WPCA . }|u+KViG3?20<ӬkYIJk#_4xIOt5 LFWp3 bhyijTkn,?PYu?c`wSMiب,LPϣ5'i=7"8w yޯKz+ְg\`w+iRۖ:>2q2U.9*SV]M KjXFU^ /J'P?Ys}Y7nY%{aQmZ*÷a[a)p7lV 0 Sdޤw#GqmHg P7֖pP|:,Xz8AX9׭ %mWHb,NaWZ6N?ޘx{Ae DN/lQb>H wnF8 H_%V:7=GY:۔, O8vQqP: +0`E}|a2j0# %a 0Dg 0GU: 0,U8nT N` UNb UF ^ w 4  ) E+ f- a/ mC Z Z bO UFW  u^ Xp ',+.333 B66668T;s?s?AHP LaserJet 5,,,,0X(#$  0  ($XXXX<6X9`("Courier NewTT(F:2F$ !XXXX        0  <4 9Z+ Courier New <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@(A Z6Times New Roman RegularQ 9Z+.Courier New Regularz0s Nx0?,}backup3|x TABLE AU F$XXXX      *    _ԀOftheCourtofAppealsfortheTenthCircuit,sittingby  designation.- -.Courier New Regular  F$XXXX      2    _ԀExamplesinclude"faggot";"Niceearring,faggot,doyou  havealotmoreathome?";"Lookinthehole,twoscabsandafag";  "Niceass,areyougoingtowearaspeedowhenyougoto \ Provincetownthissummer?";andsimilarfare.  k F$XXXX      3    _ԀUnderMCADprocedure,theinvestigatingcommissionermust  issueaprobablecausefinding"[i]f,afterappropriate  investigation,theInvestigatingCommissionerdeterminesthatthere \ issufficientevidencetosupportafindingofProbableCauseto 2 credittheallegationsofthecomplaint."Mass.Regs.Codetit. X 804,1.15(7)(b).Forthesepurposes,probablecauserequires . "sufficientevidenceuponwhichafact-findercouldforma   reasonablebeliefthatitismoreprobablethannotthatthe   respondentcommittedanunlawfulpractice."Id.1.15(7)(a). { F$XXXX      4    _ԀTheremainingtwoquestionsinvolvedtheUnion'sliability  forharassingactsbyitsmembersandthepersonalliabilityof  individualemployeesforharassmentbasedonsexualorientation.   F$XXXX      15    _ԀInChaulkServicestheclaimedoffendingconductwassex  discrimination,whichisprohibitedbyCongressinTitleVIIin  additiontobeingprohibitedbystatelaw,andsotherewasno \ obviousconflictbetweenstateandfederallaw.Thus,onemight 2 arguethatCongresshasalesserinterestinexclusiveNLRB X jurisdictioninthatsituation.SeeChaulkServices,70F.3dat . 137475(Lynch,J.,dissenting).Here,bycontrast,Congresshas   notexplicitlyprohibitedsexualorientationdiscrimination.   Furthermore,unlikeinChaulkServices,theemployment `  discriminationallegedhereisnotclassicdiscriminationbyan 6   employeragainstanemployee.Rather,itisdiscriminationby  \  lowerlevelemployeesagainstasupervisor.Italsotookplace  2  duringastrikeandalockout,whichhasbeenatraditionalarea   offederalregulationsinceenactmentoftheNLRA. w F$XXXX      12    _ԀThisoverstatesthematter.Forexample,theremayhave  beenintentionalandmaliciousdefamation,whichunderLinnv.  UnitedPlantGuardWorkers,383U.S.53(1966),thestatesmay \ regulate.Seeid.63("Themaliciousutteranceofdefamatory 2 statementsinanyformcannotbecondoned,andunionsshouldadopt X procedurescalculatedtopreventsuchabuses.").  F$XXXX      7    _ԀAtoralargument,thepartiesphrasedtheirargumentsin  termsofwhetherthewellpleadedcomplaintrule"applies"tothe  Union'scomplaint.Thatrubricisinapt:thewellpleaded \ complaintruleissimplyaruleforapplying28U.S.C.1331.It 2 "applies"ineverycaseinwhichsubjectmatterjurisdictionis X assertedunderthatstatute,bothinactionsoriginallyfiledin . federalcourtandinthoseremovedfromstatecourt.SeeFranchise   TaxBd.,463U.S.at10n.9.Thequestioninthiscaseisnot   whethertheruleappliesbutwhetheritsrequirementsare `  satisfied. F$XXXX      14    _ԀItisclearthat_McGrath_Ԁor_ComGas_ԀcouldhaveinvokedNLRB  jurisdiction(afactpertinenttothebadfaithallegation).The  Commissionheldthat_McGrath_Ԁ"hasnoabilitytobringaclaimunder \  the_NLRA_." Thatisplainlyincorrect,ascounselforthe_MCAD_  concededatoralargument. NLRBregulationsprovidethat"acharge  thatanypersonhasengagedinorisengaginginanyunfairlabor \ practiceaffectingcommercemaybemadebyanyperson."29_C.F.R._ 2 102.9(emphasisadded).Theregulationsprovidethattheterm X "person"hasthemeaningsetforthinsection2ofthe_NLRA_.29 . U.S.C.152.The_NLRA_,inturn,definespersonto"include[]one   ormoreindividuals,labororganizations,partnerships,   associations,corporations,legalrepresentatives,trustees, `  trusteesincasesundertitle11oftheUnitedStatesCode,or 6   receivers."Id.152(1)  \    Ataminimum,both_McGrath_Ԁand_ComGas_Ԁhadtherighttofilea  2  chargewiththeNLRBthattheUnion'sconductwasarguably   prohibitedunder8ofthe_NLRA_,id.158.See,e.g.,LocalNo.   207,_Int'l_Ԁ_Ass'n_ԀofBridge,Structural,&OrnamentalIronWorkers d  Unionv._Perko_,373U.S.701,707(1963)(claimsofunion :  misconducttowardasupervisormaybecognizableundertheNLRB `  wheresuchconductwouldinevitablycoercenonsupervisory 6 employees).       F$XXXX      9    _ԀThefactthattheUnion's1983claimmaysupportsubject  matterjurisdiction,ofcourse,doesnotmeanthattherelief  soughtinCountIIisavailable.In1996,Congressamended42 \ U.S.C.1983toprovidethat"inanyactionbroughtagainsta 2 judicialofficerforanactoromissiontakeninsuchofficer's X judicialcapacity,injunctivereliefshallnotbegrantedunlessa . declaratorydecreewasviolatedordeclaratoryreliefwas   unavailable."FederalCourtsImprovementActof1996,Pub.L.No.   104317,309(c),110Stat.3853.Becausetherehasbeennoprior `  declaratorydecreeinthiscase,theUnionisnotentitledto 6   injunctivereliefonits1983claimagainsttheMCAD  \  commissioners.ButbecausetheUnioncouldintheorybeentitled  2  todeclaratoryrelief,the1983claimmaystillsupportfederal   jurisdiction.  F$XXXX      10    _ԀTobeclear,wedonotholdthattheUnionisentitledto  prevailonitsMachinistspreemptionclaim.Wesimplyholdthat  CountIIoftheUnion'scomplaintassertsanonfrivolousclaimfor \ reliefunder42U.S.C.1983and,consequently,issufficientto 2 supportfederalquestionjurisdiction.  