WPCk I){F\t@^ߪ,F5ף)\Uih~5_.|ANy "7p?APp&re*N8KTYw5lgC me*=q6B?Р*0~b )Nt}҂ Gd2FQf%A+`_\חf"xC i<+Mo "4.Jf39=Ng[sǠ]E`\ lc!3"ujZ!s]!9<ΈxJLOLV-ZJ_*qP,4Iu+J˕LLH4mzۨne)@**g$V]P# ~l<ܤVDDϷ:4Av#tUF5 %{ 0: 0D 0 U=8 ^  U0 wK 4O c r mt b UN E UB N% % % % 1' 72 0 1u 721 0 cccccccccccDd n0$$r&$*$*-`g/ 2= A/3ObQbQzV?Z,5\aaa8d fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff BkHP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0<4 9Z+.Courier New RegularX($USUS.,(#$  0  (v:2$ !USUS.,  =mXdd=      0  <4 9Z+ Courier New b0s <\( 9Z+Courier P/0yfiles3|xIU- -vr Z6Times New Roman Regular<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi(CEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.<PP@:QuickFormat1XXX  cb  XXX  cb  3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(;$2  A  .3  0   : $USUS.,=Xdd=      19    _=XXdXd=XXXXItistruethat,afterthecourt'sdecision,theorder  suspendingSheridanwillnolongerbefinal.Butthedistrict  courtmaysimplyreinstatetheremedychosenbythebankruptcy \ court.#XXXX# Z $USUS.,=Xdd=      20    _=XXdXd=XXXXInanonbankruptcycase,thisissuewouldnormallybe  characterizedas"waiver."Inbankruptcycases,themorecommon  rubricisthatof"impliedconsent."Thedifferenceinterminology \ isnotimportant;notionsofwaiverandconsentareclosely 2 intertwinedinthecontextofalitigant'sassertedrighttoan X ArticleIIItribunal,astheSupremeCourthasmadeclear.See, . e.g.,CommodityFuturesTradingComm'nv.Schor,478U.S.833,849   (1986)("[T]herelevanceofconceptsofwaivertoArticleIII   challengesisdemonstratedbyourdecisioninNorthernPipeline,in `  whichtheabsenceofconsenttoaninitialadjudicationbeforea 6   nonArticleIIItribunalwasreliedonasasignificantfactorin  \  determiningthatArticleIIIforbadesuchadjudication.").Indeed,  2  severalcourtsofappealshaveusedbothtermstodescribethe   inquiryunder157(c)(2).See,e.g.,InreJohnson,960F.2d396,   40304(4thCir.1992);HomeIns.Co.v.Cooper&Cooper,Ltd.,889 d  F.2d746,749(7thCir.1989);seealsoInreNell,71B.R.305, :  310n.4(D.Utah1987).Thetermsareusedinterchangeablyinthis `  opinion,asthesubstantivestandardisthesame:becauseSheridan 6 knewofhisrighttoseekdenovoreviewinthedistrictcourtand   chosenottodoso,thesanctionsordershouldhavebeendeemed  finalandtheentirecore/noncoreproblemavoided.#XXXX#  $USUS.,=Xdd=      21    _=XXdXd=XXXXButseeHomeIns.Co.,889F.2dat74950(expressconsent  required). | $USUS.,=Xdd=      22    _=XXdXd=XXXXThebankruptcycourtexpresslyfoundthatSheridan"isan  experiencedattorneywhohaspracticed[bankruptcylaw]fora  significantperiodoftime."2001WL1757058,at*24.Thecourt \ furtherfoundthatinlightofthatextensiveexperience,Sheridan 2 "wasaware"oftheapplicablerulesandpracticesinbankruptcy X court.Id. .   Nevertheless,theprincipalopinionsaysthatSheridan's   extensiveexperienceasabankruptcyattorneydoesnotsupportthe   inferencethatheknowinglyacquiescedincoretreatmentbecause `  "thesedisciplinaryproceedingsarose,atleastinpart,from 6   Sheridan'snumerousphysicalailmentsandmentalimpairments."Op.  \  at15n.7.Thatisanonsequitur:whetherSheridan'smisconduct  2  wasrelatedtohisallegeddisabilitieshasnothingtodowith   whetherSheridanknew,basedonhisyearsofpracticingbankruptcy   law,thathewasobligedtoalertthebankruptcyjudgeifhe d  objectedtothetreatmentofhisdisciplinaryproceedingascore. :  Theprincipalopiniondoesnotsuggestthatadisabilityactually `  preventedSheridanfromobjectingtocoretreatment. 6   Inanyevent,theprincipalopinion'swillingnesstoattribute   Sheridan'sprofessionalmisconducttohisdisabilitiesispuzzling,  giventhat(1)thebankruptcycourtmadenofindingofany h disability,and(2)theBAPheldthatSheridanutterlyfailedto > supporthisclaimofdisability.See282B.R.at92&n.15. & $USUS.,=Xdd=      23    _XXXX=XXdXd=Sheridan'sreplystatedonlythatthecomplaintfailedto  allegeviolationsoftheapplicablerulesofethicsandthat,in  thealternative,hisconductshouldbeexcusedbecauseofhis \ disabilities.  h $USUS.,=Xdd=      24    _=XXdXd=XXXX_AO_Ԁ20902provides,inrelevantpart,that"[_a]ny_Ԁattorney  admittedorpermittedtopracticebefore[thebankruptcy]court  shallbedeemedtohaveconferreddisciplinaryjurisdictionupon \ _th[e_]courtforanyallegedattorneymisconductarisingduringthe 2  courseofacasependingbefore_th[e_]courtinwhichthatattorney  hasparticipatedinanyway."  $USUS.,=Xdd=      25    _XXXX=XXdXd=Sheridanarguedinhisopeningbriefthat_AO_Ԁ20902wasnot  promulgateduntilFebruary2001,afterthedisciplinarycomplaint  againsthimwasfiled.Thatisnottrue:theadministrativeorder \ wasadoptedinOctober2000,andSheridanisfairlychargedwith 2 knowledgeofitscontents.Anamendedversionof_AO_Ԁ20902became X effectiveinFebruary2001,buttheamendmentsdidnotaffectany . portionoftheorderrelevanttoSheridan'scase.  $USUS.,=Xdd=      26    _XXXX=XXdXd=ThispassageisquotedexactlyfromSheridan'sOctober22  motion;anymistakesorgrammaticalerrorsarehis. V $USUS.,=Xdd=      27    _XXXX=XXdXd=Forexample,theprincipalopinionconcedesthatbankruptcy  courtshavesubstantivedisciplinaryauthority,butitholdsthat  theexerciseofthatpowerinthisparticularcasewasnota"core \ proceeding."SeeOp.at2829.Sheridanessentiallyarguedthe 2 opposite:hechallengedthesubstantivepowerofbankruptcycourts X todisciplineattorneys,butdidnotcontestthattheinvocationof . thatpower,ifvalid,wouldbeacoreproceeding. $USUS.,=Xdd=      28    _XXXX=XXdXd=TheprincipalopinionemphasizesSheridan'scitationto  NorthernPipelineConstr.Co.v.MarathonPipeLineCo.,458U.S.  50(1982),whichitdescribesas"theseminalcaseregardingthe \ constitutionallimitationswhichundergirdthepivotalcore/non 2 coredistinction."Op.at16(emphasisinoriginal).Thereisno X doubtthatthe"coreproceeding"conceptreflectssomeofthe . ArticleIIIissuesdiscussedinthepluralityopinioninNorthern   Pipeline.ButitismorethanastretchtosaythatSheridan's   referencetothatcaseamountstoanargumentthattheproceeding `  belowwasnoncoreunder157.Congressdidnotcreatethe 6   core/noncoredistinctionuntilafterNorthernPipeline,sothe  \  citationalonehardlysufficestoraisetheissue.  2    Morefundamentally,NorthernPipelinediscussedatleastfive   waysinwhichtheBankruptcyActof1978unconstitutionallyvested   the"essentialattributes"ofjudicialpowerinArticleI d  bankruptcyjudges,onlyoneofwhichwasthefactthatbankruptcy :  judgeswereempoweredtoissuefinalordersthatwerebindingand `  enforceable.See458U.S.at8586.Significantly,anotherofthe 6 "essentialattributes"citedbytheNorthernPipelineCourtwasthe   powerofbankruptcyjudgestoexercise"allordinarypowersof  districtcourts,"includingissuingextraordinarywritsandorders. h Id.at85.Thisandnotthecore/noncoredistinctionwas > thepropositionforwhichSheridancitedNorthernPipeline. d SheridanhasconsistentlyarguedthatunderNorthernPipeline, : bankruptcycourtslackthe"inherentpower"thatdistrictcourts  enjoytodisciplineattorneysintheabsenceofstatutory  authorization.Asnotedabove,thisislogicallydistinctfromthe l argumentthatbankruptcycourtscandisciplineattorneysbutcannot B enterfinalorders.  $USUS.,=Xdd=      29    _XXXX=XXdXd=TheprincipalopinionemphasizesthatbeforeSheridanstated  he"takesnoposition"onthecore/noncoreissue,hesuccessfully  briefedtheargumentthattheproceedingbelowwasnoncore.Op. \  at16n.8.Ofcoursehedid!thewholepointofthesupplemental  briefingwastoaddressthatargument,andSheridandulytracedits  contours.Yetdespitedemonstratingthatheknewhowtomakethe \ argumentifheweresoinclined,Sheridanexpresslystatedthathe 2 "takesnoposition"onthematter.Theprincipalopinion X attributestheargumenttohimanyway. $USUS.,=Xdd=      30    _XXXX=XXdXd=Theprincipalopinioninsiststhatthecore/noncorequestion  isaquestionof"constitutionalimport,"presumablybecause  Congresscreatedthecore/noncoredistinctioninresponsetoa \ SupremeCourtcasepredicatedonArticleIII.Op.at19&n.10. 