WPCL I%iľ|-87rLk@|5`H#FeU~ sV>YQdl[<˼LjOhT5IQHvː/14}fsyYA&;=3cv蛟[YoaЪf.xUnKn'BqB?jh؂'3!1B1!kcdAݩ+zG67/E0inc GOdG˕-cBٻ$YAL$o"}M{}̱e9 =J`aNA[8\R|&sۛ77`ReDC$Љ]~wnj-بt" 郥g N爆R.4=XsyU%\Mk:!7v2] E)^F۠SE U̢Eqq:dd(O ap` '[SR a$7 d@UN % 0(# I m 0D4 0x nT NU U"8W UF ^ w E f a 4  N " Q71^UB* bl t U>$C$&U8Y++ k.k. 0Lv0 A0 0DA1 B 1 Ai1 D3 2 0D>222H3588888 &<&<&<&<&<&<&<&<9Hx9 Z6Times New Roman RegularX($HP LaserJet 5/5M - Standard,,,,0C:\DOCUME~1\SLLAWCK4\APPLIC~1\Corel\PERFEC~2\9\CUSTOM~1\wp8US2.wptC:\Documents and Settings\SLLAWCK4\Application Data\Corel\PerfectExpert\9\Custom WP Templates\wp8US2.wpt"U(#$  0  (':2us$ !        0  <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@ <4 9Z+ Courier New Q 9Z+.Courier New Regularp2s TABLE AL=1C?,}backup3|x   us$      2    _ XXXXWenotethatitisverydifficulttoprevailonaRule59(e)  motion.Thegeneralruleinthiscircuitisthatthemovingparty  must"eitherclearlyestablishamanifesterroroflawormust \ presentnewlydiscoveredevidence."_Pomerleau_v.W.Springfield 2 Pub.Sch.,362F.3d143,146n.2(1stCir.2004)(quotingFDICv. X WorldUniv.Inc.,978F.2d10,16(1stCir.1992));seealso11C. . Wrightetal.,FederalPractice&Procedure2810.1(2ded.1995)   (notingfourgroundsforgrantingsuchamotion:manifesterrorsof   laworfact,newlydiscoveredorpreviouslyunavailableevidence, `  manifestinjustice,andaninterveningchangeincontrollinglaw). 6   Aswell,grantsanddenialsofRule59(e)motionsarereviewedonly  \   forabuseofdiscretion.See_Venegas_ԄHernandezv._Sonolux_ԀRecords,  370F.3d183#X:XX Xq# XXXX:,190(1stCir.2004).Alliedclaimedtohavebrought  itsmotionbecauseofamanifesterroroflawmadebythedistrict \ court.EventhoughAlliedmayhavehadlittlechanceofprevailing 2 onitsRule59(e)motion,themotionstillactedtotollthe30day X appealperiod.#X:XX Xf# G  us$      1    _ XXXXWenotethatwehavenojurisdictionoverthemotionto  dismissfiledwithAllied'smotionforreconsiderationonJanuary  26,2004.Alliedmadenoattempttoappealthisdeterminationand, \  moreimportantly,adenialofa12(b)(6)motiontodismissisnot  anappealableinterlocutoryorder.MariearguesthatAlliedhas  waivedreviewofthedenialofthemotiontocompelarbitrationand \ stayproceedingsbecauseitsinitialbrieftothiscourtonly 2 discussedthemotiontodismissandnotthelattermotion.Thisis X untrue:whileAllied'sinitialbriefdiderroneouslydiscussthe . orderdenyingthemotiontodismiss,italsodiscussedthedenial   ofthemotiontocompelarbitrationandstayproceedings.#X:XX Xq#   us$      7    _XXXXThegeneralrule,whichtheSupremeCourtculledfromthe  RevisedUniformArbitrationAct("_RUAA_")(whichinturnwasbased  ontrendsandreasoningembodiedinjudicialprecedent),wasthat \ an"arbitratorshalldecidewhetheraconditionprecedentto 2 _arbitrability_Ԁhasbeenfulfilled";"intheabsenceofanagreement X tothecontrary,issuesofsubstantive_arbitrability_Ԁ...arefor . acourttodecideandissuesofprocedural_arbitrability_,i.e.,   whetherprerequisitessuchastimelimits,notice,laches,   estoppel,andotherconditionsprecedenttoanobligationto `  arbitratehavebeenmet,areforthearbitratorstodecide."Id. 6   at85(quoting_RUAA_Ԁ6(c)&_cmt_.2,7_U.L.A._Ԁ1213(Supp.2002)  \  (internalquotationmarksomitted)(emphasisin_Howsam_)).