F$XXXX      1    _ԀThe_statute_Ԁmakesitunlawful"[f]oralabororganization,  becauseof...sexualorientation...todiscriminateinany  wayagainst...anyindividualemployedbyanemployer."Mass. \ Gen.Lawsch.151B,4(2).Itisnotimmediatelyclearwhether 2 thisprohibitionalsoregulatestheconductofindividualmembers X ofalabororganization.Butthestatutealsoprovidesthatitis . unlawful"[f]oranypersontocoerce,intimidate,threaten,or   interferewithanotherpersonintheexerciseorenjoymentofany   rightgrantedorprotectedbythischapter."Id.4(4A).Taken `   inconjunctionwiththerightnottobediscriminatedagainst"in  anyway"byaunion,thisprovisionappearstoprohibitindividual  actsofdiscriminationwhentheyareperformedbylowerlevel \ subordinateswhoareactingasagentsoftheunion.Thisanalysis 2 isconsistentwiththeMCAD'sdecision,whichreliedonBeauprev. X Smith,50Mass.App.Ct.480,49192(2000).    F$XXXX      11    _ԀEvenifthedistrictcourthaddeterminedthatitpossessed  subjectmatterjurisdiction,thatorderingofanalysiswouldnotbe  appropriate.Ordinarily,theYoungerquestionmustbedecided \ beforedecisiononthemeritsoftheunderlyingclaim.SeeHicks 2 v.Miranda,422U.S.332,346(1975).Thedistrictcourtcorrectly X perceived,though,thattheYoungerandpreemptionissuesare . related. d  F$XXXX      5    _ԀAsweexplaininPartIII,theMCAD'sconclusionsthatthe  NLRAdoesnotprotectracial,ethnicorhomophobicslursandthat  McGrathcouldnothavecomplainedaboutsomeoftheUnionconduct \ arebothflatlywrong.  F$XXXX      8    _ԀSeealsoFallon,Meltzer,&Shapiro,Hart&Wechsler'sThe  FederalCourts&TheFederalSystem903(5thed.2003)("While  theremaybesomelackofharmonyinthecaselaw,therulethat \ thereisanimpliedrightofactiontoenjoinstateorlocal 2 regulationthatispreemptedbyafederalstatutoryor X constitutionalprovisionandthatsuchanactionfallswithin . thefederalquestionjurisdictioniswellestablished.").  F$XXXX      6    _ԀBecausetheMCADproceedinghasnotreachedfinaljudgment,  theUnionisnotpresentlyblockedbytheMassachusettsdoctrineof  collateralestoppelfromrelitigatingtheissueofGarmon \ preemptioninfederalcourt.SeeMartinv.Ring,514N.E.2d663, 2 664(Mass.1987)(collateralestoppelrequires,interalia,afinal X judgmentonthemerits).Massachusettscourtsdoaccordfinal . decisionsoftheMCADpreclusiveeffect,however,sotheultimate   outcomeofthe_MCAD_ԀproceedingmaywellbindtheUnioninany   subsequentfederalcourtaction.See_Brunson_v.Wall,541N.E.2d `  338,34041(Mass.1989). v F$XXXX      13    _ԀTheMCAD'sDecember2001decisionheldthattheNLRAdoes  notprotect"racialorethnicslursshoutedbyunionmembersduring  astrike,"andthatlikewise"thereisnoprotectionofferedwhen \ theslursarehomophobic." Asweexplain,thisholdinggravely 2 misstatesfederallaw.Further,ifsuchconductwerearguably X prohibitedbytheNLRA,thattoowouldsupportpreemption.  !XXXX  _= Xdd=TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * ! X6XXX gVX X6     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals  gV  FortheFirstCircuit    XX   SA') ` dE< ` A      `     h XXX XNos.032352 K  Ѐ032551 ! q   @@ LOCALUNIONNO.12004,UNITEDSTEELWORKERSOFAMERICA;STEPHENT.    BRADLEY;GARYS.BUMA;PAULP.EDMONDS;CHARLESH.GRANT,JR.;   RAYMONDLAHAIR,JR.;CHARLESMcNEIL;RONALDF.MEZZANO;THOMAS y  NUGENT;andTHOMASST.PIERRE, O  $@P P Plaintiffs,Appellants/CrossAppellees, K  @tt)v.    @@(( COMMONWEALTHOFMASSACHUSETTS,MASSACHUSETTSCOMMISSIONAGAINST S DISCRIMINATION;DORCAI.GOMEZ,Commissionerforthe )y MassachusettsCommissionAgainstDiscrimination;WALTERJ. O SULLIVAN,JR.,CommissionerfortheMassachusettsCommission % AgainstDiscrimination;andCYNTHIAA.TUCKER,Commissionerfor  theMassachusettsCommissionAgainstDiscrimination,  @Defendants,Appellees, -}   PETERD.McGRATH, ) G  Defendant,Appellee/CrossAppellant.  A') ` dE<0 ` A 1   @` ` APPEALSFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT !f"   FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS !<# @@*[Hon.NancyGertner,U.S.DistrictJudge] #% A') ` dE<C%` A D% ' @@'Before )&y!) @@((Selya,CircuitJudge, '%#+ Porfilio, #  *      ׀SeniorCircuitJudge, (#, andLynch,CircuitJudge. )$-  W*%.? A') ` dE<` A        RudolphMilasich,withwhomHaroldL.Lichten,TerenceE.  Coles,andPyle,Rome,Lichten&Ehrenberg,P.C.wereonbrief,for k appellants/crossappellees. A   RobertL.Quinan,Jr.,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,withwhom = ThomasF.Reilly,AttorneyGeneral,wasonbrief,forthe   Massachusettsappellees.     DonaldC.Keavany,Jr.,withwhomChristopher,Hays,Wojcik& E   Mavricoswasonbrief,forappellee/crossappellantMcGrath.  k    MicheleGranda,CharlesP.Wagner,andCharlesP.Wagner&   Assocs.wereonbriefforamicicuriaeGay&LesbianAdvocates&   Defenders(GLAD)andtheMassachusettsLesbian&GayBar s  Association. I  *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +   -  SI/ @38197@SJuly30,2004 U  RHC+" @38197 @ R(/  (  * !        *,X` XX*$OY8XXdd8 ` LYNCH,CircuitJudge .Alaborunionandseveralofits  individualmembers(theUnion)seekdeclaratoryandinjunctive x reliefagainsttheMassachusettsCommissionAgainstDiscrimination $t (MCAD)topreventtheMCADfromadjudicatingachargeof   discriminationbyasupervisoragainsttheUnionthataroseoutof |  alabordispute.ThesolebasisfortheUnion'sfederalcomplaint ( x  isitscontentionthattheMCADproceedingispreemptedbyfederal $  laborlawunderSanDiegoBuildingTradesCouncilv.Garmon,359   U.S.236(1959),andrelateddoctrines.Thedistrictcourt ,|  dismissedthecomplaintforlackofsubjectmatterjurisdiction. ( Wereverseandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththis  opinion. 0   I. ,  ` Forpurposesofthisappeal,weacceptastruethewell  pleadedfactualallegationsintheUnion'scomplaintanddrawall P reasonableinferencesfromthoseallegationsinitsfavor.Soto L Negronv.TaberPartnersI,339F.3d35,38(1stCir.2003).Where   thefederalcomplaintissilent,additionaldetailsaredrawnfrom T!" theallegationsintheverifiedcomplaintfiledwiththeMCAD. #P$  ` TheincidentsunderlyingthiscaseoccurredinApril $& 1996,whenCommonwealthGasCompany(ComGas)wasembroiledina X&!