2 Thatargumentismisplacedfortworeasons.First,thefactthat X astatutoryschemereflectsconsiderationsofconstitutionallaw . doesnotelevatethestatuteitselftoconstitutionalstature.We   donotsay,forexample,thatserviceofprocessunderFed.R.Civ.   P.4isaquestionofconstitutionaldimensions,eventhoughthat `  Rulewasplainlywrittentocomportwithconstitutionaldueprocess 6   concerns.Indeed,ifthecore/noncoreissueisamatterof  \  constitutionallaw,sotooistherestoftheBankruptcyCode  2  insofarasitreflectsCongress'sjudgmentabouthowbestto   implementitspowersundertheBankruptcyClause,U.S.Const.Art.   I,8,cl.4. d     Second,thecore/noncoredistinctionisnothinglikethe  problemsofconstitutionallaworimportthathavepreviously  servedasapredicateforthiscourt'sresorttoLaGuardia.See, \ e.g.,Castillov._Matesanz_,348F.3d1,1116(1stCir.2003) 2 (ineffectiveassistanceofcounselundertheSixthAmendment);In X reWeinstein,164F.3d677,68485(1stCir.1999)(takingsclaim . undertheFifthAmendment);_Nat'l_Ԁ_Ass'n_ԀofSoc.Workersv._Harwood_,   69F.3d622,629(1stCir.1995)(immunityofstatelegislature   fromFirstAmendmentclaimunderfederalcommonlaw,byanalogyto `  theSpeechandDebateClause);UnitedStatesv.Mercedes_Amparo_, 6   980F.3d17,19(1stCir.1992)(dueprocessconcernsin  \  prosecutorialbreachofpleabargainagreement).Inthefewcases  2  inwhichthiscourthasinvoked_LaGuardia_intheabsenceofaclaim   baseddirectlyinconstitutionallaw,wehavedonesotovindicate   astronggovernmentalinterestofakindnotpresenthere.See, d  e.g.,Chestnutv.CityofLowell,305F.3d18,21(1stCir.2002) :  (percuriam)(enbanc)(relievingacityofpunitivedamagesaward `  underCityofNewport);Inre604ColumbusAveRealtyTrust,968 6 F.3d1332,134344(1stCir.1992)(permittingtheFDICtoraise   specialgovernmentaldefensesbasedonfederalcommonlaw). % $USUS.,=Xdd=      31    _XXXX=XXdXd=Seegenerally1CollieronBankruptcy3.02[3](rev.15th  ed.2003)(listingexamplesofproceedingsrecognizedas"core"  eventhoughtheydonotfallwithintheexpresstermsof157(b)). \   $USUS.,=Xdd=      32    _=XXdXd=XXXXLongbeforeNorthernPipelineandCongress's1984enactment  of157,theSupremeCourtrecognizedthatacourt'spowerto  regulatetheconductofthebar,includingthepowertosuspendand \ disbarattorneys,isessentialtotheadministrationofjusticeand 2 theprotectionofthepublic.See,e.g.,RoadwayExpress,Inc.v. X Piper,447U.S.752,76467(1980);Theardv.UnitedStates,354 . U.S.278,281(1957);ExparteBradley,74U.S.364,374(1868);Ex   parteGarland,71U.S.(4Wall.)333,37879(1867);ExparteBurr,   22U.S.(9Wheat.)529,531(1824);seealsoInreSnyder,472U.S. `  634,64345(1985)("Courtshavelongrecognizedaninherent 6   authoritytosuspendordisbarlawyers.").#XXXX#  $USUS.,=Xdd=      33    _=XXdXd=XXXXTheSupremeCourtendorsedthisnarrowreadingofNorthern  Pipelineagainthefollowingyear,repeatedlycitingthatcasefor  thepropositionthatCongress'spowertoassignmatterstonon \ ArticleIIItribunalsisconstrained"whereprivate,commonlaw 2 rightsareatstake."Schor,478U.S.at854;seealsoid.(noting X that"private,commonlawrightswerehistoricallythetypesof . matterssubjecttoresolutionbyArticleIIIcourts,"citing   NorthernPipeline).#XXXX#  $USUS.,=Xdd=      34    _XXXX=XXdXd=Inaddition,thecourtdeterminedthatSheridancommitted  fiveviolationsinthedisciplinaryproceedingitself,bringingthe  totalto88violationsin34cases.  " $USUS.,=Xdd=      35    _=XXdXd=XXXXXXXXcb    ThevastmajorityofSheridan'sinfractionsinvolvedfailing  tofilecertificatesofserviceforhisclients'Chapter13plans  (17timesin16cases) ;failingtofiledocumentsormotions \ relatedtohisclients'Chapter13petitionsinatimelymanner(39 2 timesin28cases) ;andfailingtoappearorappearinglateat X courthearings(8occasions)and341meetings(3occasions) . relatedtoChapter13petitions .XXXXXXXXcb    ݀Mattersconcerningthe   confirmationofadebtor'splanforreorganization,including   Chapter13plans,arecoreproceedings.See28U.S.C. `  157(b)(2)(L).  $USUS.,=Xdd=      36    _XXXX=XXdXd=BankruptcyRule7052makesFed.R.Civ.P.52applicableto  bankruptcyproceedings.AnorderenteredunderRule7052isa  finaljudgment.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.52(a);seealsoInre_Werthen_, \ 329F.3d269,272(1stCir.2003)(findingsoffactunder 2 BankruptcyRule7052arereviewedforclearerror). W $USUS.,=Xdd=      37    _XXXX=XXdXd=Forsimilarreasons,thereisnojustificationforthe  principalopinion'ssuggestionthatthepowerofabankruptcyjudge  toenterbindingdisciplinaryordersshoulddependonwhetherthe \ bankruptcyjudgepersonallywitnessestheattorney'smisconduct.  $USUS.,=Xdd=      38    _XXXX=XXdXd=Neithertheprincipalopinionnortheconcurringopinion  acknowledgesXXXXXXXXcb    ݀thatseveraloftheunderlyingbankruptcycaseswere  stillpendingatthetimethedisciplinaryproceedingagainst \ SheridanwasinstitutedinOctober2000.Indeed,severalofthe 2 instancesofmisconductprovenduringthebenchtrialoccurredas X lateasNovember2000,afterthedisciplinaryproceedingshad . begun.Atleastinthesecases,thedisciplinaryactionagainst   Sheridanwasliterallya"matter[]concerningtheadministrationof   theestate."157(b)(2)(A).vXXXXXXXXcb    ݀ d !USUS.,  _# XXXX8XXdd8       @ #XXXXQ#XXXXhXXUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals#XXhN#XX  eFortheFirstCircuit # x/##XX x#  Au) ` dE` A   No.XXXX029007 m     u    %  }   VolumeIIofII u  @ INRE@@<< WILLIAMC.SHERIDAN, ! q @^^'򀀀#XXXX#XXXXԈ    @ WILLIAMC.SHERIDAN, y  @ Defendant,Appellant, %u  @NN)v. ! @~~#NANCYMICHELS, } @ Plaintiff,Appellee. )y @ 򀀀 O @ APPEALFROMTHEBANKRUPTCYAPPELLATEPANEL  @ OFTHEFIRSTCIRCUIT -} @*#XXXX#XXXXԈ@ 򀀀  @^^'Before [ @ Selya,CircuitJudge, !W! @ Cyr,SeniorCircuitJudge, "# @ andLynch,CircuitJudge. _$% @ 򀀀  &[!'   WilliamC.Sheridan,prose. '#)   NancyH.Michels,withwhomtheLawOfficesofMichels& (#* MichelsandCaroleA.Mansurwereonthebriefforappellee. c)$+ @ 򀀀 +_&-   March29,2004 , (/ W @ 򀀀#XXXXi#XXXX  -(0L #$e   ` LYNCH,CircuitJudge(dissenting) .Withregret,I  dissent.Themajoritydecidesthiscaseonanargumentthat x Sheridanneverraisedinthebankruptcycourt,intheBAP,oron $t appeal,andthatSheridanexpresslyrefusedtoadoptwhenthis   courtraiseditsuasponteandaskedforhisview.Themajority |  thendecidesthatissuethewrongway.Theresultistorelegate ( x  Sheridantoanewroundoflitigationinthecourtsbelow,more $  thantwoyearsafterthebankruptcycourtsuspendedhimfrom   practice.ForSheridan,thisisapyrrhicvictory,andonethathe ,|  askedusnottogive؀him.& #  19      ׀ (    ` TheprincipalopinionbyJudgeCyrandtheopinionby  JudgeSelyaconcurringinthejudgmentagreeontwopointsthatI 0 believearenotonlymistakenbutalsocertaintohaveconsequences , beyondthenarrowrealmofattorneydisciplineinbankruptcycases:  (1)thatthisisanappropriatecaseforinvokingthe 4 LaGuardia/Weinsteindoctrinetojustifythiscourtinaddressingan 0 issuethatSheridanelectednottoraise;and(2)thatthe   disciplinaryproceedingagainstSheridanwasnota"core 8!" proceeding"under157.Ialsodissentfromtheprincipal "4$ opinion'sconclusionthatSheridanneitherconsentednorwaivedhis $& objectionstoentryofafinalorderinthebankruptcycourt. <&!(    I.      ` Theprincipalopinionreachesthe"coreproceeding" x questioninthiscaseonlybyholdingthatwhileSheridanperhaps $t forfeitedtheissue,heneverconsentedtotheentryofafinal   judgmentorotherwisewaivedtherequirementsof157.Icannot |  jointhatconclusion:(i)itrequiresarestrictiveinterpretation ( x  of157(c)thatconflictswiththeviewsofatleastfivecircuits $  andtheleadingcommentatoronbankruptcylaw;and(ii)it   underminesthiscourt'sjurisprudenceofwaiverandconsenttosay, ,|  onthisrecord,thatSheridaneverdisputedthefinalityofthe ( bankruptcycourt'sorder.   (83""  2  A  .3  0    Section157andFinality ݌0(#(# Ќ     ` Abankruptcyjudge'spowertoenterfinalordersisnot H limitedtocoreproceedings.Rather,abankruptcycourthasthe  authoritytoenteradispositiveorderinanyproceeding, P irrespectiveofcore/noncorestatus,ifthepartiesconsent.See L 157(c)(2);seealsoInreS.Indus.BankingCorp.,809F.2d329,   331(6thCir.1987)("Arelatedproceedingwiththeconsentofall T!" partiesfunctionallyhasthesameeffectasacoreproceeding.. #P$ ..").ThiscourtheldunequivocallyinInreG.S.F.Corp.,938 $& F.2d1467(1stCir.1991),thatsuchconsentcanbeimpliedfroma X&!( party'slitigationconduct.Seeid.at1477("[I]mpliedconsent (T#* willsuffice.").Weupheldappellatejurisdictioninthatcase )%, becausethepartieshad,bytheirconductbeforethebankruptcy \+&. court,"acquiesce[d]"inthetreatmentoftheproceedingascore.  Id.If,byhisconduct,Sheridanlikewiseindicatedhisknowing \ acquiescenceinthebankruptcycourt'streatmentofhiscaseas X core,thenthesanctionsorderwasfinal,theBAPhadappellate   jurisdiction,andthecore/noncorestatusofthedisciplinary `  hearingisirrelevant.* #  20      ׀  \     ` TheprincipalopinionseemstointerpretInreG.S.F.to   requiresome"affirmative"expressionofconsentbeforeaparty d  willbeheldtohavewaivedtheproceduresrequiredby157(c). `  Op.at810.Thatdecisiondoesnotannouncesucharestrictive   andformalisticrule;itdidnotrequireanyparticularconduct, h butmerelyexaminedtherecordfor"indication[s]ofacquiescence." d 938F.2dat1477.Further,inconcludingthat"impliedconsent  willsuffice"under157(c)(2),thiscourtcitedcaseslikeInre  DanielsHead&Assocs.,819F.2d914(9thCir.1987),InreS. \ Indus.BankingCorp.,supra,andInreHatfield,117B.R.387 X (Bankr.C.D.Ill.1990),eachofwhichheldthattheabsenceofa   timelyobjectiontothebankruptcycourt'sjurisdictionisenough `  toestablishconsent.See819F.2dat919;809F.2dat331;117  \  B.R.at389n.1.      ` Theprincipalopinioncontendsthatsuchcasesmusthave d  beenwronglydecidedinlightofthe1987advisorycommitteenotes `  toFed.R.Bankr.P.7008,whichemphasize"express"consent.See   Op.at8n.2.Thatargument,however,isundercutbytheSupreme h Court'srecentdecisioninRoellv.Withrow,123S.Ct.1696 d (2003),inwhichtheCourtheldthatconsenttoproceedingsbefore  afederalmagistratejudgecanbeimpliedfromaparty'slitigation l conduct.Id.at1703.InRoell,asinthiscase,afederalrule h interpretingtheunderlyingstatuterequiredadvance,written  consentfrombothparties.Id.at1701.Asinthiscase,that p  rulewasnotsatisfied.Nevertheless,theRoellCourtheldthat !l" underthetermsofthestatuteitself,impliedconsentwasallthat "$ wasrequired.Id.at1703.Thesamelogicappliesunder157(c), t$& whichrequires#XXXX # XXXXonly"consent,"not"expressconsent."Moreover,  &p!( Congressknewhowtorequireexpressconsentwhenitwantedthat '#* resultitdidsoin157onlyafewparagraphslater.See28 x)$, U.S.C.157(e)("expressconsent"isrequiredfromallparties $+t&. beforethebankruptcycourtmayholdajurytrial).Inlightof  RoellandCongress'scalculatedchoiceofwordsin157,the \ principalopinion'srestrictiveinterpretationoftheconsent X requirementin157(c)isunjustified.#XXX X&#XXXX      ` Undertheviewadoptedbytheprincipalopiniontoday,a `  party'scompletefailuretoobjecttocoretreatmentisnot  \  sufficienttoshowconsent.Thatposition,ifadoptedbythis   court,wouldplacethiscircuitdirectlyinconflictwiththeviews d  ofatleastfiveofoursistercircuits.SeeInreTex.Gen. `  PetroleumCorp.,52F.3d1330,1337(5thCir.1995)("Apartywho   failstoobjecttoabankruptcycourt'sassumptionofcore h jurisdictionconsentstothatcourt'sentryoffinaljudgment."); d Abramowitzv.Palmer,999F.2d1274,1280(8thCir.1993)(finding  impliedconsentwhere"[n]eitherpartyobject[ed]tothebankruptcy l court'senteringafinaljudgment");InreJohnson,960F.2d396, h 40304(4thCir.1992)(findingimpliedconsentbecausetheparties  "failedtoobjecttothebankruptcycourt'sdetermination"ofthe p  mattersindispute);InreDanielsHead,819F.2dat919(failure !l" toraiseatimelyobjectiontocoretreatmentconstitutesimplied "$ consent);InreMen'sSportswear,Inc.,834F.2d1134,113738(2d t$& Cir.1987)(party'sfailuretoobjecttobankruptcycourt's  &p!( exerciseofcorejurisdictiondespitemultipleopportunitiesto '#*  lodgesuchanobjection"canonlybeconstruedasimplied x)$, consent").+ #  21      ׀Theleadingtreatiseonbankruptcylawlikewise   concludesthatthefailuretoobjecttocoretreatmentshouldbe \ enoughtoshowconsent.See1CollieronBankruptcy3.02[6][b] X (rev.15thed.2003)("Itisunstated,butprobablyimpliedin   section157(b)(3),andithasbeenheld,thatfailuretomake `  timelyobjectiontothecharacterizationoftheproceedingasa  \  coreproceedingwillbedeemedaconsenttothejurisdictionofthe   bankruptcycourttoenterdispositiveordersandjudgmentsinlike d  mannerassection157(c)(2).");id.3.03[4]("Theeffectof `  failuretointerposeanobjection[tocoretreatment]atthe   pleadingstageshouldbeconsenttothefinalorderbeingentered h bythebankruptcyjudge."). d ""  ?42  B  .3  0    WaiverintheBankruptcyCourt ?4o4݌(#(# Ќ     ` Iftheprincipalopinion'srestrictiveviewofconsent  under157(c)(2)iswrong,itcollapses.Thatisbecauseunder 4 thetestadoptedbyothercircuitsand(inmyview)endorsedby 0 thiscourtitselfinInreG.S.F.,Sheridanwaivedanyrighthemay   havehadtodenovoreviewinthedistrictcourt. 8!"    ` Sheridanutterlyfailedeventoidentifythecore/non "4$ coreissueinthebankruptcycourt,letaloneraiseacoherent $& objectiontothecorestatusoftheproceeding,despitemultiple <&!( opportunitiestodoso.Neitherinhisresponsivepleadingsnorin '8#* hisvariousmotionstothebankruptcycourtdidSheridanan  experiencedbankruptcyattorney, #  22      ׀!arguethattheproceedingswere \ noncore,thatthebankruptcycourtcouldnotenterafinal X judgmentagainsthim,thathewasentitledtodenovoreviewofthe   factsandthelawinthedistrictcourt,oranythingelsethat `  couldbeinterpretedasareferenceto157(c).  \     ` NordidSheridanidentifythisissueatthebenchtrial.   ThebankruptcycourtenteredapretrialschedulingorderonJanuary d  16,2001thatrequiredthepartiestoidentifyalldisputedissues `  oflawandapplicabledefenses.Sheridan,inresponse,raised   variouslegalobjections,notoneofwhichaddressedthecore/non h corestatusoftheproceedingorthebankruptcycourt'spowerto d enterafinaljudgmentagainsthim.. #  23      ׀ Evenduringthebenchtrial,  Sheridanmadenoargumentthatthecourtwasobligedtoenterits \ findingsas"proposedfindingsoffact"under157(c)(1).On X October12,2001,thebankruptcycourtenteredafinalopinionand   ordersuspendingSheridanfrompractice.Michelsv.Sheridan ,No. `  001140JMD,2001WL1757058(Bankr.D.N.H.Oct.12,2001).  \     ` Theprincipalopinionexplainsallofthisbysayingthat   Sheridancouldnothaveraisedthecore/noncoreissuepriorto d  judgmentbecausehehadnoideathatthebankruptcycourtintended `  toenterabindingsanctionsorder.Op.at13.Thatissimplynot   so.Sheridanhasneverclaimed,andcouldnotclaim,thathewas h unawarethatthebankruptcycourtintendedtosanctionhim d directly.Thebankruptcycourt'sJanuary16,2001pretrial  schedulingorderstatedthatthecomplaintagainstSheridanhad l beencommencedunderAdministrativeOrder20902oftheNew h Hampshirebankruptcycourts. Thatorderexpresslyallowsthe  bankruptcycourttoissuebindingorderssanctioninganddisbarring p  attorneysbydeemingattorneyswhopracticebeforethebankruptcy !l" courttohaveconsentedtodisciplinaryjurisdiction.0 #  24      ׀ Sheridan "$ wasclearlyonnoticethatthebankruptcycourtintendedtohold  suchaproceeding,yethedidnotdisputethatitwasacore \ proceedingorthatanyresultingorderwouldbefinal.1< #  25      ׀ X Ѐ   ` Eveninhismultiplemotionsforreconsiderationafter   thebenchtrial,Sheridanfailedtoraisethecore/noncoreissue. `  InhisOctober22,2001motion ,Sheridanrespondedtothe  \  bankruptcyjudge'sstatementthatbankruptcycourtshavethe   substantivepowertodisciplineattorneysunderthe"inherent d  power"doctrineofExparteBurr,22U.S.529(1824).See `  Sheridan,2001WL1757058,at*1.Becausetheprincipalopinion   reliesheavilyonSheridan'sresponsetoconcludethatheraised h andpressedthecore/noncoreargument,Iquoteithere: d  ` First,ExparteBurr,supra(U.S.1824)concerns  broadpowersinherentintheexerciseofthejudicial  powerunderArticleIIIoftheUnitedStates l Constitution.However,althoughtheUnitedStates B BankruptcyCourtisa"unitofthe[Federal]district h court,"itiswellestablishedthatthepowersof > Bankruptcyjudgesarelimitedtothose"conferredunder"  theUnitedStatesBankruptcyCode.28U.S.C.Section151.  >H ` AssuchtheBankruptcycourtdoesnotshareallof p  thepowersofthedistrictcourt.Thus,inNorthern F ! PipelineCo.vs.MarathonPipelineCo.,458U.S.50 !l" (1982)theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtheldthatitwas !B# unconstitutionalfortheBankruptcyCourtstoexercise  the"essentialattributesofjudicialpowerofthe  ArticleIIIdistrictcourt,"andthatthebankruptcy \ court'spowerwaslimitedto"coreproceedings"ofthe 2 administrationofthebankruptcyestateunderthe X bankruptcycode.28U.S.C.section157(b)(1). . J ` Itisaxiomaticthatsincethebankruptcycourtdoes   notshareinthe"essential"powersofArticleIII   judges,itfollowsthatthebankruptcycourtdoesnot `  shareinthe"inherentauthority"derivedfromthe 6   exerciseofArticleIIIjudicialpower.3 #  26        \  "H0HM ThiswasSheridan'ssolereferenceto"coreproceedings"or157   inthebankruptcycourt. :     ` Asthecontextmakesclear,Sheridanwasnotobjectingin 6 theseparagraphstothefinalityofthebankruptcycourt'sorder  againsthim.Nordidthebankruptcycourtunderstandhimtobe > makingsuchanargument.Rather,Sheridanwascontendingonlythat : bankruptcycourtsdonotenjoythe"inherentpower"describedinEx  parteBurrtodisciplineattorneys.Thisissimplyanattackon B oneofthebankruptcycourt'sassertedsourcesofdisciplinary > authority.Itisdistinctfromthecontentionthattheprincipal  opinionattributestoSheridan:namely,thatthebankruptcycourt, F ! whileempoweredtoconductdisciplinaryproceedings,wasnot !B# permittedtoenterafinalorderagainstSheridanunder #% 157(c)(1).Sheridan,anexperiencedbankruptcylawyer,knowsthe J% ' difference.Indeed,theprincipalopinionitselfrecognizesthat &F") thequestionwhetherabankruptcycourthasthepowertodiscipline (#+ attorneysisaquestionindependentofwhetherithasthepowerto  enterafinalorder.4 #  27      ׀Yettheprincipalopinioncontendsthatby \ raisingtheformerargument,Sheridansomehowalsoraisedthe X latter.5j #  28      ׀Thisisunfairtobankruptcyjudges,whoshouldnotbe   askedtoreadtealeavestodiscernalitigant'sargument. `     ` Allofthis,inmyview,requirestheconclusionthatthe  bankruptcycourt'sorderwasfinalandappealable.Sheridanwas \ plainlyawareofthecore/noncoredistinction.Hesimplyelected X nottoasserttheissue,perhapsforstrategicreasons.Perhapshe   gambledthatthebankruptcyjudge'sfactualfindingswouldbe `  favorabletohim,hopingtobenefitfromamorefavorablestandard  \  ofreviewonappeal.Perhapshepreferredtoretaintheoptionof   appealingtotheBankruptcyAppellatePanel,asheultimatelydid. d  Whateverhisreasons,Sheridanabandonedanyrighthemayhavehad `  todenovoreviewinthedistrictcourtbychoosingnottoobject   tocoretreatment.SeeInreG.S.F.,938F.2dat1477;accordIn h reTex.Gen.PetroleumCorp.,52F.3dat1337;Abramowitz,999F.2d d at1280;InreJohnson,960F.2dat40304;InreDanielsHead,819  F.2dat919;InreMen'sSportswear,834F.2dat113738.By l refusingtoinferconsentfromSheridan'sconduct,themajority h simplyencouragesfuturebankruptcylitigantstogamethesystemby  waitinguntilanadversejudgmentbeforeobjectingtocore p  treatment."Inferringconsentinthesecircumstances...checks !l" theriskofgamesmanshipbydeprivingpartiesoftheluxuryof "$ waitingfortheoutcomebeforedenyingthe[bankruptcyjudge's] t$& authority.Judicialefficiencyisserved;theArticleIIIrightis  &p!( substantiallyhonored."Roell,123S.Ct.at1703. '#* ""  _2  C  .3  0    WaiveronAppeal _O_݌x)$,(#(# Ќ     ` Sheridan'sconductonappeal,bothintheBAPandbefore @+&. thiscourt,providesfurtherassurancethatheconsentedtocore  treatment.First,Sheridanelectedtobringhisappealinthe \ BankruptcyAppellatePanelratherthaninthedistrictcourt, X despitethefactthattheBAPhasnoauthoritytoreviewproposed   findingsoffactorconclusionsoflawunder157(c)(1).The `  principalopiniondismissesthispoint,statingthatSheridan's  \  appealwasproperbecausethebankruptcyjudgeostensiblyentered   afinalorder.Op.at16n.8.Thatistrue,butitdoesnot d  negatetheinferenceofconsent:althoughSheridanhadanabsolute `  statutoryrighttobringhisappealinthedistrictcourt   irrespectiveofthecore/noncoreissue,see28U.S.C.158(c)(1), h andalthoughtheBAPnotifiedSheridanofthatrightinwriting , d  SheridanneverthelesspursuedhisappealintheBAP.If,asthe  principalopinioncontends,Sheridanhadbelievedhewasentitled l todenovoreviewinthedistrictcourt,theobviouschoicewould h havebeentoinvokehisrighttoappealtothedistrictcourtand  thentodemanddenovoreview.HisdecisiontoappealtotheBAP p  insteadisstrongevidenceofhisconsenttocoretreatment.Cf. !l" CommodityFuturesTradingComm'nv.Schor,478U.S.833,84950 "$ (1986)(plaintiff'selectiontoforgoreviewinfederalcourtand t$& seekreliefinsteadinanArticleIproceeding"constitutedan  &p!( effectivewaiver"ofArticleIIIobjectionsbecausethepartyhad '#* theoptionofArticleIIIadjudicationbut"chosetoavailhimself x)$, ofthequickerandlessexpensiveprocedureCongresshadprovided $+t&. him").     ` SheridanneverarguedtotheBAPthattheproceedingin \ thebankruptcycourtwasnoncore.Hemerelyrepeatedhisargument X about"inherentpower"underExparteBurr.TheBAPopinionmakes   clearthatthefinalityofthebankruptcycourt'sorderwasnever `  indispute.See,e.g.,InreDisciplinaryProceedings,282B.R.  \  79,85(B.A.P.1stCir.2002)(referringto"finalbankruptcycourt   orders"andindicatingthatthebankruptcycourt'sfactualfindings d  wouldbereviewedforclearerror). `     ` ThefinalandmosttellingindicationofSheridan's   consenttocoretreatmentcamebeforethiscourt.Invitedbythe h courttofileasupplementalbriefonthecore/noncorequestion, d Sheridanexpresslydeclinedtoarguethatthedisciplinaryhearing  wasnoncore.Hissupplementalbriefacknowledgedthecore/non l coreissueandevencited157(c)(1),theprovisionbarring h bankruptcyjudgesfromenteringfinalordersinnoncore  proceedingsabsenttheconsentoftheparties. Nevertheless, p  Sheridanrefusedtoassertthatthedisciplinaryproceedingwas !l" noncore!hestatedsimplythathe"takesnoposition"onwhether "$ thebankruptcycourtorderwasfinal,andheurgedthiscourtto t$& providepromptandclearguidanceonthemeritsofhisappeal  &p!