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D-!! 0V! 0K&"HP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0(9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($USUS.,ԁLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5lmj&OLE 2.0 Box <=8C HKKKK<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi2s L=1y File3|xU('$  2  (v:2m0$ !USUS.,    =8Xdd=    0  <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@- -Q 9Z+.Courier New RegularTABLE A  m0$USUS.,  =Xdd=    1    _Ԁ"XqXXXAswasthecaseinCadillac/Oldsmobile/NissanCenter,see391  F.3dat306n.1,theversionofchapter93Bineffectpriortoa  2002amendmentcontrolshere. 2 m0$USUS.,  =Xdd=    2    _Ԁ"XqXXXԀWenotethatmost,butnotall,courtshaveseenfitto  resolvethisissueafterevidentiarydevelopmentratherthanonthe  pleadings.Compare,e.g.,Lewisv.ChryslerMotorsCorp.,456F.2d x 605,607(8thCir.1972),with,e.g.,NorthgateMotors,Inc.v. N GeneralMotorsCorp.,111F.Supp.2d1071,1075(E.D.Wis.2000). $t YetBishayhasvoicednocomplaintinthisregard,andthe J pertinentfactsappearundisputed.  m0$USUS.,  =Xdd=    3    _Ԁ"XqXXXWewillassumearguendothatthe_SJC_Ԁwouldendorsethe  _Kavanaugh_exception,eventhoughacontraryconclusioncould  arguablybegleanedfromDavidsonv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,57Mass. x  App.Ct.637,64546(2003),anditsrelianceonPearsonv.Ford  MotorCo.,68F.3d1301,1303(11thCir.1995)(percuriam).The  Pearsoncourtchosenottofollow_Kavanaugh_onthefactspresented. \ Seeid.at1303n.1(endorsinglowercourtanalysisreportedat865 2 F.Supp.1504,150810(N.D.Fla.1994)). 3 m0$USUS.,  =Xdd=    4    _Ԁ"XqXXXIntheinstantcases,thecontractuallanguageclearly  contemplatedthepossibilityofoneormoreindividualsora  partnershipservingasdealer._Bishay_ԀhasnotarguedthatIsuzu x forcedhiminanywaytosetupthedealershipsascorporations.  m0$USUS.,  =Xdd=    5    _Ԁ"XqXXXWenotethatbothJohnPetersonandImperialMotors,twoof  thecasestoapplytheYorkexception,reliedontheKavanaugh  exceptionaswell.Thatwasalsotruein_Rea_v.FordMotorCo., x 497F.2d577,584(3dCir.1974),atleastaccordingtotwolower N courts.SeeNorthgateMotors,111F.Supp.2dat1076;_Moorehead_, $t 442F.Supp.at87981.Casesthathavefoundpersonalstandingin J thiscontextbasedonYorkalonearefewandfarbetween.<4 9Z+ Courier New gggg)!dxdx d)!dxdx(.3$ !USUS.,  ( $ Figure  1  !USUS.,  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !)XX     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals})  FortheFirstCircuit f}XqXf  Ag) ` dE< ` A   Nos.041392 K    041393 ! q @,,"BAHIGF.BISHAY,    @ Plaintiff,Appellant, y  @tt)v. %u  @\ \ AMERICANISUZUMOTORS,INC., ! @<< Defendant,Appellee. } Ag) ` dE<(` A )y @` ` APPEALSFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT ^ @0 0 FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS   @ [Hon.JosephL.Tauro,U.S.DistrictJudge] f Ag) ` dE<` A b @'Before G   @@((Selya,LipezandHoward,   CircuitJudges. y! Ag) ` dE<!` A !K$       BahigF.Bishayonbriefprose. "0&   JohnR.Skelton,AndrewJ.GalloandBinghamMcCutchenLLPon #' briefforappellee. $( *gddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  '^"+'^" > SIr'", @38448@SApril7,2005 H(#.  