WPCԿ @f|U~63J)耡{. + # %~vN,?wcuKao_v)}{_62H)ΏH_5ThGVa9@a^8I55$b}ٷ=8xgC7ϓGT 7)Y/T ^b|&R7 Fu܏Hb*Fw ZJDqxflT XX.>qWLʠ0uT1%ӳo`"peHފP:"D&Bj'h!['Uv~pS˫e dž9L0ںQ+x %$Sz}zt!5H) /;8ǡbZHJAV--/IKQ͌7 H6(p׾ '*Tb$?we4'&9'6!EjY o# %E 0DK 0G U: 0U<8nT-NUNUF^ w#4';JELfNaP mdN{^}UBbU% 0cz 0U2 0c(,Tx 0 0y 0_ 0B 0" 0 B! 0! 0" 0C# 0# 0$ 0% 0`& 0.' 0' 0( 0) 0@F* 0* 0Z+ 0+, 0, 0- 0. 0Q/ 00 000 0<1 0<1 0>1 0v82 0`2 0`3 0`n3 0`3 0`.4 084 04 025 05 0:6 0Y7 0_Y7 0 7 0j8 0,: B*; D/; D+ < 04< D/= 0= 06> 0> 0:? 0^-@ 0<@U6@U>@U*;AeA%CwD@K]MeMk }PAY)a'h^ ?j 1es5t 17yy 72y 0czqz{z]}_4 1e 0N F׻׻׻׻׻ 1u 72bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb@HP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0X(#$  0  ($XXXX<6X9`("Courier NewTT(:2$ !XI XXX  =I Xdd=      0  <4 9Z+ Courier New <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@vr Z6Times New Roman Regular<4 9Z+.Courier New Regular@1s L=16X?,}backup3|x1TABLE AUL:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- - K )XN<XXX  _(;3$ !XI XXX  *+ (_2623  ..  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      11    _=N<XXdXd=Atleastonememberofthemajorityhasreservationsabout  theanalysissetforthintheconcurringopinion.(;3$ !XI XXX    $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      3    _=N<XXdXd=PhaseonealsoincludedGettyMarketing'sclaimthatCapital  hadbreachedaseparateagreementthe"ThroughputAgreement"  byfailingtomakecertainrepairstothePier.Thatclaimisnot \ beforeusonappeal.  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      1    _=N<XXdXd=Thepartiesdisputeownershipofthesepipelines.However,  theissueofownershipofthepipelinesisnotbeforethiscourton  appeal. n $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      5    _=N<XXdXd=InJune2004,RhodeIslandrepealed XN<XXXN<R.I.Gen.Laws23  28.225andotherportionsofChapter23#XN<XX XN<.#Ԁaspartofanoverhaulof  itsfiresafetylaws.See2004R.I.Pub.Laws225.However,to \ properlyaddresswhethertheimprovementslistedinChief 2 Bessette'sletterofMay17,2000,were"regulations,"wereferto X RhodeIslandlawasitexistedatthetimeofthatletter,thatis, . theprovisionsineffectin2000.*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5   d*5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      (&H2  (&H3  (&H4 XXX (&H5  (&H6  20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEK[<6X9`(Courier NewKS\\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard K[<6X9`(Courier NewKS\\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/K[<6X9`(Courier NewKS\\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7Q(X7  ?]%2A`Arial?  S\\  `&Times New RomanS7R(X7&  d dP)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7T(X7  ?]%2A`Arial?  S\\  `&Times New RomanS7R(X7P)2dxd0KS.SampleK[<6X9`(Courier NewKS\\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterK[<6X9`(Courier NewKS\\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  <6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      2    _=N<XXdXd=Hereinafter,werefertotheOperatingAgreementandthe  FirstAmendmenttotheOperatingAgreementcollectivelyas"the  Agreement."  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      4    _=N<XXdXd=PhasetwoalsoincludedotherclaimsbyGettyPropertiesand  GettyMarketingthatarenotrelevanttotheissuesonappeal. m $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      6    _=N<XXdXd=R.I.Gen.Laws2328.221governstheapplicabilityof XN<XXXN<R.I.  Gen.Laws2328.225#XN<XX XN suppressionequipmentontheWilkesbarrePier d isnotrequiredbycity,state,orfederal : regulation,or,inotherwords,thatithasno  obligationtoinstallsuchequipmentonthe  Pier.Inthis,itfailed. l   AN<XdXXdA 7 $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      9    _=N<XXdXd=Capitalalsoarguesthatitwas"ambushed"byGetty  Properties'sRule50(a)motionbecauseGettyPropertieshad  admittedinitspleadingsthattheimprovementslistedinChief \ Bessette'sletterwere"required."InitsSecondAmended 2 Complaint,GettyPropertiesstates: X   ThroughitsFireChief,theCityofEast   Providencehasindicatedthatthereis   inadequatefireprotectiononthePierandhas `  setforthcertainminimumrequirementsfor 6   necessaryimprovementstothePierorelsethe  \  Pierwillbeclosed.  2    }Capitaloverreadsthestatement,whichdoesnotadmitthatthe   improvementslistedinChiefBessette'sletterwererequiredby d  "regulations."Thestatementjustacknowledgestheobviousfact :  thattheChiefrequiredtheimprovements.Moreover,Capitaldid `  notraisethis"ambush"argumentbeforethedistrictcourtuntil 6 phasetwoofthetrial,wellafterthecourthadruledonGetty   Properties'sRule50motion.Therefore,evenifthe"ambush"  argumenthadanyvalidity,ithasbeenforfeited.See,e.g., h Violettev.Smith&NephewDyonics,Inc.,62F.3d8,10(1stCir. > 1995).  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      14    _=N<XXdXd=AfootnoteinWhitesuggestsindictumthatjudicialnotice  oflawemanatesfromRule201(b).See121F.3dat805n.1.  However,thisisnotcorrect.TheAdvisoryCommitteespecifically \ disclaimedanyintenttoaddressjudicialnoticeoflawbecause 2 "themannerinwhichlawisfedintothejudicialprocessisnever X aproperconcernoftherulesofevidencebutratheroftherules . ofprocedure,"andinstead"suggest[ed]thatthosemattersoflaw   which...havetraditionallybeentreatedasrequiringpleading   andproofandmorerecentlyasthesubjectofjudicialnoticebe `  lefttotheRulesofCivilandCriminalProcedure."Fed.R.Evid. 6   201advisorycommittee'snote.Rule201,asitsaysinitsvery  \  firstsentence,"governsonlyjudicialnoticeofadjudicative  2   facts,"andcertainlynotjudicialnoticeoflaw.Indeed,one  organizationhasproposedanewRule203togovernjudicialnotice  oflaw,whichwouldhardlybenecessaryifthetopicfellunderthe \ headingofRule201.SeePaulR.Rice,TheEvidenceProject: 2 ProposedRevisionstotheFederalRulesofEvidencewithSupporting X Commentary,171F.R.D.330,405(1997).  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      10    _=N<XXdXd=Thedistrictcourtopinionconfirmsthat"[t]hepartiesdo  notdisputethattheterm'regulation',whichisnotdefinedinthe  OperatingAgreement,referstoaruleororderhavingtheforceof \ law." T $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      15    _=N<XXdXd=Icitestatelawcasesonlytoillustratetrendsinhistoric  practiceandthelogicbehindthem.Judicialnoticeispurely  proceduralandhenceisgovernedbyfederallaw. XN<XXXN<"Afederalcourt \ sittingindiversityjurisdictionisobligedtoapplyfederal 2 procedurallawandstatesubstantivelaw."AlternativeSys. X Concepts,Inc.v.Synopsys,Inc.,374F.3d23,32(1stCir.2004); . Hannav.Plumer,380U.S.460,465(1965);ErieR.R.v.Tompkins,   304U.S.64,78(1938).Indeed,ifjudicialnoticeinfederal   courtweresubjecttostatelaw,#XN<XX XN<#thenLamarwouldbesuperfluous `  wherestatelawprovidedforjudicialnoticeofstatestatutes,and 6   violateEriewherestatelawdidnotsoprovide.  \    Consequently,IdonotbelievethattheRhodeIslandrule  2  againsttakingjudicialnoticeofamunicipalordinance,seeTown   ofLincolnv.Cournoyer,186A.2d728,730(R.I.1962),wouldapply   infederalcourtevenifthiscaseinvolvedamunicipalordinance d  insteadofadocumentincorporatedbyreferenceintoastate :  statute.Contra XN<XXXN<H.WaynePalmer&Assocs.v.HeldorIndus.,839F. `   Supp.770,775(D.Kan.1993)(statingthatjudicialnoticewould  begovernedbyKansasjudicialnoticeprocedure);#XN<XX XN<#ԀMonkv.Cityof  Birmingham,87F.Supp.538,539(N.D.Ala.1949)(takingjudicial \ noticeofcityordinance,relying,withoutdiscussion,onAlabama 2 statutethatdirectedstatecourtstodoso),aff'd,185F.2d859 X (5thCir.1950).*+,-./01 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. + $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      20    _ XN<XXXN<=N<XXdXd=Thisapproachparallels,insomeimportantrespects,the  processthatfederalcourtsusetodetermineforeignlaw."In  general,foreignlawistreatedasafactthatmustbeprovenby \ theparties."Abdillev.Ashcroft,242F.3d477,489n.10(3dCir. 2 2001).However,theFederalRulesofCivilProcedureprovidea X  moreflexibleapproachthat,insomeinstances,allowsthecourtto  determineforeignlawwithoutextensiveandcumbersomefactfinding  procedures.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.44.1.TheAdvisoryCommittee \ explainedthat,whilethecourt"mayengageinitsownresearchand 2 consideranyrelevantmaterialthusfound,"itisalso"freeto X insistonacompletepresentationbycounsel."Fed.R.Civ.P. . 44.1advisorycommittee'snote.#XN<XX XN<#(CEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A.federal comitykA.(;3$2#  0  .3  0     q $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      23    _=N<XXdXd=Idonotmeantosuggestthatstateorlocalsafetycodes,  localordinances,andthelikearealwaysreadilyavailable.My  pointisthatwhentheyarereadilyavailable,therationalefor \ requiringthemtobeofferedintoevidenceandproventothejury 2 isundermined. S $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      24    _=N<XXdXd=See,e.g.,HawthorneSav.&LoanAss'nv.CityofSignal  Hill,23Cal.Rptr.2d272,275n.2(Cal.Ct.App.1993)(taking  judicialnoticeofmunicipalcodeandofUniformCodeforthe \ AbatementofDangerousBuildings);Jimenezv.Hawk,683A.2d457, 2 460(D.C.1996)(trialcourttookjudicialnoticeofD.C.Fire X Code);Rothsteinv.CityUniv.ofN.Y.,599N.Y.S.2d39,40(N.Y. . App.Div.1993)(trialcourttooksuaspontejudicialnoticeof   citybuildingcode);Commonwealthv.Marcus,690A.2d842,844-45   (Pa.Commw.Ct.1997)(trialcourttookjudicialnoticeofBOCA `  BuildingCode,adoptedbytownordinance);Hernandezv.Houston 6   Lighting&PowerCo.,795S.W.2d775,776-77(Tex.App.1990)  \  (trialcourtproperlytookjudicialnoticeoftheNationalElectric  2  SafetyCodeafterprovidingtheoppositionwithanopportunityto   rebutitsaccuracy);butseeChildersv.RichmondCounty,467   S.E.2d176,177(Ga.1996)(courtcannottakejudicialnoticeof d  cityorcountyordinances)(internalquotationmarksomitted); :  Camarav.Bd.ofAppeals,662N.E.2d719,720(Mass.App.Ct.1996) `   (courtcannottakejudicialnoticeofmunicipalzoningbylaws).  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      12    _=N<XXdXd=Thediscussionaboveappliestojudicialnoticeof  "adjudicative"facts,notjudicialnoticeof"legislative"facts.  Thisdistinctionisnotmaterialinthiscase,butIsummarizeit \ brieflyforpurposesofcompleteness."Adjudicative"facts,which 2 aregovernedbyFed.R.Evid.201,are"simplythefactsofthe X particularcase." XN<XXXN<Fed.R.Evid.201(a)advisorycommittee'snote#XN<XX XN<#. . "Legislativefacts,"bycontrast,includefacts"whichhave   relevancetolegalreasoningandthelawmakingprocess,whetherin   theformulationofalegalprincipleorrulingbyajudgeorcourt `  orintheenactmentofalegislativebody."Id.Forexample,in 6   Mullerv.Oregon,208U.S.412,41921&n.1(1908),theSupreme  \  Courttookjudicialnoticeofextensivesociologicalresearchthat  2  supportedshorterworkinghoursforwomeninevaluatingthe   rationalityofstatutesmandatingsuchhours.Judicialnoticeof   legislativefactsisnotgovernedbyRule201. XN<XXXN<Fed.R.Evid. d  201(a);Fed.R.Evid.201(a)advisorycommittee'snote.#XN<XX XN<,#Ԁ * $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      19    _=N<XXdXd=Authenticityandaccuracycanalsosometimespresentreal  concernswithstateadministrativeregulations.Federalcourtsand  moststatecourtstakejudicialnoticeofsuchregulations.See, \ e.g., XN<XXXN<_Roemer_v.Bd.ofPub.Works,426U.S.736,742n.4(1976) 2 (takingjudicialnoticeofstateregulation);_Nat'l_ԀAgric._Chems_. X _Ass'n_v._Rominger_,500F.Supp.465,472(E.D.Cal.1980)(same, . thoughincorrectlysuggestingthatRule201mightbeinvolved);see   alsoNormanJ.Singer,2SutherlandonStatutoryConstruction   39:4n.1(6thed.2000)(collectingstatecases);29Am._Jur_.2d `  Evidence122n.98(2003)(same).#XN<XX XN<# XN<XXXN<ԀSomeofthestatecourtsthat 6   declinetotakejudicialnoticeoftheirownstate'sadministrative  \  regulationshavecitedthesamepracticalconsiderationsof  2  accessibilitythatgroundedthetraditionalrefusaltojudicially   noticeordinances.See,e.g.,_Dairyland_ԀPowerCoop.v.StateBd.   ofEqualization&Assessment,472N.W.2d363,368(Neb.1991) d  ("[_B]ecause_Ԁestablishingtheexistenceandcontentsofaparticular :  administrativeruleorregulationatanygiventimeisoftena `  difficultanduncertainprocess,itisanestablishedprinciple 6 that,asageneralrule,thiscourtwillnottakejudicialnotice   ofsuchrulesorregulations.")#XN<XX XN consequentlytherewas"noreadilyavailablesourcefromwhich d [the]court[could]independentlyascertaintheexactstatusofthe : Ohioregulationsineffectin1976andearlier");McCormickon  Evidence335("Stateandnationaladministrativeregulations  havingtheforceoflawwillalsobenoticed,atleastiftheyare l publishedsoastobereadilyavailable.")(emphasisadded). B Federalregulations,bycontrast,mustbejudiciallynoticedunder h theFederalRegisterAct.See44U.S.C.1507.  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      16    _ XN<XXXN<=N<XXdXd=TheEvidenceProject'sproposedRule203goesastepfurther  byeliminatingtherequirementofacertifiedorofficialcopy:  "Thecourtshalltakejudicialnoticeofordinances...and \ similarsourcesoflawofpoliticalsubdivisionsoftheStatesor 2 TerritoriesoftheUnitedStatesifrequestedbyapartyand X suppliedwiththenecessarymaterial."ProposedFed.R.Evid. . 203(b)(3),inTheEvidenceProject,171F.R.D.at406(emphasis   added).