#X:XXXq#   us$      14    _ XXXXMariehasmadenoargument,forexample,thatthesubstantive  scopeofthearbitrationprovisionbetweenherandAllieddoesnot  includealloftheclaimsthatshehasraised.Infact,inher \ appellatebriefonthemerits,Marieconcedesthatallclaimsthat 2 shehasraisedtothedistrictcourtarewithinthesubstantive X scopeofthearbitrationclause. #X:XX Xr# L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- -   us$      3    _ XXXXTherewassomequestionaboutthisatoralargument;in  response,AlliedsubmittedaRule28(j)letter.Theorderwas  datedJanuary8,2004,butitwasnotenteredonthedocketuntil \ January12,2004.Thedocketeddateistheoneusedforpurposes 2 ofcomputingfilingdeadlines.SeeRoqueRodriguez,926F.2dat X 106.Thetendaylimitisunquestionablymetfromthislatter . date,giventhatthedaytheorderishandeddown,aswellas   intermediateweekendsandholidays,arenotincludedinthe    calculation.Seeid.at106n.5,107.#X:XX Xq#Դ\( 9Z+&Courier Regular   us$      10    _ XXXXWe#X:XX Xr#XXXX:Ԁarenotsurethatwaivercan,inallcases,becontracted  awayfromthecourt'scompetenceatall.The"default"languagein  Section3oftheFAA,whichaswenotedincludeswaiver,perhaps \ givescourtsaduty,whichcannotbeshiftedbycontractbetween 2 theparties,todeterminewhetherwaiverhasoccurred.#X:XXX#   us$      8    _#XXXXIndeed,therulethatcontractuallimitationswere  presumptivelyforthearbitratorwastheclearmajorityruleeven  before_Howsam_andGreenTree.See,e.g.,ShearsonLehmanHutton, \ Inc.v.Wagoner,944F.2d114,121(2dCir.1991)("[_W]e_Ԁstated 2 emphaticallythatanylimitationsdefensewhetherstemmingfrom X thearbitrationagreement,arbitrationassociationrule,orstate . statuteisanissuetobeaddressedbythearbitrators.");2I.R.   _Macneil_Ԁetal.,FederalArbitrationLaw21.2.1.2,21.2.2(1994)   ("[_G]enerally_Ԁtheeffectofanexpresstimelimitforarbitration `  willbedecidedbythearbitrators.").#X:XX#Xq#<4 9Z+ Courier New    us$      9    _ XXXXTheconductallegedlyconstitutingwaiverinagivencase  couldconceivablybenonlitigationrelated,althoughinpractice  virtuallyallcaseshaveinvolvedlitigationrelatedwaiver.Wedo \ notherediscusstheproperpresumptivedivisionoflaboras 2 betweencourtsandarbitratorsfornonlitigationrelatedwaiver X claimsorforotherdoctrinesthataresometimes(erroneously) . referredtoaswaiver,suchaslaches.#X:XX Xq#   us$      11    _ XXXXThisistrueevenifonepartysoughttostaythearbitration  pending_EEOC_Ԁproceedings,forcingtheexpenditureofresourcesto  obtainastayandrunningariskthattheotherpartywilloppose \ orthatthearbitratorwilldeclinethestay.#X:XX Xr#>c$"Small Circle"0 )y  <<= 8C(3$ !   d.)[Inline Te&xt" <<C****'dxd(3$ !  ݀Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5   us$      13    _ XXXXWesaynothinghereaboutwhetherorwhenanemployerhasa  righttoinitiateanarbitrationduringthecourseofan_EEOC_  investigation.Weholdonlythatanemployershouldnotbeforced \ tofileforarbitrationduringan_EEOC_Ԁinvestigationbyfindinga 2 waiverofitsrighttoarbitrateifitdoesnotmakesuchafiling.#X:XX Xr#   us$      6    _ XXXXOfcourse,itwasnotuntilplaintifffiledheramended  complaintandservedAlliedonNovember20,2003thatAlliedwason  noticeofMarie'snonTitleVIIclaims:assaultandbattery, \ negligentsupervision,breachofcontract,andunjustenrichment. 2 ThereisnoquestionthatAlliedmadeitsdemandforarbitrationas X tothoseclaimswithin60daysofitsfirstnoticeoftheclaims. . #X:XX Xq#   us$      5    _ XXXXMarieshouldnothavebeenmisledbyAllied'snoticeof  appeal,butitistruethatherinitialbrieffocusedonthe  jurisdictionalissueandtouchedonthemeritsonlyinasingle \ footnote.Anypossibleprejudicewasvitiatedbythiscourt's 2 orderofJanuary18,2005,whichgrantedMariefourteendaysto X fileanadditionalbriefonthemerits;suchabriefwasfiledby . MarieonFebruary1,2005.AnotherorderofthiscourtonFebruary   9grantedAlliedsevendaystofileabriefrespondingtoMarie's   newbrief;suchabriefwasfiledbyAlliedonFebruary16.