RHC)n$/" @38448 @ R(r'"0  (  * !   |-(4?   8 q XXdd8 P YX ` PerCuriam .Theseconsolidatedcasesinvolveachallenge  totheterminationoftwomotorvehicledealerships.Through x separatecorporationsofwhichhewasthesoleshareholder, $t plaintiffBahigBishayownedandoperatedapairofIsuzu   dealershipsinMassachusetts.DefendantAmericanIsuzuMotorsInc. |  ("Isuzu"),theAmericandistributorofIsuzumotorvehicles, ( x  terminatedthefranchisesin2002afterthetwocorporations' $  bankruptcyproceedingswereconvertedfromChapter11toChapter7.   Inhisownnameandonhisownbehalf,Bishaybroughtsuit, ,|  contendinginteraliathatIsuzuhadviolatedthe"Dealers'Billof ( Rights,"Mass.Gen.Laws.ch.93B,115.Inamotionto  dismiss,IsuzuprotestedthatBishaylackedstandingbecausehis 0 chapter93Bclaimsbelongedtothecorporations.Nosuitwasever , filedbythecorporationsthemselves.Nonetheless,theChapter7  trustee,actingonbehalfofthecorporateestates,subsequently 4 reachedasettlementwithIsuzuinvolvingallpossibleclaims 0 arisingoutoftheterminationofthedealerships.Citingthis   development,thedistrictcourtsummarilydismissed. 8!"  ` Theappealsraiseapairofoverlappingquestions: "4$ whetherBishaypossessesindependentstandingtopursueachapter $& 93Bclaim,i.e.,whetherheisa"motorvehicledealer"authorized <&!( bythestatutetobringsuit;andwhetherhisclaimsare '8#* coextensivewiththoseavailabletothecorporationsandthuswere )$, extinguishedbythetrustee'ssettlement.Havingconcludedthat @+&. theMassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourtwouldresolvethese  mattersinIsuzu'sfavor,weaffirm. \ @tt)I. X  ` Isuzuenteredinto"dealersalesandserviceagreements"   withthetwocompaniesownedbyBishay.Onecontract,signedin `  1993andrenewedin1997,waswithMassachusettsAutomotiveGroup,  \  Ltd.d/b/aBishayIsuzuCorp.andinvolvedanSUVdealershipin   EastWalpole.Theother,signedin2000,waswithCommonwealth d  AutomobileCo.d/b/aBostonTruckCenterandinvolvedatruck `  dealershipinChelsea.Thelattercompanyapparentlyalsooperated   aGeneralMotors("GM")truckdealershipattheChelseasite. h  ` Thetwoagreements,copiesofwhichBishayattachedto d hiscomplaints,werevirtuallyidentical.Eachlistedthe  corporationasthe"dealer."EachwassignedbyBishayinhis l capacityas"president."Eachidentifiedthepertinentownership h andmanagement,withBishaylistedasthesoleownerofboth  corporationsandasthemanagerofonedealership;avicepresident p  namedScottwaslistedasmanageroftheother.Eachthenstated: !l" 8 ` ThisAgreementhasbeenenteredintoby "$ Distributor[Isuzu]inrelianceupon,andin #% considerationof,thepersonalqualifications t$& andrepresentationswithrespecttheretoof J% ' theabovenamedpersons.Inviewofthe  &p!( personalnatureofthisAgreement...,this &F") Agreementandtherightsandprivileges '#* conferredonDealerhereunderarenot (#+ assignable,transferableorsaleableby x)$, Dealer.Dealeragreesthatanychangeinthe N*%- ownershiporoperatingmanagementofDealer $+t&. specifiedhereinrequiresthepriorwritten +J'/ consentofDistributor....Distributorshall  notunreasonablywithholditsconsenttoany  suchchange.