( bitterlabordispute. LocalUnionNo.12004oftheUnited (T#*  SteelworkersofAmerica,AFLCIO(Local12004),wasnegotiatinga )%, successorcollectivebargainingagreementonbehalfofitsmembers,  whoarea"bargainingunit"ofproductionandclericalemployees.  \   ` OnApril1,1996,whenthepreviouscollectivebargaining X contractexpired,ComGasorderedalockoutofallemployeeswho   weremembersofLocal12004. Local12004respondedwitha `  concertedpicketingcampaignagainstthecompany. Inadditionto  \  picketingatComGasfacilities,Local12004sentsomeofits   memberstosetuppicketlinesatoffsiteareaswherecrews d  composedofComGassupervisorsandcontractorswereperformingwork `  ordinarilydonebyLocal12004members. Thepurposeofthese   worksitepicketlineswas"toconvincethe[]supervisorsand h contractorsnottoperformworkandservicesforComGasthatwere d consideredtobebargainingunitwork."    ` OneoftheComGassupervisorsassignedtoperformthis l bargainingunitworkwasPeterMcGrath. McGrath,whoisgay ,was h ordinarilyemployedasamanagerforcommercialandindustrial  salesatthecompany'sSouthboro,Massachusettsheadquarters.  p  Shortlyafterthelockoutbegan,ComGasinstructedMcGrathto !l" assistadistributioncrewinWorcester,Massachusetts. The "$ distributioncrewwaschargedwithinvestigatingandrepairing t$& undergroundgasleaksintheWorcesterarea ,worknormallydoneby  &p!( Local12004members. '#*  ` WhenMcGrath'screwstartedthiswork,Local12004 x)$, membersfollowedthecrew andpicketeditsworksites. Thepicket $+t&. lineswererowdyandvulgar.TheUnion'scomplaintcandidly  describesthepickets'behavior:"Thelockedoutemployeeswould \ commentonhowfatthescabswere,theirlackofintelligence,what X kindsoffamiliestheymusthavecomefrom,theirlackofsexual   prowess,andtheirsexualorientation." Allofthis,accordingto `  theUnion,wascalculatedtopersuadethedistributioncrew,  \  includingMcGrath,nottoperformbargainingunitworkduringthe   lockout.  d   ` OnMay7,1996,McGrathfiledanactioninMassachusetts `  SuperiorCourtagainsttheLocal12004memberswhohadshouted   sexuallyderogatorycommentsathim,assertingbothMassachusetts h commonlawandstatutoryclaims. AccordingtotheUnion,ComGas d fundedMcGrath'sstatelawsuitandevenprovidedanattorneyto  representhim. Approximatelyonemonthlater,McGrathfileda l verifiedcomplaintagainstthesameLocal12004membersintheMCAD h allegingdiscriminationonthebasisofsexualorientation.    Unusually,theliteraltermsoftheMassachusettsemployment   discriminationstatuteappeartoextendtodiscriminationbylower 8!" rankedunionemployeesagainstasupervisorinthiscontext.# #  1      ׀ "4$  ` ThelockoutendedonSeptember8,1996,whenComGasand  Local12004agreedtoanewcollectivebargainingagreement. The \ picketswentbacktoworkandMcGrathwassubjectedtonofurther $t abuseorharassment.NothinghadyethappenedinMcGrath'sstate   courtlitigation,andMcGrathvoluntarilydismissedthatcomplaint.  |  Thevoluntarydismissal,itseems,waspartofageneralsettlement ( x  betweenComGasandLocal12004inwhicheachsideagreedto $  encourageitsmemberstodismisspendingjudicialcomplaintsbased   onthedispute.  ,|   ` McGrathdidnot,however,withdrawhisMCADcomplaint. (  Onthecontrary,McGrathfiledanewverifiedcomplaintwiththe  MCADinNovember1996,thistimeincludingLocal12004itselfand 0 onemoreindividualmember(ThomasNugent)asadditional , respondents.ThecomplaintallegedthatLocal12004membershad  subjectedMcGrathtoa"continuingpatternofspeechandbehavior 4 ...whichisintimidating,threateningandharassing,andwhich 0 constitutesdiscriminationbasedonsexandsexualorientation."    ItfurtherallegedthatLocal12004'sleadershipwasawareofthe 8!" pickets'"unlawful"behaviorandfailedtotakeanyactionto "4$ preventit. AccordingtotheUnion,ComGasfundedMcGrath'sMCAD $& complaintdespitetheendofthelockoutandcontinuedtofundthe  litigationthrough2000.  \  ` McGrath'stwoMCADcomplaintsdescribeindetailthe X verbalabusestowhichhewassubjected.Mostweresimplycrude   remarksonhissexualorientation. #  2      ׀However,severalcomments `  involvedwhatMcGrathsaysarefalseandpotentiallydamaging  \  assertionsforexample,"Hey,watchout,he'sgotAIDS,hehas   probablygivenhalfyouguysAIDSbynow," and"Lookhowsmall d  theseguysare.Youlooklikelittleboys.YouandPete[McGrath] `  shouldgettogetherbecausehelikeslittleboys." Inaddition,   severalofthecommentsinvolvedphysicalthreats.Someofthese h wereonlyvaguelythreatening,andmayormaynothavebeen d intendedasthreatsofviolence(e.g.,"DoyouwantsomeKYup  thathole,sweetie?" or"Imightlikeapieceofthatassmyself" ). l  ` TwoincidentsdescribedintheMCADcomplaints,however, h involvedapparentlydangerousandthreateningconduct.OnApril7,  1996,severalLocal12004membersallegedlychasedMcGrathintheir p  vehiclesforseveralmiles.Whentheyfinallycaughthim,they !l" bangedonthesideofMcGrath'svehicle,pushedthesideview "$ mirrorintothewindow,andshoutedthreatsthatincluded"Wewill t$& putyouinabox"and"Iwillpullyourmustacheoff,youfaggot."  &p!(  Onanotheroccasion,anunidentifiedLocal12004memberpoureda  liquidontoMcGrath'sback,causingaburningsensation.  \  ` TheUnionanditsmemberssaytheyfiledamotionto X dismisstheMCADcomplaintonpreemptiongroundsshortlyafterthe   complaintswerefiled. Inanyevent,overtwoyearslater,onJuly `  9,1999,aninvestigatingcommissioneroftheMCADissueda  \  probablecausefinding #  3      ׀againsttheUnionandorderedthatthecase   proceedtoapublichearing. Thecommissionercertifiedthree d  questionstothefullCommissionfordetermination,including:"Is ,|  thecomplaintpreemptedbytheNationalLaborRelationsActas ( interpretedinSanDiegoBuildingTradesCouncilv.Garmon,359  U.S.236(1959)?"  #  4      ׀  0  ` ThefullCommissionansweredthecertifiedquestionson , December11,2001, holdingthatMCAD'sjurisdictiontoadjudicate  McGrath'scomplaintwasnotpreemptedbyGarmon. TheCommission 4 acknowledgedthat,underGarmon,stateshavenoauthorityto 0 regulateconductthatisarguablyprotectedunder7orarguably   prohibitedunder8oftheNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA).   Cf.Garmon,359U.S.at24547.Nevertheless,theCommissionheld \ thatMcGrath'sallegationsofharassmentandthreatsofviolence X implicatedtheCommonwealth's"compellingstateinterestinthe   maintenanceofdomesticpeace," aninterestthattheGarmonCourt `  recognizedasalegitimatebasisforstateregulation.Cf.id.at  \  247.Further,theCommissionheldthatitwasnotbarredfrom   consideringtheUnion'slessthreateningverbalabusesofMcGrath d  because,theCommissionconcluded,theNLRAdoesnotprotect `  racial,ethnic,orhomophobicslurs. ItalsofoundthatMcGrath   couldnothavecomplainedabouttheconducttotheNLRB.( #  5      ׀Lastly, h theCommissionconcludedthatMcGrath'scomplaintstatedaclaim d againstLocal12004itselfbecauseitprovidedasufficientbasis  toconcludethattheorganizationknewofitsmembers'harassment l ofMcGrathand,ineffect,ratifiedtheirconduct. Atpresent,the h MCADorderhasnopreclusiveeffect., #  6         ` Morethanayearlater,onFebruary27,2003,having  litigatedthepreemptionquestionintheMCADandlost,theUnion \ filedthisactioninfederaldistrictcourt. Thecomplaintnamed X asdefendantstheMCAD,threeMCADcommissioners,andPeter   McGrath. TheUnionsoughtadeclaratoryjudgmentthattheMCAD `  proceedingwaspreemptedbothunderGarmonandunderLodge76,  \  InternationalAssociationofMachinistsv.WisconsinEmployment   RelationsCommission,427U.S.132(1976)(hereinafterMachinists), d  andaninjunctionprohibitingtheCommissionfromtakingfurther `  actiononMcGrath'scomplaint. Italsoassertedarightto   injunctivereliefforpreemptionunder42U.S.C.1983. In h response,McGrathmovedtodismissthecaseonYoungerabstention d grounds. Youngerv.Harris,401U.S.37(1971).TheCommonwealth  ofMassachusetts,onbehalfoftheMCADanditscommissioners, l likewisemovedtodismissforlackofsubjectmatterjurisdiction h or,inthealternative,forabstentionunderYounger.    ` OnAugust5,2003,thedistrictcourtheldthatitlacked p  subjectmatterjurisdictionovertheUnion'scomplaint. It !l" reasonedthattheUnion'spreemptionclaimsareinherently "$ defensiveandthusthat,underthe"wellpleadedcomplaint"rule, t$& thecasedidnotariseunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates.  &p!(  Nevertheless,thecourtwentonindictatooffertheUnion '#* "reassurance"onthemeritsofitsGarmonpreemptionargument , x)$, opiningatlengthontherelationshipbetweenfederallaborlawand $+t&. statetortlawandexpressing"confiden[ce]" thattheMCADwould  takeaccountofthatrelationshipinadjudicatingMcGrath's \ complaint. ThecourtdidnotaddressthequestionofYounger X abstention.    ` TheUnionfiledthisappealonSeptember22,2003, `  approximatelytwoweeksafterthethirtydayperiodforfilingan  \  appealhadexpired. SeeFed.R.App.P.4(a).OntheUnion's   motion ,thedistrictcourtgrantedanextensionoftimetofile.    McGrath(butnottheCommonwealth)crossappealsthedistrict ,|  court'sdecisiontogranttheextension.  (   II.    O A.TimelinessofAppeal  L  ` Beforeaddressingthedistrictcourt'ssubjectmatter d jurisdiction,wemusttendtoourown.Thetimelyfilingofa  noticeofappealis"mandatoryandjurisdictional."Browderv. l Dir.,Dep'tofCorr.,434U.S.257,264(1978).Nevertheless,the h districtcourtmayextendthedeadlineinlimitedcircumstances   uponashowingof"excusableneglectorgoodcause."Fed.R.App. p!" P.4(a)(5)(A)(ii);Bennettv.CityofHolyoke,362F.3d1,4(1st #l$ Cir.2004). $ &  ` Inthiscase,thethirtydayperiodexpiredonSeptember t&!( 8,2003. OnSeptember22,fourteendayslater,theUnionfiledits  (p#* noticeofappealandattachedamotionforanextensionoftime. )%,  McGrathopposedthemotion;theotherdefendantsdidnot. The x+&. districtcourtgranteditwithoutcomment. McGrathnowcross  appealsthecourt'sorderallowingtheplaintiffstofilelate. We \ reviewadistrictcourt'sdecisiontograntanextensionoftime X underRule4(a)(5)forabuseofdiscretion.Bennett,362F.3dat   4. `   ` Thegrantoftheextensionwaswithinthediscretionary  \  powerofthedistrictcourtandwasnotabusive.Accordingtothe   Union'sRule4(a)(5)motionandtheattachedaffidavit,the d  attorneywhowasresponsibleforpreparingthenoticeofappealwas `  preoccupiedbytheneedtocareforhisinfantson,whowas   severelyill. Thoughcounseldraftedthenoticeofappealbefore h thethirtydayperiodexpired,hefailedtofileit. Theattorney d representedthathedidnotbecomeawareofthiserroruntil , September18,2003,tendaysaftertheoriginaldeadline. McGrath  saysthatthesecircumstancesdonotamountto"excusableneglect" 4 becausetheplaintiffswererepresentedbymultipleattorneys 0 throughoutthecaseandsotheincapacityofoneattorneyshould   nothavepreventedatimelyfiling. Thereissomeforcetothat 8!" argument,andthedistrictcourtwouldnothaveabusedits #P$ discretionifithaddeniedtheUnion'sRule4(a)(5)motiononthat $& basis.Butthecourtoptedtograntthemotioninstead,andgiven X&!( therelativebrevityofthedelay,theattorney'splausibleand (T#* uncontestedexplanationforit,theabsenceofanydiscernible )%, prejudice,andthefactthattheMassachusettsdefendantsdidnot \+&. opposethemotion,weconcludethatthetrialjudgedidnotabuse  herdiscretionbydoingso.Seeid.at5(deferringtothe \ districtcourt'sdecisiontograntanextensionunderRule X 4(a)(5));UnitedStatesv.Carson,52F.3d1173,1180(2dCir.   1995)(similar);Redfieldv.Cont'lCas.Corp.,818F.2d596,604 `  &n.3(7thCir.1987)(similar);seealso16AWright,Miller,&  \  Cooper,FederalPractice&Procedure3950.3(3ded.2004)   ("Whethertograntanextensionrestslargelyinthediscretionof d  thedistrictcourt.Ifitfindsexcusableneglectorgoodcause `  andgrantsanextension,thecourtofappealsshouldnot   second-guessthisdeterminationandinthiswaydefeattheappeal h ...."). d  B.SubjectMatterJurisdiction    ` WeturntothequestionwhethertheUnion'scomplaint  triggeredthesubjectmatterjurisdictionofthedistrictcourt. 