderocourt   subsequentlynotedthatmayorsinPuertoRicoarethegovernment    officialsultimatelyresponsiblefortheemploymentdecisionsof  \  themunicipality:  2  8  8`   UnderPuertoRicolaw,oneoftheexpress C  powersgiventomayorsofmunicipalitiesis:   "Toappointalltheofficialsandemployeesof   themunicipalexecutivebranch,andremove `  themfromofficewhenevernecessaryforthe 6 goodoftheservice,pursuanttothe q  proceduresprovidedherein."P.R.LawsAnn. G tit.21,ch.1553002(15)(1980).` x` x Id.at7.Hence,DefendantVera'semploymentdecisionsipsofacto d "constitutedtheofficialpolicyofthemunicipality."Id.<4 9Z+ Courier New    ?x$USUS.,  =XXdd=    13    _Wereproducethethreeissuesoncemoreforthereader's e benefit: ;  i(80n"3"    (32  1  )3  0 `   Thatpoliticalaffiliationwasasubstantialor  motivatingfactorintheimplementationofthelayoff X plan.3݌.` (#` (# Ќ  X9%4 4 <DLX9  X6" <DL44X6(2) ` ThatDefendantsviolatedPlaintiffsdueprocessrights ?  byimplementingthelayoffplaninadiscriminatory   fashion.      \  (3) ` ThatPlaintiffsweredischargedfromtheircareer  2  positionswiththeMunicipalityof_Adjuntas_Ԁonaccountof m  theirpoliticalaffiliation;andotherindividualswere C  employedtoperformtheirdutiesunderdifferenttitles,   andotherdifferentprograms,inviolationofthelaw. !USUS.,  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !XXXXmpXX     OaOagO#qOa'mF UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsmp  FortheFirstCircuit  XX    A') ` dE< ` A   Nos.0  021139,021340,021465u (#(#    `     h @ LUISA.ACEVEDOGARCIA,etal., ! q @  PlaintiffsAppellees/CrossAppellants,    @tt)v. y  @ ROBERTOVERAMONROIG,IndividuallyandasMayorofAdjuntas; %u    MUNICIPALITYOFADJUNTAS;IRMAM.GONZALEZDELGADO,Individually K  andasPersonnelDirectorofAdjuntas, ! >@  DefendantsAppellants/CrossAppellees. } A') ` dE<(` A )y @$ $ APPEALSFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT ^   FORTHEDISTRICTOFPUERTORICO 4 @[Hon.JaimePieras,Jr.,U.S.SeniorDistrictJudge]  A') ` dE<;` A < @'Before !q   @@((Boudin,ChiefJudge,  Bownes,SeniorCircuitJudge,   andLipez,CircuitJudge. y! A') ` dE<$!` A %!u#       JohannaM.EmmanuelliHuertas,withwhomJorgeMartinez  "Z% LucianoandLawOfficesofPedroA.OrtizAlvarezwereonbrieffor "0& theMunicipalityofAdjuntas. #'   LuisVillaresSarmiento,withwhomYahaidaZabala,and $( Sanchez,Betances&Sifre,wereonbriefforappellants/cross b% ) appelleesVeraandGonzalezintheirindividualcapacities. 8&!*   GaelMahony,withwhomIsraelRoldanGonzalez,StuartSvonkin, '^"+ EricaTempleton,MichaelE.Liftik,andHill&Barlowwereonbrief '4#, forappellees/crossappellants. ( $- *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  f*%/f*% @  SI*&0 {@37853{@SAugust21,2003 +&2   RHCv,'3" {@37853 {@ R ," *&4 ? ,* !  8XXdd8*,X` XX* ` LIPEZ,CircuitJudge .Thiscomplexpolitical   discriminationcasewasfiledbyeightytwoplaintiffsterminated x fromcareeremploymentpositionswiththemunicipalityofAdjuntas $t inPuertoRico.Thedistrictcourtseveredtheplaintiffsinto   fourgroupsthreegroupsoftwentyandonegroupoftwentytwo |  Єandtheclaimsofthefirsttwentyplaintiffsarenowbeforeus ( x  ondefendants'appealfromasubstantialverdictforplaintiffs. $  Althoughthiscaseraisesmanyfamiliarissues,italsopresents   someunusualquestionsarisingfromthecourt'sinitialseverance ,|  oftheplaintiffs,anditslaterdecisiontoapplynonmutual ( offensivecollateralestoppeltothethreeremainingpiecesofthe  severedlitigation.Wevacatethecourt'scollateralestoppel 0 order,andaffirminallotherrespects. ,   I.    ` OnNovember12,1997,eightytwocurrentandformer P employeesofthemunicipalityofAdjuntasbroughtsuitunder42 L U.S.C.1983,allegingviolationsoftheirFirst,Fifthand   FourteenthAmendmentrightsarisingfromamassivelayoffof T!" municipalemployeesintheaftermathoftheNovember1996mayoral #P$ election.Everyclaimantwasfiredfroma"careerposition"(akin $& toacivilservicejob),asopposedtoa"trustposition" X&!( (politicalappointment),temporaryortransitorypost,or (T#* "contract"(fixedterm)job.Theplaintiffsnamedthreedefendants )%, inthesuitRobertoVeraMonroig("Vera"),themayorofAdjuntas \+&. O e   (suedinbothhisindividualandofficialcapacities);Irma e Gonzalez,Adjunta'sDirectorofHumanResources(suedinbothher  individualandofficialcapacities);andthemunicipalityof X Adjuntas.s  #  1      ׀ i   ` OnNovember23,1998,thedistrictcourtissuedanorder   andopiniondenyingabsoluteand/orqualifiedimmunitytoMayor  \  VeraandGonzalezintheirindividualcapacities,andgrantingin m  partanddenyinginpartthedefendants'motionforsummary   judgment.SeeAcevedoGarciav.VeraMonroig,30F.Supp.2d141 `  (D.P.R.1998)("AcevedoI").InanopinionpublishedFebruary17, q  2000,weaffirmedthedistrictcourt'sorderinallrespects,  rulinginteraliathatdefendantscouldnotclaimtheprotectionof d absoluteimmunity,andthatwelackedjurisdictiontoreviewthe e districtcourt'srulingsonqualifiedimmunityandmunicipal  liability.SeeAcevedoGarciav.VeraMonroig,204F.3d1(1st X Cir.2000)("AcevedoII"). i   ` OurdecisioninAcevedoIIclearedtheremaining   roadblockstotrial,andthedistrictcourtundertookthe  \  formidablelogisticaltaskofarrangingtotrythemultitudeof m  politicaldiscrimination,politicalharassment,anddueprocess   claimsallegedbytheeightytwoindividualplaintiffs.  #  2      ׀Tothis `  end,thecourtissuedanorderonOctober11,2001,severingthe q  caseintofourseparatetrialsoftwenty,twenty,twenty,and  twentytwoplaintiffs,respectively.Toconfigurethefirstgroup d oftwentyplaintiffs,theorderdirectedeachsidetochoosesix u plaintiffswithpoliticaldiscriminationanddueprocessclaims ! only(foratotaloftwelve),andfourplaintiffsprosecuting h politicaldiscrimination,dueprocessandpoliticalharassment y claims(foratotalofeight). %   ` ThetrialforthisfirstgroupbeganOctober12,2001,  l" andlastedtwentythreedays.Attheconclusionofthe }"$ proceedings,thejuryreturnedaverdictawardingeachplaintiffa )$& packageofcompensatoryandpunitivedamagestotalinghundredsof e thousandsofdollars,summingtoagrouptotalof$6,956,400.  Afteraflurryofposttrialmotions,thecourtenteredjudgmenton X theverdict.ItthenissuedanorderonJanuary30,2002,applying i  thedoctrineofnonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppelto   precludedefendantsfromlitigatingthedefendants'liabilityfor  \  politicaldiscriminationanddenialoftheplaintiffs'dueprocess m  rights.AcevedoGarciav.VeraMonroig,213F.Supp.2d38,41   (D.P.R.2002). `  % ` %Defendantsfiledatimelyappealafterthisfirsttrial, q  challenginginteraliathesufficiencyoftheevidenceatthe  summaryjudgmentstage,thesufficiencyoftheevidenceattrial, d theseveranceofplaintiffsintofourgroups,thedistrictcourt's u denialofqualifiedimmunity,numerousevidentiaryrulings,the ! court'sactiveparticipationattrial,thedamageaward,andthe h court'sapplicationofnonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppel. y Plaintiffscrossappealedfromthedistrictcourt'sdenialofan %  injunctionorderingthereinstatementofallplaintiffs.  l"   II.  }"$ 8( ` AcevedoIandAcevedoIIprovidealengthyexpositionof E$& thebackgroundfactsinthiscase.SeeAcevedoII,204F.3dat4 %!(  7;AcevedoI,30F.Supp.2dat14345.Wesummarizethosefacts '8#* here,andsupplementourrecitationwithanoverviewofthepost e AcevedoIIdevelopments.  #  3      ׀   A.StipulatedandUndisputedFacts  X  ` DefendantVera,representingthePopularDemocraticParty   ("PDP"),wontheNovember1996mayoralelectioninAdjuntas,and 1  appointedDefendantGonzalez,afellowPDPmember,tobethe  x  DirectorofHumanResourcesonJanuary14,1997.VeraandGonzalez $  inheritedamunicipalgovernmentwhoserankswereswelledby115 5  newhiresduringthesevenyearadministrationofRigobertoRamos, |  Vera'spredecessor,andamemberoftherivalNewProgressiveParty ( ("NPP").Ofthose115employees,only2wereaffiliatedwiththe 9 PDP.ByJanuary1997,themunicipalityemployed229regular  employees,andthepartiesstipulatedpriortotrialthat"many , departmentsweresooverstaffedthatsomeemployeesdidnothave = desks."   ` OnApril30,1996,thePuertoRicoComptroller'sOffice 0 publishedanauditreport,M9614,indicatingthatAdjuntashad A  accruedannualbudgetdeficitsofatleast$1,000,000from1985to  " 1990.AfterVeratookofficeinJanuary1997,hecommissioneda "4$ secondfinancialauditofthemunicipalitybyReinaldoRamirez,a E$& certifiedpublicaccountant.RamirezpresentedhisreportonMay %!( 8,1997,informingcityofficialsthatthemunicipalityhada e budgetdeficitofover$5,000,000andlongtermdebtstotalingmore  than$2,000,000.Anticipatingthisunwelcomenews,Verahad X previouslyhiredaHumanResourcesConsultingfirminFebruary1997 i  topreparea"LayoffPlanforMunicipalityofAdjuntasEmployees"   (the"Plan").TheconsultantscompletedthePlaninMarch1997,  \  anditreceivedapprovalfromtheAdjuntasMunicipalAssemblyon m  April2,1997(asrequiredunderPuertoRico'sAutonomous   MunicipalitiesAct).See21P.R.LawsAnn.4551,asamended `  (1995)("Law81").OnApril11,1997,acopyofthePlanwas q  circulatedtoeverymunicipalemployee.   ` Inbroadstrokes,thePlan(1)enumeratedthestepsthe d municipalitywasobligedtoundertakebeforefiringemployees u (includingrelocation,retraining,temporaryunpaidleave, ! demotionstovacantpositions,andvoluntaryretirement);(2) h establishedanorderofpriorityforlayingoffmunicipalworkers; y and(3)establishedaseriesofproceduresforearmarking %  particularemployeesandjobclassificationsfortermination,and  l" forprovidingnoticetotheaffectedindividuals.ThePlanwasnot }"$ selfexecuting.Instead,itauthorizedtheterminationof )$& municipalemployees"[w]hentheMayordeterminesthatthereare %p!