WPCw 6v8si>)(Z3Z̎sՒ+y F)=Jw׻~@lE{B+h!0t$i~1:WImxpxMp &Kg+/`gpfsf6b ;׻S\;տ}`;偸Hᬛt(x}BZD3Ist0zO;vh[ƱNqhwRQQa;.Q̏E 1-7w]&nv3޻n%EKpJ(ՋаlFx!u`ե>/+@sT;L`Sis.iJX yx`l8m[|lsp틞mbvš+N U?ho441W_ǒUH/#Q%ewq_5#vBj:ӒҢ3 !LY҅4q|*\H# % 0 D 0G# U:j 0 U)8L nT NUNUF(n^ w)4-AAPP? mAXXIl6 UB  -!U>#. 0oa.....m6N==== BHCeCeCeC 0UF 0AG 0*H 0I 0I 0J 0K 0L 0aM 0C5N 0xN 0OO 0#P 0P 0Q 0R 0US 0T 0@T 0U 0U 0V 0W 0XX 0 Y 0Y 0Z 00d[ 0<[ 0[ 0>\ 0v\ 0`B] 0`] 0`^ 0`b^ 0`^ 08"_ 0Z_ 02,` 0^` 0:Za 0Ya 0_a 0 Lb 0jVc 0d B*Df D/nf D+f 0f D/Lh 0{h 06Ii 0i 0:j 0^j 0<k 1e[kU6kU>kU*4l 1u^l 72lU@mEEmNGm^ImNm^m n^pbppbxpxp/ppuq^$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$u$ufwawHP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0X(#$  0  ($XXXX<6X9`("Courier NewTT(F:2#$ !XDXXX        0  <4 9Z+ Courier New <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@M(A Z6Times New Roman RegularQ 9Z+.Courier New Regular  #$XDXXX      11    _=DXXdd=ThedefendantsincludealetterintherecordfromtheOffice e oftheInsuranceCommissioner,indicatingthataninvestigationof ; _LLCasellas_LL'sallegationsrevealednoevidenceofwrongdoingbythe  defendants.ForpurposesoftheRule12(b)(6)analysis,weassume  theplaintiffs'allegationsaretrueanddonottakethisletter X intoaccount.N2s L=16Xy File3|x  #$XDXXX      3    _=DXXdd=Ourownsurveyfoundnoothercomparablecompulsoryinsurance  schemewhichcontemplatescompetitionoflikekind.Cf.,e.g.,  Ala.Code32-7-35(grantingCommissionerofInsuranceauthority \ tosetupassignedriskplanstoapportiondriverswhoareunable 2 toobtaininsurancethroughtheregularmarket"equitably"among X allinsurers);AlaskaStat.28.20.580(same);Fla.Stat.Ann. . 627.351(1)(same);Ga.CodeAnn409100(same);seealsoGa.   Comp.R.&_Regs_.r.120214.09(_insureds_Ԁinassignedriskplan   areassignedtoinsurers);Weaverv.ChampionIns.Co.,567So.2d `  380,382(Ala.Civ.App.1990)(assignmentof_insureds_Ԁtoinsurers 6   inassignedriskplanissemirandom).  \  'U  #$XDXXX      10    _=DXXdd=Onefurthertwistaboutpressureonrivalsunwillingtojoin e shouldbeaddressed."The_LLMcCarran_LLԀActallowsrivalstocome ; togetherandeliminatecompetitionamongthemselvesbutnotto  compelunwillingrivalstojointheircartel."I_LLAreeda_LLԀand  _LLHovenkamp_LL,supra,220a,at352.Whencartelmembersattemptto X coercerecalcitrantmembersthroughdevicesinvolvingpressureon . thirdpartiesandtheirrelationships,concernsaboutboycottare i   heightened.SeeInreWorkers'Comp.Ins.Antitrust_LLLitig_LL.,867 e F.2d1552,1560,1567(8thCir.1989).However,plaintiffsdonot ; makeanyallegationsthattherewereactsofretaliationagainst  _LLSeguros_LLԀTripleSSS,Inc.,theinsurancecompanywhobrokeranksand  soldtheprivatecompulsoryinsuranceto_LLCasellas_LL'scustomers.Nor X dotheyallegeotherenforcementactivityagainstrecalcitrant . membersofthecartel. ? #$XDXXX      6    _=DXXdd=Infact,theterm"businessofinsurance"isusedtwicein e 15U.S.C.1012(b).Thefirstclause"commitslaws'enacted.. ; .forthepurposeofregulatingthebusinessofinsurance'tothe  States,whilethesecondclauseexemptsonly'thebusinessof  insurance'itselffromtheantitrustlaws."U.S.Dep'tofTreasury X v._LLFabe_LL,508U.S.491,504(1993).Thescopeofthefirstclause . isnotas"narrowlycircumscribed"asthesecond.Seeid. CastelliniDowling<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi #$XDXXX      7    _=DXdd=Wequicklydisposeoftwopossibleobjectionstoapplication e ofthe_LLMcCarran_LLԄFergusonexemptionhere.Theliterallanguageof ; the_LLMcCarran_LLԄFergusonActexemptioncontainedinthefirstsentence  in1012(b)precludesapplicationoffederalstatuteswhich  "invalidate,impair,orsupersedeanylawenactedbyanyStatefor X thepurposeofregulatingthebusinessofinsurance."15U.S.C. . 1012(b).Anargumentcouldeasilybemadebytheplaintiffsthat i  theirclaimsareentirelyconsistentwithandnotinconflictwith ?  statelawandsothefirstprovisoisnotmetandthereisno   _LLMcCarran_LLԄFergusonexemption.Anysuchargumentisforeclosedby    judicialconstructionofthe_LLMcCarran_LLԄFergusonAct.The_LLMcCarran_LLԄ  \  FergusonActhasgenerallybeenconstruedtocoverargumentsthat  2  thedefendantsfailedtocomplywithstatelaw,solongasthe m  statelawconcernstheregulationofthebusinessofinsurance.As C  thetreatiseby_LLAreeda_LLԀand_LLHovenkamp_LLԀputsit,"ifthestate's   insuranceindustryis'regulatedbystatelaw,'thentheantitrust   lawssimplydonotapply,notwithstandingthattheapplicationof `  antitrustlawintheparticularcaseinnoway'_LLinvalidate[s_LL], 6 _LLimpair[s_LL],or_LLsupersede[s_LL]'statelawandmayevenbeconsistent q  withit."I_LLAreeda_LLԀand_LLHovenkamp_LL,AntitrustLaw,219c,at339 G (2ded.2000)(alterationsinoriginal).Further,"[_LLa]lthough_LLԀstate  insuranceregulationisnotinvalidatedorimpaired[byapplication  oftheShermanAct],themerepresenceoftheregulationis d sufficienttooustthefederalantitrustclaim."Id.at340. :   Wedisposeofanothercontention.Thefinalsentenceof u 1012(b)providesthatfederalantitrustlawshallnonethelessbe K applicable"totheextentsuchbusinessisnotregulatedbyState ! law."Thatclauseisnothelpfultoplaintiffontheirprimary  claimofinjurythattheprivateinsurershaveagreednotto h offerprivatecompulsoryinsurancebecausethestatelaw > preciselycoversthattopic.Indeed,itrequirestheprovisionof y thecompulsoryinsurance.\( 9Z+&Courier Regular(G36$ !XDXXX   d  e  } #$XDXXX      8    _=DXXdd=Wedistinguishbetweenthiscaseandthedifferentsituation e whenanexcludedthirdpartyprovider,sayanautomobilerepair ; shop,challengedanagreementbetweenthe_LLJUA_LLԀandautoshops.No  suchclaimismadehere.SeeRoyalDrug,440U.S.at23233.Even  whilehorizontalagreementsfixingmaximumpriceshavebeenheldto X bewithinthe_LLMcCarran_LLԄFergusonActexemption,verticalagreements . betweenthecarinsurersandtherepairshopsonmaximumpricesare i  not.SeeProctorv.StateFarmMut.Auto.Ins.Co.,675F.2d308, ?  312,33637(D.C.Cir.1982);QualityAutoBody,Inc.v.Allstate   Ins.Co.,660F.2d1195,120102(7thCir.1981);seealso    _LLBrillhart_LLv.Mut.Med.Ins.,Inc.,768F.2d196,199200&n.3(7th  \  Cir.1985)(findinghealthinsurerphysicianagreementstobe  2  verticalagreementsforthepurchaseofservicesandnotthe m  businessofinsurance);LibertyGlassCo.v.AllstateIns.Co.,607 C  F.2d135,13638(5thCir.1979)(findingarrangementsbetweenauto   insurersandcertaincarglassinstallersfortheinsurersto   contractonlywiththoseglassinstallerstoinstallglassforthe `  insurers'policyholdersdidnotfallwithinthe"businessof 6 insurance.").  #$XDXXX      1    _ XDXXXD=DXXdd=RuleLXXallowsprivateinsurerstoreject#XDXX XDԐ#applicantswhen  (1)themotorvehicleisusedasapublicvehicle;(2)themotor  vehicleisaracingvehicleorsuperrapid;(3) XDXXXDtheownerormain \ driverofthemotorvehiclehasaccumulatedfiveormorepointsfor 2 violationsoftheVehicleandTrafficActofPuertoRico,during X thethreeyearspriortothedateoftheapplicationforthe . compulsoryliabilityinsurance;(4)theownerormaindriverofthe   motorvehiclehasbeenconvictedofdrivingamotorvehicleunder   theinfluenceofalcoholordrugs,orofparticipatinginanytype `  ofdragracingorracesonpublicroads;(5)thelicenseofthe 6   ownerormaindriverofthevehiclehasbeenrevokedorsuspended  \  duringtheyearpriortotheeffectivedatewhenthecompulsory  2  liabilityinsuranceisrequested;(6)themotorvehicleisnot   insurableaccordingtotheprivateinsurer'swrittencriteriafor   underwritingtraditionalinsurancepolicies;(7)theownerofthe d  vehiclehasnotrequestedtheinsurance;and(8)theapplication :  formasadoptedbytheInsuranceCommissionerwasnotproperly `  filledout.RuleLXX,Art.8.