#XN<XX XN<#ԀProposedRule203(b)(3)alsoallowsthecourttotake   judicialnoticeofsuchordinances,evenwithoutsubmissionby `  counsel,ifthematerialsare"reasonablyavailabletothecourt." 6   Id. | $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      17    _=N<XXdXd=Ihavecarefullyframedtheissueofjudicialnoticeoflaw  intermsofboth"accuracy"and"authenticity"becauseafocuson  authenticityalonecouldbemisleading.Authenticitysimplymeans \ thatthedocumentiswhatitsproponentsaysitis.Seegenerally 2 Fed.R.Evid.90102.Ifthelegalmaterialsubmittedisinfact X acopyoftheordinanceasactuallyissuedbythemunicipal . authority,authenticityisprobablytheonlyissue.If,however,   thedocumentsubmittedisexcerptedfromawebpage,alegal   researchservice,orsomeothernonofficialsource,thequestion `  ofauthenticitywhetherthedocumentsubmittediswhatit 6   purportstobeiseclipsedbythemoreimportantquestionof  \  whetherthedocumentsubmittedaccuratelyrelatesthelawasset  2  forthbytheenactingauthority.Inotherwords,suchsecondary   materialsintroduceahearsayproblem;evidencethatapageof   regulationsincludedinabriefwas,infact,printedfroma d  certainwebsiteisprobablynothelpfulindeterminingwhetherthe :  websiteaccuratelystatedthelaw.  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      25    _=N<XXdXd=Suchdisputesdoarise.See,e.g., XN<XXXN<H.WaynePalmer&Assocs.  v.HeldorIndus.,839F.Supp.770,77475(D.Kan.1993)  (plaintiffspresentedexpertaffidavitthatfirecodewasadopted \ bycity,butdidnotprovidecityordinancethatallegedlyadopted 2 code,anddefendantsinsistedthatfirecodewasneveradoptedby X city);St.JamesConstr.Co.v.Morlock,597A.2d1042,1047(Md. . Ct.Spec.App.1991)(appellantarguedthattrialcourterred   becauseit"tookjudicialnoticeofcopiesof...national   buildingstandardsratherthantheCountyCodeitself,thereby `  makingitdifficulttodeterminewhetherandhowthenational 6   buildingstandardshadbeenamendedintheiradoptionby[the]  \  County").#XN<XX XN<>#  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      22    _=N<XXdXd=InPerkinson,the XN<XXXN<trialcourtapparentlyexcludedplaintiff's  evidentiaryprofferoftheDistrictofColumbiaBuildingCode,and  insteadstatedthatitwould#XN<XX XN<## XN<XXXN<takejudicialnoticeoftheCode.At \ thecloseoftrial,thedefendantarguedthattheplaintiff"waived 2 herrighttohavetheregulationsconsideredbythejurybecause X shefailedtoputtheminevidence."Afteradefendant'sverdict, . #XN<XX XN<# XN<XXXN<thetrialcourtadmittedthatithad"putplaintiff'scounsel   off-guardbyofferingtotakejudicialnoticeoftheregulations"   andgrantedtheplaintiff'smotionforanewtrial.821F.2dat `  688&n.1.#XN<XX XN<#(O$  $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      26    _=N<XXdXd=Thefactthatthejuryshouldnotbecalledupontodecide  thelawhasnoimpactonwhetherthejurymayseethelaw.These  areindependentquestions.Consideranordinarystatute. \ Typically,thejudgeinstructsthejuryonthelaw,anddoesnot 2 givejurorsacopyofrelevantstatutes: X 8  Intheorderlytrialofacase,thelawisgiventothe   jurybythecourtandnotintroducedasevidence.Itis   thefunctionofthejurytodeterminethefactsfromthe `  evidenceandapplythelawasgivenbythecourttothe 6   factsasfoundbythemfromtheevidence.Obviously,it  \  wouldbemostconfusingtoajurytohavelegalmaterial  2  introducedasevidenceandthenarguedastowhatthelaw    isoroughttobe.   UnitedStatesv.Bernhardt,642F.2d251,253(8thCir.1981) \ (quotingCooleyv.UnitedStates,501F.2d1249,1253-54(9thCir. 2 1974)).However,thejudgehasbroaddiscretiontogivethejurors X copiesofstatutesfortheirdeliberations,ordeclinetodoso,as . sheseesfit.SeeUnitedStatesv.Polizzi,500F.2d856,875-76   (9thCir.1974)(courtsentstatutesandregulationsintojury   room;noabuseofdiscretionbecausestatutesandregulationswere `  extremelycomplexandjudgecouldjustifiablybelievethatitwould 6   havebeenbettertogivejurythestatutesandregulationsrather  \  thanhavethejuryattemptareconstructionfromnotesorfrom  2  memory).Ifordinarystatutes,whicharealwayssubjectto   judicialnotice,andshouldalmostneverbeofferedintoevidence,   canbegiventothejury,thenitfollowsthatthetrialcourthas d  thediscretiontopublishtothejuryNFPA30oranyothersource :  oflaw,eventhoughthelawdoesnotenterthecaseas"evidence."   /4 ' Turner0Turner .    < $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      18    _=N<XXdXd=Whatthelawmeans,ofcourse,isoftendisputed.   3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i) 6 $XN<XXX=N<Xdd=      21    _=N<XXdXd=Anexceptionthatperhapsprovestheruleis XN<XXXN<Pub.Hous.  Admin.v.BristolTownship,146F.Supp.859,866n.5(E.D.Pa.  1957).There,theproponentofalocalbuildingcodesubmitted \ exhibitscontainingtheentirecode,butforsomereasononly 2 formallyofferedcertainportionsintoevidence.Foreminently X practicalreasons,thecourttookjudicialnoticeoftheremainder.#XN<XX XN<;# !XN<XXX  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * ! X4vXXXN< X X4v     oOYBUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals V    FortheFirstCircuit  BV V  XN<X BV  A') ` dE< ` A   No.032324 K     `     h @| | GETTYPETROLEUMMARKETING,INC.,and  G    GETTYPROPERTIESCORPORATION,    @@XX%P0 @ laintiffs,Appellees, y  @@tt)v. %u  @@ CAPITALTERMINALCOMPANYand ! _DUNELLEN_,LLC,  @@$Defendants,Appellants. S A') ` dE<` A O @@ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT 4 FORTHEDISTRICTOFRHODEISLAND   [Hon.MaryM._Lisi_,U.S.DistrictJudge] f A') ` dE<` A b @@'Before G LynchandLipez,CircuitJudges,   @@((and_Garca_ԄGregory,DistrictJudge.* y! A') ` dE<!` A !K$       GeraldJ._Petros_,withwhomCharlesJ.Blackman,_Hinckley_, "0& Allen&Snyder,_LLP_,andDuffy&Sweeney,Ltdwereonbrief,for #' appellants. $(   JamesW.Ryan,withwhomRobertK.TaylorandPartridge,Snow b% ) &Hahn,_LLP_wereonbrief,forappellees. 8&!* *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  '4#,'4# l SIH(#- @@38330@@SDecember10,2004 )n$/  RHC)D%0" @@38330 @@ R(H(#1  (  * !  _________________________ + '2   *OftheDistrictofPuertoRico,sittingbydesignation. |-(4? B    _  8N<XXdd8*,X` XX*=N<XXdd= ` PerCuriam .Thiscaserequiresustodeterminewhether  appellantCapitalTerminalCompanywasentitledtoreachajuryon x itsclaimthatcertainimprovementstoafiresuppressionsystem $t wererequiredby"regulations"underthetermsofitswritten   agreementwithappelleeGettyPropertiesCorporation.Atthe |  conclusionofappellant'scase,thedistrictcourtgranted ( x  appellee'smotionforjudgmentasamatteroflawbecause,inthe $  court'sview,appellanthadfailedtoestablishabasisfor   instructingthejuryonthecontentofsuchregulations,andhence ,|  couldnotlinktherequiredimprovementstothoseregulations.We ( affirm.    