( becausehiscasehadalreadybeenpendingtoolong.6 #  29      ׀  '#*    II.   p    ` ThesecondreasonIcannotjointhejudgmentisthe x majority'sextensionoftheLaGuardia/Weinsteinexceptiontoour $t rulesofwaiverandforfeiture.SeeOp.at1719.TheLaGuardia   exceptionisinapplicableonthesefacts,andbyinvokingithere, |  themajorityapprovesanovelandextremelyunwiseexpansionof ( x  thatdoctrine. $     ` #XXXXE)#XXXXUnderLaGuardiaanditsprogeny,thecourtofappealsmay   reviewdenovoanargumentthatisraisedforthefirsttimeon ,|  appealonlyif:(1)theargumentinvolvesapurelylegalquestion ( ofconstitutionalimportthatcanberesolvedwithcertitudeonthe  existingrecord;(2)addressingtheargumentwillpromotejudicial 0 economybecausethesameissuewillariseinnearlyidenticalterms , inothercases;and(3)theargument,ifmeritorious,wouldalmost  certainlyentitletheappellanttoprevail,sothatfailingto 4 addressitwouldresultinamiscarriageofjustice.SeeUnited 0 Statesv.LaGuardia,902F.2d1010,1013(1stCir.1990);seealso   Castillov.Matesanz,348F.3d1,12(1stCir.2003);Inre 8!" Weinstein,164F.3d677,685(1stCir.1999);Sammartanov.Palmas "4$ delMarProps.,Inc.,161F.3d96,9899(1stCir.1998).#XXXXr#XXXXԀUntil $& today,LaGuardiaprovidedanarrowexceptiontotheraiseorwaive  rule,whichthiscourtordinarilyapplies"withanearreligious \ fervor."Nat'lAss'nofSoc.Workersv.Harwood,69F.3d622,627 X (1stCir.1995).Casesqualifyingfortheexception,wehavesaid,   are"fewandfarbetween."Id. `     ` Themajority'sresorttoLaGuardiaonfactsliketheseis  \  unprecedentedinmultiplerespects.First,thiscourthasnever   invokedtheLaGuardiaexceptionwhenthepartyonwhosebehalfthe d  courtwouldintervenehasnotactuallyraisedtheissueonappeal. `  Here,notonlydidSheridanfailtoraisethecore/noncoreissue   onappeal,buthealsoexplicitlydeclinedtoadvocatetheposition h whenasked. d    ` Inaddition,theusualpredicateconditionsforinvoking  LaGuardiaareabsenthere.Thecore/noncoredistinctionisnota l matterofconstitutionallaworimport,nomorethananyother h questionofstatutoryinterpretationundertheBankruptcyCode.7 #  30      ׀  Noristhecore/noncoredetermination"strictlyaquestionof  law."LaGuardia,902F.2dat1013.Theprincipalopinionitself \ recognizesthatthecore/noncorequestioninthiscaseisnota X purelylegalonethecourtdoesnotholdthatattorney   disciplinaryproceedingsarealwaysnoncore,butratherthatthe `  proceedingwasnoncore"[i]ntheparticularcircumstancesofthe  \  instantcase."Op.at5.Andthecore/noncorestatusofan   omnibusattorneydisciplinaryproceedinginitiatedbyabankruptcy d  courtishardlyaquestionthatis"almostcertaintobepresented `  inidenticaltermsinothercases."LaGuardia,902F.2dat1013.      ` Similarly,themeritsofthecore/noncoreissueinthis h caseareneither"highlypersuasive,"Harwood,69F.3dat628,nor d "socompellingasvirtuallytoinsure[theappellant's]success,"  Sammartano,161F.3dat9899;UnitedStatesv.Slade,980F.2d27,  31(1stCir.1992).Sheridanhasnotadvancedthecore/noncore \ argumentatall,letaloneadvanceditina"highlypersuasive" X manner,andtheprincipalopinion'sreasoningisnot"so   compelling"thattheoutcomeisessentiallypredetermined.See `  Correav.Hosp.SanFrancisco,69F.3d1184,1196(1stCir.1995)  \  (decliningtoinvokeLaGuardiawheretheforfeitedargumentmerely   advancedoneoftwopossibleconstructionsofastatute). d     ` Lastly,thiscasedoesnotmeetthefinalcriterionfor `  invokingLaGuardia:thatiftheissueweremeritorious,failingto   reachitwouldconstitutea"miscarriageofjustice."902F.2dat h 1013.Itcouldhardlybeamiscarriageofjusticetoreachthe d meritsofSheridan'sappealgiventhatbothpartieshaveurgedus  todoso.Ifthereisanymiscarriageofjusticeinthiscase,it l isthedisservicedonetobothsidesinremandingthiscasefor h anotherroundoflitigationbelow.     ` IfLaGuardiacanapplyhere,itcanapplyinanycasein p  whichanappellatejudgewishestoraiseanddecideanissuesua !l" sponte,nomatterhowcompellingtheevidenceofwaiveror "$ forfeitureandregardlessofwhetherapartyadvocatesthat t$& position.Iwillnotbesurprisedifthisaspectofthecourt's  &p!( decisiontodayisregrettedbythiscourtandthebarforyearsto '#* come. x)$,     $+t&. III.   S   ` Finally,Idisagreewiththemajority'sconclusionthat x theproceedingagainstSheridanwasnoncore.Inmyview,theonly $t interpretationof157thatisconsistentwiththepurposesofthe   federalbankruptcylawsandCongress'sintentinthe1984 |  bankruptcyamendmentsisthatthedisciplinaryproceedingagainst ( x  Sheridan,whicharoseoutofmisconductoccurringinindisputably $  coreproceedings,constitutedacoreproceeding.    A.  Interpretationof28U.S.C.157  ,|    1.Plaintextof157  D    ` WhetherthedisciplinaryproceedingagainstSheridanwas   a"coreproceeding"under28U.S.C.157isamatterofstatutory h construction.Theplaintextof157makesnoexplicitreference d toattorneydiscipline,sanctions,contempt,oranythingsimilar,  justasitfailstodescribeotherproceedingsthatcourtshave l recognizedascore.8 #  31      ׀Noristhestatutoryterm"coreproceeding" h selfdefining.󀀀      ` Nevertheless,theprincipalopinionpurportstofind p!" supportinthetextof157.Itdiscussesthevariouscategories #l$ ofcoreproceedingsin157(b)(2),emphasizingthat"eachofthe $ & enumeratedmattersrelatestoafunctionessentialtothe t&!( administrationofthebankruptcycase."Op.at21.Theproceeding  againstSheridan,theprincipalopinioncontends,wasdifferent: \ itdidnotariseinanysinglebankruptcycase,sotherewasno X relevant"case"toadminister.Accordingly,itmusthavebeennon   core.Thisisanexpressiouniusrationale:Congressprovideda `  listofcoreproceedingcategoriesin157(b);thatlistdoesnot  \  includeomnibusattorneydisciplinaryhearingsorsimilar   proceedingsspanningmultiplebankruptcycases;thereforeCongress d  meanttoexcludesuchproceedingsfrom"core"treatment. `     ` Thisisflawedlogic.AstheSupremeCourtreiterated   lastTerm,theexpressiouniuscanonappliesonlywhenthe h statutorylistinquestion"justif[ies]theinferencethatitems d notmentionedwereexcludedbydeliberatechoice."Barnhartv.  PeabodyCoalCo.,537U.S.149,168(2003).Nosuchinferenceis l possiblehere.ItistruethatCongress,indraftingthe h categoriesofcoreproceedingsin157(b)(2),referredto"the  estate"(i.e.,inthesingular),butthatchoiceofwordsmerely p  reflectstherealitythatthevastmajorityofbankruptcy !l" proceedingspertaintoasingledebtor.Nothinginthestatute "$ saysaproceedingisnoncoreifitinvolvesmorethanoneestate, t$& andCongressknewhowtoexcludemattersfrom157(b)whenit  &p!( wishedtodoso.See,e.g.,157(b)(2)(O)(excludingpersonal '#* injuryandwrongfuldeathclaimsfromcoretreatment).The x)$, clincheristhatCongressspecificallyprovidedthatthelistof $+t&. examplesin157(b)(2)isnotexhaustive.See28U.S.C.  157(b)(2)(coreproceedings"arenotlimitedto"thelisted \ categories);seealso1CollieronBankruptcy,supra,3.02[3] X ("Itshouldbeemphasizedattheoutsetthatsection157(b)(2)is   notlimiting...."). `     ` Thisbringsusbacktowherewestarted.Theunderlying  \  questiononthemeritsofthecore/noncoreissueisthis:   whether,inlightofthestructureandpurposeofthecore/noncore d  distinctionandtheBankruptcyCodeasawhole,157(b)(2)should `  beinterpretedtoembracedisciplinaryproceedingslikeSheridan's.   SeeInreHart,328F.3d45,48(1stCir.2003).Theprincipal h opinionundertakesnosuchanalysis. d   2.Backgroundtothe1984BankruptcyAmendments      ` Infact,thereiseveryreasontobelievethatCongress  wantedandexpectedbankruptcyjudgestoenforcetheprofessional 4 responsibilitiesofbankruptcyattorneysthroughfinalandbinding 0 orderswherethemisconductinquestionoccurredinacore   bankruptcyproceedingorproceedings.9 #  32      ׀In1984,whenCongress 8!" amendedtheBankruptcyCodetocreatethecore/noncore  distinction,thecaselawavailabletoCongressprovidednoreason \ tothinkthatbankruptcycourts'statusasArticleItribunals X wouldbarthemfromenteringfinaldisciplinaryorders.In1926,   theSupremeCourtitselfheldinGoldsmithv.U.S.Bd.ofTax `  Appeals,270U.S.117(1926),thattheU.S.BoardofTaxAppeals,  \  anArticleItribunal,possessedtheauthoritynotonlyto   promulgateethicalrulesforadmittingattorneystopractice,but d  alsotodisbarattorneyswhofailedtomeetthosestandards.See `  id.at12122(emphasizing,inholdingthattheBoardpossessed   thispower,"thecharacteroftheworktobedonebytheboard,the h quasijudicialnatureofitsduties,[and]themagnitudeofthe d intereststobeaffectedbyitsdecisions").TheCourtexplicitly  rejectedthecontentionthatsuchatribunalcannotdisbaror l disciplinelawyersabsentexpressstatutoryauthority,observing h thatthepoweroftheBoardtodosois"sonecessary...andso  usual"thatthestatutecreatingitwouldbeinterpretedtoinclude p  thatpower.Id.at122. !l"    ` Furthermore,Congressknewthatfederalcourtsbefore "$ 1984hadupheldthepowerofotherArticleItribunalstoissue t$& bindingdisciplinaryordersagainstcounselappearingbeforethem.  &p!( See,e.g.,Kivitzv.SEC,475F.2d956,962(D.C.Cir.1973)(power '#* ofSECtodisbarattorneyforethicalmisconduct);Hermanv. x)$, Dulles,205F.2d715,71516(D.C.Cir.1953)(similar, $+t&. InternationalClaimsCommission);Francisv.VirginIslands,11  F.2d860,864(3dCir.1926)(upholdingthecontemptpowersofthe \ U.S.DistrictCourtfortheVirginIslands);Flemingv.United X States,279F.613,616(9thCir.1922)(similar,UnitedStates   CourtforChina).Consistentwiththislineofcases,somecourts `  hadby1984alreadyupheldtheauthorityofbankruptcycourtsto  \  disciplineattorneysforunethicalconductinbankruptcycases.As   earlyas1979,forexample,theSecondCircuitdescribedas d  "nothingnovel"thepropositionthatadebtor'scounselcouldbe `  sanctionedforbreachinghisethicalresponsibilitiestothe   bankruptcycourt.SeeInreArlan'sDep'tStores,Inc.,615F.2d h 925,94344(2dCir.1979). d    ` Congressenactedthe1984bankruptcyamendmentsagainst  thisbackground.Nothinginthe1984Actoritslegislative l historysuggeststhatCongressintendedtodenybankruptcyjudges h theauthoritytoregulatethebankruptcybar.Onthecontrary,  thiscourthasheldthatCongress'spurposeinthe1984amendments p  wastopressthejurisdictionofthebankruptcycourts"toits !l" constitutionalbounds"inthewakeofNorthernPipeline.SeeInre "$ ArnoldPrintWorks,Inc.,815F.2d165,168(1stCir.1987) t$& (Breyer,J.).Thecongressionalsponsorsofthe1984amendments  &p!( describednoncoreproceedingsas"Marathontype"cases,referring '#* totheNorthernPipelinedecision,andtheyunderstoodthat x)$, categorytobe"verylimited."Id.Accordingly,thiscourt $+t&. concludedthat"Congressintendedthat'coreproceedings'wouldbe  interpretedbroadly,closetoorcongruentwithconstitutional \ limits."Id. X   3.ArticleIIIandattorneydiscipline       ` CongresshadnoreasontothinkthatArticleIIIis |  offendedwhenabankruptcycourtentersabindingorderagainsta ( x  bankruptcyattorneyforprofessionalmisconductinacore $  bankruptcyproceeding.Eventheprincipalopiniondoesnotso   contend.Indeed,lessthanayearafteritsdecisioninNorthern ,|  Pipeline,theSupremeCourtemphasizedthelimitsofitsholding: ( "TheCourt'sholdinginthatcaseestablishesonlythatCongress  maynotvestinanonArticleIIIcourtthepowertoadjudicate, 0 renderfinaljudgment,andissuebindingordersinatraditional , contractactionarisingunderstatelaw,withoutconsentofthe  litigants,andsubjectonlytoordinaryappellatereview."Thomas 4 v.UnionCarbideAgric.Prods.Co.,473U.S.568,584(1985) 0 (emphasisadded).; #  33      ׀      ` TheproceedingatissueinSheridan'scaseis 8!" fundamentallydifferentfromatraditionalcommonlawcauseof "4$ action.Theprivilegetopracticelaw,includingtheprivilegeto  practicebeforeafederaltribunal,isamatterofpubliclicense. \ SeeInreSnyder,472U.S.634,644(1985).Itiswellsettled X thatcourtshavetheauthoritytorevokethatlicensewhere   necessarytoprotectthepublic.Seeid.;InreRuffalo,390U.S. `  544,550(1968);Theardv.UnitedStates,354U.S.278,281(1957);  \  ExparteWall,107U.S.265,28889(1882).Further,a   disciplinaryproceedingisamatterbetweenthecourtandthe d  attorneyonly;norighttoajurytrialattaches.SeeExparte `  Wall,107U.S.at288.Itisakintotheenforcementofa"public   right,"andasthenJudgeBreyernotedforthiscourtinArnold h PrintWorks,theSupremeCourtinNorthernPipelinefoundnothing d unconstitutionalinabankruptcyjudgeissuingdispositiveorders  insuchcases.See815F.2dat170. l   4.PurposesoftheBankruptcyCode  h    ` Noristhereanyreasontoinferfromtheoverarching 0 purposesoftheBankruptcyCodethatCongresswantedtolimit   bankruptcyjudges'powertoissuefinalandbindingorders 8!" disbarring,suspending,orotherwisediscipliningattorneyswhoact "4$ unethicallyincoreproceedings.Onthecontrary,theneedto $& maintainattorneydisciplineandenforcetherulesofprofessional <&!( responsibilityis,ifanything,strongerinthebankruptcycontext, '8#* whereconsiderationsofspeedandcosteffectivenessareparamount: )$, Asinequanoninrestructuringthedebtorcreditor @+&. relationshipisthecourt'sabilitytopolicethe ,f'/ fiduciaries...whoareresponsibleformanagingthe  debtor'sestateinthebestinterestofcreditors.The  bankruptcycourtmustbeabletoassureitselfandthe \ creditorswhorelyontheprocessthatcourtapproved 2 managersofthedebtor'sestateareperformingtheir X work,conscientiouslyandcosteffectively. . InreSouthmarkCorp.,163F.3d925,931(5thCir.1999)(holding `  thataprofessionalmalpracticeclaimbyaChapter11debtor  \  againstacourtappointedaccountantwasacoreproceeding).   Bankruptcycourtsarechargedwiththerehabilitationof d  financiallydistresseddebtorsandthereorganizationor `  liquidationoftheirassets,oftenunderthepressoftimebecause   ofthethreatoffinancialloss.InreMcLeanIndus.,68B.R.690, h 695(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Mourad,289 d F.3d174,179(1stCir.2002)(observingthatthepowertoregulate  attorneybehaviorisnecessary"ifthebankruptcycourtsareto l carryoutefficientlyandeffectivelythedutiesassignedtothem h byCongress"(quotingInreVolpert,110F.3d494,500(7thCir.  1997))).Involvingthedistrictcourtinsuchdisciplinarymatters p  would"undulyburdenthealreadycomplexandcongestedcalendarsof !l" thedistrictcourts,andunderminethereasonsforthedistrict "$ court'sreferenceofCodecasestothebankruptcycourts."Inre t$& McLeanIndus.,68B.R.at696;seealsoInreMem'lEstates,Inc.,  &p!( 116B.R.108,112(N.D.Ill.1990)(impositionofsanctionsmustbe '#* acoreproceedingbecause"anyotherinterpretationwouldseriously x)$, hamperthebankruptcycourtinitsadministrationoftheestateand $+t&. wouldprovideadditionalmethodsofmultiplyinglitigationfor  thoseseekingtohinderanddelaytheproceedingsinthebankruptcy \ court"). X    ` Congress,moreover,musthavebeenawarethatproblemsof   attorneydisciplineareparticularlyacuteintheconsumer `  bankruptcyarea,seeInreBruzzese,214B.R.444,45051(Bankr.  \  E.D.N.Y.1997),suchastheChapter13proceedingsinwhich   Sheridanspecialized.Consumerdebtors,likethosewhomSheridan d  represented,rarelyhavetheresourcesorsophisticationtobring `  tortclaimsforlegalmalpractice.Indeed,becauseofthehigh   volumeofconsumerbankruptcyfilingsandthespeedatwhich h bankruptcycourtsmustprocesssuchpetitions,manyconsumer d debtors"neverdiscoverthattheirattorneyshavecommitted  malpractice."Id.at450.Directdisciplinebythebankruptcy l courtmaybetheonlyfeasiblemeansinmanycasesofprotecting h debtorsandensuringtheethicalconductoftheconsumerbankruptcy  barincoreproceedings.Forthisreason,"[b]ankruptcyjudgesare p  expectedbyCongress,thepublic,theappointingcourtsofappeals, !l" andtheleadershipofthebartomaintainhighstandardsof "$ performancebyalllawyersappearingbeforethem.Thisis'partof t$& thejobdescription.'"Id.at45051.  &p!