#XDXX XD#  #$XDXXX      2    _ XDXXXD=DXXdd=Avehicleownermustpaythepremiumforthecompulsory  liabilityinsurancetotheSecretaryoftheTreasury#XDXX XDԐ# XDXXXDԀatthetimehe  acquiresorrenewsthevehicle'slicense.( C ׀26P.R.LawsAnn. \ 8051,8053(a).TheSecretarythenturnsoverthetotalamountof 2 thepremiumssoreceivedtothe_JUA_,whichisthenresponsiblefor X distributingthepremiumsamongitsmembersanditself,asthecase . maybe.Id.8055(c);RuleLXX,Art.19.#XDXX XDԏ#Ԁ XDXXXDInfact,underRule   LXX,everyvehicleforwhichtherequisitecompulsoryliability   insurancepremiumhasbeenpaidisconsideredtobeinsuredbythe `  _JUA_Ԁunlesstheownerofthevehicleoptsoutbyselectingaprivate 6   insurerorpurchasingatraditionalinsurancepolicy.RuleLXX,  \  Art.12(a).#XDXX XD# d } #C$XCXXX      3    _=CXdd=Vehicleownerswhoalreadyhaveorwanttohavetraditional  liabilityinsurancewithcoveragesimilarorgreaterthanthe  compulsoryliabilityinsurancemayusetraditionalliability \ insuranceinsteadofpurchasingthecompulsoryliabilityinsurance. 2 26P.R.LawsAnn.8053(a),8061.Atoralargument,appellees' X counselexplainedthatinpractice,almostallvehiclelicense . applicantspaytherequiredpremium,butthereisaprocedurefor   traditionalinsurancepolicyholderstohavethatpremium   reimbursedlater.*+ (_2623  ..*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  0.Normal<:Definition T<AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(''&H1      (&H2  (&H3  (&H4 XXX (&H5  (&H6  20Address8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKf<6X9`(Courier NewKSg\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard Kf<6X9`(Courier NewKSg\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted/%  ,Kk %#/Kf<6X9`(Courier NewKSg\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/<:zBottom of 7[(X7  ?h%2A`Arial?  Sg\  `&Times New RomanS7\(X7&  d dZ)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7^(X7  ?h%2A`Arial?  Sg\  `&Times New RomanS7\(X7Z)2dxd0KS.SampleKf<6X9`(Courier NewKSg\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKf<6X9`(Courier NewKSg\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  456789:; 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)ii)(A Z(Times New Roman L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPTL:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT  #$XDXXX      9    _=DXXdd=Thisismoreconsistentwithstandardusageoftheterm e "boycott."SeeBlack'sLawDictionary198(8thed.2004)(defining ; "boycott"as"[a]refusaltodealinonetransactioninaneffort  toobtaintermsdesiredinasecondtransaction").L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT- -- - % #$XDXXX      4    _=DXXdd=Thetextoftherelevantallegationsarereproducedinthe e Appendix. k #$XDXXX      5    _=DXXdd=Thedistrictcourtgrantedthedefendants'motionstodismiss e andenteredjudgmentdismissing"thiscase"withprejudice.y C ׀In ; lightofthemagistratejudge'srecommendation,whichthedistrict  courtadoptedinfull,thatthedistrictcourtdeclinetoexercise  supplementaljurisdictionoverthePuertoRicolawclaims,we X understandthedistrictcourttohavemeantthatonlythefederal . antitrustlawclaimsaredismissedwithprejudiceandthe i  commonwealthlawclaimsaredismissedwithoutprejudice. T #C$X@XXX      5    _=@Xdd=Inlightofthemagistratejudge'srecommendation,whichthe e districtcourtadoptedinfull,thatthedistrictcourtdeclineto ; exercisesupplementaljurisdictionoverthePuertoRicolawclaims,  weunderstandthedistrictcourttomeanthat(only)thefederal  antitrustlawclaimsaredismissedwithprejudice.TABLE A !XDXXX  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * ! XXXXD oRX X   =DXdd= XX oRXDXX X  # XXXXDr#kXXX X#koRXkXS#UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals  FortheFirstCircuitkXXkoR# XXXkX#XDXX X  h    `     h      p A'l) ` dE< ` A  8    `     h No.041045   @*(#(#K(#  @@RAFAELARROYO-_MELECIO_;DANIEL_ESPINOSA_-DE-LE:N;ANGELM. O  ORTIZ-_QUIONES_;CELIARODR0GUEZ-RIVERA;CONJUGALPARTNERSHIP %u  ORTIZ-RODR0GUEZ, K  @@Plaintiffs,Appellants,   @@tt)v. S  @  @`  @  @  @h  @  @  @p 0 @ @@ (#(## XXXXDԍ## oRX XK#> oRXDX>PUERTORICANAMERICANINSURANCECOMPANY;UNIVERSALINSURANCE O COMPANY;PREFERREDRISKINSURANCECOMPANY;_INTEGRAND_ԀASSURANCE % COMPANY;_COOPERATIVA_ԀDE_SEGUROS_ԀMULTIPLESDEPUERTORICO;ROYAL&  SUNALLIANCEOFPUERTORICO,INC.;_SEGUROS_ԀTRIPLESSS,INC.;  NATIONALINSURANCECOMPANY;AMERICANINTERNATIONALINSURANCE W COMPANYOFPUERTORICO,INC.;CARIBBEANALLIANCEINSURANCE -} COMPANY;ALLSTATEINSURANCECOMPANY;_ASOCIACI:N_ԀDE_SUSCRIPC0ON_ S _CONJUNTA_ԀDE_SEGURO_ԀDE_RESPONSABILIDAD_Ԁ_OBLIGATORIO_, ) @@*Defendants,Appellees.   @  @`  @  @  @h  @  @ A'l) ` dE<0` A 1  @  @`  @  @  @h  @  @  @p  @ @@ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT f FORTHEDISTRICTOFPUERTORICO <  [Hon.HectorM._Laffitte_,U.S.DistrictJudge] !" A'l) ` dE<C#` A D#$ @@'Before )$y& @@  Lynch,CircuitJudge, %%!( Stahl,SeniorCircuitJudge, &!) andHoward,CircuitJudge. '"* A'l) ` dE<,)` A -)}$,     AntonioJ._Amadeo_-_Murga_forappellants. *b%.   HeidiL.Rodrguez,withwhom_Nstor_ԀM._Mndez_Ԅ_G;mez_,KevinM. *8&/ _Acevedo_ԄCarlson,and_Pietrantoni_ԀMendez&Alvarez_LLP_wereon +'0 brief,forappelleesPuertoRicanAmericanInsuranceCompany& ,'1 PreferredRiskInsuranceCompany. j-(2?L   ArturoJ._Garca_Ԅ_Sol_,withwhomLuz_Nereida_Ԁ_Carrero_,Mario  Arroyo,Fiddler_Gonzlez_Ԁ&Rodrguez,RobertoC._Quiones_ԄRivera,  _Nannette_Ԁ_Berros_ԄHaddockandMcConnell_Valds_wereonbrief,for \ allappelleesexceptPuertoRicanAmericanInsuranceCompany& 2 PreferredRiskInsuranceCompany#>XXD԰#XDX># XXXXDԑ#XDXX X.# XXXXDP## oRX X# X  XX oR*'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +      SI j @38396@SXDXX XFebruary14,2005# XXXXDD#  V   RHC , " @38396 @ R( j   (  * !  # oRX X#  4  _M  8DXXdd8*,X` XX* XX oRXDXX XsO=DXXdXd= ` LYNCH,CircuitJudge .In1995,inordertoaddressthe  problemofthelargenumberofdriversintheCommonwealthof x PuertoRicowithoutvehicleliabilityinsurance,tsthecommonwealth $t enactedtheCompulsoryMotorVehicleLiabilityInsuranceAct,Law   253("Law253"),codifiedat26P.R.LawsAnn.8051etseq. |   ` Thisfederalantitrustsuitchallengedcertainconductof ( x  privateinsurersandthenewstatecreatedentityunderLaw253, $  theJointUnderwritingAssociation("JUA"),inthecompulsory   insuranceprogram.Thesuitwasdismissedatthepleadingsstage ,|  underFed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6).Theplaintiffs,whopurportto ( representaclassofharmedconsumers,appeal.   ` Insum,theplaintiffsallegethatthedefendants, 0 privateinsurersandtheJUA,haveagreedtoandcreatedamonopoly , intheJUAastoallformsoflowcostcompulsoryinsuranceand  haveboycottedandcoercedatleastonebrokerinordertomaintain 4 thatmonopoly.TheprivateinsurersandtheJUAarguethatthis 0 monopolyisaresultrequiredbythestatelaw.Thatisuntrue.   ThePuertoRicostatutecontemplates(atleastastononhighrisk 8!" policies)competition,butthen,oddly,createsincentivesfor "4$ defendantstocreatejustsuchamonopolyasalleged.Theclaims $& beforeusareadifferentmatter:afederalantitrustsuitraises <&!