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D+'/ 0R/ D/0 01 061 0 2 0:3 0^K3 0<3U63U>4U*Y4=4N<^<UB =bb=j=??(F{+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5   d( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      (&H2  (&H3  (&H4 XXX (&H5  (&H6  20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard KP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/KP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7F(X7  ?R%2A`Arial?  SQ\  `&Times New RomanS7G(X7&  d dE)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7I(X7  ?R%2A`Arial?  SQ\  `&Times New RomanS7G(X7E)2dxd0KS.SampleKP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial 3 $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    4    _ XDlXXXDlForexample,thedistrictcourtwroteinMihosIIthat  ` ` #XDlXX XDl#tocomportwithconstitutionalandother \ fundamentalprinciples,[Swift]says% _ %_qualified 2 immunityshouldberecognizedwhereapublic X officialisrequiredtoexerciseherjudgment . andformanopinionastoabalancebetween   competinginterests,solongastheofficial   doesnotknowinglyorrecklesslyrelyupon `  irrelevantconsiderationsorfalse 6   information,orignorecontraryinformation.  \   Here,defendantSwiftassertsthatshe   exercisedherjudgmentandactedonher   opinioninfactspecificcircumstancesasto d  whichpreviouscasescouldonlyhavebeenof :  limitedassistanceastotheappropriate `  weighingofclashingrightsassertedbythe 6 parties.Swiftsaysnoshowinghasbeenmade   byMihosthatSwiftactedinreckless  disregardofinformationnotsupportingher h opinion,orrelieduponirrelevantorfalse > considerations.Accordingly,sheshouldbe d protectedfrompersonalliability. :  % ` %`IconcludethatFirstAmendmentprecedents  identifiedinalltheprecedingpartsofthis l opinionsupportthisassertionbydefendant B Swift. h ` =` KMihosII,235F.Supp.2dat57.  L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- -  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    15    _WhetherareasonablepersoninSwift'spositionwouldhave  knownthatheractionsviolatedthatclearlyestablishedrightis  adifferentquestion.Weaddressthatquestioninthenext \ section.  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    6    _Inherreplybrief,SwiftalsourgesthatLevyIIispartof  therecordbecauseMihos"madespecificreferencetothe  proceedingsbeforethe_SJC_Ԁinhiscomplaint."See,e.g., XDlXXXDl_Watterson_ \ v.Page,987F.2d1,3(1stCir.1993)("documentssufficiently 2 referredtointhecomplaint"canbeproperlyconsideredona X motiontodismiss)#XDlXX XDl#.Inparagraph16ofthecomplaint,Mihosstated . that"[_f]ollowing_ԀproceedingsintheMassachusettsSupremeJudicial   Court,thedefendantActingGov.Swiftheldhearingsconcerningthe   removalofMr.MihosandMr.Levy."Thisistheonlyreferencein `  thecomplainttothestatecourtproceedings,andsimplechronology 6   compelstheconclusionthatMihoswasnotreferringtoLevyII:the  \  complaintwasfiledalmostthreemonthsbeforeLevyIIwasdecided.  2  Weneednotdecidewhetherthisreferenceissufficientto   expresslyincorporateLevyIintotherecord.ThefindingsinLevy   Iarenotgermanetotheissuesonappeal,andneitherpartyrelies d  onLevyIfortheirlegalargumentsinthebriefs.  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    1    _Threeappealshavebeenfiledinthiscase.Thefirst,02  2521,isSwift'sappealfromthecourt'sdenialofhermotionto  dismissinMihosI.Thesecond,031038,isMihos'sappealfrom \ thecourt'sdenialofdamagesinMihosII.Thethird,031090,is 2 Swift'sappealfromthecourt'sawardofadeclaratoryjudgmentto X MihosinMihosII.Accordingly,Swiftisdesignatedasthe . "Defendant,Appellant/CrossAppellee,"andMihosisdesignatedas   the"Plaintiff,Appellee/CrossAppellant."     Additionally,WilliamF.Galvin,inhisofficialcapacityas `  theSecretaryoftheCommonwealthofMassachusetts,iscaptionedas 6   the"Defendant"ontheseappeals.Afterastatecourtproceeding  \  orderedMihosreinstated,Mihos'srequestforinjunctiverelief  2  againstSwiftandGalvinwasmoot.Consequently,Mihos'smotionto   dismisstheclaimsagainstSwiftinherofficialcapacityand   againstGalvinentirelywasgrantedonOctober29,2002,andthere d  isnoappealpendinginthismatterregardingSecretaryGalvin. q $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    2    _SeeEnglandv.LouisianaStateBd.ofMed.Examiners,375  U.S.411,421(1964)(holdingthatapartymayinformthestate  court"thatheintends,shouldthestatecourt[]holdagainsthim \ onthequestionofstatelaw,toreturnto[federal]DistrictCourt 2 fordispositionofhisfederalcontentions."). X  & $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    5    _ XDlXXXDlInrecitingthesereasonsfromLevyII,thedistrictcourt  ignoredlanguageinLevyIIfindingthatmanyofthenon  retaliatoryreasonsfortheterminationsadvancedbySwiftwere \ supportedby"noevidence."See,e.g.,LevyII,436Mass.at749 2 51("Therewasnoevidencethatthevoteto'delay'thetoll X increasesviolatedanycovenantinthe1997and1999trust . agreementsortheircorrespondingbondprospectuses....There   isnoevidencethatLevyandMihosfailedtodoanythinglegally   requiredofthem....Thereisnorequirementtogenerate'new `  revenues'.TheplansatisfiestheAuthority'sexisting 6   obligations....[Mihos'sandLevy's]planhadnotbeenthe  \   resultof'haphazard'planning....Therewasnothinghaphazard  about[Mihos'sandLevy's]actions....Contrarytothe  Governor'scontention,therewasnoobligationtovoteonthe \ proposedtollincreasesandthealternativerevenueplanatthe 2 sametime.") X #XDlXX XDl# !"#$% 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)SearchTermSDU_38 MihosGalvin^i) ~ $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    7    _ XDlXXXDlWeneednotaddressatthisjuncturetheexactcontoursof  theproperuseofLevyIandLevyIIintheproceedingsonremand.  BeyondSwift'sattemptedrelianceonthemotivationissue,neither \ partyseekstobringotherfindingsintheLevylitigationintothe 2 record.#XDlXX XDl#  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    3    _Werecognizethatqualifiedimmunity,initsfullscope,  shieldspublicofficialsfromtheburdensoflawsuitsanddamages.  See,e.g.,GuzmanRiverav.RiveraCruz98F.3d664,666(1stCir. \ 1996)("Thequalifiedimmunitydefenseexistsnotonlytoshield 2 officialsfromliabilityfordamages,butalsotoprotectthemfrom X thegeneralcostsofsubjectingofficialstotherisksoftrial.. . ..")(internalquotationsandcitationsomitted). ! $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    12    _Fed.R.Civ.P.7(a)allowsacourtto"orderareplytoan  answer...."Fed.R.Civ.P.12(e)providesthat"[_i]f_Ԁa  pleadingtowhicharesponsivepleadingispermittedissovagueor \ ambiguousthatapartycannotreasonablyberequiredtoframea 2 responsivepleading,thepartymaymoveforamoredefinite X statementbeforeinterposingaresponsivepleading.Themotion . shallpointoutthedefectscomplainedofandthedetailsdesired."  