I.  0  ` AppellantCapitalTerminalCompany(Capital)ownsthe H WilkesbarrePier(thePier)inEastProvidence,RhodeIsland.The  Pierisusedprimarilyforoffloadingpetroleummostlygasoline P andhomeheatingoilfrombargesanddeepwatervessels.Two L pipelinesbeginonthePierandextendapproximately2.5milesto   apairofundergroundoilterminalfacilitieslocatedinEast T!" Providence. #  1      ׀Capitalownsoneoftheundergroundterminals; #P$ appelleeGettyPropertiesCorporation(GettyProperties)ownsthe $&  otherandleasesittoGettyPetroleumMarketing,Inc.(Getty X&!( Marketing).GettyPropertiesalsoownsausageinterestinthe  Pier. \   ` AnOperatingAgreementexecutedin1975governsthe X parties'relationshipregardingcostsassociatedwiththePier.In   1997,adisputearoseoverthenatureandextentofrepairstothe `  Pier.Asaresultofthisdispute,theparties,includingGetty  \  PropertiesandCapital'spredecessorininterest,agreedtoaFirst   AmendmenttotheOperatingAgreement.Thatamendmentprovidesthat d  GettyPropertiesisresponsiblefor"[t]hecostofcompliancewith `  allCity,State,orFederalregulationsapplicabletotheoperation   ofthepipelines."Theterm"regulations"isnotdefinedinthe h OperatingAgreementortheFirstAmendmenttotheOperating d Agreement.^ #  2         ` Before1992,theclosestsourceofpressurizedwaterto l thePierwasahydrantlocatedonneighboringpropertyownedbythe h UnionOilCompanyofCalifornia(Unocal).Intheeventofafire,  waterfromthehydrantwouldhavebeenusedtosprayfireretardant p  foamontothepipelines.In1992,theEastProvidenceWater !l" Departmentshutoffwatertothehydrantbecauseitwasconcerned "$ thatchemicalsfromUnocal'soperationsmightcontaminatethewater t$&  supply.ThisactionleftthePierwithoutsufficientabilityto  &p!( suppressafireonthepipelines.ThepartiesthatusedthePier  begantodiscussthisproblemasearlyas1994. \   ` In1997,theEastProvidenceFireDepartmentcontacted X CapitalaboutthelackofapressurizedwatersupplyonthePier.   Beginningin1998andcontinuinguntil2000,Capitalattendeda `  seriesofmeetings(theAdvisoryGroupmeetings)attheCoast  \  Guard'sMarineSafetyOffice.Atthesemeetings,representatives   ofCapital,Unocal,theCoastGuard,theStateFireMarshal's d  Office,andtheEastProvidenceFireDepartmentdiscussedhowbest `  toprovideadequatefiresuppressionservicestothePier.A   representativeofGettyMarketingalsoattendedseveralofthe h AdvisoryGroupmeetings.Thepartiesdisputewhetherthe d representativeofGettyMarketingalsorepresentedGetty  Properties. l  ` OnMay8,2000,CapitalwrotealettertoGeraldA. h Bessette,ChiefoftheEastProvidenceFireDepartment,settingout  aproposalforfiresuppressionatthePier.Itincludedfour p  specificmeasures:extensionofanexistingwatermaintothePier, !l" purchaseofamobileFoamToteTrailerthattheFireDepartment "$ couldusetosuppressafireanywhereinthecity,installationof t$& aradiosignalalarmboxatthePier,andpurchaseofaportable  &p!( chemicalfireextinguishertobehousedatthePier.Theletter '#* statedthat"[t]heestimatedtotalcostforthefour... x)$, improvementsisapproximately$200,000."ItappearsthatCapital $+t&. anticipatedpayingfortheseimprovements,astheletterstated  that"[t]hisamountisamajorexpenditurefor[Capital],and \ representsahardship,abovewhichwecannotextendourselves." X  ` OnMay12,2000,theAdvisoryGroup,including   representativesofbothCapitalandGettyMarketing,aswellas `  ChiefBessette,discussedCapital'sproposal.Theminutesfromthe  \  meetingstatethat"[a]llofthekeyplayersagreedtothe   followingproposal(summarized)...submittedbyCapital."The d  proposallistedintheminutesincludedallfourmeasuresoutlined `  inCapital'sMay8,2000,letter,plustheadditionalmeasureof   installingapipelinefromtheheadofthePiertoaseparate h manifoldareaofthePier. d  ` OnMay17,2000,ChiefBessettesentalettertoCapital,  GettyMarketing,andGettyProperties,statingthat"[a]saresult l ofanumberof[AdvisoryGroup]meetings...inregardtoalack h ofadequatefireprotectionattheWilkesbarrePier,thefollowing  areminimalacceptableimprovementstothatfacility."Theletter p  thenlistedthefiveimprovementsthattheAdvisoryGrouphad !l" agreeduponduringitsMay12,2000,meeting.Shortlythereafter, "$ CapitaldemandedthatGettyPropertiespayforthecostof t$& implementingtheimprovementslistedinChiefBessette'sletter,  &p!( contendingthatthoseimprovementswererequiredby"regulations" '#* underthetermsoftheAgreementbetweentheparties. x)$,  $+t&.   II.   + ` OnAugust2,2000,GettyPropertiesandGettyMarketing x soughtadeclaratoryjudgmentfromthedistrictcourtthatthey $t were"notobligatedtoinstallawaterlineorfiresuppression   systemforthepier."OnSeptember8,2000,Capitalfileda |  compulsorycounterclaimseeking$300,000tocoverthecostsofthe ( x  firesuppressionsystemthatithadalreadybeguntoinstall.The $  districtcourtdividedthetrialintotwophases.Inphaseone,   thecourttriedCapital'scounterclaimbeforeajury. #  3      ׀Inphase ,|  two,triedatalatertime,thecourtconductedabenchtrialto ( addressGettyProperties'sandGettyMarketing'sdeclaratory  judgmentaction._ #  4       0  ` Duringthejurytrial,Capitalintroducedintoevidence , thehistoricaldocumentsgoverninginterestsinthePier,including  theAgreementbetweenCapitalandGettyPropertiesobligatingGetty 4 Propertiestopay"[t]hecostofcompliancewithallCity,State, 0 orFederalregulationsapplicabletotheoperationofthe   pipelines."CapitalalsointroducedareportwrittenbyOrville 8!" Slye,aconsultanthiredbyCapitaltoassessthefiresuppression "4$ needsonthePier.ThatreporthadbeenpresentedtotheAdvisory $& GroupandhadbeenusedbyCapitalindevelopingitsproposalfor  firesuppressiononthePier.Capitalalsointroducedtheminutes \ oftheAdvisoryGroupmeetings. X  ` AtthecloseofCapital'scase,Gettymovedforjudgment   asamatteroflawpursuanttoFed.R.Civ.P.50(a)(1).Getty `  arguedthat"[t]herehasbeenabsolutelynotestimonyhere  \  regardinganyparticularregulationoranyruleoflawthatGetty   Propertiesdidnotcomplywith."XN<XX XN<Thisstatementsomewhatmisstates d  theissuethatwasbeforethecourt.Theissuewasnotwhether `  GettyPropertieshadfailedtocomplywithanyregulationorrule   oflaw.Rather,theissuewaswhethertheimprovementslistedin h ChiefBessette'sletterwererequiredinordertocomplywith d "regulations"asthattermwasusedintheAgreement,andtherefore  whetherGettyPropertieswasresponsibleforpayingthecostof l installingthoseimprovements.