WPC 7gM oϘ̯UH.u/8?Fᙒ _J0? Ā,n0 ǃ6q)Bd#4Ν< pk]})4Է#U?Y0.:]K&q2V[bDtL:+z `aS8@G*?kZ=zοR#a۶+.[vn8W _yS»&%-GU>u jA12ls&l.X\ƥ郟 9dRq߫Wn!GÐfsG?8GaSy+ d "OP/u3;yr:g rtk!looMb,yN~2E}xyJ)L'C(#0 % 0D 0(;U:c 0UN&nTtNUFU> ^ N wZ 4^ r  E f a m UB b 1 U0   1u 72= 0 woOv BHP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0X(#$  0  ($<6X9`("Courier NewTT(':2u$ !        0  (A Z6Times New Roman Regular<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@ Q 9Z+.Courier New Regular<\( 9Z+&Courier RegularՌK.s u-?,}backup3|xTABLE AU<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- -06(CEKQW]cioAutoList11.a.1.1.1.1.1.1.<\( 9Z+Courier   u$      2    _ ` Whileplaintiffpursuesastatelawclaimfordamages  arisingfromher1999hospitalization,theADAprecludesherfrom  seekingdamagesinarchitecturalbarrierclaimsunlesstheAttorney \ Generalassumesthecase.42U.S.C.12188(b). Further,asa 2 factualmatter,aclaimbasedonthe1999eventssuffersfroma X  causationproblem:shewastoosicktomovetotheFamilyCenter  inanycase.Asaresult,itisonlytheprospectoffutureinjury  whichisatissuehere.  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#  u$      3    _ ` While_mootness_Ԁingeneralisirrelevanttothecaseat  handas_McInnis_Ԅ_Misenor_Ԁcomplainsoffutureinjuries,notpast  onesaninterestprotectedbyoneaspectof_mootness_Ԁanalysis \ mightbethoughttobepertinenthere:the"capableofrepetition, 2 yetevadingreview"exception.SeeS.Pac.TerminalCo.v.ICC, X 219U.S.498,515(1911).Becausesomeinjuriesoccurandareover . soquicklythattheywillalwaysbemootbeforefederallitigation   iscomplete,suchinjuriesaredeemedanexceptiontotheordinary   _mootness_Ԁdoctrine.SeeE._Chemerinsky_,Federal_JurisdictionXVXXX_Ԁ `  2.5.3,at132(3ded.1999#XVXXXVO#).  ! ' Turner0Turner .     u$      1    _ ` TheCommissionReportisanofficialpublicrecordand  forthatreasoncouldbeconsideredbythecourtindecidingaRule  (12)(b)(6)motion.SeeAlternativeEnergy,Inc.v.St.PaulFire \ &MarineIns.Co.,267F.3d30,33(1stCir.2001). l u$      5    _ ` XVXXXForthereasonsdiscussedabove,whilethiscasemaybe  capableofrepetition,itwouldnotevadereview,becauseofthe  districtcourt'sabilitytorespondtoacomplaintinatimely \ fashion.#XVXXXV}#ԀXVXXXVThisdistinguishesthesituationfromthatinRoev. 2 Wade,410U.S.at125.#XVXXXV#  u$      4    _ ` TheCommissionfoundthattheFamilyCenterrenovations  proposedbyplaintiffswerenotrequiredbyMainelaw.  d !  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !XXXX7XX     =VXXdd=UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals47  FortheFirstCircuit  4 XVX   A') ` dE< ` A    XVXX XVNo.022086 K  @ KATHRYN_MCINNIS_Ԅ_MISENOR_;BRETT_MISENOR_,  G  @Plaintiffs,Appellants,   @tt)v. O  @ MAINEMEDICALCENTER, K  @<< Defendant,Appellee.  A') ` dE<R` A S   @@ APPEALFROMTHEU.S.DISTRICTCOURT 8 ЀFORTHEDISTRICTOFMAINE ^ @ [Hon.GeneCarter,DistrictJudge]   A') ` dE<e` A f @'Before K   @@((Boudin,ChiefJudge, G TorruellaandLynch,CircuitJudges.   A') ` dE<N ` A O "       DeirdreM.Smith,withwhomwasDrummond_Woodsum_Ԁ&_MacMahon_on 4!$ thebriefforappellants.  "Z%   WilliamJ._Kayatta_,Jr.,withwhomwereMargaret_Coughlin_ #' _LePage_,JoanneH.PearsonandPierceAtwoodonthebrieffor $( appellee. b% ) *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  '4#,'4#  SIH(#- c@37662c@SFebruary11,2003 )n$/  RHC)D%0" c@37662 c@ R(H(#1  (  * !   ,'3?I   XXX XV  8VXXdd8*,X` XX*OY= V XXdXXd= ` # XVXXX} #XVXX XVLYNCH,CircuitJudge .Kathryn_McInnis_Ԅ_Misenor_,age43,   suffersfromjuvenilerheumatoidarthritisandusesawheelchair. x Sheandherhusbandareattemptingtohaveasecondchild,butshe $t isnotyetpregnant.Anticipatingthatshewillbecomepregnant,   theybroughtsuitinfederalcourtinOctober2001. Thecomplaint, |  asamendedinMarch2002,allegedthattheMaineMedicalCenter ( x  ("_MMC_")wasinviolationofthearchitecturalbarrierprovisionsof $  TitleIIIoftheAmericanswithDisabilitiesAct("ADA"),42U.S.C.   12182(2000),andtheMaineHumanRightsAct,Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. ,|  tit.5,4592(West2002). Theyseekaninjunctiontoforce_MMC_ ( Єthenearesthospitalthathandleshighriskdeliveries(ashers  wouldbe)tomovewallsintheFamilyCentertomakethe 0 bathroomswheelchairaccessible. TheFamilyCenterisanafter , birthrecoveryareaofroomsusuallyused,whenavailable,bynewly  deliveredmothers. Ifsuchroomsarenotavailable,themothers 4 remaininthenewerBirthCenterrooms,inadifferentwingof_MMC_, 0 wherethedeliveryactuallytakesplace.     ` _McInnis_Ԅ_Misenor_Ԁhasreasonforconcernaboutheraccess 8!" totheFamilyCenter.Shegavebirthtoherfirstchildat_MMC_Ԁin "4$ November1999. Atthattime,_MMC_Ԁspent$5,300toreconfigurea $& privateroomintheBirthCentertomakeitavailabletoher. Due <&!( tocomplicationsassociatedwithhergivingbirth,shewasunable '8#* totransfertotheFamilyCenterandremainedintheBirthCenter )$, forthedurationofherrecovery. Evenifshehadnotsuffered @+&. _ thosecomplications,movinghertotheFamilyCenterwasnota  viableoptionbecausenoroominthatwinghadtoiletandshower \ facilitiesconfiguredtobewheelchairaccessible.  X  ` InApril2000,_ McInnis_ Ԅ_ Misenor_ Ԁfiledacomplaintwiththe   MaineHumanRightsCommissionallegingviolationsoftheMaine `  HumanRightsAct,basedonherNovember1999experience.The  \  Commissioninvestigatedandissuedareport,whichweshallrefer   tolater,andwhichthedistrictcourtconsidered.Amongtheclaims d  madetotheCommissionwasthat_ MMC_ Ԁfailedtoremovearchitectural `  barriersintheFamilyCenter.     ` Amagistratejudge,actingon_ MMC_ 'sRule12(b)(6)motion, h recommendedthattheactionbedismissedbecausetheplaintiffsdid d notatpresenthavestandingtobringtheirclaims._ McInnis_ Ԅ  _ Misenor_ v.Me.Med.Ctr.,211F.Supp.2d256,257(D.Me.2002).# XVXXXV #XVXX XVԀ l Thedistrictjudgeagreedanddismissedtheaction,without h prejudice,onJuly30,2002.Plaintiffsappeal.  @tt)I. p   ` Ourreviewofthedecisiontodismissforlackof !l" standingisdenovo._ Mangual_ v._ Rotger_ Ԅ_ Sabat_ ,No.021669,2003 "$ U.S.App.LEXIS857,at*14(1stCir.Jan.21,2003). t$&  ` NormallyonaRule12(b)(6)motiontodismiss,onlythe  &p!( complaintisreviewed.However,wherestandingisatissue,itis '#* withinthetrialcourt'spowertoallowortorequiretheplaintiff x)$, toprovidebyaffidavitoramendedcomplaint"further $+t&. particularizedallegationsoffactdeemedsupportiveofplaintiff's  standing."_ Warth_ v._ Seldin_ ,422U.S.490,501(1975).Herethe \ districtcourtalsoconsideredtheCommissionReport.  #  1       X  ` Thepartyinvokingfederaljurisdictionbearstheburden   toestablishstanding.Bennettv.Spear,520U.S.154,16768 `  (1997).Theplaintiffsinitiallyarguethatthedistrictcourt  \  erredinnottakingallfactualinferencesfromthecomplaintin   theirfavor,asisrequiredonaRule12(b)(6)motion.The d  argumentismisplaced.Weandthedistrictcourtbothhaveassumed `  ittobetruethat_ McInnis_ Ԅ_ Misenor_ Ԁisdisabled,thatplaintiffsare   attemptingtohaveanotherchild,thattheywilluse_ MMC_ Ԁ(aplace h ofpublicaccommodation)foranydelivery,andthatatpresentthe d FamilyCentercannotaccommodateher.ButRule12(b)(6)doesnot  requirewemaketheinferencesnecessarytoestablishthatthereis l federaljurisdiction. h   II.  &&A.Standing:ConstitutionalandPrudential p   ` FederalcourtsareconfinedbyArticleIIIofthe !l" Constitutiontodecidingonlyactualcasesorcontroversies.Allen "$ v.Wright,468U.S.737,750(1984).Federalcourtscanonly t$& decidea"livegrievance."Am.PostalWorkersUnionv.Frank,968  &p!( F.2d1373,1374(1stCir.1992)(quotingGoldenv._ Zwickler_ ,394  U.S.103,110(1969)).Standingisthusathresholdquestionin \ everycase,requiringthecourttodetermine"whethertheplaintiff X has'allegedsuchapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthe   controversy'astowarrant[]invocationoffederalcourt `  jurisdiction."See_ Warth_ ,422U.S.at49899(quotingBakerv.  \  Carr,369U.S.186,204(1962)).Theconstitutionalstanding   inquiryhasthreeelements.Alitigantbearstheburdenofshowing d  "thathepersonallyhassufferedsomeactualorthreatenedinjury `  asaresultoftheputativelyillegalconductofthedefendant,and   thattheinjuryfairlycanbetracedtothechallengedactionand h islikelytoberedressedbyafavorabledecision."SeeValley d ForgeChristianColl.v._ Ams_ .UnitedforSeparationofChurch&  State,Inc.,454U.S.464,472(1982)(internalquotations l omitted).Asthiscourthasnoted,"ArticleIIIstandingis h largelyalbeitnotentirelyapracticaljurisprudence."N.H.  HempCouncil,Inc.v.Marshall,203F.3d1,4(1stCir.2000) p  (citing13C.A.Wright,A.R.Miller&_ E.H._ ԀCooper,FederalPractice !l" &Procedure3531.1,at352,35556,36263(2ded.1984)). "$  ` Theplaintiffs'claimhereinvolvesathreatoffuture t$& injury. #  2      ׀Thepartiesdisputethedegreeofthreatpresentedby  &p!( thesefactstotheplaintiffs'legalinterests.Plaintiffsmust  showthatthethreatenedinjuryisimpendingandconcrete,see \ ValleyForge,454U.S.at472,sufficienttoconstitute"injuryin X fact."Theremustbesomeimmediacyorimminencetothethreatened   injury.SeeLosAngelesv.Lyons,461U.S.95,10102(1983);see `  alsoWhitmorev.Arkansas,495U.S.149,155(1990)(quotingLyons,  \  461U.S.at10102).    ` Thestandinginquiry"involvesboth# XVXXXV#XVXX XVԀconstitutional d  limitationsonfederalcourtjurisdictionandprudential `  limitationsonitsexercise."_ Warth_ ,422U.S.at498;seealso   Barrowsv.Jackson,346U.S.249,25556(1953)(describingCourt's h "complementaryruleofselfrestraintforitsowngovernance"that d existsalongsideconstitutionalrestrictiononjurisdiction).  Federalcourtshaveidentifiedanumberofprudentialconcerns l regardingtheproperexerciseoffederaljurisdiction.Threeof h theseareasarewellestablished:(1)thecomplaintmust"fall  withinthezoneofinterestsprotectedbythelawinvoked";(2)the p  plaintiff"mustasserthisownlegalrightsandinterests,and !l" cannotresthisclaimtoreliefonthelegalrightsorinterestsof "$ thirdparties";and(3)thesuitmustpresentmorethan"abstract t$& questionsofwidepublicsignificancewhichamounttogeneralized  &p!( grievances,pervasivelysharedandmostappropriatelyaddressedin '#* therepresentativebranches."N.H.RighttoLifePoliticalAction  Comm.v.Gardner,99F.3d8,15(1stCir.1996)(quotingAllen,468 \ U.S.at751;_ Warth_ ,422U.S.at499;ValleyForge,454U.S.at X 475);seealsoAdamsv.Watson,10F.3d915,918n.7(1stCir.   