(   5."Corecomesfromcore"  '#*    ` IdonotcontendthatCongressintendedallattorney )$, disciplinaryproceedingsinthebankruptcycourtstobecore @+&. proceedings,regardlessofhowtheyarise.Therearesituationsin  whichthejustificationsforpermittingbankruptcyjudgestoissue \ bindingdisciplinaryordersarelesscompelling!forexample, X whenanattorneyactsunethicallyinanoncoreproceedinginwhich   thepartieshaverefusedtoconsenttotheentryofafinalorder `  onthemerits.Insuchcases,thebankruptcycourtmustrecommend  \  findingsoffactandconclusionsoflawtothedistrictcourtin   anyevent;thereislittlereasontotreatthedisciplinaryissues d  aloneaswithinthebankruptcycourt'scorepowers. `     ` Astounethicalconductincoreproceedings,however,   Congress'spurposesintheBankruptcyCodearemuchbetterserved h byarulethatpermitsbankruptcyjudgestoissuefinalandbinding d disciplinaryordersdirectly,withoutresorttothedistrictcourt  butwithnormalrightstoappeal.Infact,thereisawidely l acceptedruleinattorneydisciplinecasesthat"corecomesfrom h core"thatis,disciplinaryhearingsarisingoutofcore  proceedingsarethemselvescoreproceedings.See,e.g.,Memorial p  Estates,950F.2dat1370;InreO'Connor,2001WL1335883,at*1 !l" (N.D.Tex.2001);InreFrenchBourekas,Inc.,183B.R.695,696 "$ (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995)("[T]hepowertosanctionpartiesfor t$& conductinacorematterisitselfcore."),aff'd,195B.R.19  &p!( (S.D.N.Y.1996);InreVIIIS.Mich.Assocs.,No.94C5593,1994WL '#* 698489,at*5(N.D.Ill.1994);Fed.Sav.&LoanIns.Corp.v. x)$, Sutherlin,109B.R.700,703(E.D.La.1989);InreUsoskin,61 $+t&. B.R.869,872(Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1986);InreEmergencyBeaconCorp.,  52B.R.979,987(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1985),aff'd,790F.2d285(2d \ Cir.1986);seealsoInreMonarchCapitalCorp.,173B.R.31,35 X 39(D.Mass.1994)(contemptproceedingagainstdebtor'sattorneys   wascorebecausethecontemptoccurredinacoreproceeding). `     ` The"corecomesfromcore"rulealsomakespractical  \  sense.Onechieffunctionaldifferencebetweenacoreproceeding   andanoncoreproceedingisthedeferenceaccordedtothe d  bankruptcycourt'sfindingsoffact.CompareFed.R.Bankr.P. `  8013(reviewofcoreproceedings),withFed.R.Bankr.P.9033(d)   (reviewofnoncoreproceedings);seegenerallyInreDelta h Petroleum(P.R.),Ltd.,193B.R.99,106(D.P.R.1996).Inacore d proceeding,thebankruptcyjudgeisempoweredtomakefactual  findingsonthemeritsandtohavethosefindingsreviewedonlyfor l clearerror.Nousefulpurposeisservedbydenyingthebankruptcy h courtthepowertomakeequallyauthoritativefindingsoffact  abouttheconductoftheveryattorneyswhoappearbeforeit."If p  thebankruptcycourtsaretoadminister'therestructuringof !l" debtor-creditorrelations,whichisatthecoreofthefederal "$ bankruptcypower,'theymustalsohavethepowertosanction t$& partiesthatinterferewithsuchadministration."InreEmergency  &p!( BeaconCorp.,52B.R.at987. '#*    ` Underthe"corecomesfromcore"principle,the x)$, proceedingagainstSheridanwasplainlyacoreproceeding.The $+t&. overwhelmingmajorityoftheethicalviolationsofwhichSheridan  wasaccusedoccurredincoreproceedings.Thebankruptcycourt \ foundthatSheridancommittedatleast83ethicalviolationsover X 33separatebankruptcycases.< #  34      ׀Itisclearfromtherecordthat   atleast80ofthose83violations,accountingforfully31ofthe `  33cases,occurredincoreproceedings(specifically,proceedings  \  topropose,file,modify,andconfirmChapter13plans).= #  35      ׀Further,   therehasbeennoshowingthattheremainingthreeinstancesof d  misconductoccurredinnoncoreproceedings;rather,itissimply `  impossibletotellfromtherecordwhetherthoseproceedingswere   alsocore.Asaresult,theonlyimpedimenttoapplyingthe"core h comesfromcore"ruleinthiscaseisasetof3ethicalviolations d inproceedingswhosecore/noncorestatusisunknown.Even  assumingthatthoseviolations(whichaccountedforlessthan l 1/20thofthechargesagainstSheridan)occurredinnoncore h proceedings,thereisnoreasontothinkthattheymaterially  affectedthebankruptcycourt'schoiceofsanction.Cf.Sheridan,  2001WL1757058,at*23(declaringthattheevidenceattrial \ "clearlyestablishes"thatSheridanisnotprofessionally X competent).     6.Summary  `     ` Thecourt'sconstrainedreadingof157contradicts ( x  Congress'sintentinthe1984amendments,whichwasnottoshrink $  thepowersofthebankruptcycourtsbuttoextendthemtotheir   jurisdictionallimitsinthewakeofNorthernPipeline.Inlight ,|  oftheopenendedstatutorytextof157;theclearcongressional ( intentthatcourtsshouldinterprettheterm"coreproceeding"  broadly;thebindingprecedentinourowncircuitcommandingthat 0 wedoso;theabsenceofrelevantconstitutionalconstraints;the , legitimatefunctionalneedforbankruptcycourtstohave"core"  jurisdictionoverattorneymisconductarisingincoreproceedings; 4 andthebroadlyacceptedrulethat"corecomesfromcore,"Ithink 0 wewouldbeobligedtohold,weretheissueproperlypresented,   thatthedisciplinaryproceedingagainstSheridanwasa"core 8!" proceeding"under157. "4$  B.  ThePrincipalOpinion'sFourDistinguishingFactors  $&    ` Theprincipalopinionreservesthequestionofwhether X&!( attorneydisciplinaryproceedingsmayeverenjoycorestatus, (T#* holdinginsteadthatSheridan'scaseisdistinguishableonfour )%, grounds:(1)thedisciplinaryproceedingagainstSheridandidnot \+&. takeplaceinthecontextofanongoingbankruptcycase,butrather  wasan"omnibus"proceedingspanningmultiplecases;(2)therule \ ofdecisioninSheridan'sdisciplinaryproceedingcamefromstate X lawethicsrules,ratherthanfederallaw;(3)anypotentialeffect   onaclosedbankruptcycaseisremoteandspeculative;and(4)the `  bankruptcycourt'sdisciplinaryorderwas"extreme"relativeto  \  Sheridan'smisconduct.SeeOp.at3132.Notoneofthesegrounds   isvalidbasisfordistinguishingthiscase. d    1.Omnibusvs.individualdisciplinaryproceedings  `     ` TheprincipalopinionfirstarguesthatSheridan'scase ( meritsdifferenttreatmentbecauseitwasan"omnibus"disciplinary  investigationthatis,becausethebankruptcycourtconsolidated 0 theethicalissuesarisinginmultiple,independentbankruptcy , casesintoasingledisciplinaryhearing.     ` Thisobjectioniswithoutmerit.Nothingin157 4 restrictscoreproceedingstoproceedingsthatconcernasingle 0 bankruptcycase,andtheprincipalopinioncitesnoauthorityfor   itssuggestionthat157(b)shouldbeinterpretedsonarrowly. 8!" CompareArnoldPrintWorks,815F.2dat168.Thereisno "4$ functionalreasontodiscouragebankruptcycourtsfromcombining $& disciplinaryissuesspanningmultiplebankruptcycasesintoa <&!( singleproceedingforexpeditiousadministration.Normallythis '8#* courtencouragesandrespectstheeffortsoflowercourtstomanage )$, theirdocketsefficiently.InreAtlanticPipeCorp.,304F.3d @+&. 135,14345(1stCir.2002);A.M.Capen'sCo.,Inc.v.Am.Trading  &Prod.Corp.,202F.3d469,472n.4(1stCir.2000);RosarioDiaz \ v.Gonzalez,140F.3d312,315(1stCir.1998).Moreover,attorney X disciplineinthefederalcourtsoutsideofthebankruptcycontext   isfrequentlyimposedin"omnibus"proceedings.See,e.g.,United `  Statesv.Johnson,327F.3d554,558,56162(7thCir.2003);Inre  \  Smith,76F.3d335,336(10thCir.1996)(percuriam).Surely   Congresswouldnothavewantedthebankruptcyjudgetohold30 d  separatedisciplinaryhearingsbeforeenteringabindingsanctions `  orderagainstSheridan.      ` Thecaselawconfirmsthat"omnibus"disciplinary h hearingsinthebankruptcycourtsaregenerallytreatedascore d proceedings.Forexample,theFifthCircuitin1999affirmeda  fouryearsuspensionimposedbyabankruptcycourtinaproceeding l thatinvolvedevidenceofmisconductinthreeseparatebankruptcy h cases.SeeInreDragoo,219B.R.460,46568(Bankr.N.D.Tex.  1998),aff'd,186F.3d614(5thCir.1999).Thecourtofappeals p  didnottakeissuewiththebankruptcycourt'sexpressentryofa !l" finalorderunderFed.R.Bankr.P.7052.