( differentissuesthanissuesofcompliancewithlocalstatutes.As '8#* tooneclaimonly,wereversethedismissalandremand;weaffirm )$, thedismissalofallotherclaims. @+&.    @` I.   ! ` Wedescribethestatutoryscheme.Beforetheenactment x ofLaw253, XDXXXDuninsureddriverscausedover$110millionindamages $t toothervehicleseachyearinPuertoRico,anditwasestimated   thatonly25percentto30percentofthevehiclesinPuertoRico |  werecoveredundersometypeofliabilityinsurance.#XDXX XDh"# ( x   ` Law253createdacompulsoryautomobileliability $  insurancesystem, XDXXXDwhich,beginningin1998,provideseachinsured   vehicleownerwith$3000ofcoveragefordamagescausedtothird ,|  partiesperaccidentinexchangeforauniformpremium,initially ( setat$99foreachprivatepassengervehicleand$148foreach  commercialvehicle.#XDXX XDL$#Ԁ XDXXXD26P.R.LawsAnn.8052(j),8056(a)#XDXX XD%#.All 0 "privateinsurers,"definedasinsurerswithmorethan1percentof , thecommonwealth'stotalvolumeofvehicleliabilitypremiums,id.  8052(b),arerequiredtoofferthecompulsoryliabilityinsurance 4 intwoways:bothasprivateinsurerstoadefinedclassofdrivers 0 andasmembersoftheJUA,towhichtheymustbelong. XDXXXDId.   8053(d),8054(a),8055(a)#XDXX XD(# XDXXXD.#XDXX XDԏ(#Ԁ XDXXXDLaw253allowsprivateinsurersto 8!" rejectcertainapplicantsforthecompulsoryinsurancepursuantto "4$ regulationspromulgatedbytheInsuranceCommissioner.Id. $& 8054(b).ThecriteriaforrejectionaredefinedbytheInsurance <&!( Commissioner'sPuertoRicanInsuranceRuleLXX("RuleLXX")#XDXX XD(# XDXXXD, '8#* promulgatedinRegulationNo.6254inDecemberof2000.#XDXX XDԖ*# XDXXXDԀMostof )$, thecriteriainRuleLXXforpermissiblerejectionsidentify @+&. applicantswhoarebaddriversorotherwiseofhighrisk." #  1      #XDXX XD%+#ԀSee  RuleLXX,Art.8. \  ` TheJUAitselfprovidescompulsoryliabilityinsuranceto X alldrivers,$ #  2      ׀includingthosehighriskdriverswhomprivate   insurersarenotrequiredtoinsure.26P.R.LawsAnn.8055(b). `  Vehicleownersmayoptoutofthecompulsoryliabilityinsurance  \  schemebypurchasingtraditionalliabilityinsurancewith   comparableorbettercoverage.Seeid.8061; XDXXXDRuleLXX,Art. d  12(a).#XDXX XD/#ԀLaw253appearstorequiretheprivateinsurersalsoto  offerthepolicydespitetheavailabilityofcoveragefromtheJUA, \ see26P.R.LawsAnn.8054(a),8055(b),andallowsprivate X insurerstoapplyforapprovaltosellthecompulsoryinsuranceat   lessthantheratesetbythecommonwealth.Seeid.8056(c) `  ("Anyprivateinsurermaysubmitfortheapprovalofthe  \  [Insurance]Commissioneravariationofauniformpercentageto   reducetheuniformcompulsoryliabilityinsurancepremium... d  .").SomelegislativehistorysuggeststhatLaw253wasmeantto `  encouragecompetition"betweeninsurancecompanieswantingtohave   agreaternumberofinsured,whowillhavetoextendoffersin h ordertoattractthem."CertifiedtranslationoftheDaily d SessionsRecord,SenateofPuertoRico,Monday,October9,1995.  Asaresult,thestatutoryschemecontemplatescompetitionin l compulsoryinsurance,atleastfornonhighriskdrivers,between h privateinsurersthemselvesandbetweenthemandtheJUA.Italso  contemplates,butdoesnotmandate,thepossibilityofamonopoly p  intheJUAastocompulsoryinsuranceforhighriskdrivers. !l"  `  XDXXXDAllmembersoftheJUAshareinitsprofitsandlosses. "$ 26P.R.LawsAnn.8055(e).Tocompensateforthefactthatthe t$& JUAmustinsuredriversconsideredtooriskybyprivateinsurers,  &p!( alltheJUA'sprofits,includingthosedistributedtoprivate '#* insurers,areexemptfromincometaxes.Id.8055(j).#XDXX XDv5#ԀThrough x)$, theJUA,theriskofinsuringthesehighriskdriversisthus $+t&. spreadamongalltheprivateinsurers.Theprofitsdistributedto  theJUAmembers(theprivateinsurers)alsoencompasstheprofits \ fromthesaleofnonhighriskpoliciesinsuredbytheJUA. X  ` Thoughcreatedbylaw,theJUAis"privateinnature,for   profit,and...subjecttotheprovisionsofthe[Insurance]Code `  applicabletoinsurers."RuleLXX,Art.2(c).TheJUAisunder  \  somedirectionbythecommonwealth.TheInsuranceCommissioneris   directedtoestablishthemannerofdistributionofthetotal d  amountofpremiumsreceivedbytheJUA,26P.R.LawsAnn. `  8055(c);RuleLXX,Art.20(e)(3),andthestructureandoperation   oftheJUA,anditsdirectionbyaboardofdirectors,sothatthe h JUAmayaccomplishitsgoalsina"costeffective,fairand d nondiscriminatory"manner.26P.R.LawsAnn.8055(f).Theplan  ofoperationsmaybeamendedonlywiththeapprovalofthe l InsuranceCommissioner.RuleLXX,Art.20(c)(1)(xv). h  ` Ontheotherhand,theInsuranceCommissionerisnotmade  amemberoftheboardofdirectorsoftheJUA,id.,Art. p  20(c)(1)(iii),anddoesnotappeartohaveactivesupervisionover !l" thedaytodayaffairsoftheJUA.Fourofthefivedirectorson "$ theJUA'sboardofdirectorsareelectedbythemembersoftheJUA, t$& whilethefifthdirectoristheofficerinchargeoftheJUA.Id.  &p!( Noneofthesedirectorsaredefinedasastateofficial.TheJUA '#* isnotanagencyofthecommonwealth.Ithas"generalcorporate x)$, powers,"suchasthepowertosueandbesued,toenterinto $+t&. contracts,toholdanduseproperty,etc.SeeRuleLXX,Art.  20(a);26P.R.LawsAnn.2905. \  ` ForbothprivateinsurersandtheJUA,thecommonwealth, X throughtheInsuranceCommissioner,setsthetermsofthe   compulsorypolicyitself,thepremiumrate,andtheamountof `  coverage.ThePuertoRicoMandatoryLiabilityInsuranceUniform  \  Policy,thepolicydefiningthetermsofthecompulsoryliability   insurance,issetforthintheInsuranceCommissioner'srules. d  RuleLXX,Art.22.Thispolicyis"thesolecontractbetween[the `  insured]and[theJUA]."Thepolicydoesnotcontainany   specificationforthetypeofrepairpartsthatmaybeusedor h provisionsgoverningrepairpractices. d  ` TheInsuranceCommissionerhasestablished,through  regulation,auniforminitialliabilitydeterminationsystemto l facilitatetheinvestigation,adjustment,andresolutionofclaims h arisingunderthecompulsoryliabilityinsurancescheme.SeeP.R.  LawsAnn.8057;PuertoRicoInsuranceRuleLXXI("RuleLXXI"). p  RuleLXXIsetsoutportionsoftheclaimsmakingprocess,including !l" theuseofdiagrams,whicharemadepartoftheregulation,to "$ allocatefaultforaccidents.RuleLXXI,Arts.2,6,7.However, t$& thereisnothinginRuleLXXIconcerningtheinsurers'autorepair  &p!( arrangementsorpractices;nordoestheRulegovernallclaims '#*  practices. x)$,  ` Afewpointsbearemphasis.First,thestatute,   apparentlyunusually, #  3      ׀contemplatescompetitionwithrespecttoat \ leastthenonhighriskdriversbetweentheprivateinsurersand X alsobetweentheprivateinsurersandtheJUA.Second,thestatute   providesameansforinsurerswhoareincompetitiontoseekto `  sellthecompulsoryinsuranceatalowerpricethanthe"uniform  \  premium."26P.R.LawsAnn.8056(c).Third,thesupervision   overtheJUAdoesnotcoveratleastsomeofthecomplainedof d  activities.Forexample,theInsuranceCommissioner,bystatute, `  hasconsiderablesupervisionovertheoperatingplanandthemethod   ofpremiumdistribution,id.8055,8056;bycontrast,there h appearstobelittlesupervisionoftheJUA'sspecificbusiness d decisions(suchashowitminimizesitscostsinrepairsandclaims  adjustment). l   II.  h K ` Theplaintiffmotorvehicleowners,asconsumersofthe 0 compulsoryinsurance,broughtaputativeclassactionagainst   O  e   elevenprivateinsurersandtheJUA,allegingthatthedefendants e violatedtheShermanAct,15U.S.C.1etseq.,theClaytonAct,  15U.S.C.12etseq.,andalsoPuertoRicoantitrustlaws.v #  4      ׀The X plaintiffsallegethattheprivatecompanies,quacompanies,have i  agreednottosellthecompulsoryinsurance;this,inturn,forces   customerstobuyfromtheJUAandputstheJUAinamonopoly  \  position.Theplaintiffsallegethattheinsurancecompanies m  choosenottocompetewiththeJUAatleastinpartbecauseofthe   taxbenefitsthatnoncompetitioncreates.TheJUAistaxexempt; `  itsmonopolyoverthecompulsoryliabilityinsurancepolicies q  allowsalltheprofitsfromthepremiums,includingthosefromnon  highriskdrivers,toaccruetaxfreetotheJUAforlater d distributiontothememberinsurancecompanies.Further,by u dealingonlythroughtheJUA,theprivateinsurerslowertheirown ! costsandinflatetheirprofitbynotprovidingpapercopiesof h policiestoinsuredsandbynotutilizingtheservicesofbrokers. y TheplaintiffsallegethatPuertoRicolawrequiresboththat %  policiesbeprovidedandthatbrokersbeused.26P.R.LawsAnn.  