4 Ourreviewisdenovo.Stewartv.TupperwareCorp.,356F.3d335, 0 337(1stCir.2004).Forthereasonsthatfollow,weholdthatthe   actionarisesunderfederallawforpurposesof28U.S.C.1331 8!" andthusthatthedistrictcourtdidhavesubjectmatter "4$ jurisdictionoverthecase. $&  ` 1.PreemptionClaims <&!(  ` Althoughstyledasacomplaintfordeclaratoryjudgment, '8#* theUnion'scomplaintinfactseeksbothdeclaratoryandinjunctive )$, reliefand,inCountII,assertsaclaimdirectlyunder42U.S.C. @+&. 1983. Forourpurposes,thelabelofdeclaratoryorinjunctive  reliefdoesnotmuchmatter.Thoughthedeclaratoryjudgment \ devicereversestheformalpositionsoftheparties,itdoesnot X altertherulesoffederaljurisdiction.SkellyOilCo.v.   PhillipsPetroleumCo.,339U.S.667,671(1950).Accordingly,the `  ruleindeclaratoryjudgmentactionsisthat"if,butforthe  \  availabilityofthedeclaratoryjudgmentprocedure,thefederal   claimwouldariseonlyasadefensetoastatecreatedaction, d  jurisdictionislacking."FranchiseTaxBd.v.Constr.Laborers `  VacationTr.,463U.S.1,16(1983)(quoting10AWright,Miller,&   Kane,FederalPractice&Procedure2767(2ded.1983));seealso h PenobscotNationv.GeorgiaPacificCorp.,254F.3d317,321(1st d Cir.2001);PlayboyEnters.,Inc.v.Pub.Serv.Comm'n,906F.2d  25,30(1stCir.1990).SowemustdeterminewhethertheUnion l couldassertitspreemptionclaimsinadirectactionagainstone h ormoreofthedefendants(i.e.,whethertheclaimscouldarisein  anondefensivepostureinanondeclaratoryaction). p   ` ThedistrictcourtdismissedtheUnion'scomplaint !l" becauseitbelieved,erroneously,thattheUnion'spreemption "$ claimsareinherentlydefensive. Itistruethat"[o]rdinarily t$& federalpre-emptionisraisedasadefensetotheallegationsina  &p!( plaintiff'scomplaint."Caterpillar,Inc.v.Williams,482U.S. '#* 386,392(1987)(emphasisadded).Insuchcases,thepreemption x)$, defense,evenifvalid,doesnotconverttheactionintoonethat $+t&. "arisesunder"federallawforpurposesof1331."By  unimpeachableauthority,asuit...doesnotariseunderanact \ ofCongressortheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesbecause X prohibitedthereby."Gullyv.FirstNat'lBank,299U.S.109,116   (1936);seeBeneficialNat'lBankv.Anderson,539U.S.1,6 `  (2003);Caterpillar,482U.S.at393;FranchiseTaxBd.,463U.S.  \  at12.    ` Inmanyways,thisissimplyanapplicationofthe"well d  pleadedcomplaintrule." #  7      ׀Underthatrule,withrareexceptions, `  "asuitarisesundertheConstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates   onlywhentheplaintiff'sstatementofhisowncauseofaction h showsthatitisbaseduponthoselawsorthatConstitution." d BeneficialNat'lBank,539U.S.at6(quotingLouisville&  NashvilleR.R.Co.v.Mottley,211U.S.149,152(1908));Penobscot l Nation,254F.3dat32122.Whereadefendantraisespreemptionas h adefensetoastatelawcauseofaction,"[t]hemostonecansay  isthataquestionoffederallawislurkinginthebackground, p  justasfartherinthebackgroundtherelurksaquestionof !l" constitutionallaw,thequestionofstatepowerinourfederalform  ofgovernment."Gully,299U.S.at117.Forthisreason,a \ defendantmaynotremoveastatelawsuittofederalcourtby X assertingapreemptiondefense,"evenifbothpartiesadmitthat   thedefenseistheonlyquestiontrulyatissueinthecase." `  FranchiseTaxBd.,463U.S.at14.Thisprincipleissubjecttoa  \  fewexceptionsnotapplicablehere,notablythedoctrineof   "completepreemption."SeegenerallyBeneficialNat'lBank,539 d  U.S.at68. `   ` Aclaimthatastateregulationispreemptedbyafederal   statute,however,neednotalwaysariseasadefensewhen h injunctivereliefissoughtagainststateofficials.SeeFranchise d TaxBd.,463U.S.at12n.12.Aplaintiffmayassertfederal  preemptionasanaffirmativecauseofactiontoenjoinstate l officialsfrominterferingwithfederalrights.Inthatcontext, h aclaimofpreemptionthoughultimately"defensive"inthesense  thatitseekstopreventharmsthreatenedbystateofficials p  doesconstituteafederalquestionunder1331.TheSupremeCourt !l" expresslyapprovedofsuchclaimsinafootnoteinShawv.Delta "$ AirLines,Inc.,463U.S.85(1983): t$& Itisbeyonddisputethatfederalcourtshave  &p!( jurisdictionoversuitstoenjoinstateofficialsfrom &F") interferingwithfederalrights.SeeExparteYoung,209 '#* U.S.123,16062(1908).Aplaintiffwhoseeks (#+ injunctiverelieffromstateregulation,ontheground x)$, thatsuchregulationispreemptedbyafederalstatute N*%- which,byvirtueoftheSupremacyClauseofthe $+t&. Constitution,mustprevail,thuspresentsafederal +J'/ questionwhichthefederalcourtshavejurisdictionunder  28U.S.C.1331toresolve.  x%x3xId.at96n.14;seealsoFranchiseTaxBd.,463U.S.at20n.20. 2  SinceShaw,theSupremeCourthasdecidedavarietyofcasesthat . fitwithinthisjurisdictionalprinciple.SeeSloss,   ConstitutionalRemediesforStatutoryViolations,89IowaL.Rev. 6   355,380&n.141(2004)(collectingcases).  2   ` Here,thedistrictcourtreliednotonShawbutonPublic   ServiceCommissionv.WycoffCo.,344U.S.237(1952). Thetwo :  casesareadmittedlydifficulttoreconcile.InWycoff,the 6 SupremeCourtheldthatadeclaratoryjudgmentactionagainsta  stateutilitycommissiondidnotinvolveajusticiablecontroversy. > Id.at245.Thoughitdeclinedtoreachthequestionofstatutory : subjectmatterjurisdiction,theCourtaddedthefollowingoft  quoteddictum: B Wherethecomplaintinanactionfordeclaratoryjudgment > seeksinessencetoassertadefensetoanimpendingor  threatenedstatecourtaction,itisthecharacterofthe  threatenedaction,andnotthedefense,whichwill p  determinewhetherthereisfederalquestionjurisdiction F ! intheDistrictCourt. !l" Id.at248(emphasisadded).Thiscircuithasadheredtothe "$ Wycoffdictuminthepast.SeeNashobaCommunicationsLtd.P'ship t$& No.7v.TownofDanvers,893F.2d435,43738(1stCir.1990);  &p!