# XN<XXXN<5# h  ` Inresponsetothismotion,thecourtpressedCapitalto  "point[thecourt]totheregulationwhichrequiresthe p  installationofthefiresuppressionsystemthatyouseek !l" compensationfor."CapitaldirectedthecourttoR.I.Gen.Laws "$ 2328.225,  #  5      ׀whichwithanexceptionnotrelevanthere,states: t$& "Theconstruction,installation,use,storage,andmaintenanceof  facilitiesstoring,using,anddispensingflammableandcombustible \ liquidswithinthescopeofthischaptershallbeinaccordance X withN.F.P.A.Standard30,1987edition."Capitalassertedthat   the1987editionoftheNationalFireProtectionAssociation `  Standard30(NFPA30),a"FlammableandCombustibleLiquidsCode"  \  developedbyanongovernmentalentity,wasincorporatedintoRhode   IslandlawpursuanttoR.I.Gen.Laws2328.225,andthus d  constituteda"regulation"forthepurposesoftheAgreement.` #  6      ׀ `   ` ThecourtaskedCapitalwheretheregulationwasand   Capitalresponded,"Icangetacopy,Isuppose."Whenasked h whetheritwasintroducedintoevidence,Capitalresponded,"It's d amatteroflaw,yourHonor."ThecourtcontinuedtopushCapital,  stating,"ShowmetheRhodeIslandBuildingCodewhichyousayhas l  forceoflaw,"towhichCapitalresponded,"Idon'thavethe h buildingcode."ThecourtarticulateditsbeliefthattheStandard  shouldbepartofCapital'spapersinthecase. \   ` Thecourtthenaskedforthecitation.Capital X responded,"ItisNFPA30andtheRhodeIslandBuildingCode,your   Honor,andIwillfinditandbringittoyou,Ipromise,orat `  leastIshouldsayIwillfinditandtrytobringittoyou."The  \  courtstatedthattheviolationofaregulationwasthe"bedrockof   [Capital's]claimagainstGetty"andthatitwasCapital's d  "obligationasthepartypressingtheclaimnotonlytosetforth `  thefactsthatsupport[the]claimbuttosetforththelaw."The   courtobservedthatCapitalhadnotcitedaspecificprovisionof h NFPA30thatrequiredtheintroductionofthefiresuppression d equipment,letalonegiventhecourtacopyofNFPA30:  8 ` [Y]ourested,butyouhavenotdirectedmeto l anyspecificregulation....ButI'masking B youtogivemeacopyoftheregulationthat h yousaysupportsyourargumentonthispoint. > Becauseifit'snotthere...youwilllose  onthisclaim.It'sassimpleasthat.` x` x MCNotingthatithadlookedunsuccessfullyforNFPA30,thecourt F ! tookashortrecesstogiveCapitaltimetoobtainacopy. !B#  ` Afterarecess,thecourtaskedcounselforCapital #% whetherhewas"ableintherecesstoidentifyaspecificstatute, J% ' ordinance,regulation,anythingthatspecificallycoversthefire &F") suppressionsystemthatwe'vebeentalkingabout[.]"Capital (#+  simplyofferedR.I.Gen.Laws2328.225;counseladmittedthat N*%- hehada2000editionofNFPA30butnotthe1987edition.The  courtstated: \  8 ` TheproblemIhaveisthis.Thisstatute X makesreferencetoadocument.Itisnot . incorporated,thatis,thetextofthe   documentisnotincorporatedintothestatute.   Thereisnothingbeforethisjuryfromwhich `  itcanmakeadeterminationthatGettyhadan 6   obligationtocomplywithcertainprovisions.  \   ` x` x HThecourtnotedthatSlye,Capital'sexpert,neverstatedwhatwas   requiredbyNFPA30;infact,hestatedthathisown d  recommendationsexceededNFPA30'srequirements.Thecourt `  continuedtopressCapital:   8 ` Whereisthereanythingintherecordother h thanthereferencetothisstandardorsetof > standardsthataddressesthepreciseissuein d thiscase....Allyouhaveisthe : reference.` x` x @K ` Thecourtthencommentedominouslyonthesignificanceof l NFPA30'sabsencefromthecase:"Nobodyknowswhatitsaysatthis h point,butmostimportantlythejuryandIdonotknowwhatit  says."Capitalrespondedthatthecourtwasconfusingissuesof p  lawwithissuesoffact: !l"   It'snotaquestionoffact,yourHonor.This "$ isaquestionoflaw....[Y]ourHonor #% wouldn'tgive[thejury]thestatute.Your t$& Honorwould,Isuspect,chargeastowhatthe J% ' lawis.IfyourHonorbelievesthatNFPA30  &p!( isnowthebuildingcodelawoftheStateof &F") RhodeIsland,Iwouldexpectyoutocharge '#* that.IbelievethatifIhadtriedtooffer (#+ eithertheGeneralLawsor[NFPA30]in x)$, evidence,thatanobjectionwouldhavebeen N*%- madeandsustained.It'samatteroflaw. $+t&.  +J'/ >N 0N "NThecourtwasnotconvincedbyCapital'sargument,noting,"I'mnot  sosure....ButIthinkyou'vegotaholeinyourcase." \  ` Capitalcontinued: X 8 ` Thepointofthematteristhatthisisnowa   matteroflaw.Wewillsubmitamemorandumat   theearliestpossibletime,anditwillbe `  quickly,toshowyouwhatNFPA30isandthat 6   itisthelawandaskyoutochargethejury  \  accordingly. 2 ` x` x @RThecourtremindedCapital,"Ineedthe'87version,"andasked,   "Who'sgotit?"Althoughcounselofferedtogetacopyofthe1987 :  editionofNFPA30,thecourtsaiditwas"toolate"andadmonished 6 that"[i]fthisiswhatyourclientishangingitshaton,thisis  somethingthatshouldhavebeenprovidedtotheCourtalongtime > ago,notnow." :  ` ThedistrictcourtgrantedGettyProperties'smotionfor  judgmentasamatteroflaw.a #  7      ׀Inreachingitsconclusion,the B courtprobedthenatureofNFPA30.ThecourtnotedthatNFPA > standardswerepromulgatedbytheNationalFireProtection  Association,whichisaprivateindustryboard.Froman F ! evidentiarystandpoint,thecourtbelievedthatbecausetheprivate !B# standardwasnotincorporatedintothetextofthestatestatute, #% butratherwassimplyreferenced,Capitalwasrequiredtointroduce J% ' NFPA30intoevidence.Thecourtbelievedthattheproblemwith &F") Capital'scasewasthat,"eventakingallofthe[evidence  introducedattrial]intoaccount,thereisabsolutelynotone \ shredofevidenceinthecaselinkingthe[recommendationsofChief X Bessette]tothe1987editionofNFPA30."    ` InitswrittenorderofDecember20,2002,thecourt `  furtherexplaineditsdecision,statingthe"dispositiveissue"was  \  "whethertherewasanyevidencethattheitemslistedinChief   Bessette'sletterwereinaccordancewiththestandardssetforth d  inNFPA30,1987edition."Thecourtnotedthat"[t]heNFPA30, `  1987editionmanualwasneverofferedasanexhibit,andisnot   partoftheevidenceinthiscase."Itfurtherstatedthat"the h onlytestimonyconcerningwhatwasorwasnotrequiredonthePier d inthewayoffireprotectionequipmentcamefromOrvilleSlye,  Jr."ThecourtaddedthattherecommendationsinSlye'sreport,by l thereport'sownterms,exceeded"minimal,nonmandatory,fire h protectionrecommendedbyNFPA30."Thedistrictcourtconcluded  that"[n]owheredoestheSlyeReportindicatethatthe p  recommendationscontainedthereinareinaccordancewiththeNFPA !l" 30,1987edition.Moreover,thereportdoesnotstatethat "$ recommendedPierimprovementsarerequiredbystatute,ordinance, t$& oranyregulationwhatsoever."  &p!