l" 329,1123.Theplaintiffsadmitthatpoliciesareavailable }"$ bothonlineandatlicensingoffices.Buttheyarguethatthese )$& omissionsinservicesreducetheservicesprovidedtotheinsureds. %p!( Theomissionsalso,itmaybeinferred,harmconsumersinanother '#* way.Theplaintiffsallegethatthedefendantssave$4.00per -)$, policyfromnothavingtoissueapapercopyofthepolicyand e about8percentofthepremiumperpolicyfornothavingtopaya  broker'scommission.Thesesavingsarenotpassedontothe X consumersastheywouldlikelybeifthecompaniesinfactcompeted i  witheachotherandwiththeJUA.Indeed,Law253contemplated   exactlysuchabenefitfromcompetitiontoconsumerswhenit  \  providedthatprivatecompaniescouldapplytosellsuchpolicies m  atlowerrates.See26P.R.LawsAnn.8056(c).Butfortheacts   ofthedefendantsincreatingamonopoly,theplaintiffsallege `  thatthepremiumsforcompulsoryliabilityinsurancecouldhave q  beenfixedtobe"atleast12%lessthantheoneestablished."The  plaintiffsdonotchallengetheratesetbythelegislature. d  ` Inadditiontothesehorizontalagreementsnotto u compete,theplaintiffsalsoallegethattheprivateinsurers ! actinginconcertcoercedbrokerstorefrainfromselling h compulsoryinsurancethroughprivatecompanies.Theplaintiffs y allegethatonebroker,CasellasandCo.("Casellas"),attemptedto %  presentaround40,000applicationsforcompulsoryinsurancetothe  l" defendantinsurancecompaniesintheyear2000,andthe }"$ applicationswereallrejected.Themonopolywasevidentlynot )$& completesincetheplaintiffsalsoallegethatoneofthe %p!( defendants,SegurosTripleSSS,Inc.,didissue128compulsory '#* insurancepoliciesin2000(andpaidthebroker,Casellas,a -)$, commissionofonly3percentinsteadof8percent).Theplaintiffs *t&. allegethatthedefendants(1)threatenedclientsofCasellasthat e theyshouldnotdobusinesswithCasellasifCasellascontinuedto  attempttosellcompulsoryinsurancethroughtheprivatecompanies X and(2)toldothermembersintheinsurancecommunitythat i  Casellas'sattemptstosellcompulsoryinsurancethroughprivate   insurerswereillegalandthatpeoplewhodidbusinesswith  \  Casellaswouldgotojail. m   ` TheplaintiffsalsoallegethatsincetheJUAhasa   monopolyinthecompulsoryinsurancemarket,theJUAisabletouse `  burdensomeclaimsproceduresandtorequiretheuseofthecheapest q  carparts,or"junkerparts,"forrepairs,thusharmingthe  consumers.TheplaintiffsarguethatiftheJUAdidnothavesuch d amonopoly,therewouldbecompetitionwhichwouldproducebetter u optionsastothequalityofrepairparts. !  ` Attemptingtocomewithintheboycott/coercionexception h totheinsurancebusinessexemptionfromfederalantitrustlaws y containedintheMcCarranFergusonAct,theplaintiffs'complaint %  allegesthattheactsofthedefendants(1)agreementsamongthe  l" privateinsurersandbetweenthemandtheJUAnottocompetewith }"$ theJUAand(2)thethreatsofharmtoCasellasconstitutea )$& boycottandcoercionandhavecausedinjuriestoconsumers. %p!(  ` Takingallinferencesintheplaintiffs'favor,the '#* complaintmaybereadtoestablishfourcategoriesofinjuries,at -)$, leastwithrespecttononhighriskcompulsoryinsurance,to *t&. consumersbeingforcedtobuythroughtheJUA'smonopoly:(1) e consumersdonotreceivecopiesofwritteninsurancepolicies;(2)  consumersdonotreceivetheassistanceofbrokers;(3)theseare X coststheprivateinsurerswouldotherwiseincuriftheprivate i  insurersofferedcomparablecompulsorycoverageastheJUA;private   companiesthussaveonthosecostsandcouldthenapplytooffer  \  thecompulsorypolicyatanapprovedratewhichislessthanthe m  ratesetbyregulatorsfortheJUA;(4)inanyevent,theJUA's   monopolymeansitcan,asitdoes,(a)requirethatrepairsbemade `  onlywith"junker"partswhichareinferiortopartswhichmight q  otherwisebemadeavailableinacompetitivesystem,(b)require  consumerstogothroughanunfairprocessofadjustmentofclaims d basedonunreasonabledepreciationpercentages,(c)require u consumerstosubmittoanunfairsystemofdeterminingfaultwith ! diagrams. h  ` Thedistrictcourt,onreportandrecommendationfroma y magistratejudge,dismissedthecomplaintuponFedR.Civ.P. %  12(b)(6)motionsfromthedefendants.x #  5      ׀Thedistrictcourtheld  l" thattherewasalackofantitrustinjuryandthattheactionwas }"$ precludedbythefiledratedoctrine.Theplaintiffstimely )$& appealed.Thedefendantspresentsixalternategroundsonappeal e foraffirmingthedismissal:(1)therewasnoantitrustinjuryso  theplaintiffslackstandingtosueundertheantitrustlaws,(2) X thestateactionimmunitydoctrine,(3)thefiledratedoctrine, i  (4)thedoctrineofprimaryjurisdiction,whichpurportedly   requiresreferraltothePuertoRicoInsuranceCommissioner,(5)  \  theMcCarranFergusonActexemptionofthebusinessofinsurance m  fromfederalantitrustliability,and(6)thelackofinvolvement   ofsubstantialinterstatecommerce. `    III.  q  Jn ` OrdersgrantingmotionstodismissunderRule12(b)(6) 9 aresubjecttodenovoreview.Rodiv.S.NewEng.Sch.OfLaw,  389F.3d5,12(1stCir.2004).Areviewingcourtacceptsall , wellpleadedallegationsoftheplaintiffsastrueandaffordsall = inferencesintheplaintiffs'favor.Rosenbergv.CityofEverett  328F.3d12,15(1stCir.2003)."Theissueiswhetherthe 0 complaintstatesaclaimundertheShermanAct,assumingthe A  factualallegationstobetrueandindulgingtoareasonabledegree  " aplaintiffwhohasnotyethadanopportunitytoconduct "4$ discovery."DMResearch,Inc.v.Coll.ofAm.Pathologists,170 E$& F.3d53,55(1stCir.1999). %!(  ` GiventheCongressionalpolicyofdeferencetostatelaw '8#* embodiedintheMcCarranFergusonAct,GroupLife&HealthIns.Co. I)$, v.RoyalDrugCo.,440U.S.205,220(1979),wethinkit *&. appropriatetobeginwiththatstatutorydefense,andthenturnto e theotherdefenses.   ` UndertheMcCarranFergusonAct,weconsiderwhetherthe X twomainallegations(1)horizontalagreementsbytheprivate i  insurersnottocompeteandnottousebrokerservices;and(2)the   JUA'spracticeofnotpermittingrepairsusingoriginalequipment  \  manufacturers'("OEM")partsarewithinthe"businessof m  insurance,"beforeweturntotheboycott/coercionexception.We   concludethatbothallegationsfallwithinthebusinessof `  insurance. q   ` Wethenturntotheboycott/coercionexceptiontothe  McCarranFergusonAct'sbusinessofinsuranceexemption.Wereject d plaintiffs'argumentthatthehorizontalnoncompetitionagreement, u evenifithascreatedamonopolyintheJUA,isaboycott.We ! rejectthedefendants'argumentthatcoercionagainstabrokerage h firm,attheRule12(b)(6)stage,doesnotstateaclaimof y boycott.Wealsorejectthedefendants'argumentthattheboycott %  activitiesarenonethelessprotectedbythestateimmunitydoctrine  l" underParkerv.Brown,317U.S.341(1943). }"$  ` Becausetheplaintiffsareconsumersandthususuallythe )$& preferredplaintiffsinantitrustclaimsofthissort,wereject %p!