\` x` x Alongsimilarlines,eachalsoprovidedthat,"[s]incethis X Agreementisinthenatureofapersonalserviceagreementandits   continuationisconditioneduponDealerbeingownedandmanagedas `  provided"inthesectionjustdescribed,Isuzucouldterminatethe  \  agreementuponthedeathofanownerormanager.    ` Bylate2001,thetwocorporationswereexperiencingcash d  flowproblems.ThiswasduemainlytothedecisionofGeneral `  MotorsAcceptanceCorp.("GMAC"),whichhadfurnished"floorplan"   financingforthepurchaseofvehiclesfromIsuzu,tocancelthose h creditarrangements.InJanuary2002,thecorporationsfiledfor d Chapter11protection,withBishayincourtpaperslistingthe  dealeragreementsascorporateassets.Overthenextseveral l months,Bishaypersonallyattemptedtokeepthecompaniesafloatby h makingandguaranteeingseveralloansandpostponingcertainrent  collections.Healsorequestedasaninterimmeasurethatthe p  companiesbeallowedtopurchasevehiclesfromIsuzuforcash,but !l" Isuzurejectedthisproposal.Meanwhile,abrokerwashiredto "$ explorethepossibilityofsellingthedealerships;several t$& potentialbuyerswereidentified,butnothingmaterializedinthat  &p!( regard. '#*  ` InJune2002,attherequestoftheUnitedStates x)$, Trustee,thecaseswereconvertedtoChapter7,whichresultedin $+t&. closureofthedealerships.Evenafterthatevent,Bishay  continuedtoseekpermissiontoeithersellthefranchisesor \ operatethemhimself.Isuzuinsteadmovedforrelieffromthe X automaticstayinordertoterminatethedealeragreements.That   motionwasallowedwithoutopposition,andIsuzusubsequently `  terminatedtheagreementsonfifteendays'notice.Itrelied,  \  interalia,onacontractualprovisionpermittingsuchastepupon   adealership'sfailuretoremainopenforsevenconsecutive d  businessdays. `   ` Bishaypromptlyfiledapairofnearlyidentical   complaintsinstatecourt.Hetherealleged,interalia,thatthe h agreementswere"personalservice"contractsentitlinghimtobring d suitonhisownbehalf;thatIsuzuhadimproperlyrefusedtoaccept  cashpaymentsfornewvehiclesduringtheChapter11proceedings, l whichrefusalhadcausedtheconversiontoChapter7;thatIsuzu h hadimproperlyrefusedtoallowBishaytooperateorsellthe  franchises;andthatIsuzuhadimproperlyterminatedthe p  agreements.EachcomplaintchargedIsuzuwithviolationofchapter !l" 93B,breachofcontract,andbreachoftheimpliedcovenantofgood "$ faithandfairdealing.Isuzuremovedthecasestofederalcourt t$& ondiversitygroundsandthenmovedtodismiss,arguinginteralia  &p!( thatBishaylackedstanding.Inoppositiontothatmotion,oneof '#* Bishay'sargumentswasthatthetwocorporationsandtheChapter7 x)$, trusteewereeitherunableorunwillingtopursueanyclaims $+t&. againstIsuzu.Uponbeinginformedthat,infact,thetrusteewas  consideringtakingsomeactionalongtheselines,thedistrict \ courtheldthependingmattersinabeyance. X  ` InMarch2003,fourentities!theChapter7trustee,   Isuzu,GMandGMAC!reachedasettlementofallpossibleclaims `  arisingoutoftheseevents.AsbetweenthetrusteeandIsuzu,the  \  settlementdescribedBishay'ssuitsandnotedthatsomeofhis   allegations"mightformthebasisofclaimsbytheDebtorsagainst d  IsuzuwhichcouldbeassertedbytheTrustee."Itthenprovided `  thatthetrustee,onbehalfofthedebtorcorporations,would   releaseIsuzufromallclaimsinvolving: h 8 ` (i)theDealerAgreements;(ii)theDebtors' d statusasauthorizedIsuzu...dealers : includingallclaims...pursuanttoM.G.L.c.  93B;(iii)theoperationofthe[two]  dealershipspursuanttotheDealerAgreements, l including[,]butnotlimitedto,the B Debtor[s']postpetitionoperations;(iv)the h conversionoftheDebtors'Chapter11 > proceedingstocasesunderChapter7;and(v)  anypotentialorproposedsaleorassignment  oftheDebtors'dealershipassetsand p  operations.F !