(  ` Intheabsenceofevidencelinkingtheimprovements '#* listedinChiefBessette'slettertotherequirementsofNFPA30, x)$, thecourtdeterminedthatnoreasonablejurycouldfindthatthose $+t&. improvementswererequiredby"regulations."Thecourtstatedthat  "[n]owhereinChiefBessette'sletterdoeshereferenceaRhode \ Islandstatestatute,cityordinance,orotherregulationrequiring X installationofthelisteditems,nordoeshementiontheNFPA30,   1987editionorstatethattheitemslistedareinaccordancewith `  NFPAstandards."Thecourtconcludedthat"thefailuretomakean  \  evidentiarylinkbetweenitemslistedinChiefBessette'sletter    withacorrespondingregulationisfataltoplaintiff'sclaim."d #  8       d   ` Onappeal,Capitalarguesthatareasonablejurycould   havefoundthattheimprovementslistedinChiefBessette'sletter \ wererequiredby"regulations."Capital'sprimaryargumentsare X that(1)thecourtshouldhavetakenjudicialnoticeofthe   contentsofNFPA30becauseNFPA30ispartofRhodeIslandlawand `  thusthejudgewasresponsibleforinstructingthejuryastoits  \  requirements,and(2)theevidenceattrialindicatedthatthe   improvementsinChiefBessette'sletterwererequiredbythe d  regulatoryauthorityoftheCityofEastProvidence,theStateFire `  Marshal,andtheCoastGuard.e #  9            0 III.   Ug ` "Wereviewthegrantofamotionforjudgmentasamatter x oflawdenovo."McLane,Graf,Raulerson&Middleton,P.A.v. $t Rechberger,280F.3d26,39(1stCir.2002). InrulingonGetty   Properties'sRule50(a)motion,thedistrictcourtheldthatthe |  jurycouldnotdecidewhether"Getty[Properties]hadanobligation ( x  tocomplywithcertainprovisions"ofNFPAwithoutacopyofNFPA $  30beingpresented.     ` ThecontractlanguageatissueprovidesthatGetty ,|  Propertiesisresponsiblefor"[t]hecostofcompliancewithall ( City,State,orFederalregulationsapplicabletotheoperationof  thepipelines."Althoughtheword"regulations"isnotdefinedin 0 thecontract,thewordunmistakablymeansthatGettyPropertiesis , onlyresponsibleforthecostofimprovementsrequiredbycity,  state,orfederallaw.g #  10      ׀ 4  ` WedealquicklywithCapital'ssecondargumentthat 0 independentofNFPA30,theevidenceintroducedattrialpermitted   ajurytofindtheimprovementswererequiredbycity,state,or 8!" federalregulations,andthusGettywasliableforthecostofthe "4$ improvementstothePier.Thatissimplynotso.EvenCapital's $& expertdidnottestifytothateffect,butrathersaidtheplan <&!( exceededtheNFPArecommendations.Indeed,Capital'smain  argument,thenandnow,turnsontheassertionthattheRhode \ IslandstatutewhichreferencesNFPA30requirestheimprovements X madetothePierandistheregulationwhich,undertheAgreement,   makesGettyresponsible. `   ` Wenowturntothisargument.Capitalcontendsthatthe  \  courtshouldhavedeterminedtherequirementsofRhodeIslandlaw   pursuanttoitsresponsibilitytodeterminethelawapplicableto d  thecase,andtheninstructedthejuryonthoserequirements. `  SinceRhodeIslandlawprovidesthat"facilitiesstoring,using,   anddispensingflammableandcombustibleliquidswithinthescope h ofthischaptershallbeinaccordancewithN.F.P.A.Standard30, d 1987edition,"R.I.Gen.Laws2328.225(emphasisadded),  Capitalargues,NFPA30ispartofthelawofRhodeIslandand l hence,asarguedinitsbrief,"[i]twasnever[Capital's] h obligationtoprovewhatthelawis."Capitalmaintainsthecourt  wasobligatedtotakejudicialnoticeofthelaw,inthiscase, p  NFPA30.Althoughcounseldidnotusethewords"judicialnotice" !l" inhisargumentbeforethedistrictcourt,wewilltakeit,inhis "$ favor,thatthecourtunderstoodhisrequestinthoseterms. t$&  ` XN<XX XN<Wedisagree,however,thatthecourtwasrequiredtotake  &p!( judicialnoticeofNFPA30.AfterGettymovedforjudgmentasa '#* matteroflawpursuanttoFed.R.Civ.P.50(a)(1),thecourtasked x)$, CapitalforacopyofNFPA30,referencedinRhodeIslandGeneral $+t&. Laws2328.225.Thecourtindicatedthatithadlookedfora  copyandwasunabletolocateone.Afterabriefrecess,Capital \ stillcouldnotprovidethecourtwithacopy;Capitalsimply X pointedtotheRhodeIslandstatutethatreferencedthestandard.   Onappeal,Capital'sargumentisthatthecourtwasrequiredto `  takejudicialnoticeofNFPA30,regardless.  \   ` Generally,inthefederalsystem,"[t]helawofanystate   oftheUnion,whetherdependinguponstatutesoruponjudicial d  opinions,isamatterofwhichthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesare `  boundtotakejudicialnoticewithoutpleaorproof."Lamarv.   Micou,114U.S.218,223(1885);Whitev.Gittens,121F.3d803, h 805n.1(1stCir.1997).Municipalordinancesandprivatecodes d referredtoinstatuteshistoricallyhavenotbeenincludedwithin  thisgeneralruleofjudicialnoticeoflaw.Undertraditional l rules,evenamunicipalordinancemustbeputintoevidence.See h Gardnerv.CapitalTransitCo.,152F.2d288,290(D.C.Cir.  1945)(affirmingtrialcourt'srefusaltotakejudicialnoticeofor p  instructthejuryregardingaDistrictofColumbiaordinancethat !l" appellanthadnotproven,because"municipalordinancesmaynotbe "$ judiciallynoticedbycourtsofgeneraljurisdiction");Robinsonv. t$& DenverCityTramwayCo.,164F.174(8thCir.1908)("[T]omake[an  &p!( ordinance]availableinestablishingachargeofnegligence,it '#* mustbepleaded,likeanyotherfactofwhichjudicialnoticewill x)$, notbetaken.")# XN<XXXN<u#XN<XX XN<;# XN<XXXN<~#XN<XX XN<TownofLincolnv.Cournoyer,186A.2d728,730 $+t&. (R.I.1962)("Itisgenerallyheldthatthedoctrineofjudicial  noticewillnotbeextendedtotheenactmentofspecificmunicipal \ ordinancesortothespecificprovisionsofsuchmunicipal X ordinances.");# XN<XXXN<~#XN<XX XN<2JohnStrong,McCormickonEvidence335(5thed.   1999)# XN<XXXN ofordinancesuponanadequatesubmission.SeeMelton,879F.2dat : 724&n.25;Newcombv.Brennan,558F.2d825,829(7thCir.1977)  ("Weholdthatmattersofpublicrecordsuchasstatestatutes, B citycharters,andcityordinancesfallwithinthecategoryof > 'commonknowledge'andarethereforepropersubjectsforjudicial  notice.");seealsoHolstv.CountrysideEnters.,Inc.,14F.3d F ! 1319,1322n.4(8thCir.1994)("[I]twouldnotbeappropriateto !B# provethefirecodebythetestimonyoftheexpertarchitect. #% Ordinarily,codes,regulations,andstatutesare,ifrelevant, J% ' establishedthroughjudicialnotice."). &F")  ` Thus,theevolvingtrendinthelawisthatmandatory (#+ safetycodes(likelocalordinancesorstateadministrative N*%- regulationsingeneral)are,whenfeasible,establishedbyjudicial +J'/ notice,notbywitnesstestimonyorotherfactualproof.The  rationaleforrequiringsuchcodestobeofferedintoevidenceand \ proventhepracticaldifficultyofobtainingthenecessary X materialshasbeenunderminedbydevelopmentsintechnologyand   opengovernmentpracticesthatoftenmakeiteasiertofindthe `  relevantlaw.p #  23      ׀Cf.MadelineMarieNursingHomes,694F.2dat446  \  (notingthatOhioadministrativeregulationswerenotpublished   until1976,andconsequentlytherewas"noreadilyavailablesource d  fromwhich[the]court[could]independentlyascertaintheexact `  statusoftheOhioregulationsineffectin1976andearlier.").   