( theargumentthat,astotheboycott,thepleadingscandetermine '#* thattheplaintiffslackstandingandhavenotsufferedany -)$, antitrustinjury.Wefindthattheplaintiffs'boycottclaimdoes *t&. notimplicatethefiledratedoctrineortheprimaryjurisdiction e defenses.Wealsorejectthedefendants'contentionthat,asto  theboycott,thesubstantialimpactoninterstatecommerce X requirementoftheantitrustlawshasnotbeenmet. i  TheMcCarranFergusonAct  \   ` Undersection1oftheShermanAct,"[e]verycontract, m  combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracy,in   restraintoftradeorcommerceamongtheseveralStates...is. `  ..illegal."15U.S.C.1."Theusualsection2[ShermanAct] q  claimrequiresmonopolyornearmonopolypowerinsomemarket,and  awrongfulexclusionaryactdesignedtoenhancesuchpowerinthat d marketortoachieveanimproperadvantageinanothermarket." u TownofNorwoodv.NewEng.PowerCo.,202F.3d408,420-21(1st ! Cir.2000). h  ` Theinsuranceindustry,however,receivesspecial y treatmentundertheantitrustlawsbyvirtueofthe1945McCarran %  FergusonAct,codifiedat15U.S.C.1011etseq.:  l" ` ` NoActofCongressshallbeconstruedto }"$ invalidate,impair,orsupersedeanylaw S#% enactedbyanyStateforthepurposeof )$& regulatingthebusinessofinsurance,orwhich $ ' imposesafeeortaxuponsuchbusiness, %p!( unlesssuchActspecificallyrelatestothe &F") businessofinsurance:Provided,That... '#* [theantitrustlawsandtheFTCAct]shallbe W(#+ applicabletothebusinessofinsurancetothe -)$, extentthatsuchbusinessisnotregulatedby *%- Statelaw. *t&.  +J'/ ` )` 715U.S.C.1012(b)(emphasisinoriginal).ThustheMcCarran e FergusonActexemptsthe"businessofinsurance"fromreviewunder  thefederalantitrustlawstotheextentthatitis"regulatedby X Statelaw." #  6      ׀PuertoRicoisconsideredtobeastateforpurposes i  ofsections1through3oftheShermanAct,asamendedandcodified   at15U.S.C.13.SeeR.W.Int'lCorp.v.WelchFood,Inc.,13  \  F.3d478,489(1stCir.1994);Cordova&SimonpietriIns.Agency m  Inc.v.ChaseManhattanBankN.A.,649F.2d36,42(1stCir.1981).    ` TheMcCarranFergusonActalsogoesontocarveout,in `  aseparatesection,anexceptiontothe"businessofinsurance" q  exemptionfromantitrustliability:"Nothingcontainedinthis  chaptershallrenderthesaidShermanActinapplicabletoany d agreementtoboycott,coerce,orintimidate,oractofboycott, u coercion,orintimidation."15U.S.C.1013(b). !  ` Thisappealislargelyabouttheinterplaybetween h 1012(b),thebasicMcCarranFergusonActexemptionfromfederal y antitrustliability,and1013(b),the"boycott,coercion,or %  intimidation"exceptiontotheMcCarranFergusonActexemption.  l" Thiscourthassummarizedtheinterplayasfollows,"TheMcCarran }"$ FergusonAct...exemptsfromtheantitrustlawsallconductthat )$& is(1)partofthe'businessofinsurance';(2)'regulatedbyState e law';and(3)notintheformof'boycott,coercion,or  intimidation.'"OceanStatePhysiciansHealthPlan,Inc.v.Blue X Cross&BlueShieldofR.I.,883F.2d1101,1107(1stCir.1989). #  7       i     A.The"BusinessofInsurance" e  ` Akeyargumentbytheplaintiffsisthatthechallenged  actsarenotwithinthe"businessofinsurance."TheMcCarran X FergusonActexemptionencompassesonlythosestatelawswhichare i  enacted"forthepurposeofregulatingthebusinessofinsurance,   orwhichimpose[]afeeortaxuponsuchbusiness"andexemptsonly  \  theregulated"businessofinsurance"fromtheantitrustlaws.15 m  U.S.C.1012(b).    ` TheCourtinUnionLaborLifeInsuranceCo.v.Pireno, `  458U.S.119,129(1982),articulatedthreecriteriatotest q  whetheraparticularpracticeisthebusinessofinsuranceexempted  fromtheantitrustlawsundertheMcCarranFergusonAct:(1) d "whetherthepracticehastheeffectoftransferringorspreading u apolicyholder'srisk";(2)"whetherthepracticeisanintegral ! partofthepolicyrelationshipbetweentheinsurerandthe h insured";and(3)"whetherthepracticeislimitedtoentities y withintheinsuranceindustry."Id. %  3,XX X,X` X3  1.BusinessofInsuranceAgreementsNotToSellandNotTo }"$   󀀀UseBrokers S#% 7,X` X,XX X7 ` UnderRoyalDrug,theMcCarranFergusonActprotects $ ' whollyintraindustryhorizontalarrangements,evenastoprice,as &F") partofthebusinessofinsurance.440U.S.at221,224n.32. W(#+ "[E]veniftheallegedhorizontalagreementbetweenthedefendant *%- insurers[inwritingestimatesatthesamerate]didexist,it +J'/ wouldbeimmunefromantitrustscrutinyundertheMcCarranFerguson e Act."QualityAutoBody,Inc.v.AllstateIns.Co.,660F.2d1195,  1201(7thCir.1981). X  ` Therequirementsunderthe"businessofinsurance"clause i  aretestednotbythemereidentityofthedefendantasan   insurancecompanybutratherbywhethertheactivityconstitutes  \  thebusinessofinsurance.HartfordFireIns.Co.v.California, m  509U.S.764,78182(1993).Theshorthandversionisthatthe   exemptionisforthe"'businessofinsurance,'notthe'businessof `  insurers.'"RoyalDrug,440U.S.at211. q   ` Horizontalagreementsamonginsurerstofixthepriceand  toissuepoliciesonlythroughtheresidualmarketarewithinthe d businessofinsurance.SeeSlaglev.ITTHartford,102F.3d494, u 49798(11thCir.1996)(Insurers'collectivearrangementtoissue ! windstorminsuranceinpartsofFloridaonlythroughjoint h underwritingassociationiswithinthe"businessofinsurance."); y UniforceTemp.Pers.,Inc.v.Nat'lCouncilonComp.Ins.,Inc.,87 %  F.3d1296,12991300(11thCir.1996)(Insurers'collectiverate  l" makingactivitiestomakeworkers'compensationinsuranceavailable }"$ totemporaryemployeeprovideronlyintheassignedriskor )$& residualmarketiswithinthe"businessofinsurance."). %p!(  ` Itisalsoclearthatthe"businessofinsurance"covers '#* theallegationsconcerningtheeffectonpricingthatwouldoccur -)$, ifinsurersdidnotusebrokersandagentsandkeptanysaved *t&. expenses.WhileRoyalDrugleftopenthequestionofwhetherthe e "businessofinsurance"includesthefixingofbrokers'  commissions,itreadthelegislativehistoryoftheMcCarran X FergusonActtosuggestthat"'thebusinessofinsurance'mayhave i  beenintendedtoincludedealingswithintheinsuranceindustry   betweeninsurersandagents."440U.S.at224n.32.Circuit  \  courtshaveexplicitlyheldthatthedecisiontouseornotuse m  agentstomarketandsolicitforpolicies,theverybehaviorwhich   theplaintiffsattackhere,iswithinthe"businessofinsurance." `  See,e.g.,Owensv.AetnaLife&Cas.Co.,654F.2d218,22526(3d q  Cir.1981)(holdingthat"businessofinsurance"includes  "authorizingagentstosolicitindividualorgrouppolicies"). d  ` Thus,thegravamenofplaintiffs'complaintthatthe u insurers,amongthemselvesandwiththeJUA,agreednottoprovide ! compulsoryinsuranceasprivateinsurersandnottousebrokersto h sellpoliciesdealswiththebusinessofinsuranceandiswithin y thescopeoftheMcCarranFergusonAct. %  6,X` X,X` X6  2.BusinessofInsuranceTheJUA'sProhibitionontheUse }"$   󀀀ofOEMparts. S#% :,X` X,X` X:U ` Theplaintiffs'allegationsabouttheJUA'srepair $ ' practicesareasfollows: &F") ` ` 55.C.