#X:XX Xq#  us$      4    _ XXXXAnymotionforreconsiderationfiledafterthetendayperiod  doesnottollthetimeperiodforappealingtheunderlyingorder  thatthepartyisaskingtobereconsidered.See,e.g., \ _Lichtenberg_,204F.3dat401. 2   Aswell,atleastabsentsomenewlyavailableevidence,law, X oranewstageoftheproceedings,ordersdenyingsuchmotionsfor . reconsiderationofanappealableinterlocutoryorderaregenerally   notthemselvesappealable.See,e.g.,_Fisichelli_v.Townof   Methuen,884F.2d17,19(1stCir.1989)(noappellatejurisdiction `  overmotiontoreconsider,raisingnonewlyavailablefactsor 6   arguments,filedoneandahalfyearsafterdenialoforiginal  \  motionforqualifiedimmunity);_Cozza_v.Network_Assocs_.,Inc.,362  2  F.3d12,15(1stCir.2004)(leavingopenquestionofwhether   appealscourtwouldhavejurisdictionovermotionfor   reconsiderationoforderdenyingstayofproceedingsandcompelling d  arbitrationbasedonnewlyavailableevidence);seealso_Behrens_v. :  _Pelletier_,516U.S.299,30607(1996)(allowingappealsoforders `   denyingqualifiedimmunitybothatmotiontodismissstageandat  summaryjudgmentstage);_Oblix_,Inc.v._Winiecki_,374F.3d488,490  (7thCir.2004)(allowingjurisdictionovermotiontoreconsider \ filedmorethantendaysafterorderdenyingmotiontocompel 2 arbitration,wherejudgeinvitedreconsiderationinorderto X considernewcaselaw).Suchadenialofamotionfor . reconsiderationisnotanotherdenialonthemeritsofthe   immediatelyappealableunderlyingmotion.The_Fisichelli_court   stressedthatthisrulewas"virtuallyessentialtoorderly `  judicialmanagement,"sinceinterlocutorymotionstoreconsiderare 6   notintheFederalRulesandthereforecanbebroughtatanypoint  \  inaproceeding,andasmanytimesasamovantwishes._Fisichelli_,  2  884F.2dat19."[A]dilatorydefendantwouldreceivenotonlyhis   allottedbiteattheapple,butaninvitationtognawatwill.#X:XX Xq# XXXX:"   Id.#X:XX XJ # /  us$      12    _XXXXWenoteaswellthatthereislittleriskofabusiveforum  shoppingbytheemployerinthiskindofsituation.Since,under  WaffleHouse,the_EEOC_Ԁcannotbestoppedfrominvestigatingand \ litigatingagainsttheemployerbyvirtueofanarbitrationclause, 2 eveniftheemployerinitiatesarbitrationonlywhenthingsturn X badlyforitbeforethe_EEOC_,the_EEOC_Ԁwillnotbehinderedinits . pursuitoftheemployer.#X:XXXr# !  _ TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !XX     UnitedStatesCourtofAppealsN  FortheFirstCircuit YNXXY  A*) ` dE< ` A      `     h No.041403 K  @,,"MARTHAM.MARIE,  G  @<< Plaintiff,Appellee,   @tt)v. O  @ ALLIEDHOMEMORTGAGECORP., K  @Defendant,Appellant,    JOSEPHTHOMPSON, S Defendant. O A*) ` dE<` A  @@ddAPPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT  FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS f [Hon.RichardG.Stearns,U.S.DistrictJudge] b A*) ` dE<` A  @@'Before   @@((Lynch,CircuitJudge, O " Stahl,SeniorCircuitJudge, %!u# andHoward,CircuitJudge. !K$ A*) ` dE<#` A #&       DianeM.Saunders,withwhomDanielleMeagher,JamesM. $( Pender,andMorgan,Brown&Joy,LLP,wereonbrief,forappellant. b% )   RobertM.Mendillo,withwhomMendillo&Ross,LLP,wason 8&!* brief,forappellee. '^"+ **ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  )$.)$  SI)D%/ @@38426@@SMarch16,2005 *&1  RHC+&2" @@38426 @@ R()D%3  (* ! |-(4?   