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    16    _Ofcourse,thisrulingdoesnotprecludeSwiftfromasserting  qualifiedimmunityinasubsequentmotionforsummaryjudgmentor  attrial.SeeGuzmanRiverav.RiveraCruz98F.3d664,669(1st \ Cir.1996)(holdingthatthe"defenseofqualifiedimmunitymaybe 2 raisedandappealedatmultiplestagesofthetrial...."). X However,ifthetrialcourtdeniestherequestforsummaryjudgment . becauseofagenuineissueastoanymaterialfact,including   motive,thatrulingwouldnotpermitaninterlocutoryappeal.See,   e.g.,Stella,63F.3dat74(holdingthat"adistrictcourt'spre `  trialrejectionofaqualifiedimmunitydefenseisnotimmediately 6   appealabletotheextentthatitturnsoneitheranissueoffact  \  oranissueperceivedbythetrialcourttobeanissueoffact."). b $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    *    _Ofthe XDlXXXDlԀNorthernDistrictofCalifornia,#XDlXX XDl#Ԁsittingby  designation.jklmnoph0CEIMQUY]aAutoList1""""""""i)1)a)hq"(O;$0  2#  a  .3  0` (#(#(b$0  0` (#(#2#   .3  0 ` (#` (#(xir$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#2#(  0  )3  0 (# (#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#2#(  a  )3  0h(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#2#(   )3  0h(#h(#($0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#2#  0  )3  0(#(#({$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#2#  a  )3  0p(#(#(F$0  0` (#(#0 ` (#` (#0 (# (#0h(#(#0h(#h(#0(#(#0p(#(#2#     )3  0p(#p(# jklmnoph`CEIMQUY]aAutoList2""""""""i)1)a)rq"  $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    8    _Inmakingthisobservation,weexpressnoopinionregarding  thepreclusiveeffect,ifany,thatLevyIImighthaveonremandin  evaluatingthelegitimacyoftheseconcernsorSwiftsabilityto \ demonstratethemontherecord. a $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    13    _Whenplaintiffsallegeanintentbasedconstitutionaltort,  defendantsassertingqualifiedimmunityoftenquotethepassagein  CrawfordElstatingthat"impropermotiveisirrelevantonthe \ issueofqualifiedimmunity...."523U.S.at589.Indoingso, 2 theytakethepassageoutofcontext.InthisportionofCrawford X El,theCourtisexplaininghowHarlowremovedthesubjective . elementsfromthethirdstepofthequalifiedimmunityinquiryso   that"bareallegations"thatthedefendantmaliciouslyorknowingly   violatedplaintiff'sconstitutionalrightswouldnolongersuffice `  toovercomeaqualifiedimmunitydefense.AsCrawfordElexplains 6   inthesameparagraph,itsholdinginHarlow"that'bare  \  allegationsofmalice'cannotovercomethequalifiedimmunity  2  defensedidnotimplicatetheelementsoftheplaintiff'sinitial   burdenofprovingaconstitutionalviolation,"whichisthefirst   stepinthequalifiedimmunityinquiry.Aswehaveexplained,the d  restoftheCrawfordElopinionconfirmsthispoint. :    Indeed,inthefootnoteimmediatelyprecedingthestatement `  that"evidenceofimpropermotiveisirrelevantontheissueof 6 qualifiedimmunity,"CrawfordElquotesanopinionofJustice   _Ginsburg_,whenshewasajudgeontheDistrictofColumbiaCircuit,  andcallsita"correctunderstandingofHarlow...." h ` ` HadtheCourt[inHarlow]intendedits d formulationofthequalifiedimmunitydefense : toforecloseallinquiryintothedefendants'  stateofmind,theCourtmighthaveinstructed  theentryofjudgmentfordefendantsHarlow l and_Butterfield_Ԁontheconstitutionalclaim B withoutfurtherado.Infact,theCourt h returnedthecasetothedistrictcourtinan > openendedremand,adispositionhardly  consistentwithafirmintenttodeletethe  stateofmindinquiryfromevery p  constitutionaltortcalculus. F ! ` ` %CrawfordEl,523U.S.at589n.11(quotingMartinv.D.C.Metro. !B# Police_Dep't_,812F.2d1425,1432(D.C.Cir.1987)(alterationand "$ emphasisinoriginal)).  ,# ' Turner0Turner .     $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    9    _Althoughinmanyareasofthelawthereareimportant  distinctionsbetween"intent"and"motive,"weusethemhere  interchangeablybecausetheSupremeCourtdoessoinitsqualified \ immunityjurisprudence.See,e.g., XDlXXXDlHarlowv.Fitzgerald,457U.S. 2 800,818(1982)#XDlXX XDl#ԀandCrawfordElv._Britton_,523U.S.574(1998). [ $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    14    _Manyofthequalifiedimmunitycasesusethephrases   substantialfactorand motivatingfactorinterchangeablyto  describethecausalrelationshipbetweentheprotectedconductand \ theadverseactiontakenagainsttheplaintiff.Weprefertouse 2 thephrase substantialfactortoavoidconfusionwiththeearlier X discussionofmotivation,wheremotivation,ratherthanreferring . tocausation,referstowhetherSwiftwasconcernedabout   legitimategovernmentinterestsorimpermissibleretaliation.See    XDlXXXDlStella,63F.3dat7475(explainingthat#XDlXX XDl#"plaintiffmustshow.. `   .thathisspeechwasa%  %=%  Ԁ%[substantialormotivatingfactorforthe  adverseactiontakenagainsthim...andthedefendantmustthen  prove...thattheemployer%  %,wouldhaveactedinthesameway \ towardtheplaintiffevenintheabsenceoftheprotected 2 _conduct."(citing_ԀMt.Healthy,429U.S.at287)(internalcitations X omitted)). - $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    11    _Ofcourse,iftheconstitutionaltortitselfdoesnotinclude  asubjectiveelementsuchasintent,itwouldbeanerrortoimport  suchanelementintothequalifiedimmunityassessmentofwhether \ theplaintiff'sallegations,iftrue,establishaconstitutional 2 violation.StarPageciteas((Cite as: 63 F.3d 71, *75)SDU_21(;3$2#  0  .3  0   " $XDlXXX  =DlXXdd=    10    _TheSupremeCourtrecentlyexplainedagainthat"[_t]he_Ԁreason  whyretaliatingagainstindividualsfortheirspeechoffendsthe  Constitutionisthatitthreatenstoinhibitexerciseofthe \ protectedright.Retaliationisthusakintoan'unconstitutional 2 condition'demandedforthereceiptofagovernmentprovided X benefit."CrawfordElv._Britton_,523U.S.574,589n.10 . (1998)(citationsomitted). !XDlXXX  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * ! X'fXXXDl X X'f     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals @   FortheFirstCircuit  D @ XDlX D     `     h   A') ` dE<` A   `     h      p           `     h      p   Nos.022521,031038,031090      `     h @<< CHRISTYPETERMIHOS, ! q @| | XDlXX XDlPlaintiff,Appellee/CrossAppellant# XDlXXXDl2#,  G  @tt)v.     @@ JANESWIFT,IndividuallyandinherOfficialCapacity O  ЀastheACTINGGOVERNOROFTHECOMMONWEALTHOFMASSACHUSETTS, %u  @ Defendant,Appellant/CrossAppellee,and K    WILLIAMF.GALVIN,inhisOfficialCapacity } asSECRETARYOFTHECOMMONWEALTHOFMASSACHUSETTS, S Defendant. )y A') ` dE<` A %   @@ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT   FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS  @ [Hon.RobertE.Keeton,U.S.DistrictJudge] f A') ` dE<` A b @'Before G   @@((TorruellaandLipez,CircuitJudges,  andSchwarzer,g #  *      ׀SeniorU.S.DistrictJudge.   S O   A') ` dE< ` A  "     ThomasA.Barnico,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,withwhom !$ ThomasF.Reilly,AttorneyGeneral,andDavidR.Kerrigan, ]"% AssistantAttorneyGeneral,wasonbrief,forappellant. 3#&   HarveyA.Schwartz,withwhomLaurieFranklandRodgers,  $Y' Powers&SchwartzLLPwereonbrief,forappellee. $/ ( _____________________________ %!) *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  a'"+a'"   SI'#, @38029@SFebruary13,2004 (#.  