1993);UnitedStatesv._ AVX_ ԀCorp.,962F.2d108,114(1stCir. `  1992).  \   ` Prudentialstandingconcerns,unlikeconstitutionalones,   canbeabrogatedbyanactofCongress."Congressmaygrantan d  expressrightofactiontopersonswhootherwisewouldbebarredby `  prudentialstandingrules."_ Warth_ ,422U.S.at501. Westartwith   thelanguageoftheADA.TheenforcementprovisionsofTitleIII h oftheADAaresetforthin308,whichprovides: d 0 ` Theremediesandproceduressetforthinsection204(a)  oftheCivilRightsActof1964(42U.S.C.2000a3(a))  aretheremediesandproceduresthistitleprovidesto l anypersonwhoisbeingsubjectedtodiscriminationon B thebasisofdisabilityinviolationofthistitleorwho h hasreasonablegroundsforbelievingthatsuchpersonis > abouttobesubjectedtodiscriminationinviolationof  section303.Nothinginthissectionshallrequirea  personwithadisabilitytoengageinafutilegestureif p  suchpersonhasactualnoticethatapersonor F ! organizationcoveredbythistitledoesnotintendto !l" complywithitsprovisions.!B#` (#` (# Z<42U.S.C.12188(a)(1)._ McInnis_ Ԅ_ Misenor_ Ԁisnot"beingsubjected #% todiscrimination,"soherclaimmustrestonwhethershe"has J% ' reasonablegroundsforbelieving[she]isabouttobesubjectedto &F") discrimination."Thestatutorylanguage"abouttobesubjectedto (#+ discrimination"dovetailswiththeusualprudentialanalysisasto N*%- whether_ McInnis_ Ԅ_ Misenor_ 'sclaimsaretoocontingentandpremature. +J'/ _  ` McInnisMisenorcitessomeADAcasestous,allfactually  distinguishable.Thisisnot,forexample,acaseinwhichthe \ existenceofarchitecturalbarriersistheonlyreasontheADA X plaintiffhasnotreturnedforservices.E.g.,Parrv.L&LDrive   InnRest.,96F.Supp.2d1065,107980(D.Hi.2000)(finding `  standingforaplaintiffpreventedfromusingfastfoodchain  \  restaurantduetovariousarchitecturalbarriersbecauseofhis   sincereintenttoreturnasevidencedbyhispastpatronageand d  tasteforthechain'sfood).TheADAdoesnotpermitprivate `  plaintiffstobringclaimsasprivateattorneysgeneralto   vindicateotherpeople'sinjuries. h  ` Thestatutoryrequirementthatplaintiffmusthave d reasonablegroundstobelieveshe"isabouttobesubjectedto  discrimination"doesnot,inourview,displacethenormal l backgroundprudentialstandinglimitations.SeeBennett,520U.S. h at163("Congresslegislatesagainstthebackgroundofour  prudentialstandingdoctrine,whichappliesunlessitisexpressly p  negated.");cf.LindaR.S.v.RichardD.,410U.S.614,617n.3 !l" (1973)(notingthatwhileCongressmaynotconferjurisdictionto "$ renderadvisoryopinions,Congressdoeshavethepowertoenact t$& statutesexpandingstandingthroughthecreationofnewlegal  &p!( rights). '#*  B.Ripeness:ConstitutionalandPrudential x)$,  ` Ingeneral,standingandripenessinquiriesoverlap.See   13AWright,Miller&Cooper,supra,3531.12,at51("Themost \ directconnections[amongjusticiabilitydoctrines]runbetween X standingandripeness.");seealsoWarth,422U.S.at499n.10   ("Thestandingquestionthusbearscloseaffinitytoquestionsof `  ripenesswhethertheharmassertedhasmaturedsufficientlyto  \  warrantjudicialintervention....").Theoverlapismost   apparentincasesthatdenystandingbecauseananticipatedinjury d  istooremote,forexample.13AWright,Miller&Cooper,supra, `  3531.12,at51.Ripeness,standing,andmootness #  3      ׀areclosely   linked: h 0 ` Ripenessandmootnesseasilycouldbeseenasthetime d dimensionsofstanding.Eachassumesthatanasserted : injurywouldbeadequate;ripenessthenaskswhetheran  injurythathasnotyethappenedissufficientlylikely  tohappen,andmootnessaskswhetheraninjurythathas l happenedistoofarbeyondausefulremedy.B` (#` (# MId.at50.Ripeness,however,canbethoughtofasfocusingonthe > "when"oflitigation,asopposedtothe"who."SeeE.Chemerinsky,   FederalJurisdiction2.4.1,at114(3ded.1999).Evenif F ! plaintiffsweretheappropriate"who,"thequestionof"when"  remains.  \   ` Thetesttobeappliedinripenessanalysisiswhether X "thereisasubstantialcontroversy,betweenpartieshavingadverse   legalinterests,ofsufficientimmediacyandrealitytowarrantthe `  issuanceofadeclaratoryjudgment."LakeCarriers'Ass'nv.  \  MacMullan,406U.S.498,506(1972).Theripenessdoctrineseeks   "topreventthecourts,throughavoidanceofpremature d  adjudication,fromentanglingthemselvesinabstract `  disagreements."AbbottLabs.v.Gardner,387U.S.136,148(1967).   Determiningripenessinvolvesadualinquiry:evaluationof"both h thefitnessoftheissuesforjudicialdecisionandthehardshipto d thepartiesofwithholdingcourtconsideration."Id.at149.Both  prongsofthetestmustbesatisfied,althoughastrongshowingon l onemaycompensateforaweakoneontheother.SeeErnst&Young h v.DepositorsEcon.Prot.Corp.,45F.3d530,535(1stCir.1995).  Likestanding,ripenesshasbothconstitutionalandprudential p  elements.SeeRenov.CatholicSoc.Servs.,Inc.,509U.S.43,57 !l" n.18(1993);13AWright,Miller&Cooper,supra,3532.1,at118. "$  ` Inthefitnessinquiry,bothconstitutionaland t$& prudentialconcernsoperate,withprudentialconcernsfocusingon  &p!( thepolicyofjudicialrestraintfromunnecessarydecisions.The '#* fitnessinquiry"typicallyinvolvessubsidiaryqueriesconcerning x)$, finality,definiteness,andtheextenttowhichresolutionofthe $+t&. challengedependsonfactsthatmaynotyetbesufficiently  developed."Sternv.U.S.Dist.Court,214F.3d4,10(1stCir. \ 2000)(quotingErnst&Young,45F.3dat535)."Thecritical X questionconcerningfitnessforreviewiswhethertheclaim   involvesuncertainandcontingenteventsthatmaynotoccuras `  anticipatedormaynotoccuratall."Ernst&Young,45F.3dat  \  536(quotingMass.Ass'nofAfroAm.Police,Inc.v.BostonPolice   Dep't,973F.2d18,20(1stCir.1992)).Thefactthatanevent d  hasnotoccurredcanbecounterbalancedinthisanalysisbythe `  factthatacaseturnsonlegalissues"notlikelytobe   significantlyaffectedbyfurtherfactualdevelopment."Ernst& h Young,45F.3dat536. d  ` Thesecondpronghardshipisentirelyprudential.  Thehardshipprongevaluates"theextenttowhichwithholding l judgmentwillimposehardshipaninquirythattypicallyturns h uponwhetherthechallengedactioncreatesa'directandimmediate'  dilemmafortheparties."Stern,214F.3dat10(quotingAbbott p  Labs.,387U.S.at152).Thegreaterthehardship,themorelikely !l" acourtwillbetofindripeness.Ernst&Young,45F.3dat536. "$ Thisinquiryencompassesthequestionofwhetherplaintiffis t$& sufferinganypresentinjuryfromafuturecontemplatedevent.See  &p!( Reg'lRailReorganiz.ActCases,419U.S.102,143n.29(1974);1 '#* L.Tribe,AmericanConstitutionalLaw310,at337(3ded.2000)# XVXXXV2#XVXX XV; x)$, seealsoLarsonv.Valente,456U.S.228,24243(1982)(assessing $+t&. understandingboththeinjurytothechurchfromcompliancewith  achallengedregistrationstatuteandtheburdenonthestateof \ demonstratingthatthechurchisnotareligiousorganization).  