( financialproblemsandthatasaresult,programsorservicesare '#* beingaffected."TheMayormadethisdeterminationinMay1997 -)$, afterconferringwithRamirezandtheHumanResourceconsultants, *t&. andheorderedcityofficialstoimplementthePlan.Whenthedust e settledonOctober31,1997,102employees,including82NPP  membersand11PDPmembers,hadbeenfiredfromtheircareer X positions. i   ` SinceJanuary1,1997,themunicipalityhashired   seventysevennewemployeesto"contract"orfixedtermjobsfunded  \  throughnonmunicipalsources(i.e.federalandstateprograms). m  Themostsignificantoftheseprograms,referredtoas"Law52,"   allowsmunicipalitiestopresentjobtrainingproposalstothe `  LaborDepartmentoftheCommonwealthofPuertoRico,whichmaythen q  appropriatefundsonanannualbasistounderwritethesalariesof  acertainnumberofmunicipalemployeesthatthecitycouldnot d otherwiseafford.Onlyfiveoftheeightytwoplaintiffsreceived u oneoftheseseventysevenappointments,thevastmajorityofwhich ! wenttoPDPmembers. h  B.ContestedFacts  y  ` Thetrialfeaturedacontentiousdisputeregardingthe A  periodprecedingtheOctober31,1997,layoffs.Thetwenty  " plaintiffsinthefirsttrialgrouptestifiedthat,duringthis "4$ period,thedefendantssabotagedtheirworkingconditionsby E$& denyingNPPemployees(andonlyNPPemployees)basicamenities, %!( includingphoneprivileges,shortworkbreaksforbreakfast,access '8#* torestroomfacilities,andtheopportunitytodrivemunicipal I)$, vehiclestoperformtheirjobfunctions.Manyplaintiffstestified *&. thattheywereremovedfromtheirjobsentirely,andsenttorandom e locationswheretheywereeithergivennothingtodoformonthson  endorelseorderedtoperformmenialtasksoutsidethescopeof X theirjobdescriptions.Thedefendantsdeniedtheseallegations, i  contendingthatpriorabusesoftelephoneprivilegesandmunicipal   vehicleshadcontributedtolargebudgetoverrunsthatcompelled  \  themunicipalitytorestrictaccesstotheseservices.According m  todefendants,thedearthoffunctioningbathroomfacilitieswasa   consequenceofplumbingandphysicalinfrastructuredeficiencies `  thatwereignoredduringthepreviousNPPmayoraladministrations. q   ` Therewasalsoafactualcontroversyconcerningthe  implementationofthePlan.Thedefendantsinsistedthatthe d particularlayoffschemedevelopedinaccordancewiththePlanwas u politicallyneutralinbothitsconceptionandimplementation. ! NotingthatpriorNPPadministrationshadalmostexclusivelyhired h NPPmemberstofilloverahundredmunicipalpositionsinthe y precedingyears,theyclaimeditwasinevitablethataseniority %  basedlayoffplanwoulddisproportionatelyimpactNPPemployees.  l" Ѐ ` Plaintiffspresentedevidenceofadifferentagenda.In }"$ theirview,MayorVeramanipulatedthePlantoproduce )$& discriminatoryresultsinthreeways.First,hecontravened %p!( provisionsofthePlanbyfailingtoseriouslyconsidermeasures '#* shortofoutrighttermination,includingrelocation,retraining, -)$, temporaryunpaidleave,demotionstovacantpositions,and *t&. voluntaryretirement.   #  4      ׀Second,thelayoffschemedeveloped e pursuanttothePlantiedterminationtosenioritywithinjob  classifications,ratherthanseniorityacrosstheboard. X Hypothetically,underthisscheme,anNPPlibrarianwithseven i  yearsofsenioritycouldbelaidoffwhileaPDPofficeclerkwith   fiveyearsofseniorityretainedherposition.Vera'sschemethus  \  eschewedthepossibilityofretrainingveteranNPPemployeesto m  takeoverthejobsoflessseniorPDPmemberswithjobsrequiring   asimilarskillset(butbearingadifferentclassification), `  therebyexacerbatingthediscriminatoryimpactofthelayoffs. q  Third,thesenioritysystememployedbydefendantsincorporateda  fixedyearsofservicethresholdeightyearsandtenmonths d thatdatedbackpreciselytotheendofthepreviousPDP u administrationinAdjuntas.Inotherwords,anyemployeewith ! eightyearsandtenmonthsofseniority(ormore)wasimmunefrom h thelayoffs.Accordingly,PDPmembershiredduringthatprevious y administrationwereinsulatedfromthelayoffs,whileallemployees %  mF  me m  hiredthereafter(duringtheinterveningNPPadministrations)were  atriskoftermination.   ` Finally,therewasevidencethatVeracontrivedtoshed rX NPPemployeeswithsufficientsenioritytowithstandtheinitial   roundoflayoffsbysimplyeliminatingtheirjobcategory   altogether.Forexample,ifanNPPmemberemployedasa"Citizens' v \  AffairsSpecialist"outrankedhisPDPcolleaguesontheseniority "  scale,themunicipalitywouldeliminatetheCitizens'Affairs   Specialistpositionentirely,andthenhirebacktheformerPDP z`  Citizens'AffairsSpecialistsundertheauspicesofLaw52orsome &  otheremploymentprogramfundedbyoutsidesources.    III.  ~d wQ  ` Asapreliminarymatter,wenotethatourreviewofthe F, legalissuesinthiscaseishandicappedconsiderablybythe  defendants'failuretoproducetranscriptsofthesecondhalfof  thetrial.ThedefensebeganpresentingitscaseonOctober29, J0 andthecourtissueditsinstructionstothejuryonNovember19.   Theonlyrecordofthedefendants'caseinchiefbeforeusisa  " smallexcerptofMayorVera'sdirecttestimonyonOctober30,and N"4$ anexcerptofCPARamirez'sdirecttestimonyonNovember6.The #& informativevalueofeventhesetidbitsisreducedsubstantiallyby %!( thedefendants'failuretoprovideatranscriptofthecross R'8#* examinationofthesewitnessesbyplaintiffs'counsel.  ($,  ` Rule10oftheFederalRulesofAppellateProcedure *&. clearlystatesthat"[i]ftheappellantintendstourgeonappeal V,<(0 thatafindingorconclusionisunsupportedbytheevidenceoris  contrarytotheevidence,theappellantmustincludeintherecord  atranscriptofallevidencerelevanttothatfindingor rX conclusion."Fed.R.App.P.10(b)(2).Elaboratingonthis   requirement,wehaveadmonishedappellants"witharegulatory   borderingonthemonotonous"that v \  8 ` [t]hisruleimposesadutyuponanappellant "  toprintalloftheevidence,goodandbad,   materialtothepointhewishestoraise.   Shouldanappellantspurnthisdutyanddrape   anincompleterecordaroundthecourt'sneck, z`  thecourtinitsdiscretioneithermay P6 scrutinizethemeritsofthecaseinsofaras &  therecordpermits,ormaydismisstheappeal  ifabsenceofafulltranscriptthwarts  intelligentreview.Inthisvein,wehave  held...that,shouldtherecordprovidedon ~d appealprecludeusfromreachingareasoned T: determinationonthemerits,itisthe * appellantwhomustbearthebruntofan  insufficientrecordonappeal.` x` x Ѐ  WMoorev.Murphy,47F.3d8,1011(1stCir.1995)(internal h citationsandquotationsomitted);seeScarfov.CabletronSys., . Inc.,54F.3d931,963(1stCir.1995);UnitedStatesv.OneMotor   YachtNamedMercury,527F.2d1112,1113(1stCir.1975).  l"  ` Weareleftwithnochoicebuttoconfineourreviewof 2"$ defendants'challengestothoseclaimsadequatelygroundedinthe #& portionsoftherecordproducedonappeal.Asweworkourway %p!( throughtheirmanifoldclaimsoferror,weidentifythose 6'#* challengesthatweareunabletoevaluateowingtotheprocedural ($, default. *t&. Ѐ  :, (0 A.PreTrialRulings   1.Sufficiencyoftheevidenceatthesummaryjudgmentstage   ` Inpartiallydenyingdefendants'motionforsummary t dispositionofplaintiffs'politicaldiscriminationclaims,the :  districtcourtofferedthefollowingexplanationforitsruling:   8 ` Plaintiffshaveputforthsufficientevidence  x  tosustaintheirinitialburdenthat h N  Defendants'employmentdecisionswerebasedon >$  improperanddiscriminatorymotives.   Defendantshave,however,putforthevidence   insupportoftheirburdenthatregardlessof   Plaintiffs'politicalaffiliation,the |  municipalbudgetarycrisisrequiredthe lR municipalitytocutjobsonthebasisof B( seniority....TheCourtfindsthatthis  profferofevidenceissufficientto  demonstratethatregardlessofpolitical  affiliation,Defendantswouldhavemadethe  samedecisioninlayingoffPlaintiffs.pV` x` x `AcevedoI,30F.Supp.2dat154.Defendantscontendthatthis  findingmandatedthedismissalofplaintiffs'political  discriminationclaimsundertheruleestablishedinMt.Healthy tZ CitySch.Dis.Bd.ofEduc.v.Doyle,429U.S.274,287(1977),and   insistthatthedistrictcourterredinshiftingtheburdenof ! proofbacktoplaintiffstodemonstratethat"theywouldnothave x!^# beenfired'butfor'theirpoliticalaffiliation."AcevedoI,30 $# % F.Supp.2dat154(citingRodriguezPintov.TiradoDelgado,982 $ ' F.2d34,39(1stCir.1993);AvilesMartinezv.Monroig,963F.2d |&b") 2,5(1stCir.1992)).Thecourtcompoundeditserror,in (($+ defendants'view,bypostponingafinalrulingonplaintiffs' )%- politicaldiscriminationclaimspendingthesubmissionof +f'/ additionalevidencefromplaintiffstodemonstratethattheywere  qualifiedtofilltheseventysevennewpositionscreatedbythe  municipalityafterJanuary1,1997.Defendantsarguethatthe rX courtwasobligedtoruleintheirfavoronthebasisofthe   insufficientevidencecurrentlybeforeit.    ` Theseobjectionsareunavailing.Whenadistrictcourt's v \  assessmentoftheevidentiaryrecordatthesummaryjudgmentstage "  issubsequently"overtaken"byafulltrialandverdict,itisour   practicenottorevisitthatdeterminationonappeal: z`  8 ` Weneednotaddressthemeritsof[a] &  preverdictchallengetothesufficiencyofthe  evidenceonthemotionforsummaryjudgment.  Suchanattackonthedenialofdefendant's  motionforsummaryjudgment"hasbeen ~d overtakenbysubsequentevents,namely,a T: fulldresstrialandanadversejuryverdict" * ...Therationaleforthisrulehasbeen  basedontheproceduralfactthatdenialofa  motionforsummaryjudgment"ismerelya  judge'sdeterminationthatgenuineissuesof h materialfactexist.Itisnotajudgment, X> anddoesnotforeclosetrialonissueson . whichsummaryjudgmentwassought."Hence,a  challengetothesufficiencyoftheevidence   adducedonthemotiontosupportthedistrict ! court'sconclusionthatgenuineissuesof  l" materialfactexistwillnotlieonappeal.\!B#` x` x LkEasternMountainPlatformTennis,Inc.v.SherwinWilliamsCo.,40 #% F.3d492,500(1stCir.1994)(internalcitationsomitted). $ ' Accordingly,anysufficiencyoftheevidencechallengeonappeal `&F") mustbegroundedintherecordasawhole.Here,defendantsalso  (#+  arguethatthetrialrecordconsideredinitsentiretydidnot )%- supportthejuryverdict,andweaddressthatclaimlaterinthe  discussion.   2.Severance rX  ` OnOctober11,1997,thedistrictcourtseveredthecase   intofourseparatetrials,findingthat   8 ` itisnotpracticalorjusttosubjectone v \  jurypaneltoatrialinwhich82plaintiffs L 2  withvaryingclaimswillbetestifying.No "  singlejurypanelwouldbeabletoremember   allofthetestimonyandevidenceorbeable   toreachafairandimpartialverdictatthe   endofthattime.Itistheopinionofthis z`  Courtthatseverancewillmostlikelyresult P6 inajustfinaldispositionofthis &  litigation.