RHCq)$/" @38029 @ R('#0  (  * ! w*%0? Ї    8VDlVXXdd8W*,X` XX* ` LIPEZ,CircuitJudge .In2002,thenActingGovernorJane  SwiftfiredChristyPeterMihosandJordanLevyfromtheir x positionsasmembersoftheMassachusettsTurnpikeAuthorityafter $t bothmencastvotesonthetimingofcertaintollincreaseson   roadsandtunnelsinMassachusetts.Inthisaction,Mihosbrought |  suitagainstSwiftundertheFirstandFourteenthAmendmentsand42 ( x  U.S.C.1983,allegingthatSwiftviolatedhisFirstAmendment $  rightsbyremovinghiminretaliationforvotingagainstherwishes   onthetollincreases.Swiftfiledamotiontodismiss,raising ,|  thedefenseofqualifiedimmunity. (  ` AlthoughthepleadingsneveradvancedbeyondSwift's  motiontodismiss,thedistrictcourtissuedtworulingsinthis 0 case,seeMihosv.Swift,2002WL31455257(D.Mass.2002)("Mihos , I")andMihosv.Swift,235F.Supp.2d45(D.Mass.2002)("Mihos  II").Initsfirstruling,thecourtheldthatSwiftviolated 4 Mihos'sFirstAmendmentrights,rejectedSwift'squalifiedimmunity 0 defense,anddeniedSwift'smotiontodismisstheclaimsagainst   herinherindividualcapacity.Initssecondruling,thecourt 8!" enteredadeclaratoryjudgmentthatSwiftviolatedMihos'sFirst "4$ Amendmentrightsbutessentiallychangedcourseonqualified $& immunity,rulingthatthelawprotectedSwiftagainstclaimsfor <&!( damagesarisingfromtheviolationofMihos'sFirstAmendment '8#* rights.Specifically,thecourtenteredafinaljudgmentthat )$, includedtheseprovisions: @+&. ` ` (1)Plaintiff,ChristyPeterMihos,isawarded  thefollowingdeclaratoryrelief:Itishereby  declaredthatActingGovernorJaneM.Swift, \ actinginherofficialcapacity,violatedhis 2 legallyprotectedrightsbyretaliating X againsthimforhisvoting,inhisofficial . capacityasMassachusettsTurnpike   Commissioner,contrarytohercommunicated   wishes. `  (2)AllclaimsofMihosfordamagesandfor  \  anyotherformofreliefbeyondthatallowed  2  inparagraph(1)ofthisjudgmentare   DISMISSEDWITHPREJUDICE.   ` MihosII,235F.Supp.2dat63. :  `  ` Swiftappealsthecourt'sdenialofhermotiontodismiss 6 inMihosIandthedeclaratoryjudgmententeredagainstherin  MihosII.Mihosappealstherulingdenyinghisclaimsfor > damages.Z #  1      ׀Forthereasonssetforthherein,weaffirmthedenial : ofthemotiontodismiss,vacatethedeclaratoryjudgmentandthe  denialofdamages,andremandforfurtherproceedings. B  >   I.   ` Thiscasecomestouswithtwolengthystatecourt \ opinionsandtwodistrictcourtopinionsalreadyfiled.SeeLevy X v.TheActingGovernor,435Mass.697,761N.E.2d494(Mass.   2002)("LevyI")XDlXX XDl;# XDlXXXDlE#Levyv.TheActingGovernor,436Mass.736,767 `  N.E.2d66(Mass.2002)("LevyII");MihosI,2002WL31455257(D.  \  Mass2002);andMihosII,235F.Supp.2d45(D.Mass2002).   Becausetheextensiveandundisputedfactualbackgroundofthis d  casehasbeensetforthfullyinpublishedopinions,particularly `  inLevyII,wewillconfineourrecitationofthefactstothose   pertinenttoourholdings.Thefindingsandanalysisofeachprior h opinionarediscussedbelowwhererelevanttotheissuesnowbefore d usonappeal.    A.Background l u" ` GovernorPaulCellucciappointedChristyPeterMihosto h theMassachusettsTurnpikeAuthorityinDecember1998tofulfill  theunexpiredtermofadepartingmember.InJuly1999,Governor p  CelluccireappointedMihostotheTurnpikeAuthoritytoafull !l" eightyearterm.InMay2000,Mihoswaselectedvicechairmanof "$ theTurnpikeAuthority. t$&  ` TheTurnpikeAuthorityis"abodypoliticandcorporate"  &p!( and"apublicinstrumentality"authorizedtooperatethe '#* MassachusettsTurnpikeandcertainotherroadsknownasthe x)$, MetropolitanHighwaySystem,includingtheMassachusettsTurnpike, $+t&. itsextensionintoBoston,andthetunnelsunderBostonHarbor(the  SumnerTunnel,theCallahanTunnel,andtheTedWilliamsTunnel). \ Mass.Gen.Lawsch.81A,1,3.Threemembers,eachofwhomis X appointedbytheGovernor,comprisetheTurnpikeAuthority,anda   twomemberquorumisrequiredtoconductbusiness.Id.at2. `  ThroughagreementswiththeMassachusettsHighwayDepartment,the  \  TurnpikeAuthorityisresponsibleforcertainaspectsofthedesign   andconstructionoftheCentralArtery/TunnelProject,commonly d  knownas"theBigDig."Additionally,theTurnpikeAuthoritybears `  soleresponsibilityforestablishingtollsfortheTurnpike,the   BostonHarbortunnelcrossings,andtheMetropolitanHighway h System. d  ` Thistollsettingresponsibilitygaverisetothedispute  betweenMihosandSwift.TheExecutiveOfficeofTransportation l andConstruction,theTurnpikeAuthority,andGovernorCellucci h reachedaconsensusinlate1996orearly1997thattollsshouldbe  raisedin1997andagaininJanuary2002.InApril2001,then p  LieutenantGovernorSwifttookofficeasActingGovernorwhen !l" Celluccidepartedtoacceptanambassadorialposting.Duringthe "$ latterpartof2001,MihosandLevybecameconcernedaboutthe t$& proposalstoimplementtollincreasesonportionsofthe  &p!( MassachusettsTurnpikeinJanuary2002.Followinginvestigations '#* ofthefinancialimpactoftheproposedtollincrease,including x)$, consultingwithattorneys,financialexperts,andbondcounselfor $+t&. theAuthority,MihosandLevyconcludedthatthetollincreasewas  neithernecessaryasamatteroflawnorinthebestinterestsof \ theTurnpikeAuthority.Swift,however,supportedtheJanuary2002 X increase.    ` OnOctober30,2001,thethreeTurnpikeAuthoritymembers `  met.AmotiontoraisethetollsinJanuary2002failedforwant  \  ofasecond.Subsequently,amotiontoincreasethetollsinJuly   2002wasmade,seconded,andpassedina21vote,withMihosand d  Levyinfavor.SwiftdeliveredletterstoMihosandLevydated `  November16,2001,notifyingthemthatshewasremovingthemfrom   theirpositionsasmembersoftheTurnpikeAuthority. h   B.TheStateCourtProceedings d !1 ` Followingreceiptofthoseletters,MihosandLevyfiled  averifiedcomplaintintheSupremeJudicialCourtofMassachusetts l seeking,interalia,declaratoryreliefthatSwiftlackedauthority h toremovemembersoftheTurnpikeAuthority.TheSupremeJudicial  Court(SJC)rejectedthatargumentandruledinsteadthatMass. p  Gen.Lawsch.30,9"confersontheActingGovernorthepowerto !l" removeamemberoftheMassachusettsTurnpikeAuthorityin "$ accordancewiththetermsofthatstatute."LevyI,435Mass.at t$& 700.  &p!(  ` Afterthisruling,Swiftconductedhearingstodetermine '#* whethershewouldremoveMihosandLevyfromtheirpositionsonthe x)$, TurnpikeAuthorityforcause.ByletterdatedFebruary6,2002, $+t&. SwiftnotifiedMihosandLevythatshewasremovingthemfrom  office,assertingthattheprincipalcauseforremovalwasthe \ fiscalirresponsibilityoftheirvotesattheOctober30,2001 X meeting.MihosandLevyagainsoughtreview,inthenatureof   certiorari,underMass.Gen.Lawsch.249,4,incountycourt. `  Asinglejusticereversedandreferredthemattertothefull  \  court.TheSJCheld,interalia,that"thedisputeinvolvesa   differenceofopinionoverpolicythat,inthecircumstances,does d  notconstitutesubstantialevidenceofcausetoremove"andvacated `  theorderofdismissal.LevyII,436Mass.at737.MihosandLevy   weredulyrestoredtotheirpositionsandreceivedbackpay. h   C.TheDistrictCourtProceedings d 8 ` Inadditiontoseekingreviewinstatecourt,Mihos  reservedhisrighttopresshisFirstAmendmentclaiminfederal l districtcourt,whichhedidsimultaneouslywiththestatecourt h proceedings.[ #  2      ׀Inhisdistrictcourtcomplaint,Mihosallegedthat  SwiftviolatedhisFirstAmendmentrightsbyretaliatingagainst p  himbecauseofhisvoteregardingthetimingofthetollincreases, !l" andhesought,interalia,declaratoryrelief,compensatoryand "$ punitivedamages,andattorney'sfees.Swiftrespondedwitha t$& motiontodismiss,assertingthedefenseofqualifiedimmunity.  