> #  36      ׀See219B.R.at468 "$ n.2.SeealsoInreMelendez,235B.R.173,18182,20104(Bankr. t$& D.Mass.1999)(imposingsanctionsinanomnibusdisciplinary  &p!( hearinginitiatedsuaspontebythebankruptcycourtagainst  severaldebtors'attorneysforinadequaterepresentationoftheir \ respectiveclients,andexpresslyenteringitsfindingsunder X BankruptcyRule7052);InreNesom,76B.R.101,102&n.1(Bankr.   N.D.Tex.1987)(suspendinganattorneyformisconductintwo `  bankruptcycasesafterasuaspontedisciplinaryhearingbythe  \  court,andexpresslytermingtheproceedingcore).      ` Theprincipalopinion'sobjectiontoconsolidated d  disciplinaryproceedingsalsomakeslittlesenseinlightofthe `  rulesofevidence.Bytheprincipalopinion'sreasoning,the   bankruptcycourtinSheridan'scasecouldsimplyhaveframedits h hearingasaninvestigationintoSheridan'smisconductinasingle d bankruptcycase,thenadmittedevidenceofSheridan'smisconductin  othercasesunderFed.R.Evid.404(b)andenteredafinalorderon l thatbasis.SeeInreLudwick,185B.R.238,242-47(Bankr.W.D. h Mich.1995)(enbanc)(followingthisapproachinsuspendinga  bankruptcyattorneyfrompracticefortwoyears);seealsoid.at p  239(determiningthatthehearingwasacoreproceeding).It !l" elevatesformoversubstancetoholdthatthefunctionally "$ equivalentapproachselectedbythebankruptcycourtinthiscase t$& renderedtheproceedingnoncore.? #  37        &p!(   2.Sourceoflaw      ` Theprincipalopinionnextarguesthattheproceeding x againstSheridanshouldbecharacterizedasnoncorebecausethe $t underlyingsubstantiveethicsrules"derive...fromstatelaw."   Op.at2425.Thatisflatlywrong.Therulesofattorneyconduct |  infederalcourtarefederallaw,notstatelaw.TheSupremeCourt ( x  soheldinInreSnyder,inwhichthecourtofappealshadasserted $  thatanattorney'sethicalobligationsinfederalcourtaredefined   bystatelaw.TheSupremeCourtdisagreed:"Thestatecodeof ,|  professionalresponsibilitydoesnotbyitsowntermsapplyto ( sanctionsinthefederalcourts.Federalcourtsadmitandsuspend  attorneysasanexerciseoftheirinherentpower;thestandards 0 imposedareamatteroffederallaw."472U.S.at645n.6 , (emphasisadded);seealsoInreLarry'sApartment,L.L.C.,249  F.3d832,83738(9thCir.2001)(federallaw,notstatelaw, 4 governstheimpositionofsanctionsinfederalbankruptcycases). 0 Thiscasedidnotinvolvea"statelawclaimthatcouldexist   outsideofbankruptcy."InreACIHDTSupplyCo.,205B.R.231, 8!" 236(B.A.P.9thCir.1997).Rather,itinvolvedafederal "4$ bankruptcyjudge'senforcementoffederalstandardsofconduct $& againstanattorneywhopracticedinthefederalbankruptcycourts. <&!(    ` Inanyevent,thefocusonthesourceoftheapplicable '8#* lawisbesidethepoint.AsthiscourtheldinArnoldPrintWorks, )$, "[i]tisthenatureoftheproceeding!itsrelationtothebasic @+&. functionofthebankruptcycourt!notthestateorfederalbasis  fortheclaim,thatmakesthedifferencehere."815F.2dat169 \ (emphasisadded). X   3.Closedcases       ` Theprincipalopinionalsoattemptstodistinguishthe |  proceedingagainstSheridanonthegroundsthatmuchofthecharged ( x  misconductoccurredinnowclosedbankruptcycases,@ #  38      ׀sothatany $  remedyorderedbythebankruptcycourtisunlikelytoconcernthe   administrationofthoseclients'estates.Therefore,theprincipal ,|  opinionargues,theproceedingcannotbecorebecauseitneither ( "concern[s]theadministrationof[an]estate,"157(b)(2)(A),nor  "affect[s]theliquidationoftheassetsof[an]estate," 0 157(b)(2)(O). ,    ` This,too,isunpersuasive.Thebankruptcycourt's  impositionofsanctionsonSheridandidinfact"concern[]the 4 administrationoftheestate"ineachoftheunderlying! i~ XXX!  i~    i~  XX i~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXcb    bankruptcyThXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXi~ XXi~  i~i~  i~i~  i~i~  i~i~  i~i~  i~i~  i~cb    #XX i~#! XXXXX! 0 caseswithinthemeaningof157(b)(2)(A).Thatsection   conspicuouslydoesnotrequirethattheproceedinginquestion 8!" contemporaneouslyaffecttheongoingadministrationoftheestate; "4$ themattermustsimply"concern[]"theadministrationofthe  estate.Compare157(b)(2)(O)(coreproceedingsinclude"other \ proceedingsaffecting...thedebtorcreditor...relationship" X (emphasisadded)).Andtheimpositionofsanctionsagainstthe   debtor'sattorneynecessarily"concern[s]"theadministrationof `  thedebtor'sestatebecause,inaChapter13case,thedebtor's  \  attorneyispaidwithfundsfromtheestateinanamount"basedon   aconsiderationofthebenefit...of[theattorney's]services d  tothedebtor."11U.S.C.330(a)(4)(B);seealsoid. `  503(b)(2)(authorizingpaymentstoattorneysunder330(a)as   "administrativeexpenses"oftheestate);cf.DeltaPetroleum,193 h B.R.at106(disputesovertheappointmentandcompensationof d attorneysarecoreproceedingsbecausetheyconcernthe  administrationoftheestate). l    ` Themajority'srulewouldrequireabankruptcycourteven h inasinglecoreproceedingtointerruptitsadjudicationofthe  debtor'spetitiontodecide,thenandthere,anattorney p  disciplinarymatter.Itwouldprecludethecourt,onpenaltyof !l" convertingtheproceedingfromcoretononcore,fromwaitingto "$ dealwiththeattorneyuntilafterithaddealtwithdebtor'sand t$& creditors'arguments.Thatpriorityisbackwards.  &p!(    ` Moreover,eveninthemajority'sterms,theorder '#* sanctioningSheridan"concern[ed]"theadministrationofthe x)$, underlyingestatesbecauseitprovidedaclearbasisforreopening $+t&. thosecases,whichthebankruptcycourtmaydowheneveritfinds  "cause."See11U.S.C.350(b)("Acasemaybereopened...to \ administerassets,toaccordrelieftothedebtor,orforother X cause.").Theprincipalopinioncharacterizesthepossibilityof   reopeningtheunderlyingcasesas"remoteandoverlyspeculative." `  Op.at31.Butatleastonebankruptcycourthasreopenedacase  \  "forcause"duetoevidenceofineffectiverepresentationbythe   debtor'scounsel.SeeBruzzese,214B.R.at44950.% XXXXX]%! XXXXX!Moreover, d  thereisnowarrantin157(b)(2)forinsistingonproofthata `  proceedingwillaltertheadministrationoftheestate;thestatute   requiresonlythattheproceeding"concern[]"itsadministration. h Thenarrowerreadingiscontrarytothiscourt'sconclusionin d ArnoldPrintWorksthatCongressintendedtheterm"core  proceeding"tobeinterpretedexpansively. l    ` Lastly,thereisnoindependentproblemwithimposing h sanctionsonanattorneyformisconductthatoccurredinasince  closedcase.Disciplinaryproceedingsagainstattorneysdonot p  dependonthecontinuedpendencyoftheunderlyingactionandcan !l" beimposedlongafterajudgmentonthemerits.SeeChambersv. "$ NASCO,Inc.,501U.S.32,56(1991);Cooter&Gellv.Hartmarx t$& Corp.,496U.S.384,396(1990).Thishasbeentherulein  &p!( bankruptcycasesaswell.SeeInreHasan,287B.R.308,31112 '#* (Bankr.D.Conn.2002)(collectingcases);seealsoInreRambo, x)$, 209B.R.527,52829(B.A.P.10thCir.1997)(dismissalof $+t&. underlyingChapter13casedidnotaffectBAP'sjurisdictionto  decideappealofsanctionsorder);% XXXXX`!%! XXXXX!InreBalboaImprovements,Ltd., \ 99B.R.966(B.A.P.9thCir.1989)(similar). X   4."Extreme"natureofthesanction       ` Finally,theprincipalopinioncitesthe"extreme"nature |  ofthesanctionimposedonSheridanasajustificationforholding ( x  thattheproceedingagainsthimwasnotcore.Op.at3132.This $  conflatesthecore/noncorequestionwiththemeritsofSheridan's   appeal.Whetherthebankruptcycourt'schosensanctionwas ,|  "extreme"hasnothingtodowithwhetherithadthestatutory ( authoritytoenterabindingorderembodyingthatsanction.  Suspensionsanddisbarmentsareseveresanctionsthatmeritclose 0 review.Butthatreviewshouldhavebeendonehere. ,    IV.   +   ` Fortheforegoingreasons,Irespectfullydissent.#XXXX'# #XXXX