Furthermore,thistrendisparalleledbyasimilarchangeofview h inmoststatecourtsystems.q #  24      ׀ d  ` Insum,therationalefornotjudiciallynoticinglocal  orstatelawotherthanpublicstatestatuteshaslargelyeroded, \ andtheevolutionofthelawpointsinthisdirection.Inmyview, X whenpossible,localordinancesincludingsafetycodesthathave   theforceoflawshouldbeplacedintoacaseviathemechanism `  ofjudicialnoticeoflaw,notprooftothejury.  \   E. ` Capital'sBurden    ` Becausejudicialnoticeoflawisapracticaldoctrine,   theburdenofproductionfortheproponentofthelawshoulddepend ,|  largelyonthenatureofthelegalmaterialsandhowreadilythey ( maybeaccessedbyordinarylegalresearchmethods.Ifthe  documentmaybeaccessedbyawidelyusedelectroniclegalresearch 0 serviceorfoundinthecollectionofanyreasonablywellstocked , publiclawlibrary,then(absentalocalcourtruletothe  contrary)asimplecitationwillalmostalwayssuffice. 4  ` Here,thematerialswerenotsoreadilyavailable.While 0 R.I.Gen.Laws2328.225isapublicstatestatute,readily   retrievablebythesimplestlegalresearchanditselfsubjectto 8!" judicialnoticeunderLamar,itisnotfullyspecified.Tofully "4$ understandwhatthestatuterequires,onemustturntoNFPA30, $& whichisprivatelyauthored,published,andcopyrighted.In <&!( respectsrelevanthere,however,itdoesnotdifferfroman '8#* unpublishedordinanceorregulation:itisneitherreproducedin )$, theRhodeIslandstatutebooksnorretrievableviacommonlyused  legalresearchmethods. \  ` 1. UnchallengedCopies X  ` IfCapitalhadprovidedthedistrictcourtwithacopyof   NFPA30thathadbeencertifiedbythestateofRhodeIslandas `  official,thecourtwouldhavebeenrequired,inmyview,totake  \  judicialnoticeofit.NFPA30is,afterall,partofthelawof   RhodeIsland.InthepresenceofacertifiedcopyofNFPA30,I d  cannotimaginewhyitwouldbenecessaryorevenhelpfultoprove `  itscontentsorauthenticityinlieuofthecourttakingjudicial   noticeoflaw.SeegenerallyFed.R.Evid.902(4)(certified h copiesofpublicrecordsareselfauthenticating);Ryanv.E.A.I. d Constr.Corp.,511N.E.2d1244,1252(Ill.App.Ct.1987)("The  courttookjudicialnoticeofthe[ChicagoBuildingC]odeafter l plaintifftenderedacertifiedcopytothecourt."). h  ` IfCapitalhadpresentedthedistrictcourtwithan  uncertifiedcopy,theanalysiswouldbealmostthesame.Parties p  routinelysubmitcopiesofdocumentsoflawtofederalcourts,and !l" certifiedcopiesarerarelyrequired.IfCapitalhadpresentedthe "$ districtcourtwithacopyofthe1987editionofNFPA30thatbore t$& reasonableindiciaofauthenticity,thecourtwouldhavebeen  &p!( authorizedtojudiciallynoticeit,aftergivingGettyProperties '#* areasonableopportunitytocontestitsauthenticityandaccuracy x)$, beforethecourt.Cf.S.Pac.Co.v.DeValleDaCosta,190F. $+t&. 689,697-98(1stCir.1911)(notingthat"underordinary  circumstances,informalityinproofofageneralstatuteofoneof \ theUnitedStates[isnot]asufficientgroundforreversalbya X UnitedStatescourt"ifthereisnoactualdisputeregardingthe   statute'scontents).Iftheauthenticityandaccuracyofthat `  uncertifiedcopyofNFPA30werenotcontested,thecourt,inmy  \  view,wouldprobablyhavebeenrequiredtojudiciallynoticeit.    ` 2. ChallengedCopies d   ` If,ontheotherhand,therehadbeenagenuinedispute `  abouttheauthenticityandaccuracyofaprofferedcopy,v #  25      ׀Ibelieve   thatthecourtnotthejurywouldhavebeenrequiredto h resolvethatdispute.Irecognizethattraditionaldoctrine d requiredtheproponentto"prove"ordinancestothejury,see,  e.g.,Robinson,164F.at176,whichpresumablywoulddeterminethe l lawincaseofadispute.Butthispracticemadelittlesensethen h andmakeslesssensenow.Cf.ArthurJohnKeeffe,WilliamB.  Landis,Jr.,&RobertB.Shaad,SenseandNonsenseAboutJudicial p  Notice,2Stan.L.Rev.664,674(1950)(describingtheviewthat  determinationofforeignlawpresentsajuryquestionasa \ "ridiculousproposition"with"disastrous"results).Therewasa X viewthatdisputesabouttheauthenticity,accuracy,andcontents   ofdocumentswere"factual,"andfactualdisputesmustberesolved `  onadmissibleevidencesubmittedtothejury.Thatviewhangstoo  \  muchimportanceontheabstractionof"fact"andnotenoughonthe   logicalandinstitutionallyoptimalallocationofresponsibility d  betweenthejudgeandthejury.SeeNormanJ.Singer,2Sutherland `  onStatutoryConstruction39:7(6thed.2000)("'Proof'ofthe   ordinancedoesnotmakeitafact;itonlypresentsforjudicial h considerationapartofthelawwhichmaynotbeasavailableas d otherparts.");cf.ChristopherB.Mueller&LairdC.Kirkpatrick,  1FederalEvidence59(2ded.1994)("Sometimes,becausea l questionof'fact'wasthoughttobeinvolved[inestablishing h foreignlaw],theproofwasmadetothejury,althoughthe  inappropriatenessofhavingjuriesmakedeterminationsoflawis p  nowgenerallyrecognized."). !l"  ` Inmyview,thejudge,notthejury,shoulddeterminethe "$ governinglaw."Itwouldappeartobeself-evidentthatitis t$& peculiarlythefunctionofthejudgetofindandinterpretthelaw  &p!( applicabletotheissuesinatrialand,inajurycase,to '#* announcehisfindingsoflawtothejuryfortheirguidance." x)$, McCormickonEvidence335.Iffactfindingisnecessaryto $+t&. ascertainthelaw,thejudgeshouldfindthenecessaryfactsand  theninstructthejury: \ 8 ` Whenajudgepresidinginthepresenceofa X jurydecidesaquestionoffact,a . sufficientlyuniqueeventoccurstomerit   specialtreatmentbecausethejuryisthought   toperformthefactfindingroleincommonlaw `  countries....Thereisnothingvery 6   remarkableaboutajudgerulingonthetenor  \  ofthelawtobeappliedtotheresolutionof  2  thecontroversy,however,becauseby   definitionthisistheveryfunctionjudges   aresupposedtoperform.d ` x` x @*b)Id.;seealsoNeuberv.RoyalRealtyCo.,195P.2d501,517-518 `  (Cal.Ct.App.1948)(trialcourthadrefusedtoadmitcity   ordinancesintoevidencebutinsteadinstructedjuryastowhat h conductwouldviolatethoseordinances;affirmingandexplaining d that"itwouldseemtousjustasimpropertosubmitordinancesto  thejuryforinterpretationasitwouldbetohandthemacopyof l theCivilCodeforthemtoperuseindeterminingwhatthelawof h thestatewas"),overruledinpartonothergrounds,Porterv.  MontgomeryWard&Co.,313P.2d854,857(Cal.1957).y #  26       p   ` Thesuperiorityofthisinstitutionalallocationof  responsibilitybetweenjudgeandjuryisillustratedbywhatcould \ havehappenedinthiscaseifthejuryhadbeenrequiredto X determinethelaw.SupposethatCapitalhadprovidedthe2000   editionofNFPA30(which,infact,itpossessed)andawitnesswho `  wouldtestifythatthe1987editionwasmateriallyidentical,but  \  thatGettyPropertieshaddisputedthatassertionandprovideda   contrarywitness.Itwouldmakelittlesenseforthejuryto d  decidewhatthelawsaid,andthenforthejudgetoinstructthe `  juryonthelawbasedonwhatthejuryhadjusttoldthejudge.   Suppose,evenmoresimply,thatCapitalhadpresentedacertified, h undisputedcopyofNFPA30tothecourt,butthedistrictcourt d declinedtotakejudicialnoticeandinsteadletthejurydecide.  