Bothpartiesagreedthatdiscoveryshouldbestayedpendingthe \ resolutionofthequalifiedimmunityissue.OnOctober29,2002, X thedistrictcourtrejectedSwift'squalifiedimmunitydefenseand   deniedhermotiontodismiss.MihosI,2002WL31455257at*7*8. `  Thedistrictcourtthenstatedthat"[t]heonlyremainingissueor  \  issuesthiscourtmustdecideconcernwhatrelieftoplaintiffis   appropriate,"andorderedthattheparties'argumentsondamages d  wouldbeheardatthenextcasemanagementconference.Id.at*8. `   ` Pursuanttothedistrictcourt'srequest,theparties   submittedmemorandaregardingplaintiff'sclaimforcompensatory h andpunitivedamages,aswellasattorney'sfees.Additionally, d plaintiffsoughtdiscoveryonissuesrelatingtopunitivedamages.  Afterdenyingthediscoveryrequest,thedistrictcourtissuedan l opinionandfinaljudgmentonDecember17,2002.MihosII,235F. h Supp.2d45.ThedistrictcourtdeclaredthatSwift"violated  [Mihos's]protectedrightsbyretaliatingagainsthimforhis p  voting."However,eventhoughthedistrictcourtpreviouslyhad !l" ruledinMihosIthatSwiftwasnotentitledtoqualifiedimmunity, "$  itheldthatSwift'sownFirstAmendmentinterestsservedasa t$& shieldtodamages,essentiallygrantingSwiftqualifiedimmunity,d #  3         regardlessoftheterminologyitemployed.Sj #  4       \ ` k`  ` SwiftappealedthedeclaratoryjudgmentinMihosIIand   thedenialofqualifiedimmunityinMihosI,andMihosappealedthe \ denialofanyclaimfordamagesinMihosII.Bothpartiesargue X thattherecordbeforethedistrictcourtinMihosIIwas   inadequatetosupporttherulingagainstthem. `    II.   BF ` Wefirstaddressthedistrictcourt'srulingsinMihos d  II.Then,becausethescopeoftherecordnecessarilyaffectsour `  analysisofSwift'squalifiedimmunitydefenseinMihosI,weturn   nexttodeterminingtherecordthatwasproperlybeforethe h districtcourt.Finally,weanalyzeSwift'squalifiedimmunity d defenseinlightofthatrecord.  9,X` m X,X` X9  0 @` 0@m ` (#` (# @` A.TheMihosIIRulings:DeclaratoryJudgmentforMihosand l JudgmentforSwiftonMihos'sDamagesClaim B HH ` Swiftseeksreversalofthedeclaratoryjudgmentthatshe > violatedMihos'sFirstAmendmentrights,arguingthatitwas  prematurelyentered.Weagree.Foraplaintifftoovercomea F ! qualifiedimmunitydefense,hemustshowthathisallegations,if !B# true,establishaconstitutionalviolation;thattherightwas #% clearlyestablished;andthatareasonableofficialwouldhave J% ' knownthatheractionsviolatedtheconstitutionalrightatissue. &F") SeeSubohv.DistrictAttorney'sOfficeofSuffolkDist.,298F.3d (#+ 81,90(1stCir.2002).However,thedenialofqualifiedimmunity N*%- toadefendantdoesnottranslateintoavictoryforaplaintiffon +J'/ themerits.Adeterminationthatthe"plaintiff'sallegations,if  true,establishaconstitutionalviolation,"Hopev.Pelzer,536 \ U.S.730,736(2002),doesnotmeanthattheplaintiff's X allegationsaretrue.Itsimplymeansthatthecasemaygo   forward.Thecourthadnobasisforenteringadeclaratory `  judgmentforMihosontheconstitutionalviolationclaim.  \   ` ThejudgmentforSwiftonMihos'sdamagesclaimpresents   adifferentproblem.Althoughthedistrictcourtavoidedthe d  languageofqualifiedimmunityinitsrulingagainstMihos,its `  conclusionthatSwiftdidnothavetoanswerindamagesfora   violationofMihos'sFirstAmendmentrightwastantamounttoa h qualifiedimmunityvictoryforSwift.Assuch,thedenialof d damagesinMihosIIwasareversalofthedistrictcourt'sruling  inMihosI,whichrejectedSwift'squalifiedimmunitydefense l entirely.Theoverridingquestioniswhichqualifiedimmunity h rulingwascorrect.Ifthecourt'srejectionofqualifiedimmunity  inMihosIwasright,itsacceptanceofqualifiedimmunityinMihos p  IIwaswrong.Forreasonsweshallexplain,thedistrictcourt's !l" firstrulingwascorrect.Consequently,thedistrictcourterred "$ indismissingMihos'sdamagesclaim. t$&   B.TheScopeoftheRecord  &p!( S ` Whenamotiontodismissisbasedonthecomplaint,asit '#* ishere,thefactsallegedinthecomplaintcontrol.XDlXX XDlBehrensv. x)$, Pelletier516U.S.299,309(1996)("# XDlXXXDlT#XDlXX XDl[T]helegallyrelevant_factors $+t&. ...willbedifferentonsummaryjudgmentthanonanearlier  motiontodismiss.Atthatearlierstage,itisthedefendant's \ conductasallegedinthecomplaintthatisscrutinizedfor X 'objectivelegalreasonableness.'# XDlXXXDlU#XDlXX XDl")(emphasisintheoriginal)# XDlXXXDlV#;see   also_Dirrane_,315F.3dat69n.2.However,asalways,thereare l  exceptionstotherule._Watterson_v.Page,987F.2d1,3(1stCir.  h  1993)(describing"narrowexceptionsfordocumentstheauthenticity   ofwhicharenotdisputedbytheparties;forofficialpublic p  records;fordocumentscentraltoplaintiff'sclaim;orfor l  documentssufficientlyreferredtointhecomplaint.")   ` Atissuehereiswhetherandtowhatextentoneofthese t exceptionsencompassesthe_SJC_'sdecisioninLevyII.Thatis,we  p mustdeterminewhetherthedecisionofthe_SJC_ԀinLevyIIchanged  therulesapplicabletoamotiontodismisswhenevaluatingMihos's x claiminhisfederallawsuitthatSwift'smotivationforfiringhim $t wasconstitutionallyproscribed.Inherreplybrief,Swiftneatly   sumsupthecourseofactiontakenbythedistrictcourt:"the |  DistrictCourtassumedthefactsallegedinthecomplainttobe (!x" true,disregardedallegationsconcerningthesubjectiveintentof "$$ theGovernor[and]reliedonthedecisionsoftheSupremeJudicial $& CourttoexplainthecourseoftheproceedingsandtheGovernor's ,&|!( statedgroundsforremoval...."WeagreewithSwiftthatthis '(#* isthecourseofactionthedistrictcourttook;however,that )$, coursewasmisguided. 0+&.  ` BecauseSwift's"motivationineffectingthedischargeis  anessentialelementof[Mihos's]constitutionalclaim,"the \ motivationsforSwift'sactionsarecrucialtothiscase. X _Feliciano_Ԅ_Angulo_v.RiveraCruz,858F.2d40,45(1stCir.1988).   AsweexplaininPartC.1.b.infra,themotivationelementofthe `  constitutionalclaimdoesnotdisappearatthequalifiedimmunity  \  stage._Acevedo_ԄGarciav.Vera_Monroig_,204F.3d1,12(1stCir.   2000)(affirming"therightnessofthedistrictcourt's d  considerationofmotivationinrejectingthequalifiedimmunity `  defense....").    ` Here,relyingonLevyIIforfindingsaboutSwift's h motivationsforfiringMihos,thedistrictcourtfoundthat"[_i]n_ d theexerciseofherdiscretion,SwifthadconcludedthatMihos'[s]  'actsandomissionsconcerningtheAuthority'sfinances, l particularlyduringthetimeperiodculminatingwiththe h Authority'sOctober30,2001[,][_b]oard_Ԁmeetingandimmediately  thereafter,werefiscallyirresponsible,resultinginadverse p  consequencesofsubstantiallydecreasingprojectedrevenuesofthe !l" Authority,damagingtheAuthority'screditoutlook,andcreating "$ financialinstability.'"MihosII,235F.Supp.2dat48(quoting t$& LevyII,436Mass.at744).Similarly,thedistrictcourt  &p!( determined,basedonLevyII,that"Swiftfurtherfoundthatthe '#* alternativerevenueplanpreparedbyMihoswascreated'hurriedly' x)$, andina'haphazard'manner,andthatitdidnot'adequately' $+t&. _compensatefortherevenuesthathadbeenlostasaresultof  [Mihos'sandLevy's]actions."MihosII,235F.Supp.2dat48 \ (quotingLevyII,436Mass.at746)(alterationsintheoriginal). X  ` Basedonthesefindings,thedistrictcourt"conclude[d]   thattheseclaimsbyMihosarebarredbytheFirstAmendmentand `  otherprotectionsagainstanawardofdamagesforthegoodfaith  \  performanceofpublicdutiesbytheActingGovernorofthe   Commonwealth."MihosII,235F.Supp.2dat62(emphasisadded). d  Further,thedistrictcourtcharacterizedSwiftas"anenergetic, `  strong,andcommittedgovernor...whohasrenderedcreditable   servicetothepublicbystandingfastintheassertionofdeeply h heldconvictions."Id.Finally,thedistrictcourtfoundthatthe d "expressiveelementsofSwift'sactionsariseoutoftheexercise  ofherdiscretioninperformingherdutiesastheActingGovernor l oftheCommonwealth.Swiftwasrequiredtoexercisethat h discretionbecauseshewasfacedwithwhatsheperceivedtobe,  amongotherthings,grossfiscalirresponsibilityonthepartof p  [Mihos.]"Id.at5758.