(a)Themonopolyhasallowedthe[JUA]to W(#+ freelydictatethepracticesrelatingtothe -)$, adjustmentofclaimsallowingsaid[JUA]to *%- establishunreasonabledepreciation *t&. percentagesforthereplacementofnewparts +J'/ tobereplaced;repairingvehicleswithold e partsobtainedfrom"[j]unkers";creatinga ; complicatedandunfairsystemofdiagramsfor  thedeterminationoffaulttothedetrimentof  theaffectedmember[s]oftheclass.This X monopolyandabsenceofcompetitionhas . resultedinthediminutionofthequalityof i  serviceastheinsuredshavebecame[sic] ?  captivesofthe[JUA]withoutanypossibility   ofescaping.    ` ` ףAlthoughthetermsofthestandardinsurancepolicyofthe  2  compulsoryinsuranceprogramdonotspecifypracticesonrepair C  parts,weunderstandtheallegationstomeanthattheJUAsubjects   consumerstocertaindepreciationpracticesandtoanonOEMparts 6 requirement.Itisnotclearhowthisiscarriedout:conceivably G therequirementsareimposeddirectlyonthepolicyholdersor  perhapstheJUArefersconsumerstogarageswhichadheretothese : practices.Theprecisemechanismmakesnodifference. K  ` Thisclaimisessentiallyacontractdisputebetweenthe   policyholderandtheJUA;theclaimisaboutthe"businessof > insurance."! #  8      ׀SeeGilchristv.StateFarmMut.Auto.Ins.Co.,390 e F.3d1327,133234(11thCir.2004).    ` Moresignificantly,noseriousantitrustclaimis X presented.TheplaintiffsarguethattheJUAisusingitsmonopoly i  toincreaseitsprofitsthroughusingcheappartswithoutcharging   cheaperprices.Butamonopolistisentitledtoexploitamonopoly  \  inordertomaximizeitsprofits.SeeIIIAreedaandHovenkamp, m  AntitrustLaw,720a(2ded.2000)."Monopolypricingand   monopolyprofitsareneither'exclusionary'actsnor'abuses'of `  monopolypowerunder2[oftheShermanAct]."Id.at254.A q  monopolist"isfreetoexploitwhatevermarketpoweritmaypossess  whenthatexploitationtakestheformofcharginguncompetitive d prices."Kartellv.BlueShieldofMass.,Inc.,749F.2d922,927 u (1stCir.1984)(holdingitwaslawfulforhealthinsurerto ! requireparticipatingphysicianstorefrainfrombillinginsurer's e subscribersextrachargesevenassumingthathealthinsurerhad  marketpowerinthebuyingmarket);seealsoBerkeyPhoto,Inc.v. X EastmanKodakCo.,603F.2d263,297(2dCir.1979)("[M]orethan i  monopolypowerisnecessarytomakethechargingofa   noncompetitivepriceunlawful.").  \  6,X'` X,X` X6B.TheBoycottException:AgreementNotToSellandCoercionof    ' Casellas   Ѐ `  ;:,X` X,X'` XM: ` WeturntotheexceptiontotheMcCarranFergusonAct 6 exemptionfor"boycott,coercion,orintimidation"containedin15 G U.S.C.1013(b).   ` Recallthattheplaintiffsallegetwodifferenttypesof : concertedactions.Thefirst(andmainclaim)isaconcerted K actionbyprivateinsurershorizontallytoagreenottoprovide  compulsorylowriskinsurancetoconsumers,buttoforceconsumers > tobuythroughtheJUA.Thesecondisaclaimthattheprivate O insurerscoercedandintimidatedaninsurancebroker,Casellas,in ! severalways,suchasthreateningclientsofCasellasnottodo !B# businesswiththebrokerifthebrokercontinuedtoattempttosell S#% compulsoryinsurance,andtellingothermembersintheinsurance $ ' communitythatCasellas'sattemptstosellcompulsoryinsurance &F") throughprivatecompanieswereillegal.Theplaintiffsallegethat W(#+ theprivateinsurersdidsoinordertoretaliateagainstthe *%- brokerforattemptingtoplacecustomers'ordersforcompulsory +J'/ insurancewiththeprivateinsurers(andnottheJUA)and,itmay e beinferred(takingallinferencesintheplaintiffs'favor),to  punishCasellasforsuccessfullyinducingoneinsurancecompany, X SegurosTripleSSS,Inc.,toaccept128policiesfromconsumers i  (thusbreakingrankswiththeotherinsurerswhohadagreedtostay   outofthemarket).Thecomplaintdoesnotallegeretaliation  \  directlyagainstSegurosTripleSSS,Inc.,theinsurerwhobroke m  ranks,butonlyagainstthebrokerwhoinducedittodoso.   6,X` X,X` X60  1.Boycott:PrivateInsurers'AgreementNotToSellq (#(# :,X` X,X` XG: ` Assumingtherewasanagreementnottosell,asalleged,  theseallegationsdonotshowaboycott.Ithasbeenrepeatedly d heldthatinsurers'refusaltosellinsuranceotherthanatrates u fixedthroughintraindustryratemakingassociationsdonot ! constituteaboycott.See,e.g.,Slagle,102F.3dat499 h (Insurers'collectiverefusaltoissuewindstorminsuranceonopen y marketinpartsofFloridaexceptthroughjointunderwriting %  associationisnotaboycott.);UniforceTemp.Pers.,Inc.,87F.3d  l" at1300(Insurers'collectiverefusaltosellworkers'compensation }"$ insurancetotemporaryemployeeproviderexceptintheassigned )$& riskorresidualmarketisnotaboycott.).Itmaybeaviolation %p!( ofstatelawforprivateinsurerstorejectapplicationsfrom '#* qualifiedapplicantsforthecompulsoryinsurancewhenLaw253says -)$, thattheymustprovidesuchcoverage.26P.R.LawsAnn.8054(a). *t&. Butitwasnotaboycottfortheinsurerscollectivelytoagree e thattheywouldnotoffercompulsoryvehicleinsuranceexcept  throughtheJUA. X  ` Rather,suchanagreement,iftherewasone,createda i  permissiblecartel.SeeHartford,509U.S.at802(Themembersof   acartel"arenotengaginginaboycott,because:Theyarenot  \  coercinganyone,atleastintheusualsenseofthatword;theyare m  merely(thoughconcertedly)saying'wewilldealwithyouonlyon   thefollowingtradeterms.'"(internalquotationmarksandcitation `  omitted));IAreedaandHovenkamp,supra,220a,at35152.Asa q  result,theiractivitiesalsodonotconstitutecoercionor  intimidation.SeeHartford,509U.S.at808n.6("Onceitis d determinedthattheactionsofthe[]insurersdidnotconstitutea u 'boycott,'...itfollowsthattheiractionsdonotconstitute ! 'coercion'or'intimidation'withinthemeaningofthestatute. h Thatisbecause...suchconcertedagreementsdonotcoerce y anyone,atleastintheusualsenseofthatword...."(internal %  quotationmarks,citation,andalterationomitted)).  l"  ` Theboycottexceptionmustmeansomethingotherthanthe }"$ usualhorizontalagreement,whenitispartofthebusinessof )$& insuranceofthestate,tofixratesandtermsofcoverage.SeeI %p!( AreedaandHovenkamp,supra,220b,at347.TheMcCarranFerguson '#* Act's"primaryconcernthatcooperativeratemakingwouldbe -)$, protectedfromtheantitrustlaws"andprotectionof"cooperative *t&. rateregulation"withintheindustryfurtherargueagainstfinding e a"boycott"intheseallegations.RoyalDrug,440U.S.at22324.   ` InHartfordFireInsuranceCo.,theSupremeCourt X emphasizedthatitiscrucial"todistinguishbetweenaconditional i  boycottandaconcertedagreementtoseekparticulartermsin   particulartransactions."509U.S.at80102.Aconditional  \  boycottseekstocoercethetargetoftheboycottintoaccedingto m  certaindemandsbymeansofrefusaltodealwiththetargetin   collateral,unrelatedtransactions.Seeid.at80103.q #  9      ׀"Itis `  thisexpansionoftherefusaltodealbeyondthetargeted q  transactionthatgivesgreatcoerciveforcetoacommercial  boycott:unrelatedtransactionsareusedasleveragetoachievethe d termsdesired."Id.at80203.TheHartfordCourtfoundthatit u wasnotaboycottforreinsurerstocollectivelyrefusetoreinsure ! certaintypesofcommercialgeneralliability(CGL)insurance h policiesbecausethosepoliciescontainundesirableterms:thatis y becausetherefusalislimitedtotheCGLreinsurancetransaction %  itself.Id.at806.Sotoohere. #  10        l"  ` 6,X` X,X` X6  2.Boycott:CoercionTargetedAtCasellas  :,X` X,X` X: ` Theallegationsaboutcoercionandthreatstargetedat X thebroker,Casellas,andthebroker'sclients,fitmoresquarely i  withintheboycottexception.SeeHartford,509U.S.at81011   (holdingthatallegationthatdefendantinsurersandreinsurers  \  told"groupsofinsurancebrokersandagents...thata m  reinsuranceboycott,andthuslossofincometotheagentsand   brokerswhowouldbeunabletofindavailablemarketsfortheir `  customers,wouldensue"ifthetermsdesiredbydefendantsin q  commercialgeneralliabilityinsurancewerenotapproved,wasa  boycottundertheMcCarranFergusonAct).Suchallegationsof d coerciononCasellasarewithintheboycottexceptiontothe u McCarranFergusonact'sinsuranceexemption. j #  11       !  %    IV.  e StateActionImmunity -  ` Thedefendantsarguethattheyarenonethelessentitled t todismissalofallclaimsonstateactionimmunitygrounds.We   disagree. 1   ` ToobtainstateactionimmunityunderParkerv.Brown,  x  317U.S.341(1943),thestatemustmanifestintenttointervenein $  themarket,displacingantitrustlawsandmustengageinactive 5  supervisionofthechallengedconduct.IAreedaandHovenkamp, |  supra,221c,at362.Statedanotherway:first,"thechallenged ( restraint[ontrade]mustbeoneclearlyarticulatedand 9 affirmativelyexpressedasstatepolicy";andsecond,"thepolicy  mustbeactivelysupervisedbytheStateitself."Cal.Retail , LiquorDealersAss'nv.MidcalAluminum,Inc.445U.S.97,105 = (1980)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Therequirementsfor  Parkerimmunityaresignificantlymorestringentthanthe 0 requirementsforstateregulationofthebusinessofinsurance A  undertheMcCarranFergusonAct.IAreedaandHovenkamp,supra,  " 219c,at342.Mereavailabilityofstateinsuranceregulationis "4$ insufficienttoconferParkerimmunity.Astate'sgeneral E$& authorityoverorpassiveacceptanceofaregulatedfirm'sposition %!( doesnotconferParkerimmunity.Id. '8#*  ` Thereisamoreimportantpoint.Sincethesurviving I)$, boycottclaimnowdoesnotcallintoquestiontheactsofthe *&. commonwealthortheInsuranceCommissioner,andtheJUAisnota e stateagency,Parkerimmunityisnotapplicable.Cantorv.Detroit  EdisonCo.,428U.S.579,59192(1976).Further,noneofthe X boycottconductcomplainedofwasmandatedorevenauthorizedby i  thestate.Id.at59495.     V.   \   ` Althoughwemayaffirmthedistrictcourt'sdismissalon $  anygroundssupportedbytherecord,Aldridgev.A.T.CrossCorp., 5  284F.3d72,84(1stCir.2002),noneofthedefendants'remaining |  groundsfordismissaloftheboycottclaimarepersuasive. ( A.AntitrustStanding   ` Therearesixnonexclusivefactorstoconsiderin , determiningwhetheraplaintiffhasantitruststanding:"(1)the = causalconnectionbetweentheallegedantitrustviolationandharm  totheplaintiff;(2)animpropermotive;(3)thenatureofthe 0 plaintiff'sallegedinjuryandwhethertheinjurywasofatype A  thatCongresssoughttoredresswiththeantitrustlaws('antitrust  " injury');(4)thedirectnesswithwhichtheallegedmarket "4$ restraintcausedtheassertedinjury;(5)thespeculativenatureof E$& thedamages;and(6)theriskofduplicativerecoveryorcomplex %!( apportionmentofdamages."Sullivanv.Tagliabue,25F.3d43,46 '8#* (1stCir.1994)(citingAssociatedGen.ContractorsofCal.,Inc. I)$, v.Cal.StateCouncilofCarpenters,459U.S.519,53745(1983)). *&.  ` Inmanywaysthestandingquestionisthemostdifficult e issueinthecase.WhethertheallegedboycottofCasellashasin  factcausedanyinjurytotheplaintiffsishardtoknow. X  ` Wedealonlywiththelackofstandingarguments i  articulatedbythedefendants.Thedefendantsconcedeimproper   motiveswerealleged,butarguethatthisaloneisinsufficientto  \  givestanding.Theyargueanydamageswerespeculativeandthat m  thedamagessoughtwillrequirecomplexapportionment.Finally,   theyarguethatthiscasewouldinvolveduplicativerecovery `  becausetherearetwopendingstateactionsaboutthesystem.But q  itisfarfromclearwhatisatissueintheseactions.This  argumentisalsoinconsistentwiththeirargumentthatanydamages d wouldbetoospeculativeordifficulttoapportion. u  ` Wecannotsay,attheRule12(b)(6)stage,thatthe ! plaintiffshavenoantitruststanding.SeeMorales-Villalobosv. h Garcia-Llorens,316F.3d51,55-56(1stCir.2003).Astoseveral y ofthecriteria,wenotethattheplaintiffshereareconsumersand %  assucharepresumptivelyfavoredasappropriateplaintiffsto  l" assertantitrustinjury.SASofP.R.,Inc.v.P.R.Tel.Co.,48 }"$ F.3d39,45(1stCir.1995). )$&  ` Astothesurvivingboycottallegation,typicallythe %p!( plaintiffsinsuchcases,unlikehere,arethemselvesthetargets '#* oftheboycotts,butstatusasthetargetisbynomeansnecessary. -)$, See,e.g.,Hartford,509U.S.at770(Theplaintiffs,nineteen *t&. statesandprivateparties,suedCGLinsurersandreinsurerswhose e allegedboycottwasagainstrecalcitrantinsurers.);InreWorkers'  Comp.Ins.AntitrustLitig.,867F.2dat1554(Theplaintiffs, X privateemployers,suedworkers'compensationinsurersand i  insurers'collectiveratingassociationforusingacooperative   agreementnottochargelessthanthemaximumlawfulrate;the  \  agreementwasaboycottbecauseitmaybeenforcedagainst m  recalcitrantratingassociationmembersbyexpellingthemsothat   theycannolongersellworkers'compensationinsurance.);seealso `  BlueShieldofVa.v.McCready,457U.S.465,478(1982)(rejecting q  argumentthatpatientsofpsychologistshavenoantitrustinjury  andnostandingtosueundertheantitrustlawswherethealleged d conspiracybetweenhealthinsurerandorganizationofpsychiatrists u wasaimedtokeeppsychologistsoutofthemarket). !  ` AttheRule12(b)(6)stage,wecannotconcludethatthe h allegedantitrustactivitiescouldnotbeproventobeabutfor y causeoftheharmtheconsumersallegedlysuffered.SeeSASof %  P.R.,Inc.,48F.3dat46(affirmingdismissalofcasebecause,  l" evenassumingharmcausingantitrustviolation,theplaintiffwas }"$ nottheappropriateplaintiff).Suchcausationissuesareoften )$& decidedatsummaryjudgment,notonthepleadings,precisely %p!( becausetheydependonsomefactualdevelopment.See,e.g., '#* Morales-Villalobos,316F.3dat55-56;RSAMedia,Inc.v.AKMedia -)$, Group,Inc.,260F.3d10,15(1stCir.2001)(findingagainst *t&. plaintiffoncausationissueatsummaryjudgment);Sullivan,25 e F.3dat51(same).Dismissalatthepleadingsstageismoreoften  associatedwithdisfavoredplaintiffs,notconsumers,suchas X distributorsorsuppliersinjuredbyanticompetitivethreats i  directedtowardsothers.SeeSerpaCorp.v.McWane,Inc.,199F.3d   6,13(1stCir.1999);SASofP.R.,Inc.,48F.3dat44.  \  B.FiledRateDoctrine    ` Thedefendantsarguethattheplaintiffs'claimsare `  barredbythefiledratedoctrinebecausetheclaimsarereallyan q  attackonthereasonablenessofthe"uniformpremium"setbyLaw  253andoverseenbytheInsuranceCommissioner.See26P.R.Laws d Ann.8056.Theplaintiffsareemphaticthattheyarenot u attackingtheratewhichthePuertoRicolegislaturehassetfor ! compulsoryinsurance,andthereisnoclaiminthecomplaintthat h theJUA'srateisunreasonable. y  ` Thefiledratedoctrinehasitsoriginsasajudicially %  createdbartoantitrustdamagesclaimsinthecontextofthe  l" InterstateCommerceCommission'sregulationofcommoncarrier }"$ rates.SquareDCo.v.NiagaraFrontierTariffBureau,Inc.,476 )$& U.S.409(1986);Keoghv.Chicago&N.W.Ry.Co.,260U.S.156 %p!