X   III.   b ` Weconsidertheconstitutionalstandingissuetobea `  closeone.PlaintiffsherearebettersituatedthanthoseinLujan  \  v.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,564(1992),whoarguedthe   injurycouldsomedayoccur,ortheplaintiffinLyons,461U.S.at d  98,whoarguedthat,havingbeenonceplacedinachokeholdby `  policewhenarrested,hemightwellbeagain.WithintheArticle   IIIstandingcases,thereisconsiderablelanguageaboutnot h recognizingstandingwhere"hypothetical,""speculative,"or d "conjectural"injuryisatissue.See,e.g.,Lujan,504U.S.at  560;Lyons,461U.S.at10102.CallingMcInnisMisenor'spossible l injuries'hypothetical'is,inasense,inaccurate;itisclear h alreadywhatthenatureoftheclaimis,thecontoursofthe  threatenedinjury,thattheinjurywouldbetracedtochallenged p  action,andthattheinjuryisredressablebyacourt.SeeValley !l" Forge,454U.S.at471. "$  ` Thisisnotasituationofalitigant"pressingsolely t$& abstractconcernsfoundedonilldefinedfacts,creatingadanger  &p!( thatajudicialpronouncementwouldconstituteaprohibited '#*  'advisoryopinion.'"1Tribe,supra,314,at388 .Plaintiffs' x)$, concernisnotsolelyabstract,givenherexperiencesatMMCin  1999;norarethefactsilldefined. \   ` Noristhestandingissueinthiscaseclearlyresolved X bytheprecedentsetbythecasesrelieduponbyMMCthatreject   claimstostandingtochallengerestrictionsonabortionbasedon `  potentialpregnancy.SeeRoev.Wade,410U.S.113,121(1973);  \  Abelev.Markle,452F.2d1121,112425(2dCir.1971);Crossenv.   Breckenridge,446F.2d833,839(6thCir.1971);AkronCtr.for d  ReproductiveHealthv.Rosen,633F.Supp.1123,1128(N.D.Ohio `  1986).Thereisanimportantdifferenceinthelevelofimminence   betweentheriskofanunhopedforandactivelyavoidedpregnancy h (whichmightormightnotleadtoseekinganabortion)# XVXXXV`#XVXX XVԀandan d activelysoughtafterandplannedforpregnancy.Itis,however,  alsotruethatthetimeframetoobtainanabortionisshorter.We l declinetoembraceaperserulebarringallclaimstostanding h basedonpotentialpregnancywhateverthenatureofthecauseof  action.Giventhedifficultyofpredictingallthepossibleclaims p  thatmightariseinthecontextofpregnancy,wecannotsaythat !l" standingcanneverbebasedonpotentialpregnancy. "$  ` Intheend,wedonotdecidethemoredifficultquestion t$& ofwhetherconstitutionalstandingispresent,becausewethinkthe  &p!( casemayberesolvedbasedontheprudentialaspectsofthe '#* standingandripenessdoctrines.Asnotedabove,ripenessand x)$, standingoverlapinmanyways;forpurposesofanalysishere,the $+t&. casesdealingwithripenesspresentacloserfit.Bothanalyses  areconcernedwithfitnessforreviewandhardship.  \ A.Fitness X  ` Inseveralways,thisisasimplecase,andarguablyfit   fordetermination.Thelegalissuesarerelatively `  straightforward.Plaintiffs'complaintasserts,atparagraphs22  \  and23:    (6(03! !0 ` RemovalofthebarrierintheFamilyCentertopermituse d  byMrs.McInnisMisenorandotherpeoplewhouse :  wheelchairswouldbereadilyachievableforMMCwithin `  themeaningof42U.S.C.12181(9)and5M.R.S.A.4592 6 inlightof: ` (#` (# ";"  0 ` ;u0 ` (#` (#26(  a  .3  0 (# (#  Thenatureandcostofthebarrierremoval;;uu݌(#(# Ќ  ";"  0 ` ;v0 ` (#` (#26(  b  .3  0 (# (#  MMC'soverallfinancialresources,numberof h employeesandtheeffectofthebarrier > removalonMMC'sexpensesandresources;and;vw݌d(#(# Ќ  ";"  0 ` ;hx0 ` (#` (#26(  c  .3  0 (# (#  MMC'stypeofoperation.;hxx݌:(#(# Ќ  0 ` UnlessDefendantremovesthebarriersintheFamily  Center,Plaintiffsandotherpeoplewhousewheelchairs  willcontinuetobeexcludedfromtheFamilyCenterand l thereforeunabletoenjoythegoods,services, B facilities,privileges,advantages,andaccommodations h providedtonondisabledpersonswhostayinandusethe > FamilyCenter.