\ #  5       !l"  ` Swiftclaimsthatthedistrictcourtproperlyreliedon  LevyIIinmakingthesedeterminationsregardinghermotivations \ forfiringMihosbecause,accordingtoSwift,federalcourtsmay X takejudicialnoticeofrelateddecisionsofstatecourtswhen   rulingonamotiontodismiss.Y #  6      ׀Inessence,Swifturgesthatthe `  SJC'sfindingsinLevyIIestopMihosfromalleginginthisfederal  \  lawsuitthathermotivesforfiringhimwereotherthanthose   describedbytheSJCinLevyII. d   ` Thisargumentmisapprehendsthescopeofissue `  preclusion:XDlXX XDl"Whenanissueoffactorlawisactuallylitigated   anddeterminedbyavalidandfinaljudgment,andthedetermination h isessentialtothejudgment,thedeterminationisconclusiveina d subsequentactionbetweentheparties,whetheronthesameora  differentclaim."Restatement(Second)ofJudgments27 \ (1982)(emphasisadded).# XDlXXXDlp#Itfollowsfromthishornbookdefinition X ofissuepreclusionthatthedistrictcourtmadeimproperuseof   LevyIIindecidingMihosII.ThetaskbeforetheSJCinLevyII `  wastodecidewhetherSwift'sstatedreasonsforterminatingMihos  \  satisfiedthe"forcause"standard.TheSJCdidnotaddress   whetherSwift'sstatedreasonswereactuallythereasonsthat d  motivatedheractions.Indeed,thecourtstatedspecificallythat `  "theGovernor'sgoodfaithandhonestjudgmentplaynopartinthe   instantmattersaffectingtheAuthority."LevyII,436Mass.at h 749.Inotherwords,theSJCacceptedSwift'sstatedreasonsas d trueforpurposesoftheiranalysisof"forcause"dismissalunder  Massachusettslaw.Mihos'scomplaintallegesadifferent l motivation:that"Swiftwasenraged"atMihos'svoteandfiredhim h "indirectretaliation"inanactof"politicalinterferenceand  intimidation."ThedistrictcourtdeniedMihostheopportunityto p  pursuediscoveryontheseallegations,despitethecentralrole !l" thatmotivationplaysinFirstAmendmentpoliticalretaliation "$ claims. t$&  ` Weconcludethatthedistrictcourt'srelianceonLevyII  &p!( inassessingSwift'sactualmotivationforfiringMihoswas '#* impropersincethatissuewasneverlitigated.Aswehavesaid x)$, before,"whentwoadversariesconcentrateinattemptingtoresolve $+t&. anissueimportantlyinvolvedinalitigation,thereisno  unfairnessinconsideringthatissuesettledforalltimebetween \ thepartiesandthoseintheirshoes.But...itisunfairto X closethedoortoissueswhichhavenotbeenonstagecenter,for   thereisnoknowingwhatthewhitelightofcontroversywouldhave `  revealed."FarmingtonDowelProds.Co.v.ForsterMfg.Co.,Inc.,  \  421F.2d61,79(1stCir.1969).   ` {D`  ` ThestatementsinLevyIIrelatedtoSwift'smotivation d  donotfallwithinoneoftheexceptionstothegeneralrulethat `  thefactsallegedinthecomplaintcontrolonamotiontodismiss.   Accordingly,welimitthefactualconsiderationsinourqualified h immunityanalysistotheallegationsinMihos'scomplaint.c #  7       d    @` C.QualifiedImmunity  +~ ` Havingascertainedthescopeoftherecordbeforeus,we l nowturntoSwift'squalifiedimmunitydefense."[G]overnment h officialsperformingdiscretionaryfunctionsgenerallyareshielded  fromliabilityforcivildamagesinsofarastheirconductdoesnot p  violateclearlyestablishedstatutoryorconstitutionalrightsof !l" whichareasonablepersonwouldhaveknown."Harlowv.Fitzgerald, "$ 457U.S.800,818(1982).Atleasttotheextentthatthe t$& qualifiedimmunitydefenseturnsuponapurelylegalquestion,we  &p!( reviewqualifiedimmunitydeterminationsdenovo.SeeMitchellv.  Forsyth,472U.S.511,530(1985);seealsoSubohv.District \ Attorney'sOfficeofSuffolkDist.,298F.3d81,90(1stCir. X 2002).    ` DrawingonSupremeCourtprecedentandourowncaselaw, `  weemployathreeparttestwhendeterminingifapublicofficial  \  isentitledtoqualifiedimmunity:(1)whetherplaintiff's   allegations,iftrue,establishaconstitutionalviolation;(2) d  whetherthatrightwasclearlyestablishedatthetimeofthe `  allegedviolation;and(3)whetherasimilarlysituatedreasonable   officialwouldhaveunderstoodthatthechallengedactionviolated h theconstitutionalrightatissue.Suboh,298F.3dat90.See d alsoHarlowv.Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,81819(1982).The  "SupremeCourthasinstructedustostart...withthequestion l ofwhetherthefactsasallegedmakeoutaviolationoftheFirst h Amendment."Dirranev.BrooklinePoliceDept.,315F.3d65,69  (1stCir.2002)(citingSaucierv.Katz,533U.S.194,201 p  (2001))(emphasisinoriginal).Accordingly,wetakeeachofthese !l" issuesinturn. "$ <,X` " X,X` m X< ` 1.ConstitutionalViolation t$& @,X` m X,X` " X@ ` BecauseMihosallegedthatSwiftviolatedhisFirst  &p!( Amendmentrights,thefirststepinourqualifiedimmunityanalysis '#* breaksdownintoathreepartinquiryitself:(1)whetherthe x)$, speechinvolvesamatterofpublicconcern;(2)whether,when $+t&. balancedagainsteachother,theFirstAmendmentinterestsofthe  plaintiffandthepublicoutweighthegovernment'sinterestin \ functioningefficiently;and(3)whethertheprotectedspeechwas X asubstantialormotivatingfactorintheadverseactionagainst   theplaintiff.Mullinv.TownofFairhaven,284F.3d31,3738 `  (1stCir.2002)(discussingtheSupremeCourtprecedentsthat  \  requireeachofthesethreeinquiries:Connickv.Myers,461U.S.   138,14748(1983)(matterofpublicconcernrequirement);Pickering d  v.BoardofEduc.,391U.S.563(1968)(balancingrequirement);Mt. `  HealthyCitySchoolDist.Bd.Educ.v.Doyle,429U.S.274,287   (1977)(substantialfactorrequirement)).Weaddresseachofthese h itemsinsequence. d  `  m a.MatterofPublicConcern   ` Forpurposesofthemotiontodismiss,Swiftdidnot l contestthatMihos'svoteonthetollincreasewasamatterof h publicconcern.MihosI,2002WL31455257,at*5.Likethe  districtcourt,wepausebrieflytoaddresstheissueonthe p  merits. !l"  ` WeareguidedinthisinquirybytheSupremeCourt's "$ holdinginConnick:"Whetheranemployee'sspeechaddressesa t$& matterofpublicconcernmustbedeterminedbythecontent,form  &p!( andcontextofagivenstatement,asrevealedbythewholerecord." '#* 461U.S.at14748.Mihos'svotesagainsttheproposedJanuary x)$, 2002tollincreaseandforaJuly2002tollincreaseconcerneda $+t&. matterofsignificantimportrelatedtofinancingthelargest  constructionprojectinthecountry.Further,thetimingofthe \ increaseswouldaffecteverypersonandcorporationwhousedthe X TurnpikeextensionintoBostonandtheBostonHarbortunnels.   ` |`  ` "Whereapublicemployeespeaksoutonatopicwhichis `  clearlyalegitimatematterofinherentconcerntotheelectorate,  \  thecourtmayeschewfurtherinquiryintotheemployee'smotivesas   revealedbythe'formandcontext'oftheexpression."O'Connorv. d  Steeves,994F.2d905,91314(1stCir.1993).Thereisnoneed `  forfurtheranalysisofthe"publicconcern"issue.Weconclude,   asdidthedistrictcourt,thatMihos'svotesinvolvedamatterof h publicconcern,satisfyingthefirstprongoftheconstitutional d violationanalysis.   `  m b.BalancingtheInterests l  ` ThenextstepindeterminingwhetherSwiftviolated h Mihos'sconstitutionalrightsistobalancetheinterestsofMihos  andthepublicinMihos'sspeech(hisvote)againstthe"interest p  oftheState,asanemployer,inpromotingtheefficiencyofthe !l" publicservicesitperformsthroughitsemployees...." "$ Pickering,391U.S.at568.SeealsoMullin,284F.3dat39.This t$& processiscommonlyknownas"Pickeringbalancing."  &p!( XDlXX XDl ` Itishere,inthePickeringbalancing,thatSwift's '#* motivationsforfiringMihosloomlarge.Inevaluatingthe x)$, defendantssideofthescale# XDlXXXDl]#XDlXX XDl,Pickeringanditsprogenyinstruct $+t&. courtstofocusonthegovernments legitimateinterestsin  preventingunnecessarydisruptionsandinefficienciesincarrying \ outitspublicservicemission.OConnor,994F.2dat915(citing X Pickering,391U.S.at56875).Accordingly,# XDlXXXDlj#XDlXX XDlifSwiftfiredMihos   becauseshewasconcernedthatthetangibleresultsofhisvote `  wouldnegativelyaffecttheefficient# XDlXXXDl0#functioningofgovernment  \  servicesandthefinancialstandingoftheTurnpikeAuthority,she   wouldhaveweightyinterestsonhersideofthePickeringscale.t #  8      ׀ d  Ontheotherhand,ifSwiftfiredMihosinaretaliatoryfitof `  piquebecauseshedisagreedwithhisvoteandwishedtopunishhim,   shewouldhavenolegitimategovernmentalinterestsonhersideof h thescale.Indeed,SwiftstruemotivationforfiringMihosfor d hisvoteisacoreissueinthiscase.   ` GiventheimportanceofSwiftsmotivationforfiring l Mihosforhisvote,wemustpausetoaddressSwiftsargumentin h herbriefthatXDlXX XDl"# XDlXXXDl#thestateofmindofthepublicofficialisnot  relevanttothequestionofqualifiedimmunity,XDlXX XDl"# XDlXXXDlb#ԀcitingtoHarlow p  v.Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,81617(1982).Thisargument,along !l" withcitationstoHarlow,isoftenmadeinFirstAmendment "$ retaliationcaseswhendefendantsraisethequalifiedimmunity t$& defense.WearemindfulthattheSupremeCourtinHarlowchanged  &p!( qualifiedimmunitydoctrinetoemphasizetheobjective,not  subjective,natureofthatinquiry.However,Harlowdoesnotstand \ forthepropositionthatinquiriesintodefendantssubjective X motivationisinappropriateinthefirststepofthequalified   immunityanalysisinassessingwhetheranintentbased `  constitutionalviolationhasbeenalleged.y #  9        \   ` PriortoHarlow,thethirdstepofthequalifiedimmunity   inquiryconsistedofbothobjectiveandsubjectivecomponents:a d  defendantwouldnotbeentitledtoqualifiedimmunityXDlXX XDl"ifheknew `  orreasonablyshouldhaveknownthattheactionhetookwithinhis   sphereofofficialresponsibilitywouldviolatetheconstitutional h rightsofthe[plaintiff],orifhetooktheactionwiththe d maliciousintentiontocauseadeprivationofconstitutionalrights  orotherinjury....# XDlXXXDl\#XDlXX XDl"# XDlXXXDl7#ԀWoodv.Strickland,420U.S.308,322 l (1975)(emphasisadded).UnderWood,then,aplaintiffcould h usuallyavoidanadversepretrialqualifiedimmunityrulingby  merelyalleging(1)aconstitutionalviolation(2)ofclearly p  establishedlaw(3)byapublicofficialwhoeitheracted !l" maliciouslyorknewthathisactionswoulddeprivetheplaintiffof "$ hisconstitutionalrights.Thisthirdstepinvolvedaninquiry t$& intothepublicofficialssubjectivestateofmindtoassess  &p!( whethertheofficialactedwithmaliceorwasawareofthe  constitutionalviolationthatwouldflowfromhisactions. \  ` Sevenyearslater,inHarlow,theSupremeCourtrevisited X therelevanceofthepublicofficial'ssubjectivestateofmindin   thequalifiedimmunityanalysis.First,theCourtnotedthat `  "[t]heresolutionofimmunityquestionsinherentlyrequiresa  \  balancebetweentheevilsinevitableinanyavailablealternative."   Harlow,457U.S.at813.TheCourtalsoreiterateditsconcern d  thatallowinginsubstantialclaimsagainstpublicofficialsto `  proceedtotrialexactedcostsonsocietyasawhole,"includ[ing]   theexpensesoflitigation,thediversionofofficialenergyfrom h pressingpublicissues,andthedeterrenceofablecitizensfrom d acceptanceofpublicoffice."Harlow,457U.S.at814.TheHarlow  CourtnotedthatWoodv.Strickland's"subjectiveelementofthe l goodfaithdefensefrequentlyhasprovedincompatiblewithour h admonition...thatinsubstantialclaimsshouldnotproceedto  trial...[because]anofficial'ssubjectivegoodfaithhasbeen p  consideredtobeaquestionoffactthatsomecourtshaveregarded !l" asinherentlyrequiringresolutionbyjury."Harlow,457U.S.at "$ 816. t$&  ` Becauseoftheincompatibilityofthesubjectiveinquiry  &p!( withtheneedtodismissinsubstantialcasespriortotrial,the '#* HarlowCourtfoundthat"thedismissalofinsubstantiallawsuits x)$, withouttrialafactorpresupposedinthebalanceofcompeting $+t&. interestsstruckbyourpriorcasesrequiresanadjustmentofthe  'goodfaith'standardestablishedbyourdecisions."Harlow,457 \ U.S.at81415.This"adjustmentofthe'goodfaith'standard"was X areformulationofthethirdstepofthequalifiedimmunitytestto   eliminatethegoodfaith,subjectiveinquiry:"Wethereforehold `  thatgovernmentofficialsperformingdiscretionaryfunctions  \  generallyareshieldedfromliabilityforcivildamagesinsofaras   theirconductdoesnotviolateclearlyestablishedstatutoryor d  constitutionalrightsofwhichareasonablepersonwouldhave `  known."Harlow,457U.S.at818(emphasisadded).    ` Harlow,then,didnotaffectthefirststepofthe h qualifiedimmunityanalysis:whetherplaintiff'sallegations,if d true,establishaconstitutionalviolation.Certainconstitutional  violations,includingFirstAmendmentretaliationclaims,include l defendant'smotivationsasafoundationalelementofthetort: h Mihos'sFirstAmendmentretaliationclaim"hasnomeaningabsent  theallegationofimpermissiblemotivation."AcevedoGarcia,204 p  F.3dat11. #  10      ׀WhiletheSupremeCourthasremovedfromthe !l" qualifiedimmunityanalysisinquiriesintowhetheradefendantknew "$ thathewasviolatingplaintiff'sconstitutionalrightsoracted t$& maliciouslytothatend,thisjurisprudencehasnotsuggestedthat  the"objectification"ofthequalifiedimmunityinquirysomehow \ removestheintentelementinthe"subsetofconstitutionaltorts X [inwhich]motivationorintentisanelementofthecauseof   action."Id.AccordXDlXX XDlJohnsonv.Ganim,342F.3d105,117(2dCir. `  2003)( Thoughthequalifiedimmunityinquiryisgenerallyan  \  objectiveone,adefendant'ssubjectiveintentisindeedrelevant   inmotivebasedconstitutionaltortssuchastheoneallegedby d  [plaintiff].).# XDlXXXDl#{ #  11      ׀ `   ` InCrawfordElv.Britton,523U.S.574(1998),the   SupremeCourtconfirmedthatalthoughHarloweliminatedinquiries h intothedefendant'ssubjectivestateofmindinthethirdstepof d thequalifiedimmunityanalysis,itdidnoteliminateinquiries  intothedefendant'ssubjectivestateofmindinthefirststepof l thequalifiedimmunityanalysiswhenplaintiffallegesanintent h basedconstitutionaltort.Whilestrikingdownaheightened  pleadingrequirementformotivationbasedconstitutionaltorts,the p  CrawfordElCourtstatedthat"ajudicialrevisionofthelawto !l" barclaimsthatdependonproofofanofficial'smotive"wasnot "$ justified.Id.at592.TheCourtwentontoexplainthat"there t$& isanimportantdistinctionbetweenthe'bareallegationsof  &p!( malice'thatwouldhaveprovidedthebasisforrebuttinga  qualifiedimmunitydefenseunderWoodv.Strickland[thethird \ step]andtheallegationsofintentthatareessentialelementsof X certainconstitutionalclaims[thefirststep]."Id.    ` Emphasizingitsconcernwithintrusivediscoveryintoa `  publicofficial'sstateofmind,theCourtobservedthatunder  \  Wood,priortoHarlow,allegationsofdefendant'smaliciousintent   tocauseanyinjuryatalltoplaintiffnotjustconstitutional d  deprivations"wouldhavepermittedanopenendedinquiryinto[the `  official's]subjectivemotivation."Id.Incontrast,theCourt   foundthatwhenassessingintentasanelementofaconstitutional h violation,themotivationinquiryisnotsobroadastoallow d discoveryonanypotentialtheoreticalbasisforthecauseof  defendant'sallegedanimositytowardsplaintiff:"rather,[the l motivationinquiry]ismorespecific,suchasanintent...to h deterpubliccommentonaspecificissueofpublicimportance."  Id. p   ` TheCourtthenobservedthat"existinglawalready !l" preventsthismorenarrowelementofunconstitutionalmotive "$ [allegedaspartoftheunderlyingconstitutionaltort]from t$& automaticallycarryingaplaintifftotrial."Id.Thisistrue  &p!( becauseadefendantmightprevailonaqualifiedimmunitydefense '#* inacasealleginganintentbasedconstitutionaltort,without x)$, needtoinquireastohermotives,if(1)therelevantlawwasnot $+t&. clearlyestablished,(2)theplaintiff'sspeechdidnotrelateto  amatterofpublicconcern,or(3)thedefendantshowedthatshe \ wouldhavereachedthesamedecisionevenintheabsenceofthe X employee'sprotectedspeech.Id.at59293.Inconsequence,as   notedbytheCrawfordElCourt,"unlikethesubjectivecomponentof `  theimmunitydefenseeliminatedbyHarlow,theimproperintent  \  elementofvariouscausesofactionshouldnotordinarilypreclude   summarydispositionofinsubstantialclaims."Id.at593. d   ` InPartIVofitsopinioninCrawfordEl,theCourt `  recognizedthateventhoughaqualifiedimmunitydefensetoan   intentbasedconstitutionaltortoftencanberesolvedongrounds h thatavoidinquiriesintothegovernmentofficial'smotives,that d willnotalwaysbeso.Therefore,theCourtfoundit"appropriate  toaddafewwordsonsomeoftheexistingproceduresavailableto l federaltrialjudgesinhandlingclaimsthatinvolveexaminationof h anofficial'sstateofmind."Id.at597."First,thecourtmay  orderareplytothedefendant's...answerunderFederalRuleof p  CivilProcedure7(a),orgrantthedefendant'smotionforamore !l" definitestatementunderRule12(e)."e #  12      ׀Id.at598."Second,.. "$ .thedistrictcourtshouldresolve[the]thresholdquestion[of t$& qualifiedimmunity]beforepermittingdiscovery...[by]  determin[ing]whether,assumingthetruthoftheplaintiff's \ allegations,theofficial'sconductviolatedclearlyestablished X law."Id.TheCourtthennotedthat"[i]ftheplaintiff'saction   survivestheseinitialhurdlesandisotherwiseviable,the `  plaintiffordinarilywillbeentitledtosomediscovery.Rule26  \  veststhetrialjudgewithbroaddiscretiontotailordiscovery   narrowlyandtodictatethesequenceofdiscovery."Id.TheCourt d  describedthewaysinwhichthedistrictcourtmaylimitthe `  number,length,subjectmatter,time,place,andmannerof   depositionsandinterrogatories,aswellasvariousdiscovery h scenariosthatwouldfacilitate"thepromptandefficient d resolutionofthelawsuit...."Id.at599.Finally,theCourt  observedthat"[b]eyondtheseproceduresandothersthatwehave l notmentioned,summaryjudgmentservesastheultimatescreento h weedouttrulyinsubstantiallawsuitspriortotrial."Id.at600.   ` Withitscarefulattentiontothewaysinwhichtrial p  courtscancontroltheexaminationofanofficial'sstateofmind !l" pretrial,theSupremeCourtacknowledgedinCrawfordElthatthe "$ adoptionofanobjectivestandardforqualifiedimmunityinHarlow t$& didnotforecloseallstateofmindinquiriesduringthepretrial  &p!(  considerationofqualifiedimmunitywhenstateofmindisan '#* elementoftheconstitutionaltort.u #  13      ׀SwiftmisreadsHarlowin   assertingthatitsreformulationofthequalifiedimmunitydefense \ makeshermotivationinfiringMihosirrelevanttothequalified X immunityanalysis.Therefore,ifthequalifiedimmunitydefense   profferedinhermotiontodismissdoesnotidentifypropergrounds  apartfrommotivefordismissingthecase,andifthethrustofher \ motiontodismississimplytodenythatsheactedwiththe X constitutionallyproscribedmotive,sheisunlikelytosucceed.    ` Apartfromhermisguidedargumentthatmotivationis `  alwaysirrelevanttothequalifiedimmunityinquiry,Swiftonly  \  arguesthatnoconstitutionalviolationoccurredbecauseher   terminationofMihoswasmotivatedbyherlegitimateconcernsfor d  thepublic'sinterestratherthanbyadesiretopolitically `  retaliateagainsthim.However,aswehavepreviouslyexplained,   onamotiontodismisswemustacceptastruetheallegationsin h Mihos'scomplaintaboutSwift'smotivation.InthePickering d balance,theexercisetowhichwenowreturn,theseallegations  produceadecisivetiltforMihos. l  ` WelookfirsttoMihosssideofthescaletoassess the h interestsXDlXX XDlservedby[MihossFirstAmendmentactivity]!including  [his]interestsincommunicating,andtheinterestsofthe p  communityinreceiving,informationonmattersofpublic !l" importance....O'Connor,994F.2dat915.# XDlXXXDl#ԀPublicofficials "$ haveastronginterestinvotingtheirconscienceonimportant t$& issueswithouthavingtosufferretaliatoryrecriminationsfrom  &p!( theirsuperiors.See,e.g.,Connickv.Myers,461U.S.138,149 '#* (1983)("XDlXX XDl[I]tisessentialthatpublicemployeesbeabletospeak x)$, outfreelywithoutfearofretaliatorydismissal.# XDlXXXDlq#").Thepublic $+t&. alsohasasubstantialinterestinmembersofpublicauthorities  beingabletofreelycasttheirvotesinaccordancewiththeirbest \ judgment,withoutfearofpoliticalinterferenceandintimidation. X SeeButzv.Economou,438U.S.478,506(1978)(notingXDlXX XDlԀ"public   interestinencouragingthevigorousexerciseofofficial `  authority"# XDlXXXDl#).Together,Mihos'sandthepublic'sinterestsweigh  \  heavilyontheirsideofthePickeringbalance.    ` InturningtoSwift'ssideofthebalance,wefindalmost d  nothingbecauseofthepostureofthiscase.Wehavealready `  explainedwhytheLevyIIdescriptionsofSwift'sreasonsfor   firingMihoscannottrumpthecontraryallegationsinMihos's h complaint.Inconsequence,thecomplaintalonesetsforththe d factualallegationsthatinformourreviewofthismotionto  dismiss. l ` `  ` Inhiscomplaint,MihosexplainsthatSwiftstatedinthe h February6,2002terminationlettersthatsheremovedMihosand  Levyfromofficeprincipallybecausetheirvoteswere"fiscally p  irresponsible."However,Mihos'scomplaintthendeniesthis !l" charge,statingthatthemotionforwhichhevoted"wasfiscally "$ soundandinthebestinterestoftheAuthority."Furthermore, t$& Mihosallegedthat"heexercisedhisbestjudgmentandconcluded  &p!( thattheJanuary2002tollincreasewasnotintheAuthority'sbest '#* interestsandwasnotnecessaryasamatteroflaw."Accordingto x)$, Mihos'scomplaint,"SwiftwasenragedthattheAuthorityfailedto $+t&. approvetheJanuary2002tollincrease,whichshesupported."  Further,MihosallegedthattheactionsSwifttookagainsthim \ "wereindirectretaliationforthevotes"hetookregardingthe X tolls.Finally,Mihosallegedthathewas"removedfrompublic   officebeforetheexpirationofhistermbecauseofdisagreement `  withtheway[he]votedonmattersofpublicconcern"andthathis  \  terminationwas"politicalinterferenceandintimidation."The   districtcourt,andthiscourtonappeal,mustacceptMihos's d  versionofthedispute.Accordingly,whenconsideringonlythe `  complaint,asweareboundtodo,wefindavoidonSwift'ssideof   thescaleandthePickeringscaletipsdecisivelyinfavorof h Mihos. d  `  m c.SubstantialFactor   ` HavingdeterminedthatthePickeringbalanceXDlXX XDlfavors l MihossFirstAmendmentrights,wenowconsiderwhetherhisvote h wasasubstantialfactorinSwiftsdecisiontofirehim.