( (1922).Thedoctrine"isactuallyasetofrulesthathaveevolved '#* overtimebutrevolvearoundthenotionthat[whereregulated -)$, entitiesarerequiredtofilerateswiththeregulatoryagency], *t&. utilityfilingswiththeregulatoryagencyprevailoverunfiled e contractsorotherclaimsseekingdifferentratesortermsthan  thosereflectedinthefilingswiththeagency."TownofNorwood X v.F.E.R.C.,217F.3d24,28(1stCir.2000).Allthatisleftof i  theplaintiffs'federalantitrustactionaretheclaimsofboycott   ofCasellas.Wethinkthatboycotthaslittletodowiththefiled  \  ratedoctrine,afamouslycomplexandsometimescriticizedsetof m  rules.SeeTownofNorwoodv.NewEng.PowerCo.,202F.3d408,   420(1stCir.2000)("[T]helawonthefiledratedoctrineis `  extremelycreaky.").Thereisnodirectrelationshipatallandit q  issimplynotthecasethatanyactionwhichmightarguablyand  coincidentallyimplicaterates,muchlessthosedeterminedbya d state,ratherthanafederalagency,isgovernedbythedoctrine. u SeeInreLowerLakeErieIronOreAntitrustLitig.,998F.2d1144, ! 1159(3dCir.1993). h C.PrimaryJurisdiction %   ` Similarly,theprimaryjurisdictiondoctrinehaslittle  l" todowiththiscaseanditcertainlydoesnotgotothesubject }"$ matterjurisdictionofthefederalcourt.P.R.Mar.ShippingAuth. )$& v.Fed.Mar.Comm'n,75F.3d63,67(1stCir.1996).Itisnot %p!( appropriatelyusedhereasadefenseinanyevent. '#*  ` Generally,thedoctrine'sapplicationdependsonthree -)$, factors:"(1)whethertheagencydeterminationlayattheheartof *t&. thetaskassignedtheagencyby[thelegislature];(2)whether e agencyexpertisewasrequiredtounravelintricate,technical  facts;and(3)whether,thoughperhapsnotdeterminative,the X agencydeterminationwouldmateriallyaidthecourt."Mashpee i  Tribev.NewSeaburyCorp.,592F.2d575,58081(1stCir.1979).   Noneoftheseconditionsaremethere.  \  D.LackofSubstantialImpactonInterstateCommerce    ` Defendantsfinallyarguethatthejurisdictional `  requirementsoftheShermanActarenotsatisfiedherebecausethe q  activitiesdescribedinthecomplaintdonotsubstantiallyaffect  interstatecommerce.SeeMcLainv.RealEstateBd.ofNewOrleans, d Inc.,444U.S.232,242(1980). u  ` Thisargumentisfrivolousinitsownterms.The ! plaintiffsallegethatthedefendants,someofwhomareglobal h insurers,haveinvestedtheextraprofitsfromtheirmonopoly y schemeoutsideofPuertoRicoandmadeitmoredifficultforthe %  plaintiffstopurchase,repair,andmaintaincarsobtainedin  l" interstatecommerce.Inlightoftheallegationthatsome"1.5 }"$ millionto2million"vehicleownersinPuertoRicoare )$& policyholdersofthecompulsoryinsurance,"asamatterof %p!( practicaleconomics,"thecomplaint,atleastforRule12(b)(6) '#* purposes,statesa"notinsubstantialeffectontheinterstate -)$, commerce"sufficientfortheShermanAct.Cordova&Simonpietri *t&. Ins.AgencyInc.v.ChaseManhattanBank,N.A.,649F.2d36,45 e (1stCir.1981)(quotingMcLain,444U.S.at246).  Conclusion i   ` Itwasthedefendantswhochosetotesttheplaintiffs'   caseonthepleadings,andweholdnomorethanthat,astothe  \  Casellasboycottfederalantitrustclaims,thecasesurvives. m   ` Wereversethejudgmentofdismissalwithrespecttothat   oneclaimandremandthecaseforfurtherproceedingsconsistent `  withthisopinion.Nocostsareawarded.  q    Appendix  e  Theplaintiffs'complaintcontainsthefollowingrelevant t allegations:   ` ` 12.Thedefendantinsurancecompaniesacting 1  jointly,inconcertandinagreementwitheach    otherandwith[thedirectorsoftheJUA],  x  agreedtoimplementaboycottagainstall  N  motorvehicleownerswherebynoneoftheten $  [sic]privateinsurancecompanieswouldissue _  totheownersofmotorvehiclescoveredbyLaw 5  253,supra,thecompulsoryinsurancepolicy.    ..andwouldcauseandachievethatallsaid |  motorvehicleownersbeinsuredwithrespect R tosaidcompulsoryinsurancepoliciesonlyby ( the[JUA]. c 13.Themainandprincipalreasonforsuch  concertedschemeandboycottwasofcoursethe  obtention[sic]oflargerprofitsforallof V thedefendants.Asthe[JUA]isexemptedfrom , incomeandothertaxes,ifthe[JUA]became g thesoleinsurerofallvehicleshavingonly = compulsoryinsurance,allthepremiumswould  accruetaxfreetothe[JUA]tobelater  distributedamongthedefendant's[sic] Z participatinginsurancecompaniesmembersof 0 the[JUA].Themonopolyobtainedbya k successfulboycottwouldlowertheircostsas A  nowritteninsurancepolicieswouldbeissued  ! withasavingsofaround$4.00.Theywould  " alsoeconomizeinthepaymentofthe !^# commissiontothebrokersandagentswith "4$ anothersavingsof8%oftheinsurancepremium o# % astheywouldcovertheinsureddirectly E$& withouttheinterventionofanagentorbroker % ' asrequiredbylawwhencoverageisissuedby %!( aprivateinsurer.Othereconomieswouldbe &b") obtainedbythemonopolizationinthe '8#* adjustmentoftheclaimsandother s($+ administrativeexpenses.Ashereinfurther I)$, alleged,theyhavebeensuccessfulandhave *%- beenabletoaccumulateextraordinaryprofits. *&.  +f'/ 19.ByApril1999,a"supersyndicate"was e createdandthe[JUA]wasissuingcompulsory ; insuranceonvirtuallythewholeuniverseof  vehicleownersoperatinginPuertoRiconot  havingtraditionalinsurance.... X 21.Notonlydidtheyconcertedlyremain i  inactiveinpromotingtheofferingofthe ?  compulsoryinsurancebutalsowentfurtherin   theirconcertedboycottandeachofthem    systematicallyrejectedallapplicationsby  \  brokersandagentstotheten[sic]defendant  2  insurancecompanies. m  26.OnAugust31[st],2000itwasco   defendantSegurosTripleS,[sic]Inc.who   rejectedtheapplicationsforcompulsory `  insurancesubmittedbyCasellasandCo.[a 6 broker]Thiscompanylateragreedtoissue q  128policiesbutlimitingthecommissionto G Casellastoonly3%insteadof8%as  establishedinthepremiumdistribution.  32.ByOctober16th,2000CasellasandCo. : hadaround40,000insuranceapplications u includingbrokerdesignationforcompulsory K insurancethatthedefendantshadconsistently ! refusedtoaccept.  38.[Thedefendants'agents]representedto > beprivatedetectivesinvestigatinginsurance y fraud.Theywouldtakephotosandmake[] O statementstotheemployeesandownersofthe %  inspectioncenterstotheeffectthatCasellas ! andCo.wascommittingfraud;thathewas  l" forcingandcoercingvehicleownerstosign !B# applications;thathewasdoingillegalacts; }"$ thatthepersonswhodidbusinesswith S#% Casellascouldgotojail;thatCasellas )$& promisescouldnotbetrusted;andother $ ' similardisparagingcommentscasting %p!( aspersionsagainstCasellasandCo.withthe &F") purposeofintimidatingpotentialcustomersof '#* compulsoryinsurancepoliciesanddissuade W(#+ themfromdoingtobusinesswithCasellasand -)$, Co. *%-   *t&. 40.Theplanandeffortsofintimidationand e  coercionwerealsopracticedbythedefendants ; whothreatenedclientsofCasellasandCo.not  todobusinesswithsaidbrokerifhewould  continuewithhisattemptstosellcompulsory X insuranceandtellingmembersoftheinsurance . businesscommunitythatwhathewasdoingwas i  illegal. ?  55.C.(a)Themonopolyhasallowedthe[JUA]to    freelydictatethepracticesrelatingtothe  \  adjustmentofclaimsallowingsaid[JUA]to  2  establishunreasonabledepreciation m  percentagesforthereplacementofnewparts C  tobereplaced;repairingvehicleswithold   partsobtainedfrom"[j]unkers";creatinga   complicatedandunfairsystemofdiagramsfor `  thedeterminationoffaulttothedetrimentof 6 theaffectedmember[s]oftheclass.This q  monopolyandabsenceofcompetitionhas G resultedinthediminutionofthequalityof  serviceastheinsuredshavebecame[sic]  captivesofthe[JUA]withoutanypossibility d ofescaping. : 63.[Theplaintiffs]havebeendeprivedof K therighttoreceivewrittenpoliciesandthe ! servicesandqualityofservicebasedona  systemofcompetition.Hadthelawintended h thatnowrittenpoliciesweretobeissuedand > nobrokersorcompetinginsurancecompanies y wouldparticipate,thepremiumscouldhave O beenfixedlower(atleast12%lessthanthe %  oneestablished).... ! ` `