` x` x rThedefendantsobjectedonnumerousgrounds,arguinginteralia  thatthecourt'sproposal(1)precludeddefendantsfromeliciting T: contradictorytestimonyamongplaintiffs,(2)imposedincreased  expenseandinconvenienceondefendantsbycompellingthe  examinationofexpertwitnessesandgovernmentofficialsonfour X> occasionsratherthanone,(3)reducedthelikelihoodofan  impartialjuryforthesecond,thirdandfourthplaintiffgroups, ! and(4)hampereddefendants'abilitytoportraytherelevantevents \!B# tothejuryinacomprehensivefashion.OnOctober15,thecourt #% emphaticallyrejectedtheseconcernsinawrittenruling: $ ' 8 ` TheconsiderationsallegedbyDefendantsasto `&F") thefactthattheywouldhavetopresent 6'#* evidenceatfourdifferentoccasionsisof  (#+ secondaryimportance."Aparamount ($, considerationatalltimesinthe )%- administrationofjusticeisafairand *t&.  impartialtrialtoalllitigants. d+J'/ Considerationsofeconomyoftime,moneyand  convenienceofwitnessesmustyieldthereto."` x` x  xAcevedoGarciav.VeraMonroig,240F.R.D.26,30(D.P.R.2001)  (quotingInreBendectinLitigation,857F.2d290,308(6thCir. H. 1988)).    ` Defendantslodgetwoobjectionstotheseveranceon    appeal.First,theyarguethatthedistrictcourt'srefusaltotry L 2  theclaimsofalleightytwoplaintiffsatoncewasinappropriate   andunfairlyprejudicial.Wecandispensewiththisargument   quickly.Thedecisiontoseparatepartiesorclaimsisacase P6 managementdetermination"peculiarlywithinthediscretionofthe  trialcourt,"GonzalezMarinv.EquitableLifeAssuranceSocy.,845  F.2d1140,1145(1stCir.1998),andcourtsofappealsaccordbroad T: latitudetodistrictcourtsinthisarea.Id.;Applewhitev.  ReicholdChems.,Inc.,67F.3d571,574(5thCir.1995);NewYork  v.HendricksonBros.,Inc.,840F.2d1065,1082(2dCir.1988).We X> wouldnote,however,thatweneednotrestouraffirmanceonthis  deferentialstandardofreviewthecircumstancesofthiscase ! compeltheconclusionthatthedivisionofplaintiffswasa \!B# legitimateandfeasiblemeansofefficientlyconductingthis #% unwieldylitigation. $ '  ` Defendants'secondobjectionismoretroublesome,and `&F") implicatestheparticularproceduraldeviceemployedbythe  (#+ districtcourttoquartertheproceedings."Twotypesof )%- severancesorseparationsofclaimsarecontemplatedbytheFederal d+J'/ RulesofCivilProcedureonewithintheactionitself,theother  resultinginasecond,ornewaction."OfficialComm.ofUnsecured  Creditorsv.Shapiro,190F.R.D.352,354(E.D.Pa.2000).Rule21 rX oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurefurnishesthemechanismfor   separatingacaseintoseparateactions,i.e,severance:"Parties   maybedroppedoraddedbyorderofthecourtonmotionofany v \  partyorofitsowninitiativeatanystageoftheactionandon "  suchtermsasarejust.Anyclaimagainstapartymaybesevered   andproceededwithseparately."Fed.R.Civ.P.21;see9Charles z`  AlanWright&ArthurR.Miller,FederalPracticeandProcedure &  2387(1971);88C.J.S.Trial17(2003)("Aseveranceoccurswhen  alawsuitisdividedintotwoormoreseparateandindependentor ~d distinctcauses.").Rule42(b),ontheotherhand,authorizes * courtstodivideasingleactionintoseparatetrialsthatremain  undertheumbrellaoftheoriginalsolitaryaction: h 8 ` Thecourt,infurtheranceofconvenienceorto . avoidprejudice,orwhenseparatetrialswill  beconducivetoexpeditionandeconomy,may   orderaseparatetrialofanyclaim,cross ! claim,counterclaim,orthirdpartyclaim,or  l" ofanyseparateissueorofanynumberof \!B# claims,crossclaims,counterclaims,third 2"$ partyclaims,orissues.#%` x` x Fed.R.Civ.P.42(b);see9Wright&Miller,FederalPracticeand $ ' Procedure2387;88C.J.S.Trial17("Anorderforaseparate `&F") trialkeepsthelawsuitintactwhileenablingthecourttohearand  (#+ decideoneormoreissueswithouttryingallofthecontroverted )%- issuesatthesamehearing."). d+J'/ aOa a a   ` Thesalientdistinctionbetweenthesetwoprocedural  devicesconcernstheappealabilityofanorderterminatingthe  proceedingsinapartitionedpieceofthelitigation: rX 8 ` Thejudgmentinaseveredactionisfinal,   enforceableandappealablewhenitdisposesof   allpartiesandissues.Conversely,theorder   enteredattheconclusionofaseparatetrial    isofteninterlocutorybecauseafinaland v \  appealablejudgmentcannotberendereduntil L 2  allofthecontrollingissueshavebeentried "  anddecided. ` x` x  88C.J.S.Trial17;seeWhitev.ABCOEng'gCorp.,199F.3d140,   145n.6(3dCir.1999);9Wright&Miller,FederalPracticeand P6 Procedure2387(1971)("Separatetrialsusuallywillresultin  onejudgment,butseveredclaimsbecomeentirelyindependent  actionstobetried,andjudgmententeredthereon, T: independently.").   ` Courtsoftenconfusethesetwoproceduraldevices."The  procedureauthorizedbyRule42(b)shouldbedistinguishedfrom X> severanceunderRule21....Unfortunately,thisdistinction,  clearenoughintheory,oftenisobscuredinpracticesinceat ! timesthecourtstalkof'separatetrial'and'severance' \!B# interchangeably."9Wright&Miller,FederalPracticeand #% Procedure2387;seeMcDanielv.AnheuserBusch,Inc.,987F.2d $ ' 298,304(5thCir.1993).Here,defendantsarguethatthecourt `&F") committedreversibleerrorbyinvokingRule42(b)asthebasisfor  (#+ partitioningtheplaintiffsintofourgroupswhileconductingthe )%- proceedingsasiftheyhadbeenseveredunderRule21. d+J'/  ` ThedistrictcourtaddressedthedistinctionbetweenRule  42(b)andRule21initsOctober15decision:  8 ` Intheinstantmotion,Defendantscontendthat rX severanceofactionsiscoveredbyRule21of H. theFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,andnot   byRule42(b).Thisdistinctionisoflittle   consequencebecausebothrulesprovidethe   Courtwithwidediscretiontoorderseverance    ....TheCourt'sdeterminationasto v \  whetheritshouldsevertheclaimsof L 2  PlaintiffsunderRule21orwhetheritshould "  orderseparatetrialsunderRule42requires   thesameconsiderations,andarewithinthe   broaddiscretionoftheDistrictCourt. ` x` x kAcevedoGarcia,204F.R.D.at2930.Althoughthecourtaccurately P6 observedthatithadwidediscretiontomanagethelitigationunder  eitherrule,theparticularproceduraldeviceitemployedisof  paramountimportanceinthisappeal.Becauseourjurisdictionis T: limitedto"allfinaldecisionsofthedistrictcourtsofthe  UnitedStates,"UnitedStatesv.Leichter,160F.3d33,35(1st  Cir.1998)(emphasisadded),wecannotexercisejurisdictionover X> anappealfromaseparatetrialordainedunderRule42(b).SeeIn  reLicht&Semonoff,796F.2d564,569(1stCir.1986)("A'final ! decision'isordinarilyonewhichdisposesofalltherightsofall \!B# thepartiestoanaction.")(emphasisadded).Moreover,since #% separatetrialsdonotindividuallyproducefinaljudgments,any $ ' attempttoapplycollateralestoppeltotheremainingthreetrials `&F") wouldbeinvalidunderaRule42(b)regime.SeeNLRBv.DonnaLee  (#+ SportswearCo.,836F.2d31,3334(1stCir.1987)(notingthatone )%- "essentialelementwhichmustbepresentforthesuccessful d+J'/ applicationofissuepreclusion"isthat"thedeterminationmust  resultinavalidandfinaljudgment.")(emphasisadded);Griffin  v.Burns,570F.2d1065,1072(1stCir.1978)(same);Restatement rX (Second)ofJudgements27(same).    ` Asdefendantsconcede,thisisnotacasewherethe   districtcourt'sintentionswereambiguous.SeeMcDaniel,987F.2d v \  at304.Thedistrictcourt'sorderofOctober11explicitlystates "  that"[e]achJudgmententeredattheendofeachofthesefour   trialsshallbefinalandappealableandpublishedandsubjectto z`  allmotionsprovidedbytheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,such &  as'newtrial,''judgmentnotwithstandingtheverdict',etc."  Additionally,initsopinionrejectingdefendants'objectionsto ~d theseverance,thecourtreasonedthat * 8 ` conductingseparatetrialswhereinthejury  verdictfromeachtrialisfinaland  appealableastoeachsetofPlaintiffs h facilitatesjudicialeconomyandpossible X> settlementinthiscasebyprovidingthe . partieswithsomescaleormodeluponwhichto  reassesswhetherfurtherlitigationwouldbe   prudentoradvantageoustotheircause.!` x` x AcevedoGarcia,204F.R.D.at30.Thus,thecourt'sreferencesto \!B# Rule42(b)notwithstanding,itsclearlyarticulatedintentwasto #% severtheplaintiffspursuanttoRule21.TheThirdCircuit $ ' observedinWhitethat"[n]othingonthefaceofRule21indicates `&F") thatitmustbeexplicitlyinvokedinordertohaveeffect.There  (#+ mustbe,however,astrongindicationthatthejudgeintendedto )%- effectaseverance."White,199F.3dat145n.6(citingAllied d+J'/ Elevator,Inc.v.E.Tex.StateBankofBuna,965F.2d34,36(5th  Cir.1992)).Thatintentismanifestfromthelanguageofthe  court'sOctober11order.Accordingly,wefindnoreversibleerror rX inthecourt'sseverancerulingunderRule21,andweregardthe   districtcourt'sentryofjudgmentontheverdictbelowasafinal   andappealablejudgmentunder28U.S.C.1291.b  #  5       v \   B.TheTrial  "  1.Evidentiaryrulings    ` Plaintiffsaptlycharacterizethedefendants'challenges |  tothedistrictcourt'sevidentiaryrulingsas"rambling," B( "discursive"and"unrefined."Defendants'briefsnarratively  reciteaplethoraofoffendingrulingsinascattershotformat  devoidoflegalauthority,citationstoanalogouscases,orany F, applicationoflawtofacts.Manyofdefendants'challenges  referenceevidentiaryrulingsand/orcourtroomexchangesthat  occurredduringtheirowncaseinchief,andhenceareprocedurally  defaultedasaconsequenceoftheirfailuretoproducetherelevant rX transcripts.Thebriefsalsoleaveuncertainwhichofthedozens   ofevidentiarychallengesraisedonappealwereproperlypreserved   below.SeeReyesGarciav.Rodriguez&DelValle,Inc.,82F.3d v \  11,14(1stCir.1996).Withoneexception,theevidentiary "  challengesthatsurvivetheseproceduraldefects lackthedeveloped   argumentationneededtotriggerreviewonthemerits."Wehave z`  steadfastlydeemedwaivedissuesraisedonappealinaperfunctory &  manner,notaccompaniedbydevelopedargumentation."Mulvihillv.  TopFliteGolfCo.,335F.3d15,27(1stCir.2003). ~d Ѐ ` Theoneevidentiarychallengethatdoesmeritour * attentionisthedefendants'contentionthatthecourtimproperly  admittedevidenceaboutclaimsnotatissuenamely,political h harassmentclaimsfiledbyparticularplaintiffsthatthecourthad . earlierdismissed.Defendantscorrectlypointoutthat,insome   cases,evidenceofpreviouslydismissedclaimsmayhaveanundue  l" tendencytosuggestadecisiononanimproperbasis.However,the 2"$ SupremeCourthasruledthatsuchevidenceisnotipsofacto #& inadmissible,notingthat"[a]discriminatoryactwhichisnotmade %p!