` x` x Inreturn,Isuzuwastopay$10,000tothetrustee,arrangefor !B# another$14,000owedbyanotherentitytobepaidtohim,andwaive #% allpossibleclaimsagainstthecorporationsortheirestates J% ' (includingthoseforpossibletrademarkviolations). &F")  ` ThetrusteeandIsuzuthenfiledseparatemotionswith (#+ thebankruptcycourtseekingapprovalofthesettlement.The N*%- trusteestated,interalia,thattheproposedstipulationwas +J'/ "reasonable"andinthebestinterestsoftheestatesandtheir  creditors,thattherewere"seriousquestions"astotheviability \ ofanyclaimagainstIsuzu(ortheothers),andthattheestates X lackedthefundsneededtopursueanysuchlitigation.Bishay   objectedtothesettlement,butonlyalongthelinesthatafurther `  "accounting"wasneededbeforeitsreasonablenesscouldbe  \  determined.Overthatopposition,thebankruptcycourtendorsed   thesettlementinMay2003.Bishayappealedthatruling,buta d  separatedistrictcourtjudgeaffirmedinaJanuary2004decision. `   ` Meanwhile,followingthebankruptcycourt'sapproval,the   partiesinJuly2003returnedtodistrictcourtandrequesteda h rulingonthependingmotiontodismiss.Thetrusteealsofileda d supplementalreport,explainingthathehadenteredintothe  settlement"[b]asedon[his]evaluationoftheclaimsassertedby l Mr.Bishay."Afterreceivingsupplementalmemoranda,thedistrict h courtsummarilydismissedtheactionsinlightofthe  "comprehensivesettlement"thathadbeenreached.Bishaynow p  appeals,confininghisattentiontothechapter93Bclaims. !l" @88)II. "$  ` Chapter93Bwasdesignedinpart"tocurbthepotentially t$& oppressivepowerofautomobilemanufacturersanddistributorsin  &p!( relationtotheiraffiliateddealers."Cadillac/Oldsmobile/Nissan '#* Center,Inc.v.GeneralMotorsCorp.,391F.3d304,306(1stCir. x)$, 2004)(internalquotationmarksomitted).Thestatutedeclares $+t&. unlawful"[u]nfairmethodsofcompetitionandunfairordeceptive  actsorpractices." '  1      ׀Mass.Gen.Lawsch.93B,3(a).Itthen \ spellsouttheforbiddenactions!firstproscribingconductthatis X "arbitrary,inbadfaith,orunconscionable,"id.4(1),and   proceedingtolisttwentyonediscreteactsandpractices,id. `  4(2)(4).Onesuchlistingrendersitunlawful"tocancelor  \  terminatethefranchiseorsellingagreementofamotorvehicle   dealerwithoutgoodcause."Id.4(3)(e). d   ` Chapter93B'sremedialsectionauthorizesany"motor `  vehicledealer"complainingofaviolationtobringsuitfor   equitablereliefanddamages.Id.12A.Thattermisdefinedin h relevantpartas"anypersonwho,intheordinarycourseof d business,isengagedinthebusinessofsellingneworusedmotor  vehiclestoconsumersorotherendusers."Id.1(h).Theword l "person"includesbotha"naturalperson"anda"corporation."Id. h 1(n).Bishaytakestheviewthathewasthe"dealer"here,while  Isuzucontendsthatthecorporationsoccupiedthatrole. p   ` Thereislittlecaselawaddressingwhetheranindividual !l" owner/operatorofacorporatedealershipcanqualifyasadealer "$ underchapter93B.Yetthereisagooddealofcaselawaddressing t$& theanalogousquestionundertheAutomobileDealers'DayinCourt  &p!