` (#` (# 7t TheclaimsanddefensesarewellpresentedbytheCommission p  Report. !l"  ` TheCommission'sReportdetailedMMC'spositionon "$ whetherrenovatingaroomintheFamilyCenterwas"readily t$& achievable"under42U.S.C.12181(9). TheReportoutlinedMMC's  &p!( revenueforthefiscalyearendedSeptember2000,itsexpenses,and '8#* itscapitalbudget. Itspecifiedthattheestimatedcostof )$, renovatingapatientroomandassociatedbath/showerroomwas @+&. $62,000.Therewouldbeadditionalcostsfromclosingthatroom  whilerenovationsweredone. Ifmoneywasspentonthis \ renovation,MMCsaid,itwouldhavetopostponeotherADAphysical X barrierremovals,suchasawheelchairramp,orcutbackelsewhere.    MMCalsonotedthatitisarelativelyrareoccurrencetohavea `  wheelchairusingpatientgivebirth,andtherewasnotanothersuch  \  patientbetweenNovember1999andMarch2001. MMCtookthe   positionthatitwouldbeirrationaltospendthemoneyas d  plaintiffsdesired,asthelaboranddeliveryunithasthelowest `  incidenceofusebymobilityimpairedpatientsofanyofthein   patientunits." #  4      ׀ Thefactsatissuearelimitedinnumber,and h easilydiscoverable,andthissuggestssimplicity. d  ` Butthissimplicityisnotenoughtocreatefitness.  Eventhoughthelegalissuesmaybeclear,acasemaystillnotbe l fitforreview: h 0 ` [T]hequestionoffitnessdoesnotpivotsolelyon  whetheracourtiscapableofresolvingaclaim  intelligently,butalsoinvolvesanassessmentofwhether p  itisappropriateforthecourttoundertakethetask. F ! Federalcourtscannotandshouldnotspendtheir !l" scarceresourcesonwhatamountstoshadowboxing.Thus, !B# ifaplaintiff'sclaim,thoughpredominantlylegalin "$ character,dependsonfutureeventsthatmaynevercome #% topass,orthatmaynotoccurintheformforecasted, t$& thentheclaimisunripe.J% '` (#` (# Ernst&Young,45F.3dat537."[P]rematurereviewnotonlycan &F") involvejudgesindecidingissuesinacontextnotsufficiently (#+ concretetoallowforfocusandintelligentanalysis,butitalso  caninvolvethemindecidingissuesunnecessarily,wastingtimeand \ effort."W.R.Grace&Co.v.UnitedStatesEPA,959F.2d360,366 X (1stCir.1992).Moreover,thisisnotasituationinwhicha   decisionis"unavoidable,"asinStern.214F.3dat10.Here, `  thatthefutureeventmaynevercometopassaugursagainsta  \  findingoffitness.    ` Thechainofcontingencieslyingbetweentheplaintiffs' d  currentstateandtheircomplainedoffutureinjurybolstersthat `  conclusion.LikethesituationinErnst&Young,thepresentcase   alsodependsonachainofcontingencies.InErnst&Young,the h threatenedinjurywascontingentuponaseriesofeightevents d whichmayormaynotcometopass,"alongstringof  contingencies,"wefound,"solongthat[Ernst&Young's]assertion l offitnessforjudicialreviewtripsoveritandfalls."45F.3d h at538.   ` Similarly,thepresentcaseisoneinwhichthe p  threatenedinjuryiscontingentonseveraleventswhichmayormay !l" nothappen.Firstasthemagistratejudgerecognizedthe "$ keystoneisthatMcInnisMisenormayormaynotbecomepregnant. t$& Second,thereisnowayofknowingwhen,ifever,McInnisMisenor  &p!