( thebasisfora[]charge...mayconstituterelevantbackground 6'#* evidenceinaproceedinginwhichthestatusofacurrentpractice ($, isatissue."UnitedAirLines,Inc.v.Evans,431U.S.553,558 *t&. (1977);seeO'Rourkev.CityofProvidence,235F.3d713,726(1st :, (0 Cir.2001);Morrisonv.CarletonWoolenMills,Inc.,108F.3d429,  439(1stCir.1997).Wefindnoabuseofdiscretioninthe  districtcourt'sdecisiontoadmitthisevidenceasrelevant rX background"toshowtheatmosphereinwhich[plaintiffs]livedand   developedsinceMayorVerawaselectedMayor."   2.Activeparticipationofthecourt v \   ` Defendantsallegethatatvariousjuncturesduringthe "  trialthedistrictcourtinaccuratelyandprejudiciallycommented   ontheevidence,truncatedthedefendants'crossexaminationof z`  severalplaintiffs,andchastiseddefensewitnessesinfrontofthe &  jury.Aswehavepreviouslyobserved,itiswellsettledthat  thetrialjudge"hasaperfectrightalbeitarightthatshould ~d beexercisedwithcaretoparticipateactivelyinthetrial * proper."Loguev.Dore,103F.3d1040,1045(1stCir.1997)."A  trialjudgeretainsthecommonlawpowertoquestionwitnessesand h tocommentontheevidence....Aninquiryintothejudge's . conductofthetrialnecessarilyturnsonthequestionofwhether   thecomplainingpartycanshowseriousprejudice."UnitedStates  l" v.GonzalezSoberal,109F.3d64,72(1stCir.1997). 2"$  ` Wereiteratethatthecomplaintsgroundedindefendants' #& caseinchiefaredefaultedonthebasisofaninadequaterecord. %p!( Defendantsalsofailtodemonstrate"seriousprejudice"arising 6'#* fromthecourt'sparticipationduringplaintiffs'caseinchief. ($, Thiswasalengthyandcontentioustrialfeaturingdozensof *t&. witnesses,numeroussidebarconferences,andamyriadofother :, (0 proceduraldelaysarising,interalia,fromtheinartfullabeling  andintroductionofexhibits,translationdifficulties,anda  continuingstreamofobjectionsfrombothparties.Underthese rX challengingcircumstances,thecourt'seffortstoacceleratethe   paceofthetrialwithinfrequentcommentaryontheevidenceand   theoccasionalproddingofwitnesseswereamplyjustifiedandwell v \  withinitsdiscretion.SeeRosarioDiazv.Gonzalez,140F.3d312, "  315(1stCir.1998)("TheCivilRulesendowjudgeswithformidable   casemanagementauthority....Inexercisingthispower,trial z`  judgesenjoygreatlatitude.")(citationsomitted). &   C.PostTrialRulings   1.QualifiedImmunity   ` TheSupremeCourthasrecognizedthatqualifiedimmunity F, embodies"anentitlementnottostandtrialorfacetheother  burdensoflitigation,conditionedontheresolutionofthe  essentiallylegalquestionwhethertheconductofwhichthe J0 plaintiffcomplainsviolatedclearlyestablishedlaw."Mitchellv.   Forsyth,472U.S.511,526(1985).Defendants'effortstoinvoke  " theprotectionsofqualifiedimmunityatthesummaryjudgment N"4$ stage,however,wererejectedbythedistrictcourt,which #& concludedthat"[p]laintiffs[]profferedevidenceofatriable %!( issueoffactregardingapotentiallydiscriminatoryapplicationof R'8#* theLayoffPlan....Therefore,Defendantsarenotentitledto ($, qualifiedimmunityfortheirallegedlydiscriminatoryactions *&. merelybecausetheyasserttheyactedpursuantto[theLayoff V,<(0 Plan]."AcevedoI,30F.Supp.2dat149.Aspreviouslynoted,we  dismisseddefendants'interlocutoryappealfromthisruling,  determiningthatwelackedjurisdictiontoreviewthefactual rX groundsforthedistrictcourt'sdenialofqualifiedimmunity.   AcevedoII,204F.3dat10.    ` Afterthejuryreturneditsverdict,defendantsrenewed v \  theirchallengetothecourt'sdenialofqualifiedimmunity,c  #  6       "  arguingthatinlightofthefactselicitedattrial,"the   unlawfulnessofimplementingalayoffplandulyapprovedbythe z`  municipallegislatureaccordingtosenioritywouldnothavebeen &  apparenttoareasonableofficial."(citingHarlowv.Fitzgerald,  457U.S.800,818(1982)).Thecourtonceagainrejected ~d defendants'claim,concludingthatthejury'sfindingsforeclosed * theavailabilityofimmunity:  8 ` Fortherecord,theprohibitionagainst h politicaldiscriminationwasclearly X> establishedin1997whenDefendantsactedto . violatePlaintiffs'constitutionallyprotected  rights.Ajurytrialwasheldwherein   Plaintiffspresentedevidencethatsupported ! theirallegationsofpoliticaldiscrimination.  l" TheevidenceledtheJurytoconcludethat \!B# politicalaffiliationwasinfacta 2"$ substantialormotivatingfactorforMayor #% VeraMonroig'sandIrmaGonzalez'sactions.. #& ..Therefore,thequalifiedimmunityargument $ '  thatDefendantsnowmakeissimplyanattempt %p!( torewritethefactsandrelitigatethis  case.` x` x   ` Defendantsallegetwoerrorsinthedistrictcourt's  postverdictdenialofqualifiedimmunity.First,theyclaimthat H. thecourterredinfailingtodelivertwoproposedinstructionson   qualifiedimmunitytothejury:    1. ` ProposedJuryInstruction51:QualifiedImmunity L 2  0 ` Governmentofficialsperformingdiscretionaryfunctions   aregrantedqualifiedimmunityfromcivilclaimsfor   damages,iftheirconductatthetimeoftheallegedacts   thatgiverisetothecivildamages"doesnotviolate z`  clearlyestablishedstatutoryorconstitutionalrightsof P6 whichareasonablepersonwouldhaveknown."The &  relevantinquiry"istheobjectivequestionwhethera  reasonableofficercouldhavebelievedtheactions  allegedbytheplaintiffherein"tobelawful,inlight  ofclearlyestablishedlawandtheinformationthestate ~d officialpossessed.T:` (#` (# 2.0 ` ProposedJuryInstruction53:ReachofQualified  Immunity` (#` (# 0 ` Evendefendantswhoviolateconstitutionalrightsenjoy h aqualifiedimmunitythatprotectsthemfromliability X> fordamagesunlessitisfurtherdemonstratedthattheir . conductwasunreasonablewithrespecttoclearly  establishedrightsandlawsatthetimeoftheconductat   issue.!` (#` (# TAfterproposingtheseinstructions,defendantsconcedethatthey \!B# failedtoobjectontherecordtothecourt'srefusaltoissuethe #% instructionsbeforethejuryretiredtodeliberate.Accordingly, $ ' wereviewforplainerroronly.SeeChestnutv.CityofLowell, `&F") 305F.3d18,20(1stCir.2002)(enbanc)("Failurestoobject,  (#+ unlessatruewaiverisinvolved,arealmostalwayssubjectto )%- reviewforplainerror.");AdvisoryCommitteeontheFederalRules d+J'/ ofCivilProcedure,ReportoftheCivilRulesAdvisoryCommittee  6268(March14,2001),revisedJul.31,2001(modifyingRule51of  theFederalRulesofCivilProceduretoprovideforplainerror rX reviewofchallengestojuryinstructionswheretheclaimwasnot   properlypreserved).    ` Theavailabilityofqualifiedimmunityafteratrialis v \  alegalquestioninformedbythejury'sfindingsoffact,but "  ultimatelycommittedtothecourt'sjudgment."Whenthecasegoes   totrial,thejuryitselfdecidestheissuesofhistoricalfact z`  thataredeterminativeofthequalifiedimmunitydefense,butthe &  jurydoesnotapplythelawrelatingtoqualifiedimmunitytothose  historicalfactsitfinds;thatisthecourt'sduty."Johnsonv. ~d Breeden,280F.3d1308,1318(11thCir.2002);seeSinghv.Blue * Cross/BlueShieldofMass.,308F.3d25,34(1stCir.2002);Swain  v.Spinney,117F.3d1,10(1stCir.1997).Accordingly,therewas h noerror,letaloneplainerror,inthedistrictcourt'srefusalto . submittheproposedqualifiedimmunityinstructionstothejury.    ` Defendantsalsocontendthatthecourtcommitted  l" reversibleerrorwhenitfailedtograntanewtrialorjudgment 2"$ notwithstandingtheverdictonthebasisofqualifiedimmunity. #& Theyreinforcethissecondclaimoferrorwithtwolegalarguments. %p!( First,theyassertthatthedistrictcourtmisappliedthesecond 6'#* prongofthefamiliarthreeprongedqualifiedimmunitytest: ($, 8 ` Determiningwhetherqualifiedimmunityis *t&. availabletoaparticulardefendantata d+J'/ particulartimerequiresatrifurcated :, (0 inquiry.Weask,first,whethertheplaintiff  hasallegedtheviolationofaconstitutional  right.Ifso,wethenaskwhetherthe  contoursoftherightweresufficiently  establishedatthetimeofthealleged rX violation.Finally,weaskwhetheran H. objectivelyreasonableofficialwouldhave   believedthattheactiontakenoromitted   violatedthatright. ` x` x Hatchv.Dept.forChildren,YouthandtheirFamilies,274F.3d12, v \  20(1stCir.2001).Defendantscontendthatthecourterroneously "  characterizedthe"constitutionalright"atissueasplaintiffs'   rightnottobediscriminatedagainstonthebasisoftheir z`  politicalbeliefsduringtheimplementationofthelayoffplan. &  Theydecrytheexcessiveabstractnessofthis"right,"citing  languagefromtheSupremeCourt'sdecisioninAndersonv. ~d Creighton,483U.S.635(1987): * 8 ` Theoperationofthisstandarddepends  substantiallyuponthelevelofgeneralityat  whichtherelevant"legalrule"istobe h identified....If[referringtotheright X> todueprocessoflaw]thetestof"clearly . establishedlaw"weretobeappliedatthis  levelofgenerality,itwouldbearno   relationshiptothe"objectivelegal ! reasonableness"thatisthetouchstoneof  l" Harlow.Plaintiffswouldbeabletoconvert \!B# theruleofqualifiedimmunitythatourcases 2"$ plainlyestablishintoaruleofvirtually #% unqualifiedliabilitysimplybyalleginga #& violationofextremelyabstractrights.$ '` x` x ЀiId.at639;seeRiveraRamosv.Roman,156F.3d276,27980(1st `&F") Cir.1998).Itisdifficulttodivinefromdefendants'briefshow  (#+ theywouldarticulatetherightatissuethepertinent )%- discussionisgearedexclusivelytodemonstratingtheabsenceof d+J'/ anyclearlyestablishedruleregulatingtheimplementationof  senioritybasedlayoffplans.Ofcourse,thisapproachcommitsthe  Andersonfallacyinreversebyconstruingtherelevantrights/rules rX withsuchspecificitythatthepredictablyscantjurisprudenceon   pointwouldneversatisfythe"clearlyestablished"threshold.    ` Intheend,theirargumentisunavailing.Theclearly v \  establishedlawbothinthiscircuitandbeyondprecludes "  governmentofficialsfromdischargingcivilor"career"employees   forpoliticallymotivatedreasons.SeeBrantiv.Finkel,445U.S. z`  507(1980);Elrodv.Burns,427U.S.347(1976);RoldanPlumey,115 &  F.3dat6566;JirauBernalv.Agrait,37F.3d1,3(1stCir.  1994).Thecomplexityofthemunicipality'sworkforcereduction ~d plansuggeststhatitwasconceivedbytheAdjuntasmunicipal * assemblyasapoliticallyneutralmeansofrespondingtothecity's  fiscalcrisis.Yetthejurycouldreasonablyhavefoundthatwhile h thePlanitselfwaspoliticallyneutral,themethodof . implementationrevealedthedefendants'discriminatoryintent.    ` Defendantsalsoraiseachallengeunderthethirdprong  l" ofHatch,relyingonstipulatedfactspaintingableakpictureof 2"$ themunicipality'sfinancialstatus,seesupra,andtheconclusory #& assertionthat"theaforementionedsetofcircumstancesclearly %p!( demonstratethatdefendantsactedwithinthereasonableboundaries 6'#* oftheirdutiesunderthelayoffplan."Inlimitingtheirfocus ($, totheobjectivecircumstancessurroundingtheimplementationof *t&. thePlan,defendantsmisconceivethesalientinquiryunderthe :, (0 thirdprongofthequalifiedimmunityanalysis.Asweobservedin  Tangv.StateofRhodeIsland,120F.3d325(1stCir.1997):  8 ` Theobjectivetestfocusesonthe rX reasonablenessoftheofficial'sconduct H. independentofmotive.Itisrarelygoingto   bemanifestlyunreasonable,judgedapartfrom   motive,to[takecertainactionagainst]an   employee.Butbecauseofspecial    constitutionalorstatutoryprotections,some v \  motivescanconvert[thosedecisions]into L 2  causesofaction." ` x` x Id.at327(emphasisinoriginal).Indeed,werecognizedin   AcevedoIIthatillicitmotiveisthetouchstoneofapolitical z`  discriminationclaim:"Theplaintiffsallegethattheywere &  terminatedbecauseoftheirpoliticalaffiliation,aconstitutional  claimthathasnomeaningabsenttheallegationofimpermissible ~d motivation."AcevedoII,204F.3dat11;seeStellav.Kelley,63 * F.3d71,7475(1stCir.1995).Here,asplaintiffspointout,  "thejuryverdictnecessarilyrejectedtheclaimthattheseniority h systemwasapoliticallyneutralmethodforimplementingtheLayoff . Plan."    ` Finally,defendantsinsistthattheSupremeCourt's  l" decisioninSaucierv.Katz,533U.S.194(2001),establishes"a 2"$ marginforerrorsandexpandsthezoneofprotectionin #& discretionarydeterminationswhereanofficialreasonablybelieved %p!( thatheactedreasonablyalthough[he]waslaterfoundtohave 6'#* actedunlawfully."Thedistrictcourtaptlydisposedofthis ($,  argumentbelowbydistinguishingSaucieronitsfacts: *t&. 8 ` Saucierinvolvedamilitarypoliceofficer's   mistakenbutreasonablebeliefthatexcessive  forcewasneededtoprotecttheVicePresident  oftheUnitedStatesfromanunknown  demonstrator.Becausehighsecuritymeasures rX areneededtosafeguardaUnitedStatesVice H. President,becausethedegreeofdangerposed   bythedemonstratorwasunknown,andbecause   lawenforcementofficersareusuallyrequired   tomakesplitsecond,lifeanddeath    decisions,theCourtheldthattheofficer v \  actedreasonably...MayorVeraMonroigand L 2  IrmaGonzalezactedovera10monthperiodof "  time.Astheyhadalongperiodwithinwhich   toassessthesituation,theprobabilitythat   theycouldhavemadea"reasonablemistake"as   inthecaseofanofficerguardingtheVice z`  President,islargelydiminished.P6` x` x Accordingly,weconcludethatthedistrictcourtdidnoterrin  denyingdefendants'postverdictrequestforqualifiedimmunity.  2.Sufficiencyoftheevidence T:  ` Afterthejuryissueditsverdict,defendantsmovedfor  judgmentasamatteroflawunderRule50(b),orinthealternative  foranewtrialpursuanttoRule59.Thedistrictcourtdenied X> bothavenuesofrelief,anddefendantsappealed.Apartyseeking  recourseundereitherrulefacesanuphillbattle: ! D:8 ` Inreviewingthedenialofamotionfor \!B# directedverdictorforjudgment 2"$ notwithstandingtheverdict"wemustexamine #% theevidenceinthelightmostfavorableto #& theplaintiffanddeterminewhetherthereare $ ' factsandinferencesreasonablydrawnfrom %p!( thosefactswhichleadtobutoneconclusion `&F") Єthatthereisatotalfailureofevidenceto 6'#* proveplaintiff'scase." (#+` x` x !GutierrezRodriguezv.Cartagena,882F.2d553,558(1stCir.1989) )%- (quotingMayov.SchoonerCapitalCorp.,825F.2d566,568(1st d+J'/ Cir.1987)).WhenconsideringaRule59(a)motion,"adistrict  courtmaysetasideajury'sverdictandorderanewtrialonlyif  theverdictisagainstthedemonstrableweightofthecredible rX evidenceorresultsinablatantmiscarriageofjustice."Sanchez   v.PuertoRicoOilCo.,37F.3d712,717(1stCir.1994).    ` Defendants'failuretoproducethetranscriptsfromtheir v \  owncaseinchiefprecludesreviewoftheirsufficiencyofthe "  evidencechallenges.Itiswellsettledthatacourtmustreview   asufficiencyoftheevidencechallengeagainstthebackdropofthe z`  recordasawhole.SeeUnitedStatesv.McLaughlin,957F.2d12, &  18(1stCir.1992)("Inreviewingtherecordforasufficiencyof  theevidenceappeal,itiswellestablishedthattheevidencemust ~d beexaminedinitsentirety...");N.Y.StateElec.&GasCorp. * v.Sec'yofLabor,88F.3d98,108(2dCir.1996)("[T]he  sufficiencyoftheevidenceistestedonappealbyviewingthe h entirerecord.").Asnotedabove,Rule10oftheFederalRulesof . AppellateProcedurerequiresanappellantcontestingthe   sufficiencyoftheevidenceonappealto"includeintherecorda  l" transcriptofallevidencerelevanttothatfindingorconclusion." 2"$ Fed.R.App.P.10(b)(2).Ourpreviousjurisprudenceestablishes #& thattheevidence"relevant"toafindingofsufficiency(orlack %p!( thereof)istherecordasawhole.Since"itistheappellantwho 6'#* mustbearthebruntofaninsufficientrecordonappeal,"Moore,47 ($, F.3dat11,wemustconcludethatdefendantshaveprocedurally *t&. defaultedtheirsufficiencyoftheevidencechallenges. :, (0 3.Damages   ` Rule59(e)oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure  permitsapartyaggrievedbythejuryverdicttomove"toalteror rX amendthejudgment"withintendaysafterentryofjudgment.Fed.   R.Civ.P.59(e).PursuanttoRule59(e),thedefendantsfileda   timelymotionseekingreductionorremittiturofthedamageaward v \  foreachplaintiff.Wheredefendantsproperlypreserveachallenge "  totheamountofcompensatorydamagesawardedbythejury,"our   inquiryislimitedtodetermining'whetherthetrialcourtabused z`  itsdiscretioninrefusingtosetasidetheverdictasexcessive.'" &  Anthonyv.G.M.D.AirlineServs.,Inc.,17F.3d490,493(1stCir.  1994)(quotingMcDonaldv.Fed.Labs.,Inc.,724F.2d243,246(1st ~d Cir.1984)).Thereviewofapreservedchallengetoapunitive * damagesaward"isdenovo,andtheawardwillstandunlesswefind  it'certain'thattheamountinquestionexceedsthatnecessaryto h punishanddetertheallegedmisconduct."Romanov.UHaulInt'l, . 233F.3d655,672(1stCir.2000).    ` Thesedeferentialstandardsofreviewimplicitly  l" recognizethat"[t]ranslatinglegaldamageintomoneydamages 2"$ especiallyincaseswhichinvolvefewsignificantitemsof #& measurableeconomiclossisamatterpeculiarlywithinthe %p!( jury'sken."GutierrezRodriguezv.Cartagena,882F.2d553,577 6'#* (1stCir.1989);seeBrownv.FreedmanBakingCo.,810F.2d6,11 ($, (1stCir.1987)("Werarelywilloverridethejury'sjudgmenton *t&. theappropriateamountofdamagestobeawarded.");Segalv. :, (0 GilbertColorSystems,Inc.,746F.2d78,81(1stCir.1984)("This  courthasconsistentlydeclinedtoplayMondaymorningquarterback  inreviewingajury'sassessmentofdamages.").Consequently, rX defendantsbeartheonerousburdenofprovingtooursatisfaction   thatthedamageawardwas"grosslyexcessive,inordinate,shocking   totheconscienceofthecourt,orsohighthatitwouldbea v \  denialofjusticetopermitittostand."Correav.HospitalSan "  Francisco,69F.3d1184,1197(1stCir.1995)(quotingSegal,746   F.2dat81). z`   ` Thedistrictcourtissuedastrongendorsementofthe &  juryverdictinrejectingdefendants'Rule59(e)motionbelow:  8 ` TheCourtbelievesthattheJuryconsidered ~d alloftheevidencepresented,andfashioned T: theirawardinlightofPlaintiffs'economic * damages,anddamagesresultingfrompainand  suffering.Simplyput,theverdictwasnot  againsttheweightoftheevidence.  Consideringthesignificantdisruptionswhich h Defendants'actionscausedthePlaintiffs' X> lifestyles,theCourtdoesnotfindthatthe . compensatoryandpunitivedamagesawardfor  eachindividualPlaintiff...isgrossly   excessiveorinordinate.Further,after ! weighingtheevidence,theCourtfindsthat  l" thedamageawardalsodoesnotshockthe \!B# conscience.2"$` x` x AcevedoGarcia,213F.Supp.2dat53.Onappeal,defendants #& reiteratetheirobjectionstothejuryverdictasexcessive.They %p!( alsoraiseanewargumentthatwasnotsubmittedtothedistrict 6'#* courtnamely,thatthejury'sawardofcompensatorydamagesfor ($, dueprocessviolationswasduplicativeofthepolitical *t&. discriminationdamagesalsoawardedaspartoftheverdict. :, (0  ` a.Duplicatedamages   ` Thisargument,whichispremisedonanerroroflaw,has  moreforcethandefendants'factuallygroundedclaimofexcessive rX damages.Beforeaddressingtheconsequencesofdefendants'failure   topreservethisargumentbelow,weexaminethemeritsoftheclaim   itself. v \   ` Bywayofbackground,thejuryawardwasbrokendowninto "  fivecomponentsfortheeightplaintiffsallegingdiscrimination,   dueprocessviolationsandharassment: z`   n(83"e;"  e;"0 ` 2(  1  )3  0 ` (#` (#  Dueprocessviolations;e;""݌&  (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;#0 ` 2(  2  )3  0 ` (#` (#  Politicaldiscriminationintheformof  harassment;e;##݌ (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;$0 ` 2(  3  )3  0 ` (#` (#  Politicaldiscriminationresultingindismissal  causingpainandsuffering;e;$%݌~d (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;&0 ` 2(  4  )3  0 ` (#` (#  Politicaldiscriminationresultingindismissal Z@ causinglossofearnings;ande;&J&݌0 (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;h'0 ` 2(  5  )3  0 ` (#` (#  Punitivedamagese;h''݌  (# (# Ќ  "Forthetwelveplaintiffsallegingonlypoliticaldiscrimination  anddueprocessinjuries,thejuryawardcontainedalloftheabove dJ componentsexcept(2).p  #  7      ׀  gO$ ge g   ` Defendantspointoutthatplaintiffs'Fourteenth e Amendmentdueprocessclaimsarisefromthemunicipality'sfailure  tooffertheclaimantsalternativestooutrighttermination.The X consequencesofthisdenialofdueprocessincludethenormal i  injuriesassociatedwithremovalfromasecurejoblost   earnings,painandsufferingassociatedwithunemployment,lost  \  futureincome,etc.Defendantscontendthattheiralleged m  violationofdefendants'FirstAmendmentrightsresultedin   preciselythesameharms.Becausethejuryessentiallycompensated `  plaintiffsfortheirunemploymentinjuriestwiceonceundera q  FirstAmendmenttheoryandonceunderaFourteenthAmendmenttheory  Єdefendantsarguethatthecourterredasamatteroflawin d enteringjudgmentona"doubleaward"forthesameinjury. u  ` Itiswellsettledthatdoubleawardsforthesameinjury ! areimpermissible.Lewisv.Kendrick,944F.2d949,954(1stCir. h 1991);Freemanv.PackageMach.Co.,865F.2d1331,1345(1stCir. y 1988).Moreover,Congressintendedforcompensatorydamagesin %  section1983casestoremedyonlyactualinjuriescausedbya  l" deprivationofconstitutionalrights,andnot"theabstract'value' }"$ of[]dueprocessandFirstAmendmentrights."MemphisCommunity )$& Sch.Dist.v.Stachura,477U.S.299,313(1986).TheSupreme %p!