Butwhatexactlywouldthejurydecide?WhetherNFPA30isinfact l partofthelawofRhodeIsland?Whetherthecertified,undisputed h copypresentedincourtaccuratelystatesNFPA30totheextent  thatitispartofthelawofRhodeIsland?Furthersupposethat \ thejurygotthelawwrong:woulditsdecisionbereviewablebyan X appellatecourt,andunderwhatstandardsufficiencyofthe   evidence?Thesystemworksbestwhenthejudgeconductsthe `  necessaryinvestigationanddeterminesthelaw:  \  8 ` Indeterminingthecontentorapplicabilityof   aruleofdomesticlaw,thejudgeis   unrestrictedinhisinvestigationand d  conclusion....Hemaymakeanindependent :  searchforpersuasivedataorrestcontent `  withwhathehasorwhatthepartiespresent. 6 Hemayreachaconclusioninaccordwiththe   overwhelmingweightofavailabledataor  againstit.Ifheisatrialjudge,his h conclusionissubjecttoreview.>` x` x 6EdmundM.Morgan,JudicialNotice,57Harv.L.Rev.269,270 : (1944). `    ` &  3. ProcedureforInvokingJudicialNotice B  ` Capital'ssubmissionneednothavebeenaccompaniedbya > formalrequestforjudicialnoticeoflaw.'B9ԀRather,thequestionis  whethertheproponenthassubmittedmaterialtothecourt(andto F ! opposingparties)thateffectivelymakesthejudicialnoticeoflaw !B# request.Ifthematerialisreadilyavailableoractually #% submittedinfulltothecourt,theproponentneednotformally J% ' requestjudicialnoticeoflaw;thesubmissionofareadily &F") retrievablecitation,orofcopiesoftherelevantdocuments,ought (#+ tosuffice.SeeStateDep'tofHighwaysv.Halvorson,181N.W.2d N*%- 473,476(Minn.1970)("Whereacourtisaskedtotakejudicial +J'/ noticeofanagencyregulation...counselshouldbepreparedto  exhibittothecourttherelevantcontentsoftheregulation, \ eitherbytenderingacopyofthepublishedregulationorby X referencetosomeotherreadilyavailableofficialreport   disclosingitscontents.")(emphasisadded);Commonwealthv. `  Marcus,690A.2d842,844-45(Pa.Commw.Ct.1997)(wherecounsel  \  submittedamemorandumtotrialcourtatbeginningofthehearing,   settingforthBOCACodeandordinancesections,butdidnotsubmit d  anauthenticatedcopyofthecompleteordinance,"counselfulfilled `  hisobligationtoaidthetrialcourtinobtainingtherelevant   provisionsoftheOrdinance.Hence,thetrialcourtproperlytook h judicialnoticeoftheOrdinancewiththeaidofthecounsel d ....").Bythesametoken,themerefactthataproponent  requeststhecourttojudiciallynoticeabodyoflawdoesnot l sufficeifthatlawisneitherreadilyavailablenoractually h submitted.   ` DistrictcourtsneednotgotoHerculeanlengthsto p  discoverthelawwhencounseldonotadequatelypresentit. !l" Rather,thecourtshouldhavethediscretiontodeterminewhether "$ theproponent'ssubmissionsufficientlyenablesthecourtto t$& ascertainthelaw.Cf.Bello,194F.3dat23(reviewingtrial  &p!( court'sdecisiontotakejudicialnoticeofadjudicativefactunder '#* Rule201forabuseofdiscretion).Underthatstandard,ifthe x)$, courtcannotascertainthelawfromcounsel'ssubmission,then, $+t&. virtuallybydefinition,thesubmissionisinadequate.  Accordingly,thecourtneednotjudiciallynoticeadocumentthat \ wasneverpresentedtothecourtandthatisnotreasonably X availablebyordinarylegalresearch.Cf.Holst,14F.3dat1323   (affirmingtrialcourt'sexclusionofcrossexaminationtestimony `  regardingfirecode;wherepartyneitherintroducedfirecodeinto  \  evidencebydirecttestimonynorrequestedjudicialnoticeofcode,   itwasnotbeforethecourtandcouldnotbeinvestigatedincross d  examinationoronredirect);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Buswell,45 `  C.M.R.742,747&n.3(A.C.M.R.1972)(reversingconvictionwhere   soldierwasconvictedofviolatingclassifiedregulation,contents h ofwhichwerenotpresentedtomilitarycourt,andnotingthatif d theregulationwere"physicallyavailable"tocourt,court"would  nothesitatetotakejudicialnoticeofit,"butwithoutacopyof l allegedlyviolatedregulation,therewasnothingtojudicially h notice,andthereforethechargefailedtostateanoffense);  Marcherv.Butler,749P.2d486,489(Idaho1988)("offhandmention p  ofbuildingcodes"insummaryjudgmentmemorandum"wasinsufficient !l" toputthetrialcourtonnoticeofthem");PlainsTransp.ofKan., "$ Inc.v.Baldwin,535P.2d865,871(Kan.1975)(appellantsdidnot t$& "makeasufficientpresentationforthetrialjudge....  &p!( Essentially,thedistrictcourthadnothingbeforeitwhich '#* justifiedorrequiredthegivingof[appellants'requested] x)$, instruction.").  $+t&.  F. ` & t Conclusion    ` Isummarize'tMԀtheprinciplesofjudicialnoticeoflawthat x Ihavedescribedhereandthenapplythemtothedistrictcourt's $t rulingonGetty'smotionforjudgmentasamatteroflaw.Parties   generallymustidentifythelawthatisessentialtotheircase. |  Noformalrequestforjudicialnoticeoflawneedbemade,butthe ( x  relevantlawmustbeprovidedtothecourtinameaningfulform. $  Wherethislawcanbereadilyretrievedfromasimplecitation,   providingthatcitationtothecourtwillusuallysuffice.Where ,|  thelawisdifficulttoobtain,theproponentmustphysically ( providethecourtwithacopy.Acertifiedcopyoftheordinance  orotherlegaldocumentwillalmostalwayssuffice.Anuncertified 0 copywillsufficeifitbearsreasonableindiciaofauthenticity , andthereisnogenuinedisputeastoitsaccuracy.Thecourt,not  thejury,mustresolveanysuchdisputes.Finally,wherethelaw 4 isnotreadilyobtainableandtheproponentdoesnotprovidethe 0 courtwithanycopyatall,thecourtmayproperlyconcludethat   theproponenthasnotestablishedthecontentsofthatlaw.  8!"  ` Pursuanttoitsjudicialnoticeoflawrequest,Capital "4$ wasrequiredtomakethe1987editionofNFPA30whichisnot $& readilyobtainablebyordinarylegalresearchavailabletothe <&!( districtcourt.ThecourtexplicitlyaskedCapitaltosubmita '8#*  copyofNFPA30.Capitalwasunabletoprovideone.Therefore,I )$, joinmycolleagues'conclusionthatthecourtwasnotrequiredto  takejudicialnoticeofNFPA30.Seeanteat1819. \  =N<XXdXXd= ` Ordinarily,aRule50(a)motionisbasedonalackof X evidence,notalackoflaw.Inthisbreachofcontractaction,   however,Capitalclaimedthattheimprovementswererequiredbya `  "City,State,orFederalregulation[]applicabletotheoperation  \  ofthepipelines."SinceNFPA30,throughR.I.Gen.Laws23   28.225,wastheonly"regulation[]applicabletotheoperationof d  thepipelines"arguablyinvolvedinthiscase,andCapitaldidnot `  provideanadequatebasisforjudiciallynoticingthatstandard,   Capitalfailedtoprovidea"legallysufficientevidentiarybasis h forareasonablejurytofind"thatthefiresuppressionequipment d wasrequiredbyanyregulation.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.50(a)(1).  Capital'sfailuretoproduceacopyofNFPA30wasfataltoits l case.Therefore,Iconcurinthepercuriamopinionaffirmingthe h districtcourt.# XN<XXXN<3#