( ColonialPennGroup,Inc.v.ColonialDepositCo.,834F.2d229, '#* 233(1stCir.1987);Greenfield&MontagueTransp.Areav.Donovan, x)$, 758F.2d22,2627(1stCir.1985).Wehavealsorecognizedthe $+t&. tensionbetweenWycoffandtheShawfootnote.SeePlayboyEnters.,  906F.2dat30(notingthattheSupremeCourtinShawrecognized \ jurisdictionoverclaimsapparentlyprecludedbyWycoff"[w]ithout X explainingexactlywhy").     ` Thishistorydoesnotmatter.ArecentSupremeCourt `  caseeliminatesanydoubtaboutthevitalityoftheShawfootnote.   \  InVerizonMarylandInc.v.PublicServiceCommission,535U.S.635   (2002),atelephonecompanysuedastatepublicutilitycommission d  infederalcourt.Id.at640.Thecomplaintsoughtdeclaratory `  andinjunctivereliefagainstthecommission,allegingthatan   orderthatthecommissionhadissuedagainstthecompanywas h preemptedbyfederallaw.Id.Thecourtofappealsheldthatthe d company'scomplaintdidnotpresentafederalquestionunder  1331.Id.CitingShaw,theSupremeCourtreversed: l Wehavenodoubtthatfederalcourtshavejurisdiction h under1331toentertainsuchasuit.Verizonseeks > relieffromtheCommission'sorder"onthegroundthat  suchregulationispreemptedbyafederalstatutewhich,  byvirtueoftheSupremacyClauseoftheConstitution, p  mustprevail,"anditsclaim"thuspresentsafederal F ! questionwhichthefederalcourtshavejurisdictionunder !l" 28U.S.C.1331toresolve." !B# ЀΈ܈Id.at642(quotingShaw,463U.S.at96n.14). #%  ` InlightofVerizon,thedistrictcourtinthiscase J% ' plainlyhadsubjectmatterjurisdictionovertheUnion'scomplaint. &F") LiketheplaintiffinVerizon,theUnionhassuedastate (#+ administrativeagencyfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief, N*%- allegingthattheagencyhasactedinamannerinconsistentwith +J'/ federallaw.Thisisnotmerelytheassertionofafederalissue  that,butforthedeclaratoryjudgmentdevice,wouldariseonlyas \ adefensetoastatelawcauseofaction.VerizonandShawmake X clearthatinsuitsagainststateofficialsfordeclaratoryand   injunctiverelief,aplaintiffmayinvokethejurisdictionofthe `  federalcourtsbyassertingaclaimofpreemption,evenabsentan  \  explicitstatutorycauseofaction.+ #  8      ׀    ` 2.Section1983 d   ` Thereisafurtherreasonwhythedistrictcourterredin `  dismissingtheaction.TheUnion'scomplaintcontainstwoseparate   counts:CountIassertsadirectcauseofactionforpreemption, h andCountIIassertsacauseofactionforpreemptionunder42 d U.S.C.1983. Thedistrictcourt'sdecisiondidnotaddressthe  1983count. l  ` Almostbydefinition,aclaimunder1983arisesunder h federallawandwillsupportfederalquestionjurisdictionsolong  asitdoesnot"clearlyappear[]tobeimmaterialandmadesolely p  forthepurposeofobtainingjurisdiction."Bellv.Hood,327U.S. !l" 678,68283(1946);seePenobscotNation,254F.3dat322.Of "$ course,1983doesnotitselfconfersubstantivefederalrights; t$& itsimplyprovidesaremedyfortheirdeprivation.SeeChapmanv.  HoustonWelfareRightsOrg.,441U.S.600,61718(1979).Sothe \ Union's1983claimwillsupportjurisdictioninthiscaseifit X colorablyassertsthattheMCADdeprivedtheUnionofaspecific   "right[],privilege[],orimmunit[y]securedbytheConstitution `  andlaws."42U.S.C.1983.! #  9        \   ` Weconcludethatitdoes.TheSupremeCourtheldin   GoldenStateTransitCorp.v.CityofLosAngeles(GoldenState d  TransitII),493U.S.103(1989),thattheSupremacyClauseisnot `  itselfasourceofrightsenforceableunder1983.Seeid.at   107.Still,aplaintiffwishingtoassertaclaimofpreemption h mayneverthelessinvoke1983iftheallegedlypreemptingfederal d statutedoescreatesucharight.Seeid.at107n.4;Playboy  Enters.,906F.2dat32.Thattestisreadilysatisfiedhere.The l UnionallegesthattheMCAD'sadjudicationofMcGrath'scomplaint h ispreemptednotonlyunderGarmonbutalsoundertheMachinists  doctrine ,whichrecognizesthattheNLRAspecificallyconferson  employersandemployeesarighttobefreefromgovernmental \ regulationofthe"peacefulmethodsofputtingeconomicpressureon X oneanother."Machinists,427U.S.at154.Suchaclaimisnot   frivolousonthefactsofthiscase,giventhattheMCADhas `  assertedjurisdictiontoregulatetheconductofUnionmembers  \  picketingduringalabordispute.AndinGoldenStateII,the   SupremeCourtheldthattheMachinistsdoctrineembodiesa d  substantiverightundertheNLRAthatCongressintendedtobe `  enforceableunder1983.See493U.S.at11113;seealsoLivadas   v.Bradshaw,512U.S.107,13334(1994). h  ` Accordingly,becausetheUnion's1983claimisnot d "immaterialandmadesolelyforthepurposeofobtaining  jurisdiction,"Bell,327U.S.at68283,itissufficienttoconfer l federalquestionjurisdictionunder28U.S.C.1331." #  10       h      III.      ` Havingdeterminedthatthedistrictcourterredin   dismissingtheUnion'scomplaintforlackofsubjectmatter 8!" jurisdiction,wemustturnnexttothequestionwhether,underthe "4$ doctrineofYounger,thedistrictcourtshoulddeclinetoexercise $& jurisdictionindeferencetotheongoingMCADproceedings.Because <&!( thedistrictcourtfoundthatitlackedsubjectmatter  jurisdiction,itdidnotreachtheissueofYoungerabstention, \ thoughitdidaddressthesubstantivequestionofpreemption.