(  CourtelaboratedinStachurathat '#* 8 ` when1983plaintiffsseekdamagesfor e  violationsofconstitutionalrights,thelevel ; ofdamagesisordinarilydeterminedaccording  toprinciplesderivedfromthecommonlawof  torts....Congressadoptedthiscommonlaw X systemofrecoverywhenitestablished . liabilityfor"constitutionaltorts." i  Consequently,"thebasicpurpose"of1983 ?  damagesis"tocompensatepersonsforinjuries   thatarecausedbythedeprivationof    constitutionalrights." \ ` x` x <1Id.at30607(quotingCareyv.Piphus,435U.S.247,254(1978)). C  Consequently,anyduplicationproblemcannotberesolvedby   conceptualizingFirstAmendmentandFourteenthAmendmentviolations 6 asdistinct"injuries"warrantingseparatecompensation. G  ` Indefendingthejuryverdict,plaintiffsarguethatthe  damagesawardedforthedueprocessviolationswereretrospective : innature,designedtocompensatetheclaimantsforwageslostfrom K thedateofdismissaltothedateoftheverdict.Bycontrast,the  compensatorydamagesawardedfordefendants'FourteenthAmendment > violationswereforwardlookingandintendedtoremedythe O plaintiffs'lostpropertyrightsl  #  8      ׀intheircareeremployment ! positions.Specifically,plaintiffsarguethat !B# 8 ` becausecareeremploymentcarrieswithitan S#% expectancyofcontinuedincomeprospectively )$& (frontpay),retirementandmedicalinsurance $ ' (lostbenefits),andthesecurityof e continuingemploymentterminableonlyfor ; cause,adeprivationofthatrightpermitsan  additionalaward.Thisawardislegally  distinguishableinthatitrepresents X compensationforprospectivelosses,fromthe . dateofthetrialforward,whereaspolitical i  discriminationdamagesarecalculated ?  retroactivelyfromthedateoftrial. ` x` x 8Weagreewithplaintiffsthatbothfrontandbackpayarevalid  \  elementsofacompensatorydamageawardundersection1983. m  Indeed,"compensatorydamagesmayincludenotonlyoutofpocket   lossandothermonetaryharms,butalsosuchinjuriesas `  'impairmentofreputation...,personalhumiliation,andmental q  anguishandsuffering.'"Stachura,477U.S.at307(quotingGertz  v.RobertWelch,Inc.,418U.S.323,350(1974));seeDavetv. d Maccarone,973F.2d22,29(1stCir.1992). u  ` Insupportoftheirargumentthatthejuryapportioned ! itscompensatorydamageawardsbetweentheFirstAmendmentand h FourteenthAmendmentviolations,plaintiffsreferustothe y "PoliticalDiscrimination"sectionofthespecialverdictform, %  whichdirectsthejuryto"indicatetheamountofbackpaytodate  l" [plaintiff]shouldreceive"ifpoliticalaffiliationwasa }"$ substantialormotivatingfactorinhis/herdismissal(emphasis )$& added).Yetthereisnoanalogousreferencetofrontpayineither %p!( thejuryinstructionsorthedueprocesssectionoftheverdict '#* form,whichsimplyprovidesthat"[u]nderthelawyoumaychooseto -)$, awarddamagesforaviolationofdueprocess.Ifyouanswered *t&. 'YES'tothepreviousquestion[addressingliability],statethe e amountofdamagesthisPlaintiffshouldbeawardedfrom  [defendants]"(emphasisadded). X  ` Moreover,plaintiffs'theoryofapportionmentarguably i  suffersfromanotherflaw.Ifthejuryhadfounddefendantsguilty   ofeitheradueprocessviolationoraFirstAmendmentviolation,  \  butnotboth,plaintiffswouldstillbeentitledtofrontpay,back m  pay,andpainandsuffering,becausethesingularviolationwould   stillhaveresultedinthelossofcareeremploymentandany `  secondaryharmsflowingfromthatloss.Putdifferently,nothing q  inherentinthenatureofadueprocessviolationlimitsthe  resultingeconomicinjurytofrontpay,andnothinginherentinan d actofpoliticaldiscriminationinflictsaninjurythatislimited u tobackpay. ! e ` Finally,wenotethatthecourt'sduplicativedamage h instructionwaswordedsoastosuggestthattherelevant"injury" y thatcouldnotbedoublycompensatedwastheviolationofa %  constitutionalright,ratherthananactuallossorharm.  l" 8 ` Inawardingdamagesyoushouldbecarefulnot }"$ toawardduplicatedamages.Plaintiffsare S#% entitledtocollectfullcompensationfor )$& theirinjuriesifproved,buttheymustnot $ ' collectmorethanonceforthesamewrong.. %p!( ..Again,eachplaintiffisentitledto &F") collectfullcompensationforhisorher '#* injurybuttheplaintiffmustnotcollectmore W(#+ thanonceforthesamewrong.-)$,` -` -   *%- qOa( q q  G(emphasisadded).Thecourt'suseoftheterm"wrong,"readin e  conjunctionwithaspecialverdictformdividedintoseparate  sectionsforeachconstitutionalviolation,mayhaveledthejury X toconceptualizetheterm"injury"astheviolationofa i  constitutionalrightvelnon,ratherthananactuallosscausedby   theviolationofthatright.SeeStachura,477U.S.at30607;  \  Carey,435U.S.at254.Possibly,intheabsenceofmoredetailed m  instructionssupportingplaintiffs'frontpay/backpaytheory,the   jurymayhaveerroneouslyawardedduplicativedamagesby `  compensatingplaintiffsforthesameactuallossesunderbothadue q  processandpoliticaldiscriminationtheoryofliability.We  acknowledge,therefore,thatthelackofclarityinthecourt's d duplicativedamagesinstructionwasobviouserrorwhichmay u potentiallyhaveresultedinanimproperawardofdoubledamages. !  ` Wemustnowdecidewhetherdefendantsareentitledto h reliefinthefaceofthiserror.Defendantswereonnotice y throughouttheproceedingsthatplaintiffswereseekingrecoveryfor %  bothdueprocessviolationsandpoliticaldiscrimination.Tothe  l" extentthatajuryawardonbothclaimswouldbeduplicative,the }"$ properpracticeistoensurethattheverdictformisstructuredso )$& astoallowthejurytorecompensetheplaintiffs'injuriesjust %p!( once.AsweobservedinBrittonv.Murphy,196F.3d24,32(1st '#* Cir.1999): -)$, 8 ` Theproblemofguardingagainstdouble *t&. recoveryisafamiliaronewhenmultiple +J'/ claimsexistbutseparatedamagesoneach e wouldbepartlyorwhollyduplicative.Ifthe ; partiesexplicitlyagreethatthedamages  shouldbethesameoneachclaim,thenitis  easyenoughtoconstructspecial X interrogatoriesthatidentifyseparatebases . forliabilitybuthaveonlyasinglelinefor i  damages.Ontheotherhand,whentheamounts ?  awardedcouldconceivablydifferdependingon   theclaimbutmayalsoinvolvesomeoverlap,    verdictformssometimesrequireaseparate  \  specificationofdamagesforeachclaimon  2  whichthejurydeterminesliability,leaving m  ittothejudgetomaketheappropriate C  adjustmentstoavoiddoublerecovery. ` -` - 8RId.(internalcitationomitted).Defendantscouldalsohave `  requestedjuryinstructionsthatclearlydirectedthejuryto q  compensatetheplaintiffs'unemploymentinjuriesjustonce.Here,  defendantsfailedtolodgeapertinentobjectiontoeitherthejury d instructionsortheverdictform.Evenafterthejurydeliveredits u sizeableverdict,defendantsneversubmittedaposttrialmotion ! challengingtheactualawardasduplicative.Accordingly,wereview h theappellants'allegationofduplicativedamagesforplainerror y only.SeeChestnut,305F.3dat20(verdictform);M&IHeat %  TransferProds.v.Gorchev,141F.3d21,23(1stCir.1998)(jury  l" instructions);AdvisoryCommitteeontheFederalRulesofCivil }"$ Procedure,ReportoftheCivilRulesAdvisoryCommittee6268; )$& supra. %p!(  ` "Weapplytheplainerrordoctrine'inexceptionalcases '#* orunderpeculiarcircumstancestopreventaclearmiscarriageof -)$, justice...[or]wheretheerrorseriouslyaffectedthefairness, *t&. integrityorpublicreputationofjudicialproceedings.'"Rocafort e v.IBMCorp.,334F.3d115,122(1stCir.2003)(citingBeattyv.  MichaelBus.Machs.Corp.,172F.3d117,121(1stCir.1999).Our X previouscasesreflectamarkedreluctancetofindplainerrorin i  civilcases:"[E]speciallyinacivilcasethisisaveryhardtest   tomeetbecauseoverandaboveplainerror,itrequiresashowing  \  bothofprejudiceandamiscarriageofjusticeorsomethingofthis m  magnitude."Fraserv.MajorLeagueSoccer,L.L.C.,284F.3d47,62   (1stCir.2002)(citingDavisv.Rennie,264F.3d86,10001(1st `  Cir.2001),cert.denied,123S.Ct.118(2002)). q   ` Defendants'claimforrelieffromtheallegeddouble  damagesfoundersontheprejudiceprongoftheplainerrorstandard. d Inreachingthisconclusion,weareinnowaytrivializingthe u consequencesofthisverdictforthemunicipalityofAdjuntasand ! theindividualdefendants.Thejuryreturnedaverdictof h $6,956,400,ofwhich$6,356,400(thetotaljuryaward,excluding y punitivedamages)h  #  9      ׀wasagainstamunicipalitywhoseentireannual %  budgetin199697wasonly$4,529,327.SeeExhibit2,Defendants'  l" StatementofUncontestedFacts(July17,1998).Moreover,this }"$ figurereflectsthedamagesowedonlytothefirsttwenty )$& plaintiffs;sixtytwoplaintiffsremaininthequeue.But %p!( "prejudice,"asthattermisincorporatedintotheplainerrortest, '#* requiresastrongcausallinkbetweentheharmtotheaggrieved e partyandthelegalerror.Atbest,defendantscanonlydemonstrate  thepossibilitythatfaultyjuryinstructionsresultedina X duplicativedamageaward. i   ` Indeed,theappellatematerialssetforthcompeting   explanationsforthejury'sawardofdamagesunderbothadue  \  processandFirstAmendmenttheoryofliability.Appellantsargue m  thatthecompensatorydamagesawardedundereachtheorydoubly   recompensedclaimantsfortheiractuallosses,whileappellees `  insistthatthejurycompensatedplaintiffsfortheirtotalloss q  justonce,butdividedthatsingleawardbetweenthedueprocessand  FirstAmendmentcausesofaction.Nothinginthisrecordprecludes d thatpossibility,orrulesoutotherappropriatebasesforthejury u award.Fordefendantswhofailtoprotectthemselvesontherecord ! byrequestingjuryinstructionsand/orspecialverdictforms h structuredtoprecludethepossibilityofadoubledamageaward, y thesepossibilitiesarefataltoarequestforplainerrorrelief. %  The"prejudice"componentoftheplainerrorstandardimpliesa  l" stringentdemonstrationofcausation.Thus,inChestnutv.Cityof }"$ Lowell,ourdecisiontovacateapunitivedamageawardonplain )$& errorreviewrestedinpartonthefindingthat"[p]rejudiceinthe %p!