XXXX  8XXdd8*,X` XX*=  XXdd= ` LYNCH,CircuitJudge. Thiscaseinvolvingemployment  arbitrationagreementsdealswithimportantissuesbothforTitle x VIIlawandforthedivisionoflaborbetweencourtsand $t arbitratorsaftertheSupremeCourt'sdecisionsinHowsamv.Dean   WitterReynolds,Inc.,537U.S.79(2002),andGreenTreeFin. |  Corp.v.Bazzle,539U.S.444(2003).Theemployeeconcedesthat ( x  theTitleVIIclaimsinvolvedinthiscasearearbitrable.See $  Rosenbergv.MerrillLynch,Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.,170F.3d   1,10(1stCir.1999).#XXX XM # XXXXԀThekeyissueiswhetheranemployerwaives ,|  itscontractualrighttocompelarbitrationofaTitleVIIclaimby ( notfilingforarbitrationwhentheemployeeinitiatesanEEOC  complaint,butinsteadwaitingandonlymovingtocompel 0 arbitrationaftertheemployeelaterfilesacivilclaiminfederal , court.Weholdherethatalthoughtheissueofcompliancewitha  contractualtimelimitshould,inthefirstinstance,beaddressed 4 bythearbitrator,theissueofwaiveroftherighttoarbitrate 0 duetoinconsistentactivityinanotherlitigationforumremainsan   issueforthecourtevenaftertheHowsamandGreenTreeholdings. 8!"  ` Moreover,onthemerits,weholdthatanemployerdoes "4$ notwaiveitsrighttoarbitrationbyfailingtodemandarbitration $& duringthependencyofanEEOCinvestigation.Thisconfirmsinthe <&!( lightofinterveningSupremeCourtcasesaresultthiscourthad '8#* reachedearlierondifferentreasoning.SeeBrennanv.King,#XXX XS#139 )$, F.3d258,26364(1stCir.1998). XXXXԀOurreasoningrestsinparton @+&. EEOCv.WaffleHouse,Inc.,534U.S.279(2002),#XXX X#whichheld XXXXԀthatan  employercannotprecludetheEEOCfrombringinganenforcement \ actionbasedonanemployee'scomplaintbyrelyingonan X arbitrationclausebetweentheemployerandemployee.Inlightof   WaffleHouse,aruleforcingtheemployertofileforarbitration `  duringthependencyofanEEOCinvestigationwouldleadto  \  wasteful,duplicativeproceedings,andwerejectsucharesult.We   holdthattheemployerinthiscasehasnotwaiveditsrightto d  arbitratetheclaimsatissue.Wereversethedecisionofthe `  districtcourtrefusingtostayjudicialproceedingsandcompel   arbitration,andremand. h   I.  d  ` AlliedHomeMortgageCorporationisaTexascorporation , inthebusinessofmortgagebanking;ithasabranchofficein  Woburn,Massachusetts.MarthaM.MariebeganworkingforAllied's 4 WoburnbranchonNovember1,2000asamortgageloanprocessor. 0  JosephThompson,abranchmanagerofAllied'sWoburnbranch,hired   Marieandwashersupervisor.HewasMarie'sboyfriendatthetime 8!" ofherhiring. Shewastobecompensatedbyreceivingfifty "4$ percentofanyloanoriginationfeesonallloanssheoriginated.  $&  ` MarieallegesthatThompsonused"undueinfluence,verbal <&!( abuse,andthreatsofphysicalabuse"todivertloanorigination '8#* creditfromMarietoThompson,toforceMarietoengageinan )$, "autodialing"schemeinviolationofTheTelephoneConsumer @+&. ProtectionActof1991,47U.S.C.227,andtoforceMarietopay  forofficesuppliesoutofherownpocket.Marieallegesthat \ Alliedknewthatsomeofheroriginationcreditwasbeingdiverted X fromMarietoThompsonanddidnothing.     ` MariealsoallegesthatThompsonthrewheroutofa `  stoppedcarinthewinterof2002becausehewasangrywithher  \  work.Finally,sheallegesthatThompsonphysicallybeatMariein   June2002bothbecausehewasangrywithherworkandbecausehe d  thoughtshewashavingasexualaffairwithanotherAllied `  employee.MarieallegesthatThompsonwantedhertohavesexual   relationssolelywithhim.Marieneverreturnedtoworkafterthe h beatinginJunethecompanylistedherterminationdateasJune d 28,2002.SheclaimsthatAlliedfalselyreportedinitspersonnel  recordsthatshevoluntarilyquitherposition. InJuly2002, l MariesoughtandobtainedanAbusePreventionOrderfroma h MassachusettsstatecourtrequiringThompsontostayawayfromher.    ` WhenMariewashiredbyAlliedonNovember1,2000,she p  signedanemploymentcontractthatwasalsosignedbyThompsonas !l" Allied'srepresentative.Thisfourpagestandardformagreement "$ containedanarbitrationclauseinArticle5.1.Theclausestates: t$& 8 ` EmployerandEmployeeagreetosubmittofinal  &p!( andbindingarbitrationanyandalldisputes, &F") claims(whetherintort,contract,statutory, '#* orotherwise),anddisagreementsconcerning (#+ theinterpretationorapplicationofthis x)$, AgreementandEmployee'semploymentby N*%- EmployerandtheterminationofthisAgreement $+t&. andEmployee'semploymentbyEmployer +J'/ includingthearbitrabilityofanysuch  controversyorclaim....Arbitration  underthissectionmustbeinitiatedwithin \ sixtydaysoftheaction,inaction,or 2 occurrenceaboutwhichthepartyinitiating X thearbitrationiscomplaining. # .` x` x Theagreementalsostatedthatanyarbitrationwastobeconducted   undertherulesoftheAmericanArbitrationAssociation(AAA).  6    ` OnApril23,2003,Mariefiledachargeofdiscrimination  2  withtheEqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(EEOC)andwith   theMassachusettsCommissionAgainstDiscrimination(MCAD)against :  AlliedandThompson. Thechargeallegedsexualdiscriminationin 6 violationofTitleVIIoftheCivilRightsActof1964and  applicablestatelaw.Thecharge,inparticular,allegedthat Z duringMarie'semploymentwithAllied,Thompson"physicallyabused V [her]andverballyabused[her]repeatedlybecausehethought[she]  washavingasexualaffairwithanotheremployee,andThompson ^ wanted[her]tohavesexualrelationsonlywithhim."   Z  ` AlliedfiledaresponsetothischargeonMay22,2003.  TheEEOCissuedaDismissalandNoticeofRightsonJuly18,2003, b ! statingthatithadconcludeditsinvestigationwithoutfinding "^# thatanyviolationofTitleVIIoccurred.Itstatedthatthe # % evidenceshowedthatMarieandThompsonlivedtogetherand f% ' representedthemselvesasdomesticpartners;therewasnoevidence 'b") thather"consensualrelationship"withThompsonwas"unwelcome"as ($+ requiredtobeactionableunderTitleVII.Also,Thompson's j*%- actionsweremotivatedbyhispersonalrelationship,notbyMarie's ,f'/ gender.Finally,thedismissalnotedthatMariedidnotutilize  Allied'sexistingsexualharassmentpolicy.Thedismissalstated \ thatMarienowhadarighttosueThompsonorAlliedforsexual X discriminationinfederalorstatecourt.     ` OnOctober14,2003,Mariefiledacivilcomplaintin `  MassachusettsSuperiorCourt,namingAlliedandThompsonas  \  defendants;anamendedcomplaintwasfiledonNovember6,2003.    TheamendedcomplaintnamedbothAlliedandThompsonasdefendants d  forassaultandbatteryandsexualharassmentunderTitleVIIof `  theCivilRightsActof1964,andnamedAlliedfornegligent   supervisionofThompsonandforbreachofcontractandunjust h enrichment#XXX X# XXXX. Marieaskedformoneydamagesandattorney'sfeesand d costsunderTitleVII.     ` Thompsonhasneverbeenserved;Alliedwasservedon l November20,2003. Alliedremovedtheactiontofederaldistrict h courtinMassachusettsonDecember9,2003. #XXX XV2# XXXXOnDecember22,Allied  filedademandforarbitrationwiththeAAA,withinsixtydaysof p  beingserved. OnDecember23,2003,Alliedmovedtocompel !l" arbitrationandtostaythecourtproceedings;themotionwas "$ opposedbyMarie.ThismotionwasdeniedonJanuary8,2004(the t$& orderwasdocketedonJanuary12,2004),byorderstating:"It  &p!( beingundisputedthattheinitiationofarbitrationproceedings '#* occurredonDecember22,2003,morethansixtydaysafterthe x)$, conclusionof[the]chargeproceedingsbeforethe[EEOC],the $+t&. demandforarbitrationisuntimelyunderArticleVofplaintiff's  employmentagreement."  \  ` Allieddidnotappealthisorderbutinstead,onJanuary X 26,2004,movedtodismissMarie'scomplaintasuntimely,or,in   thealternative,toreconsiderthedenialofthemotiontocompel `  arbitrationandstayproceedingsunderFed.R.Civ.P.59(e).This  \  motionwasdeniedastoeachalternativeonFebruary18. Thecourt   consideredthecontracttobeoneofadhesionandrelieduponthe d  rulethatan"ambiguousprovisioninanadhesionagreementwillbe `  strictlyconstruedagainstthepartythatwroteit."Thecourt   alsostatedthatAllied'sargumentwasbasedonthepremisethat h Mariewasrequiredtoinitiatearbitrationwithinsixtydaysofthe d conclusionoftheEEOCproceedingsifshewantedtopursueher  claims,whileAlliedhadsixyears(thefulllimitationperiodfor l contractactionsunderMassachusettslaw)todemandarbitration. h This,thecourtstated,wasinequitableanda"breathtaking"  readingofthecontract.Thecourt,citingMartinv.Norwood,478 p  N.E.2d955,95758(Mass.1985),heldthatAllied,throughits !l" delay,had"waived"itsrighttoarbitratetheclaimsandthusthe "$ lawsuitwouldproceed. t$&  ` Thedistrictcourt'sJanuary12andFebruary18holdings  &p!( reliedontwodistincttheoriesforwhyarbitrationshouldnotbe '#* compelledandlitigationstayed:(1)Allied'spurportedfailureto x)$, complywiththeprecise60daytimelimitcontainedinthe $+t&. arbitrationprovision,asinterpretedbythecourt,and(2)  Allied'swaiverofitsrighttoarbitrateduetounreasonable \ delay.  X  ` AlliedfiledanoticeofappealtothiscourtonMarch   12,2004. Thenoticeappealedthedistrictcourt'sFebruary18, `  2004order,"insofarassuch[o]rderdeniedAllied'smotionfor  \  reconsiderationofthedenialofAllied'smotiontocompel   arbitration."  d    II. `     ` Wefirstexaminethecomplexissueofourjurisdictionin ( thiscase;Mariearguesthereisnone.   ` Ordinarily,appealsareonlypermittedfromfinal 0 judgmentsofthedistrictcourt.Therearealimitednumberof , exceptions.See,e.g.,PuertoRicoAqueduct&SewerAuth.v.  Metcalf&Eddy,Inc.,506U.S.139,14243(1993).Afewofthese 4 exceptions occurinthearbitrationcontext,asstatedinthe 0 FederalArbitrationAct(FAA).See9U.S.C.16(a).Appealmay   betakenfromaninterlocutoryorderofthedistrictcourt T!" "refusingastayofanyaction"pendingarbitrationor"denyinga #P$ petition...toorderarbitrationtoproceed,"althoughnoappeal $& maybetakenfromadistrictcourt'sgrantingsuchastayor X&!( grantingamotiontocompel#XXX X4# XXXXarbitration.  #  1      #XXX XnE# XXXXԀId.16(a)(1),(b). (T#*  ` Inthiscase,Alliedfiledamotionwiththedistrict  courttostaycourtproceedingsandcompelarbitration;both \ requestsweredeniedandthesedenialswereimmediatelyappealable. X Butinterlocutoryappeals,likeallotherappeals,aregovernedby   thetimelimitationsidentifiedinFed.R.App.P.4(a)(1)(A). `  Thisprovisionrequiresapartytofilethenoticeofappealwithin  \  30days"afterthejudgmentororderappealedfromisentered."   Id.Thistimelinessrequirementisjurisdictional.SeeGriggsv. d  ProvidentConsumerDisc.Co.,459U.S.56,61(1982)("Itiswell `  settledthattherequirementofatimelynoticeofappealis   'mandatoryandjurisdictional.'"(quotingBrowderv.Dir.,Ill. h Dep'tofCorr.,434U.S.257,264(1978)));seealsoDavignonv. d Clemmey,322F.3d1,1011(1stCir.2003)(timelynoticeofappeal  requirementisjurisdictionalalthoughitisnotanArticleIII l requirement).