( Act(ADDCA),15U.S.C.122125,thefederalcounterpartto '#* chapter93B.TheADDCApermitsan"automobiledealer"tobring  suitagainstamanufacturerforfailure"toactingoodfaithin \ performingorcomplyingwithanyofthetermsorprovisionsofthe X franchise,orinterminating,canceling,ornotrenewingthe   franchisewithsaiddealer."Id.1222.Muchlikechapter93B, `  itdefines"automobiledealer"as"anyperson,partnership,  \  corporation,association,orotherformofbusinessenterprise...   operatingunderthetermsofafranchiseandengagedinthesaleor d  distributionofpassengercars,trucks,orstationwagons."Id. `  1221(c).Giventhislinguisticoverlap,thefederalcaselawcan   properlybeconsideredhereinconstruingchapter93B.See,e.g., h GeorgeLussierEnter.,Inc.v.SubaruofNewEngland,Inc.,393 d F.3d36,4748(1stCir.2004)(relyingonfederallawtodefine  "coercion"inchapter93Bandrelatedstatestatutes). l @(III. h  ` RelyingprincipallyonImperialMotors,Inc.v.Chrysler  Corp.,559F.Supp.1312(D.Mass.1983),Bishayframesthe p  standingissueasfollows.Heacknowledgesthegeneralruleof !l" corporatelawthat"whenacorporationisinjured,onlythe "$ corporation,areceiver,orastockholdersuingderivativelyinthe t$& corporation'snamemaysuetoredresstheinjury."Id.at1314  &p!( (citingVincelv.WhiteMotorCorp.,521F.2d1113,1118(2dCir. '#* 1975)).Yethecontendsthatanindividualowner/operator x)$, nonethelesshaspersonalstandingwheneitheroftwocircumstances $+t&. ispresent:whenthedealershipcorporationisforsomereason  unableorunwillingtobringsuitagainstthemanufacturer,see, \ e.g.,Kavanaughv.FordMotorCo.,353F.2d710,717(7thCir. X 1965);orwhenthefranchiseagreementexpresslyreliesonthe   individual'sparticipationandtherebymakesthatperson `  "essential"tothedealership'soperation,YorkChryslerPlymouth,  \  Inc.v.ChryslerCreditCorp.,447F.2d786,790(5thCir.1971).   Bishayassertsthatbothexceptionswhichwewillcallthe d  "Kavanaughexception"andthe"Yorkexception,"respectivelyare `  applicablehere.Weareunpersuaded. '  2      ׀    ` InKavanaugh,itwas"inconceivable"thatthedealership h corporationwouldseekADDCArelief;allofitsvotingstockwas d ownedbythemanufacturer,andthusthelatterinessencewould  havebeensuingitself.353F.2dat717.Nothingofthesortis l involvedhere.Farfromfacinganysuchimpedimenttosuit,the h corporations,viathebankruptcytrustee,havereceivedvaluable  considerationforthereleaseofanychapter93Bclaims.Bishay p  nonethelessmakestwoarguments. '  3      ׀First,heassertsthatthe !l" KavanaughexceptionappliesbecausetheChapter7trusteelacked  thepowertocontrolandoperatethetwocorporationsandbecause \ theyhave,inanyevent,beendissolved.Yetcourtshaveregularly X rejectedindividualstandingunderKavanaughwhereabankruptcy   trustee,actingonbehalfofthecorporationoritsestate,has `  settledandreleasedallADDCAclaimsagainstthemanufacturer.  \  See,e.g.,Vincel,521F.2dat1120;BronxChryslerPlymouth,Inc.   v.ChryslerCorp.,212F.Supp.2d233,238,243&n.6(S.D.N.Y. d  2002);Milburnv.FordMotorCo.,437F.Supp.7,910(E.D.Okla. `  1977).ButseeJohnPetersonMotors,Inc.v.GeneralMotorsCorp.,   613F.Supp.887,903(D.Minn.1985). h  ` Second,Bishaycontendsthatanychapter93Bclaimbythe d trusteewastimebarredandthuswaseffectivelyabandoned.Inhis  view,thesettlementwasthusasham,reflecting"anattemptby l IsuzutoavoidBishay'sclaims"anda"willingnessbythe h bankruptcytrusteetotakeanominal$10,000paymentforthe  releaseofclaimshehadnoabilitytoassert."YetBishay's p  readingofchapter93B!totheeffectthatthelimitationsperiod !l" in4(3)(e)(3)trumpsthatin14!isalmostcertainlyincorrect, "$ atleastwithrespecttoactionsfordamages.Andasmentioned, t$& boththebankruptcycourtandthedistrictcourtfoundthe  &p!( settlementtobereasonable.Bishay'srelianceontheKavanaugh  exceptionisthusmisplaced. \  ` Inturn,wethinkitreasonablyclearthattheSJCwould X rejectpersonalstandingunderchapter93BbasedontheYork   exceptionalone.Thatexceptionrestsonthenotionthatthe `  corporationandtheindividualowner/operatorcanbecomeso  \  intertwinedastoproperlybeconsideredasingleentity,   justifyingdisregardofthecorporateform.See,e.g.,John d  Peterson,613F.Supp.at903(referringtodealershipas"alter `  ego"ofowner/operator).Yetthemajorityofcourtstoaddressthe   issuehaverejectedthisapproach.See,e.g.,Shermanv.British h LeylandMotors,Ltd.,601F.2d429,440n.11(9thCir.1979)("we d arenotpersuadedtofollowYork);BronxChryslerPlymouth,212F.  Supp.2dat23943(deemingYorkinconsistentwithSecondCircuit's l Vinceldecision);NorthgateMotors,Inc.v.GeneralMotorsCorp., h 111F.Supp.2d1071,107576(E.D.Wis.2000);ConroyDatsunLtd.  v.NissanMotorCorp.,506F.Supp.1051,105556(N.D.Ill.1980); p  Mooreheadv.GeneralMotorsCorp.,442F.Supp.873,880(E.D.Pa. !l" 1977);cf.WestsideMarreroJeepEagle,Inc.v.ChryslerCorp.,56 "$ F.Supp.2d694,699701(E.D.La.1999)(findingYork"likely t$& misguided"butstillbindingincircuit).  &p!(  ` Insupportofthemajorityview,itisnotedinteralia '#*  thattheowner/operator,havingchosenthecorporateform,should x)$, ordinarilybeheldtothatdecision.  '  4      ׀Especiallywherethe   corporationisabletopursueanADDCAclaim(eitherdirectlyor \ throughabankruptcytrustee),noequitablereasonisseenfor X disregardingthatformandallowingindividualstobringprivate   actionsfortheirpersonalbenefit.See,e.g.,NorthgateMotors, `  111F.Supp.2dat1076.Noconvincingrebuttalhasbeenoffered  \  byBishayorthehandfulofcasesthathavereliedonYork.! '  5          ` WethereforeconcludethatBishayisnota"motorvehicle d  dealer"withstandingtopursuechapter93Breliefonhisown `  behalf.Wealsothinkitapparentthathisclaims,totheextent   theywerecoextensivewiththoseavailabletothecorporationsor h thetrustee,wereextinguishedbythesettlement.Inarguingthat d thesettlementhadnosuchpreclusiveeffect,Bishayhasinsisted  thathisgrievancesweredistinctfromanycorporateclaims.While l weneednotpursuethematter,wenotethatsuchafindingarguably h  wouldrendertheKavanaughandYorkexceptionsinapplicable!  therebyprovidingfurthersupportfortheconclusionthatpersonal  standingunderchapter93Bisabsenthere. \   ` Affirmed.