# XDlXXXDl#SeeMt.  HealthyCitySchoolDist.Bd.Educ.v.Doyle,429U.S.274,287 p  (1977).This substantialfactorrequirementiswhollydistinct !l" fromthediscussionof motivationintheprevioussection.z #  14      ׀ "$ Here,theinquiryiswhetherMihossterminationwasattributable  tohisexerciseofhisFirstAmendmentrightsortosomeother \ reasonunrelatedtohisvote.Seeid.Inshort,theissueisthe X causallinkbetweentheprotectedconductandtheadverse   employmentaction.Forpurposesofhermotiontodismiss,Swift `  didnotcontestthatMihos'svotewasthereasonforherdecision  \  toremovehimfromtheTurnpikeAuthority.Again,wepausebriefly   toaddressthisissueonthemerits. d   ` MihosandLevyvotedagainstSwift'swishesregardingthe `  tollincreasesonOctober30,2001.Seventeendayslater,on   November16,SwiftinformedMihosandLevythatshewasremoving h themfromoffice.FollowingLevyIandtheterminationhearing, d SwiftnotifiedMihosandLevyofherdecisiontoremovethemfor  cause,statingthattheprincipalcausefortheirremovalwastheir l "fiscallyirresponsible"votesonOctober30,2001.Thethird h memberoftheTurnpikeAuthority,whoproposedtheJanuary2002  increasesandvotedagainsttheJuly2002tollincreases,never p  receivedanysuchcommunication.Hence,weagreewiththedistrict !l"  courtthat,onthesefacts,thereisnoseriousdisputethat "$ Mihossvoteonthetimingofthetollincreaseswasasubstantial  factorinSwiftsdecisiontoremovehimfromoffice. \   ` Havingdeterminedthat(1)Mihos'svoteinvolvedamatter X ofpublicconcern,(2)Mihos'sandthepublic'sinterestaremore   weightyonthePickeringscalethanSwift's,and(3)Mihos'svote `  wasasubstantialfactorinSwift'sdecisiontofirehim,we  \  concludethatMihoshasallegedaviolationofhisFirstAmendment   rights. d   ` <,X` " X,X` m X<2.ClearlyEstablishedRight `  @,X` m X,X` " XI@ ` WenowturntowhetherMihos'sFirstAmendmentrightin   thiscasewasclearlyestablishedatthetimeSwiftdecidedto h removehimfromtheTurnpikeAuthority. d  ` Thelevelofabstractnessatwhichthe"right"in  questionisarticulatedcanoftendeterminetheoutcomeofthis l inquiry.Inconsequence,theSupremeCourthascautionedagainst h applyinggeneraldefinitionsofconstitutionalrightsinthe  qualifiedimmunitycontext.Andersonv.Creighton,483U.S.635, p  639(1987)."Theinquiryintothenatureofaconstitutionalright !l" forthepurposeofascertainingclearestablishmentseeksto "$ discoverwhethertherightwasreasonablywellsettledatthetime t$& ofthechallengedconduct...."Martinezv.Colon,54F.3d980,  &p!( 988(1stCir.1995).Additionally,the"inquiryintowhetherthe '#*  rightisclearlyestablished'mustbeundertakeninlightofthe x)$, specificcontextofthecase,notasabroadgeneralproposition.'"  Suboh,298F.3dat93. \   ` Withthisguidanceinmind,wearticulatetheFirst X Amendmentrightatstakehereastherightofapublicofficialto   voteonamatterofpublicconcernproperlybeforehisagency `  withoutsufferingretaliationfromtheappointingauthorityfor  \  reasonsunrelatedtolegitimategovernmentalinterests.Wehave   appliedasimilarformulationbefore:"[a]lthoughwehavefoundno d  casesdirectlyonpoint,probablybecauseitisconsidered `  unassailable,wehavenodifficultyfindingthattheactofvoting   onpublicissuesbyamemberofapublicagencyorboardcomes h withinthefreedomofspeechguaranteeofthefirstamendment... d .Therecanbenomoredefiniteexpressionofopinionthanby  votingonacontroversialpublicissue."Millerv.TownofHull, l 878F.2d523,532(1stCir.1989).Wereiteratedsixyearslater h thatthisrightwasclearlyestablished:"Votingbymembersof.  ..boards,commissions,andauthoritiescomeswithintheheartland p  ofFirstAmendmentdoctrine,andthestatusofpublicofficials' !l" votesasconstitutionallyprotectedspeech[is]establishedbeyond "$ peradventureofdoubt...."Stellav.Kelley,63F.3d71,75(1st t$& Cir.1995).  &p!(  ` NotwithstandingStellaandMiller,Swifturgesthat"a '#* balancingtest,byitsindeterminatenature,makesithighly x)$, unlikelythatapublicemployer,insuchcircumstances,couldbe $+t&. heldtohaveviolatedaclearlyestablishedright."Insupportof  thisproposition,SwiftreferstoFrazierv.Bailey,quotedbythe \ districtcourtinMihosII,holdingthatwhenarightis"subject X toabalancingtest,therightcanrarelybeconsidered'clearly   established,'atleastintheabsenceofcloselycorresponding `  factualandlegalprecedent."957F.2d920,931(1stCir.1992).  \  Here,though,MillerandStellaprovidethe"closelycorresponding   factualandlegalprecedents"thatwouldhaveservedtoinforma d  publicofficialthatMihos'sFirstAmendmentrightwasclearly `  established.X #  15          ` AsSwiftacknowledgesinherbrief,bothcasesinvolve h votesbypublicofficialsonmattersofpublicconcernandtheir d subsequentremovalbasedonthosevotes.Swiftseekstodownplay  theirimportbyemphasizingthatMillerandStellaneitherapplied l thePickeringbalancingtestnoraddressed"thelimitsofthe h 'righttovote'wheretheremovingofficialstatesthatthe  consequencesofthedecisionrenderedbythe'vote'willharmthe p  publicinterest." !l"  ` Onceagain,Swiftishamperedbytheproceduralposture "$ ofthiscase.HerstatedbeliefthattheconsequencesofMihos's t$& votewillharmthepublicinterestcannottrumpMihos'sclaimofa  &p!( politicallyretaliatorymotive.Aswehaveexplainedatlength,on  amotiontodismissthefactualallegationsinthecomplaint \ control.Hence,Swift'sdefenseofheractioncannotserveto X distinguishStellaandMilleranymorethanitcanweighonher   sideofthePickeringscale. `  <,X` " X,X` m X< ` 3.TheUnderstandingofaReasonableOfficial  \  @,X` m X,X` " X?@ ` Thethirdstepinthequalifiedimmunityanalysis,which   embodiestheobjectivestandardannouncedinHarlow,requiresusto d  analyze"whetheranobjectivelyreasonableofficerinthe `  defendant'spositionwouldhaveunderstood[her]actiontoviolate   theplaintiff'srights."Suboh,298F.3d95.Giventhefacts h allegedinthecomplaint,asdescribedinPartI.A.supra,wehave d notroublefindingthatareasonableofficialsimilarlysituatedto  SwiftwouldhaveknownthatterminatingMihosforhisvoteviolated l hisconstitutionalrights.Takingtheallegationsinthecomplaint h astrue,Mihosexercisedhisbestjudgmentastothepropercourse  ofaction,casthisvote,andwasfiredinretaliationforthat p  voteforreasonsunrelatedtolegitimategovernmentalinterests. !l" Noreasonablepublicofficialcouldhavefailedtorealizethata "$ memberofapublicinstrumentalitycannotbeterminatedonsuch t$& groundsforvotingonmattersofpublicconcernwithinhis  &p!( authority. '#*  ` Havingfoundthat(1)Mihos'sallegations,iftrue, x)$, establishaviolationofhisFirstAmendmentrights,(2)theright $+t&. wasclearlyestablishedatthetimeSwiftfiredhim,and(3)a  reasonablepublicofficialwouldhaveknownthatthedischarge \ constitutedaconstitutionalviolation,wefindthatSwiftisnot X entitledtoqualifiedimmunity.f #  16           III. `  r ` Forthereasonsexplainedabove,weaffirmthedistrict  \  court'sdenialofthemotiontodismissinMihosI,vacatethe   declaratoryjudgmentandthedenialofdamagesinMihosII,and d  remandforproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion. `   ` SOORDERED.   ` `