& #  11      ׀ X  ` TwodifferentcategoriesofexceptionstoYoungerare   potentiallyinvolvedhere.Thefirstistheexceptionforstate `  courtproceedingsbroughtinbadfaith.SeeHuffmanv.Pursue,  \  Ltd.,420U.S.592,61112(1975).Thesecondconcernsthe   exceptionstoYoungerthatariseoutofthepreemptiondoctrineand d  thestrongnationalinterestintheuniformityoflaborlaws.See `  NewOrleansPublicService,Inc.v.CityofNewOrleans,491U.S.   350,367(1989)("NOPSI").Astothelatter,theYoungeranalysis h isintheendaquestionofwhoshoulddecidewhetherthereissome d formofpreemptionbythefederallaborlaws:thestatecourtson  reviewofanyMCADorder,subjecttoreviewbycertiorariinthe l SupremeJudicialCourt,orthefederalcourts,whichalsohave h jurisdictionoverthematter.Wesay"someform"ofpreemption  becausetwotypesofpreemptionmaybeimplicatedbytheMCAD p  proceedings.First,thereisthemoretypicalissueofwhether !l" federalsubstantivelaborlawconflictswithMassachusettslaw "$ concerningthelegalityoftheUnion'sconduct.See,e.g.,Golden t$& StateTransitCorp.v.CityofLosAngeles(GoldenStateI),475  U.S.608,614(1986).Second,thereisthefundamentallydifferent \ questionofGarmon"forumpreemption,"whichconcernswhetherboth X stateandfederaltribunals(includingtheMCAD)must"defertothe   exclusivecompetenceofthe[NLRB]."Garmon,359U.S.at245. `  ThereisnoSupremeCourtcasedirectlyonpointastothe  \  intersectionbetweenYoungerandGarmon.Themostanalogouscase   fromthiscircuit,ChaulkServs.,Inc.v.Mass.Comm'nAgainst d  Discrimination,70F.3d1361(1stCir.1995),foundYounger `  abstentiontobeinappropriateinasimilar,butnotidentical,   situation.Id.at1370.Potentially,though,thereare h significantdifferencesbetweenChaulkServicesandthiscasethat d mayormaynotrequireadifferentresulthere.   ` Asallofthissuggests,resolutionoftheYounger l abstentionquestionisextremelycomplicated.Itturnsonthe h interplayofseveraldifferentdoctrines,includingYoungeritself,  theexceptiontoYoungerfor"faciallyconclusive"preemptionthat p  isleftopeninNOPSI,andthedoctrineof"forumpreemption" !l" establishedinGarmon.Italsomaywelldependontheanswerto "$ severalquestionsthathavenotbeenbriefedbyanyoftheparties t$& andoninformationnotavailabletous.  &p!(  ` Forthesereasons,weremandthecaseforfurther '#* proceedingsonthequestionofYoungerabstentionratherthan x)$, decidetheissueonablankslate.Intheinterestsofproviding $+t&. guidancetothepartiesandthedistrictcourt,weframethebasic  issues.Atfirstblush,thiscasemightseemaneasyonefor \ Youngerabstention.UndertheframeworkannouncedbytheSupreme X CourtinMiddlesexCountyEthicsCommitteev.GardenStateBar   Association,457U.S.423(1982),Youngerabstentionisordinarily `  requiredif(1)thereisanongoingstatejudicialproceeding  \  involvingthefederalplaintiffthat(2)implicatesimportant   stateinterestsand(3)providesanadequateopportunityforthe d  federalplaintifftoasserthisfederalclaims.Seeid.at432; `  Brooksv.N.H.SupremeCourt,80F.3d633,638(1stCir.1996).   Thefirstandthirdrequirementsappeartobesatisfiedhere;the h secondistiedintotheanalysisbelow.Butthereareseveral d potentiallyapplicableexceptionstoYoungerthatfrustrateany  simpleresolutionoftheissue. l  ` First,abstentionunderYoungerisnotappropriatefor h prosecutionsthatarebroughtinbadfaith.Huffman,420U.S.at  611("Younger...do[es]ofcourseallowinterventioninthose p  caseswheretheDistrictCourtproperlyfindsthatthestate !l" proceedingismotivatedbyadesiretoharassorisconductedin "$ badfaith....").TheUnionhasarguedthatMcGrath'scomplaint t$& withtheMCADmeetstherequirementsforthisexception.Itclaims  &p!( thatComGas,whichitsaysactivelyfundedthesuitthrough2000, '#* isusingitasan"economicweapon...toharassthepicketing x)$, unionmembersandLocal12004"andtoevadetherequirementsofthe $+t&. $OY $ $  NLRA.TheysaythattheSupremeCourtspecificallywarnedagainst  suchbehaviorinLinnv.UnitedPlantGuardWorkers,383U.S.53, \ 64(1966). Thisargumentisnotafrivolousone;itis X fundamentallyfactboundandshouldbedecideduponinthefirst   instancebythedistrictcourt. `   ` ThesecondexceptiontoYoungerthatmaybeapplicable  \  hereissignificantlymorecomplicated,andinvolvesYounger's   requirementthatthestatejudicialproceedingimplicatean d  importantstateinterest.InNOPSI,thepetitionerarguedthat `  Youngerdoesnotrequireabstentioninthefaceofa"substantial"   preemptionclaimbecausethestatehasnolegitimateinterestin h conductingapreemptedproceeding.491U.S.at364.Althoughthe d SupremeCourtrejectedthatargument,itleftopenthepossibility  thatYoungerabstentionmightnotbeappropriatewhenaclaimof l preemptionisnotmerely"substantial"but"faciallyconclusive." h Seeid.at367(emphasisinoriginal).SinceNOPSI,casesfrom  boththiscircuitandothercircuitshaveendorsedtheexistenceof p  this"faciallyconclusive"preemptionexceptiontoYounger. !l" MidwesternGasTransmissionCo.v.McCarty,270F.3d536,539(7th "$ Cir.2001);CommunicationsTelesystemsInt'lv.Cal.Pub.Util. t$& Comm'n,196F.3d1011,1017(9thCir.1999);ChaulkServs.,70F.3d  &p!( at1370. '#*  ` TheUnionarguesthatthisexceptiontoYoungerapplies x)$, herebecauseitis"faciallyconclusive"thattheMCADproceedings $+t&. werepreempted,becauseall #  12      ׀oftheconductinvolvedwas"arguably  protected"or"arguablyprohibited."Itisnotsurprisingthatthe \ UnionfocusesonGarmon"forumpreemption,"asitisthebroadest X formofpreemptioninthiscontext.UnderGarmon,whenconductis   either"arguablyprotected"by7or"arguablyprohibited"by8 `  oftheNLRA,"thestatesaswellasthefederalcourtsmustdefer  \  totheexclusivecompetenceofthe[NLRB]ifthedangerofstate   interferencewithnationalpolicyistobeaverted."359U.S.at d  24445;Sears,Roebuck&Co.v.SanDiegoCountyDist.Councilof `  Carpenters,436U.S.180,221(1978).Garmonthusenforces   Congress'schoicetovesttheNLRBwith"primaryjurisdiction"over h conductwithinthescopeoftheNLRAandtherebyensuresa d "uniform,nationwidebodyoflaborlawinterpretedbyacentralized  expertagency."Tamburellov.CommTractCorp.,67F.3d973,976 l (1stCir.1995).TheSupremeCourthasexplainedthatinthe h contextofGarmonpreemption,theterm"primaryjurisdiction"has  ameaningdifferentfromitsusualimportinadministrativelaw: p  whenGarmonpreemptionapplies,thestatecourtsarepermanently !l" divestedofjurisdictionoverthecontroversy.SeeSears,Roebuck, "$ 436U.S.at199n.29. t$&  ` ItisclearthatmuchoftheconductatissueintheMCAD  proceedingsseemstobearguablyprotectedorarguablyprohibited \ underGarmon,andthuspotentiallytowarrantanexceptionto X YoungerunderNOPSI.Mostnotably,thereisnoquestionthatthe   insultsandepithetsthatunionmembersdirectedtowardsMcGrath `  whiletheywerepicketingare,attheveryleast,arguably  \  protectedby7oftheNLRA.