( senseofaffectingthefinaloutcomeis...obvious:hadthejury '#* beeninstructedastotheCity'simmunity[frompunitivedamages] -)$, therealmostcertainlywouldnotbea$500,000judgmentagainstit *t&. today,althoughconceivablythejurymighthavesomewhatincreased e thecompensatorydamages."Chestnut,305F.3dat20(emphasis  added).Here,althoughwecanspeculatethatthecourt's X instructionsmayhaveledthejurytoerroneouslyawardduplicative i  damages,wehavenoconcretebasisforacceptingdefendants'   characterizationofthejuryaward.Underthesecircumstances,we  \  declinetoexpandtheruleofChestnuttoencompasscasesinwhich m  prejudicetotheaggrievedpartyisnotmanifestonthefaceofthe   record. `   ` b.Excessivedamages q   ` Defendantsmeticulouslydocumenttheeconomicdamages  awardedtoeachplaintiff,andarguemathematicallythatthetotals d ineverycaseexceedthelostwages(reducedbytheappropriate u percentageformitigation).Asathresholdmatter,themagnitude ! oftheclaimeddiscrepancyissufficientlysmall(rangingfrom h $2,607.94to$10,900.00)toprecludeafindingthattheverdictwas y "grosslyexcessive,inordinate,shockingtotheconscienceofthe %  court,orsohighthatitwouldbeadenialofjusticetopermitit  l" tostand."Correa,69F.3dat1197;Segal,746F.2dat81. }"$ Furthermore,thejurywasentitledtoconsideranysecondary )$& economicinjuriesflowingfromtheplaintiffs'lossofearningsand %p!( employmentbenefits.SeeStachura,477U.S.at307;Davet,973F.2d '#* at29.Forexample,nearlyeveryclaimanttestifiedthatthey -)$, reliedentirelyontheirmonthlyearningstocovertheexpensesof *t&. runningtheirhousehold,meettheirmortgageobligations,paytheir e childrens'tuition,etc.Asaconsequenceoflosingtheirjobs,  plaintiffswereforcedtoseekadditionalbankloans,dipintotheir X savings,andmakeothercostlyfinancialadjustmentstocoverthese i  expenses.    ` Wealsodeclinetosetasidethedamagesawardedinthe  \  otherthreecategories(painandsufferingresultingfrompolitical m  harassment,painandsufferingresultingfromdismissal,and   punitivedamages).Damagesforpainandsufferingdefy"exact `  mathematicalcomputation,"MooreMcCormackLines,Inc.v.Amirault, q  202F.2d893,898(1stCir.1953);and"arenotsusceptibletoproof  byadollaramount,"MejiasQuirosv.MaxxamPropertyCorp.,108 d F.3d425,428(1stCir.1997).Thejury'sawardsofnoneconomic u compensatorydamagesandpunitivedamagesweremoderateinscopeand ! wellwithinacceptablebounds.Theindividualizednatureofthe h twentyverdictsreflectsthejury'scarefulattentiontothe y peculiarcircumstancesofeachplaintiff,andevincesthejury's %  desiretocraftanappropriateawardforeachclaimant.r  #  10      ׀  l"   )$&  D.NonMutualOffensiveCollateralEstoppel  e   ` OnJanuary30,2002,thedistrictcourtissuedanorder - precludingthedefendantsfromrelitigating(withrespecttothe t remainingsixtytwoplaintiffs)thefollowingthreeissuesthatwere   determinativeofdefendantsliabilityinthefirsttrial: 1    B" <DL,X` XB(1)  Thatpoliticalaffiliationwasasubstantialor  x  motivatingfactorintheimplementationofthelayoff  N  plan. $    X9%4 4 <DL  X9  X6" <DL44X6(2)  ThatDefendantsviolatedPlaintiffsdueprocessrights 5  byimplementingthelayoffplaninadiscriminatory    fashion. |    X9%4 4 <DL  X9  X6" <DL44X6(3)  ThatPlaintiffsweredischargedfromtheircareer ( positionswiththeMunicipalityofAdjuntasonaccountof c theirpoliticalaffiliation;andotherindividualswere 9 employedtoperformtheirdutiesunderdifferenttitles,  andunderdifferentprograms,inviolationofthelaw.    X9%4 4 <DL  X9   m     u    %  }    - X<( 4 <DL44X<AcevedoGarcia,213F.Supp.2dat40.Thisruling,ifallowedto , stand,wouldconfinethescopeofthesubsequentthreetrialstothe = issueofdamages.Notsurprisingly,defendantsvigorouslydispute  thecourtsapplicationofcollateralestoppel,raisingahostof 0 objectionsthatweconsiderinduecourse. A      Asathresholdmatter,neitherpartydisputesour  " jurisdictiontoreviewthecourt'sapplicationofcollateral "4$ estoppel.Thiscasepresentsuniquecircumstances,however,that E$& callintoquestiontheripenessofthecollateralestoppelquestion. %!( SeePustellv.LynnPub.Sch.,18F.3d50,51n.1(1stCir.1994) '8#* (observingthatwemayraiseissuesofjurisdictionsuasponte). I)$, Generally,acourtwilldeterminethatcollateralestoppelis *&. appropriatewithintheveryproceedingwheretherulingistohave e itspreclusiveeffect.Here,thedistrictcourtannouncedits  attentiontoapplycollateralestoppelattheendofTrial1,but X thecourt'srulingwillhavenopreclusiveeffectuntilTrials2, i  3,and4,whicharenotcurrentlybeforeus.Becausethesetrials   wereseveredintofourindependentproceedingspursuanttoRule21,  \  seesupra,anyresolutionofthecollateralestoppelquestionwill m  havenoeffectontherightsofthepartiesastheypertaintoTrial   1.SeeCotterv.CityofBoston,323F.3d160,173(1stCir.2003) `  ("ArticleIII'scasesandcontroversieslanguageprohibitsfederal q  courtsfromissuingadvisoryopinions.Acourtmaynotdecide  questionsthatcannotaffecttherightsoflitigantsinthecase d beforeit.")(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted). u     Intheend,however,weconcludethatwehavejurisdiction ! toreviewthedistrictcourt'sapplicationofcollateralestoppel. h Thefourcasescomprisingthismatterbeganasasinglelawsuit. y Theboundariesthatnowdivideitintofourseveredcasesarenot %  temporalortransactionalinnature.Instead,theyareajudicial  l" artificeimposedpursuanttothecourt'scasemanagementauthority }"$ underRule21tostreamlinetheproceedingsinthesubsequentthree )$& trials.Thatthecourtchosetoissueitscollateralestoppel %p!( rulingattheattheendofTrial1ratherthanthebeginningof '#* Trial2innowayattenuatesthefinalityoftheorderortheforce -)$, ofitspreclusiveeffect. *t&.     Moreover,neitherpartydisputesthatthedistrictcourt e Єthesamecourtthatispresidingoverthesubsequenttrials  hasenteredafinalorderdecreeingthatnonmutualoffensive X collateralestoppelwillbeenforcedinthesubsequentthreecases. i  Thecontoursoftheorderareclearfromitslanguage,andthe   attorneyswholitigatedtheissuebelowandnowonappealarethe  \  counselofrecordforplaintiffsanddefendantsinallfourmatters. m  Thedistrictcourt'sorderboundthedefendantsasofitsentryof   January30,andtheapplicationofcollateralestoppelinthe `  subsequenttrialsisacertaintybeyondanyspeculation. q  Accordingly,thereisnocompellingreasonforustodelayour  reviewofthecollateralestoppelquestionuntilthejudgmentin d Trial2isappealed.If,asaconsequenceofsidesteppingthe u collateralestoppelissuenow,webelatedlyreversedthedistrict ! court'sestoppelrulingatthatlatestage,wewouldunnecessarily h voidaburdensomelitigationthatiscurrentlyslatedtoinvolve y twentyplaintiffsandfortyeightclaims.Disclaimingjurisdiction %  overthedistrictcourt'scollateralestoppelrulingunderthese  l" circumstanceswouldvindicateformoversubstance,tothedetriment }"$ ofbothpartiesandthedistrictcourt.SeeSchneiderv.Lockheed )$& AircraftCorp.,658F.2d835,(D.C.Cir.1981)("Thepotential %p!( futureuseofcollateralestoppelintheremainingcasesrequires '#* thatweaddresstheseargumentsintheinterestofsoundjudicial -)$, administration."). *t&.     Thebrandofcollateralestoppelappliedbythedistrict e courtnonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppelhistorically  spawnedthegreatestmisgivingsamongjurists.PriortotheSupreme X CourtsdecisioninBlonderTongueLabs.v.Univ.ofIll.Found., i  402U.S.313(1971),manycourtsadheredtothedoctrineof    mutualityofestoppel,whichordainedthat unlessbothparties  \  (ortheirprivies)inasecondactionareboundbyajudgmentina m  previouscase,neitherparty(norhisprivy)inthesecondaction   mayusethepriorjudgmentasdeterminativeofanissueinasecond `  action.Id.at32021;seeTriplettv.Lowell,297U.S.638,644 q  (1936);RestatementofJudgments93(1942)( [A]personwhoisnot  apartyorprivytoapartytoanactioninwhichavalidjudgment d ...isrendered(a)cannotdirectlyorcollaterallyattackthe u judgment,and(b)isnotboundbyorentitledtoclaimthebenefits ! ofanadjudicationuponanymatterdecidedintheaction.).!  #  11      ׀The h  BlonderTongueCourtdeterminedthatthetraditionalrationales y undergirdingthemutualityrequirementd  #  12      ׀wereunavailingintheface e ofweightierinstitutionalconcerns:   8  8   Inanylawsuitwhereadefendant,becauseof X themutualityprinciple,isforcedtopresent . acompletedefenseonthemeritstoaclaim i  whichtheplaintiffhasfullylitigatedand ?  lostinaprioraction,thereisanarguable   misallocationofresources.Totheextentthe    defendantinthesecondsuitmaynotwinby  \  asserting,withoutcontradiction,thatthe  2  plaintiffhadfullyandfairly,but m  unsuccessfully,litigatedthesameclaiminthe C  priorsuit,thedefendant'stimeandmoneyare   divertedfromalternativeusesproductiveor   otherwisetorelitigationofadecided `  issue.And,stillassumingthattheissuewas 6 resolvedcorrectlyinthefirstsuit,thereis q  reasontobeconcernedabouttheplaintiff's G allocationofresources.Permittingrepeated  litigationofthesameissueaslongasthe  supplyofunrelateddefendantsholdsout d reflectseithertheauraofthegamingtableor :  alackofdisciplineandofdisinterestedness u onthepartofthelowercourts,hardlya K worthyorwisebasisforfashioningrulesof ! procedure. x x Id.at329(quotingKerotestMfg.Co.v.COTwoCo.,342U.S.180, > 185(1952)).TheexcerptedlanguagefromBlonderTongueendorses O theapplicationofnonmutualdefensivecollateralestoppel. e Collateralestoppelis defensivewhenwieldedbyadefendantto  barplaintiffsfromrelitigatinganissue(s)previouslydecidedin X hisfavorinasuitinvolvingotherplaintiffs.Forthereasons i  articulatedbyJusticeWhite,permittinglitigantstoassert   collateralestoppelinadefensiveposepromotesefficiencyby  \  discouragingspeculativelawsuitsandconservingtheresourcesof m  defendants.       Nonmutualcollateralestoppelmaybeassertedoffensively `  aswell.Thatis,where,ashere,plaintiffsseektouseissue q  preclusiontotiethedefendants'handswithanadverselydecided  issuefromapreviouscase,theuseofcollateralestoppelisdeemed d  offensive.AstheSupremeCourtrecognized,theoffensiveuseof u nonmutualcollateralraisesspecialconcerns: ! 