#XXX XF# XXXXԀ  h  ` Ratherthanappealingimmediately,Alliedfiledamotion  forreconsideration.Alliedarguesthatitsfilingamotionfor p  reconsiderationwithintendaysoftheinitialordertolledthe !l" timeforappealuntilafterthecourt'srulingonthemotionfor "$ reconsideration.Sinceanappealwasfiledwithinthirtydaysof  therulingonthemotionforreconsideration,Alliedarguesthat \ theappealistimely. X  ` Allied'spositioniscorrect.Allied'smotionfor   reconsiderationstatedthatitsbasiswasasamotiontoalteror `  amendthejudgmentunderFed.R.Civ.P.59(e);atanyrate,we  \  haveheldthatamotionforreconsiderationshouldbeconstruedas   amotiontoalteroramendajudgmentunderRule59(e)wherethis d  isrelevantforjurisdictionalpurposes.See,e.g.,UnitedStates `  v.$23,000inU.S.Currency,356F.3d157,165n.9(1stCir.2004);   Youngv.Gordon,330F.3d76,80(1stCir.2003);InreSunPipe h LineCo.,831F.2d22,24(1stCir.1987)("Notwithstandingthat d [appellant]didnotdenominateanyparticularruleasthe  springboardforitsreconsiderationmotion,itissettledinthis l circuitthatamotionwhichaskedthecourttomodifyitsearlier h dispositionofacasebecauseofanallegedlyerroneouslegal  resultisbroughtunderFed.R.Civ.P.59(e).").Themotionfor p  reconsiderationfiledheremustbesoconstrued.  #  2       !l" Ѐ ` The"judgment"thatAlliedaskedthecourtto"alteror  amend"wasthecourt'sJanuary8,2004#XXX XtK# XXXXԀorderdenyingAllied's \ motiontostayproceedingsandcompelarbitration.Fed.R.Civ.P. X 59(e).ForpurposesoftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,this   orderwasajudgmentbecauseitwasan"orderfromwhichanappeal `  lies."Fed.R.Civ.P.54(a);seeAbdulwaliv.Wash.Metro.Area  \  TransitAuth.,315F.3d302,30304(D.C.Cir.2003)(orderdenying   summaryjudgmentbasedonsovereignimmunitywas"judgment"for d  purposesofFederalRulesofCivilProcedure);Lichtenbergv. `  BesicorpGroupInc.,204F.3d397,40001(2dCir.2000)(samewith   respecttoordergrantingapreliminaryinjunction);Roque h Rodriquezv.LemaMoya,926F.2d103,106(1stCir.1991)(same d withrespecttoorderdenyingsummaryjudgmentbasedonqualified  immunity). l  ` ThemotionrequestingthattheJanuary8orderbealtered h oramendedwastimelyfiledwithintendaysofthatorder.  #  3      ׀Fed.  R.Civ.P.59(e).UnderFed.R.App.P.4(a)(4)(A),certain  motions,iftimelyfiled,cantollthethirtydayappealperiod. \ AmotionunderFed.R.Civ.P.59(e)toalteroramendthejudgment X appearsonthislist.Fed.R.App.P.4(a)(4)(A)(iv).Atimely   motiontoalteroramenda"judgment"thatisanappealable `  interlocutoryordertollsthetimeforfilinganoticeofappeal.  \  SeeLichtenberg,204F.3dat40001;RoqueRodriguez,926F.2dat   10607;Denleyv.Shearson/Am.Express,Inc.,733F.2d39,41(6th d  Cir.1984).Thethirtydayclockrestartsaftertheorderdenying `  themotiontoalteroramendthejudgment.Fed.R.App.P.   4(a)(4)(A).ThisorderwashandeddownonFebruary18,2004; h AlliedfileditsnoticeofappealonMarch12,2004.Thenoticeof d appealwasthustimelyastotheunderlyingmotiontostay  proceedingsorcompelarbitration.7f  #  4       l  ` Mariearguesthat,evengrantingallofthis,Allieddid  notattempttoappealtheunderlyingmotiontostayproceedingsor \ compelarbitration,butonlytheorderdenyingreconsideration, X becauseitsnoticeofappealnamedonlythelatterorder.Itis   truethatthenoticeofappealnamedonlytheorderdenying `  Allied'smotionforreconsiderationasbeingappealed,andFed.R.  \  App.P.3(c)(1)(B)statesthatapartyshould"designatethe   judgment,order,orpartthereofbeingappealed."Aswell,aRule d  59(e)motionisseparatefromtheunderlyingjudgmentforpurposes `  ofappeal.Correav.Cruisers,298F.3d13,21n.3(1stCir.   