- #  13      ׀TheNLRAclearlyprotectstheright   ofpicketingworkerstouseavarietyofharshandinsultingspeech d  Єincludingracial,ethnic,andhomophobicslursinfurtherance `  oftheir7righttoengagein"concertedactivitiesforthe   purposeofcollectivebargainingorothermutualaidor h protection."29U.S.C.157.See,e.g.,OldDominionBranchNo. d 496,Nat'lAss'nofLetterCarriers,AFLCIOv.Austin,418U.S.  264,283(1974)("[F]ederallawgivesaunionlicensetouse l intemperate,abusive,orinsultinglanguagewithoutfearof h restraintorpenaltyifitbelievessuchrhetorictobean  effectivemeanstomakeitspoint.");MilkWagonDriversUnionof p  Chi.,Local753v.MeadowmoorDairies,Inc.,312U.S.287,293 !l" (1941)(peacefulpicketingisprotecteddespite"moment[s]of "$ animalexuberance");Nat'lCouncilofYoungIsrael,276N.L.R.B. t$& 1123,1136&n.14(1985)(callingreplacementworkers"[n]iggers"  wasprotectedconductunder7);BenPekinCorp.,181N.L.R.B. \ 1025,1028(1970)("[O]ffensive,vulgar,defamatory,oropprobrious X remarksutteredduringthecourseofprotected,concerted   activitieswillnotautomaticallydestroytherightconferredby `  theActtoengageinconductotherwisesafeguardedbyitstext.").  \  Atthesametime,italsomaybe"faciallyconclusive"thatat   leasttheallegedinstancesinwhichunionmembersmadecredible d  threatsofviolenceagainstMcGratharearguablyprohibitedby8 `  oftheNLRA.See29U.S.C.158(b)(1)(A).See,e.g.,NLRBv.   UnionNacionaldeTrabajadores,540F.2d1,67(1stCir.1976)(in h dicta,observingthatthreatsofphysicalharmbyunionmembers d againstemployeeswhorefusedtoparticipateinastrikewouldbe  prohibitedunder8oftheNLRA).Additionally,theUnion's l actionsmayhavebeenarguablyprohibitedunder8oftheNLRA h becausetheytookplaceinfrontofotherbargaining-unit  employees,whointurnmighthavebeencoercedintosupportingthe p  picketoutoffearofbeingsubjectedtosimilarabuses.SeeLocal !l" No.207,Int'lAss'nofBridge,Structural,&OrnamentalIron "$ WorkersUnionv.Perko,373U.S.701,707(1963);UnionNacionalde t$& Trabajadores,540F.2dat6-7.Ifso,bothComGasandMcGrath  &p!( couldhavefiledcomplaintswiththeNLRB.   #  14       '#*  ` Inasimilarcase,adividedpanelofthisCourtheldin  ChaulkServicesthatabstentionwasnotappropriatebecausethe \ stateMCADproceedingswereclearlypreemptedbyfederallaw.In X ChaulkServices,alaborunionfiledchargeswiththeNLRBon   behalfofafemalelabororganizerwhoclaimedheremployerhad `  discriminatedagainstheronthebasisofhersex.70F.3dat  \  1363.WhilethoseNLRBchargeswerepending,theemployeefileda   discriminationchargeagainstthecompanywiththeMCAD.Whenthe d  MCADrefusedtodismisstheproceedingaspreemptedunderGarmon, `  thecompanysuedinfederaldistrictcourttoenjointheMCADfrom   adjudicatingthecomplaint.Id.at136364.Thedistrictcourt h abstainedunderYounger.Id.at1364.CitingNOPSI'sexception d for"faciallyconclusive"preemptionclaims,thiscourtreversed,  concludingthat"undertheGarmondoctrineitisreadilyapparent  thattheCommissionisactingbeyonditsjurisdictionalauthority \ byentertaining[the]complaint,foritisreadilyapparentthat X [thecompany's]conductisatleastarguably...subjecttothe   NLRA."Id.at1370(internalquotationmarksomitted). `   ` ButChaulkServicesisdistinguishablefromthiscasein  \  atleastonepotentiallyimportantrespect. #  15      ׀Inexplainingwhy   Garmonpreemptionwas"faciallyconclusive,"themajorityinChaulk d  ServicesemphasizedthatwhentheMCADassumedjurisdictionand `  beganitsinvestigations,therewasalreadyapendingNLRB   proceedingbasedonthesameincident.Seeid.at136869.This h case,bycontrast,presentsnearlytheoppositecircumstance: d neithersidehaseverfiledacomplaintwiththeNLRB,andthe  Unionnowseeksaninjunctionagainststateproceedingsthathave l  beenpendingformorethaneightyears. h  ` Theimportofthisdistinctionturnslargelyonatwhat   point,ifever,theUnionhadtheabilitytoinvoketheprimary \ jurisdictionoftheNLRB.IftheUnionchoseforstrategicreasons X toarguetheGarmonpreemptionpointtotheMCADwhenitcouldhave   gonetotheNLRB,thenitsclaimthatthefederalcourtshouldnot `  abstainunderthefaciallyconclusivepreemptionexception  \  recognizedinNOPSIissignificantlyweaker.UnderSearsRoebuck,   thereisastrongargumentthattherationaleforGarmonpreemption d  islesspowerfulwhenapartyvoluntarilychoosestoforegothe `  primaryjurisdictionoftheNLRB.See436U.S.at20203(holding   that"theprimary-jurisdictionrationaledoesnotprovidea h sufficientjustificationforpre-emptingstatejurisdictionover d arguablyprotectedconductwhenthepartywhocouldhavepresented  theprotectionissuetotheBoardhasnotdonesoandtheother l partytothedisputehasnoacceptablemeansofdoingso"(emphasis h inoriginal)).   ` Still,weareuncertainwhen,ifever,theUnionhadthe p  abilitytoinvoketheprimaryjurisdictionoftheNLRB.Evenif !l" duringthestrikeitselftheUnionhadnotbeenabletoinitiate "$ suchproceedingsonthegroundthatitsconductwasprotected, t$& perhapsitcouldhavegonetotheNLRBafterMcGrathinstitutedthe  &p!( MCADproceedings.Theanswerstothesequestionshavenotbeen '#* briefed,andarepotentiallyofsignificantrelevancein x)$, determiningwhetherChaulkServicesgovernshere.Inanycase,the $+t&. difficultissuesinvolvedintheYoungerabstentionquestionshould  befullybriefedandarguedbythepartiesbeforetheyare \ resolved. X   IV.     ` Theextensionoftimetofileanappealis affirmed ,the |  judgmentofdismissalis reversed ,andthecaseis remanded for D   furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion. Soordered .# XXXX#