8  8   First,offensiveuseofcollateralestoppel h doesnotpromotejudicialeconomyinthesame > mannerasdefensiveusedoes.Defensiveuseof y collateralestoppelprecludesaplaintifffrom O relitigatingidenticalissuesbymerely %  "switchingadversaries."Thusdefensive ! collateralestoppelgivesaplaintiffastrong  l" incentivetojoinallpotentialdefendantsin !B# thefirstactionifpossible.Offensiveuseof }"$ collateralestoppel,ontheotherhand,creates S#% preciselytheoppositeincentive.Sincea )$& plaintiffwillbeabletorelyonaprevious $ ' judgmentagainstadefendantbutwillnotbe %p!( boundbythatjudgmentifthedefendantwins, &F") theplaintiffhaseveryincentivetoadopta '#* "waitandsee"attitude,inthehopethatthe W(#+ firstactionbyanotherplaintiffwillresult -)$, inafavorablejudgment.Thusoffensiveuseof *%- collateralestoppelwilllikelyincreaserather *t&. thandecreasethetotalamountoflitigation, +J'/ sincepotentialplaintiffswillhaveeverything e togainandnothingtolosebynotintervening ; inthefirstaction.   m Asecondargumentagainstoffensiveuseof  collateralestoppelisthatitmaybeunfairto X adefendant.Ifadefendantinthefirstaction . issuedforsmallornominaldamages,hemay i  havelittleincentivetodefendvigorously, ?  particularlyiffuturesuitsarenot   foreseeable.Allowingoffensivecollateral    estoppelmayalsobeunfairtoadefendantif  \  thejudgmentrelieduponasabasisforthe  2  estoppelisitselfinconsistentwithoneor m  morepreviousjudgmentsinfavorofthe C  defendant.Stillanothersituationwhereit   mightbeunfairtoapplyoffensiveestoppelis   wherethesecondactionaffordsthedefendant `  proceduralopportunitiesunavailableinthe 6 firstactionthatcouldreadilycausea q  differentresult.G x x ParklaneHosieryCo.v.Shore,439U.S.322,32931(1979)(internal  citationsandfootnotesomitted).Notwithstandingtheseconcerns, : theSupremeCourtcompleteditsbreakwithtraditionalcollateral K estoppeldoctrineinParklaneHosierybyaccordingdistrictcourts  broaddiscretiontoapplynonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppel: > 8  8   Wehaveconcludedthatthepreferableapproach O fordealingwiththeseproblemsinthefederal %  courtsisnottoprecludetheuseofoffensive ! collateralestoppel,buttogranttrialcourts  l" broaddiscretiontodeterminewhenitshouldbe !B# applied.Thegeneralruleshouldbethatin }"$ caseswhereaplaintiffcouldeasilyhave S#% joinedintheearlieractionorwhere,either )$& forthereasonsdiscussedaboveorforother $ ' reasons,theapplicationofoffensiveestoppel %p!( wouldbeunfairtoadefendant,atrialjudge &F") shouldnotallowtheuseofoffensive '#* collateralestoppel.W(#+ x x  Id.at331. *%-     Significantly,theSupremeCourt'sapprehensiveregardfor e  nonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppelisrootedinconsiderations  thatareinappositeinauniquecasesuchasthiswhereacourt X appliescollateralestoppeltopiecesofaseveredactionoverwhich i  itispresiding.Inthecaseatbar,thedistrictcourtexercised   itsdiscretionunderRule21tomandatetheseveranceofplaintiffs  \  intofourtrialgroups,therebyprohibitingthesixtytwoplaintiffs m  ingroups2,3and4fromvoluntarilyjoiningthefirstlitigation.   Oncetheactionwassevered,theprospectofmultipletrialswas `  eminentlyforeseeabletothedefendants,ifnotexplicitlyassured. q  Moreover,withoneeyeontheimpendingthreetrials,andtheother  ontheirpotentiallyimmenseexposuretothefirstgroupoftwenty d plaintiffs,seesupra,thedefendantshadeverypossibleincentive u tovigorouslylitigatetheissueofliabilityinthefirstaction. ! Seeid.Thecontentiousproceedingsbelow,coupledwiththecopious h materialsfiledbyappellantsinthisappeal,confirmthat y defendantszealouslycontested(andcontinuetocontest)theissue %  ofliabilitytothefirstplaintiffgroup.Finally,becausethe  l" courtseveredtheproceedingsontheeveoftrial,defendantshave }"$ fullyavailedthemselvesofdiscoveryandotherpretrialprocedures )$& withrespecttoalleightytwoplaintiffs.Accordingly,thereis %p!( littleriskthatthesubsequentproceedingswill"afford[]the '#* defendant[s]proceduralopportunitiesunavailableinthefirst -)$, actionthatcouldreadilycauseadifferentresult."Id.The *t&. districtcourt'sstatedintenttopresideoverallfourtrials e furthersuggeststhattrialandposttrialproceduresforthe  remainingsixtytwoplaintiffswillnotvarysubstantiallyfromthe X proceduralopportunitiesavailableinthefirsttrial. i  Ѐ ?      Havingaddressedthebackgroundconcernsraisedbythe   applicationofnonmutualoffensivecollateralestoppel,weturnour  \  attentiontothemostimportantquestionwhetherdefendants m  "receivedafullandfairopportunitytolitigatetheirclaims"in   thefirsttrial.ParklandHosiery,439U.S.at332.Ourprior `  jurisprudenceenumeratesfourfactorsthatweconsiderinthis q  regard:    (1)0  anidentityofissues(thatis,thattheissuesoughtto d beprecludedisthesameasthatwhichwasinvolvedin : thepriorproceeding),u (# (# ! !"e;"  e;Z0  2(  2  )3  0 (#(#  actualityoflitigation(thatis,thatthepointwas ! actuallylitigatedintheearlierproceeding),e;Z݌ (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;0  2(  3  )3  0 (#(#  finalityoftheearlierresolution(thatis,thatthe > issuewasdeterminedbyavalidandbindingfinal y judgmentororder),ande;݌O (# (# Ќ  "e;"  e;60  2(  4  )3  0 (#(#  thecentralityoftheadjudication(thatis,thatthe ! determinationoftheissueinthepriorproceedingwas  l" essentialtothefinaljudgmentororder).e;6c݌!B# (# (# Ќ  =Faiginv.Kelly,184F.3d67,78(1stCir.1999);seeGrellav. }"$ SalemFiveCentSav.Bank,42F.3d26,30(1stCir.1994);NLRBv. )$& DonnaLeeSportswearCo.,836F.2d31,34(1stCir.1987). %p!( Ѐ    tXXXXOurfocushereisconfinedtofactor(2)actualityof '#* litigation.Tosatisfythisfactor,thepartyseekingtoimpose -)$, issuepreclusionmustdemonstratethattheissuetobegiven *t&. preclusiveeffectwasactuallylitigatedinthepriorproceeding.u  #  13      ׀ e Withoutexcludingthepossibilityofotherproblemswiththescope  ofthecourt'scollateralestoppelorder,wecitebywayof X illustrationthepoliticaldiscriminationclaimsofplaintiffs. i  ThoseFirstAmendmentclaimsimplicatetheburdenshiftingframework   setforthinMt.HealthyCitySchoolDist.Bd.ofEduc.v.Doyle,  \  429U.S.274,287(1977).TosatisfythefirstprongoftheMt. m  Healthyframework,plaintiffsmustdemonstratethattheyengagedin   constitutionallyprotectedactivities,andthatthisprotected `  conductwasasubstantialormotivatingfactorinanemployer's q  adverseemploymentaction.Ifplaintiffssatisfythefirstprong,#XXXtX)#tXXXX  thesecondprongofMt.Healthyshiftstheburdentodefendantto d prove"byapreponderanceoftheevidence"thattheplaintiffwould u havebeensubjecttotheadverseemploymentactevenifhehadnot ! engagedintheprotectedconduct.Id.at278;Lewis,321F.3dat h 219. y     Therecordindicatesthateightytwoplaintiffsbrought e claimsagainstthedefendants,butthemunicipalityonlymade  seventysevennewhiresovertherelevantperiod.Accordingly,it X standstoreasonthatnoteveryplaintiffwassubstitutedforona i  onetoonebasis.Morefundamentally,applicationoftheMt.   Healthydefensenecessarilyvarieswiththecircumstancesofthe  \  individualplaintiffs.Certainplaintiffsmayhaveheldmunicipal m  positionsthatweresosuperfluousorduplicativeoftheduties   assignedtootheremployeesthatdefendantscouldreasonablyargue `  thattheseplaintiffswouldhavebeenterminatedregardlessoftheir q  politicalaffiliation.Putdifferently,thedefendantsmightbe  abletoestablishthatthepositionofcertainmunicipalemployees d weresufficientlyprecariousthattheywouldhavebeeneliminated u underaproperlymotivatedorimproperlymotivatedimplementation ! oftheplan.Thiscontentionhasneveractuallybeenlitigated h becauseitisnecessarilyuniquetothecircumstancesofthe y particularplaintiffsinvolvedinTrial2.Yetthesecondclause %  ofthethirdissuedesignatesforpreclusiveeffectthe  l" "established"factthat"otherindividualswereemployedtoperform }"$ theirdutiesunderdifferenttitle,andotherdifferentprograms, )$& inviolationofthelaw."Inourview,thisrulingrunsafoulof %p!( theactuallitigationrequirement. '#*     Ourrulingisnotintendedtosuggestthatanyflawsin -)$, thecollateralestoppelorderarelimitedtothesecondclauseof *t&. thethirdissue.Havingidentifiedthisproblem,however,wecannot e goontoapproveeveninpartacollateralestoppelorderthat  purportstoprecludeanyliabilitydefenseinTrial2.Whereeven X oneissueofliabilitymustbemadeavailabletodefendantsinthe i  secondtrial,grantingpreclusiveeffecttotheotherissuesmaynot   resultinefficiencygainsbecauselitigationofthe"live"issue  \  mayrequireintroductionofsomeofthesameevidencepertinentto m  theestoppedissues.See18AWright,Miller&Cooper4465.3("The   needtorelitigateindividualissuesthatoverlapthecommonissues `  mayprovideaspecialreasontodenypreclusionlittleifany q  trialtimewillbespared...").      Still,forthereasonsenumeratedinthepreceding d backgrounddiscussion,weacknowledgethatnonmutualoffensive u collateralestoppelmaywellbeausefulandappropriatetrial ! managementdeviceinthesecondtrial.Ourrulingisnotintended h todiscourageitsapplication.However,anyrenewedconsideration y ofthatdoctrinebythetrialcourtmustbegroundedinthe %  proceedingsofTrial2.Specifically,thejudgeandtheparties  l" shouldrevisitthecourseofproceedingsinTrial1,andtheissues }"$ andproposedproofinTrial2.Thedefendantsandthesecond )$& plaintiffgroupshouldthenhaveanopportunitytobriefandargue %p!( thequestionofhowthedoctrineofnonmutualoffensivecollateral '#* estoppelshouldbefairlyappliedinlightofthoseconsiderations. -)$, Atthisjuncture,andatthisremovefromanimpendingsecondtrial, *t&. wecannotdeterminewiththenecessarycertitudethatdefendants e havehadafullandfairopportunitytolitigatealltherelevant  dimensionsoftheirliabilitydefense.Accordingly,wemustvacate X thecourt'scollateralestoppelorder.#XXXtXc# i    IV.        Theuniquecircumstancesofthiscasepresentedthe  x  districtcourtwithanumberofcomplexquestionsinareasthathave $  previouslyreceivedlittleattentioninthiscircuit.Thecourt 5  correctlyresolvedmostoftheseissuesincomprehensivewritten |  decisionsthatgreatlyaidedourreviewonappeal.Thecourtalso ( acquitteditselfadmirablyinmanagingthisdifficultlitigation. 9 Theerrorswehavecitedinnowaydetractfromouradmirationfor  andappreciationofthecourt'swork. ,     We vacate thedistrictcourt'scollateralestoppelorder. = Inallotherrespectswe affirm .      Soordered. M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M  M