( willbecomepregnant,andsothereisnowayofknowingwhetherMMC '#* willbythenhaveFamilyCenterfacilitiesavailabletomothersin x)$, wheelchairs.Othercontingenciesinclude:ifshedeliversatMMC $+t&. (asislikely)shemayormaynotbeeligiblefortransfertothe  FamilyCenter;herdeliverymayposecomplications,aslasttime, \ whichpreventhertransfer;andtheremayormaynotberoom X availableattheFamilyCenteronthedayshewouldwantto   transfer.Wedonotsuggest,however,thattheselatterconditions `  alonewoulddefeatstanding.  \  e ` AsinErnst&Young,"thecasethat[plaintiffs]argue[]   is,atthisstage,largelyhypothetical,andsuchcasesareseldom d  fitforfederaljudicialreview."Id. `  B.Hardship    ` Weconsiderhardshipaswell.Theplaintiffs'weak h showingonthefitnessprongmeansthattheymustcompensateonthe d hardshipprong.Thehardshipanalysisfocuseson'directand  immediate'harm.Itisunconcernedwithwhollycontingentharm. l W.R.Grace,959F.2dat367.Theplaintiffscontendthattheywill h sufferhardshipfromwithholdingofadecision.Theyarguethat  theywillbeunabletopresenttheirclaimsinfederalcourt,have p  theclaimsheard,havethecourtgrantthemanyrelieftowhichthey !l" maybeentitled,andhavethedefendantscomplywithanyremedial "$ orders,includingtheemploymentofnecessaryprofessionalssuchas t$& carpentersandarchitectstoremovethebarrier,allwithinthe  &p!( limitedtermofapregnancy. '#*  ` Wedisagreewiththeplaintiffs'assessmentofhardship. x)$, Thereiseveryreasontothinkthedistrictcourtcouldtimely $+t&. OY    resolveacaseifMcInnisMisenorbecomespregnantandeffectuate  aremedy.Thelegalissuespresentedbyplaintiffsarenot \ complicated.Manyofthefactsarealreadypresented,orcanbe X discoveredreadily.Discoverywillconcernthecostsofthe   architecturalchangesversusMMC'ssizeandresources,mattersall `  capableofstipulation.Wepredicttrial,ifany,wouldbeshort  \  anddiscoverybrief.MMCrepresentedthatlitigationand   implementationofanydecisioncouldbeaccomplishedwithinthe d  neededtime.Themagistratejudgeexpressedcertaintythatthe `  trialcourtcouldachievespeedyresolutionandremedy, andthere   isnoreasontodoubtthatconfidence.! #  5      ׀ Wedonotfindsufficient  hardshiponthepartoftheplaintiffstooffsettheirweakshowing 0 onthefitnessprong. ,  ` Inbalancingthesealternatives,wealsomustweighthe  factthatMcInnisMisenormayneverbecomepregnant,orshemaynot 4 deliver,orMMCmayhaveanewfacilitybythenandsothatthe 0 claimedinjurymaynevercometopass.Theconditionalnatureof   theclaimscounseledinfavorofthedistrictcourtrefusingto 8!" entertainjurisdictionatthispoint.Theprudentialreasonsalone "4$ provideadequatebasistoaffirmtheorderdismissingtheADAclaim $& withoutprejudice. <&!(   IV. @`   a ` Wereviewthedismissalofpendentstatelawclaimsfor \ abuseofdiscretion.UnitedMineWorkersv.Gibbs,383U.S.715, X 728(1966).Theplaintiffs'argumentsthatthedistrictcourt   shouldnothavedismissedthependentstateclaimsarewithout `  merit.Whenfederalclaimsaredismissedbeforetrial,stateclaims  \  arenormallydismissedaswell.SeeCameliov.Am.Fed'n,137F.3d   666,672(1stCir.1998).Itisuptoplaintiffswhethertofile d  theirstateclaims,astopastactionsoftheMMCinthe1999 `  delivery,inthestatecourts.     V. h  ` Thedismissalofthecaseis affirmed . Costsareawarded d toMMC. , # XVXXXVm#