2002). h  ` However,whendeterminingwhatisactuallybeing d appealed,wehavebeenliberal.SeeChamorrov.PuertoRicanCars,  Inc.,304F.3d1,34(1stCir.2002).Welooktotheappellant's l intentontherecordasawholeandatwhethertheappelleehas h beenmisledbytheappellant'sunclearnotice.See#XXX XS# XXXXFomanv.Davis,  371U.S.178,18182(1962)("Itis...entirelycontrarytothe  spiritoftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurefordecisionsonthe \ meritstobeavoidedonthebasisof...meretechnicalities."); X Youngv.Gordon,330F.3d76,8081(1stCir.2003);#XXX X]c# XXXXZukowskiv.   St.LukesHomeCareProgram,326F.3d278,283n.4(1stCir.2003) `  (noticeofappealmaybereadtoincludedenialofunderlying  \  motion,andnotsimplydenialofmotionforreconsideration,when   it"canbefairlyinferredfromthenotice"thatappellantintended d  toappealtheunderlyingmotion(quotingAybarv.CrispinReyes, `  118F.3d10,15n.5(1stCir.1997)));Correa,298F.3dat21n.3   #XXX Xe# XXXX(briefsaswellasnoticeofappealcanbeconsultedduringthis h process);Chamorro,304F.3dat34.Here,basedonourreviewof d thenoticeofappealaswellasthebriefs,Alliedmanifestedan  intent,howeverawkwardlyphrased,toappealtheunderlyingorder l denyingthemotiontostayproceedingsandcompelarbitrationas h wellasthelaterdenialoftheRule59(e)motion.2  #  5      ׀   ` Wewillexercisejurisdictiontoreviewthedistrict p  court'sinitialorderdenyingAllied'smotiontostayproceedings !l" andcompelarbitration.Weturnnowtothemerits.#XXX Xg# XXXXԀ "$   III.      ` Giventhenatureoftheissuesinthiscase,theprimary x ofwhichiswaiver,ourreviewofthedistrictcourt'sdenialofa $t motiontocompelarbitrationandstayjudicialproceedingsisde   novo.InreCitigroup,Inc.,376F.3d23,2526(1stCir.2004) |  (reviewofwaiverissue,factfindingaside,isdenovo);InterGen ( x  N.V.v.Grina,344F.3d134,141(1stCir.2003);KKWEnters.,Inc. $  v.GloriaJean'sGourmetCoffeesFranchisingCorp.,184F.3d42,48   (1stCir.1999). ,|  A.Whodecideseachissue:courtorarbitrator? (  ` Theinitialquestioniswhetherthecourtorthe  arbitratorisempoweredtodecidetheissuesof(1)waiverof 0 Allied'srighttoarbitrate,and(2)compliancewiththe60day , contractualprovision#XXX Xk# XXXX.1  #  6      ׀Webeginbyconsideringrelevantprecedent  inthisarea. 4  ` #XXX Xo#Itdoesnotresolvethesedivisionoflaborissuesmerely 0 tonotethattheyareusually,ultimately,mattersofcontract   interpretation.SeeGreenTreeFin.Corp.v.Bazzle,539U.S.444, 8!" 45152(2003)(pluralityopinion);FirstOptionsofChicago,Inc. "4$ v.Kaplan,514U.S.938,943(1995).Certainpresumptionshave $& beenconstructedtoaidintheresolutionoftheseissuesof  divisionofresponsibility;thesepresumptionsgenerallyhold"in \ theabsenceofclearandunmistakableevidencetothecontrary." X SeeGreenTree,539U.S.at452(alterations,internalquotation   marks,andcitationomitted).Thesepresumptionsoperatewithin `  theunderlyingframeworkthat"anydoubtsconcerningthescopeof  \  arbitrableissuesshouldberesolvedinfavorofarbitration,"   giventheproarbitrationpolicyoftheFederalArbitrationAct. d  MosesH.ConeMem'lHosp.v.MercuryConstr.Corp.,460U.S.1,24 `  25(1983).    ` TheSupremeCourthasmostrecentlytreatedtheissueof h howthesepresumptionsoperateinHowsamv.DeanWitterReynolds, d Inc.,537U.S.79(2002),andGreenTree,539U.S.at444,where  muchoftheCourt'sprecedentinthisareawasconsolidatedand l simplified.InHowsam,theCourtheldthattheissueofwhetheran h arbitrationclaimwasbarredbyasixyearlimitationsperiod  embeddedinthearbitrationrulesunderwhichthepartieshad p  agreedtoarbitratewasanissueforthearbitrator,andnotfor !l" thecourt.Howsam,537U.S.at8586.TheCourtnotedthatat "$ leasttwosortsofquestionswerepresumptivelyforthecourtto t$& decide:(1)"whetherthepartiesareboundbyagivenarbitration  &p!( clause,"and(2)"whetheraconcededlybindingarbitrationclause '#* appliedtoaparticulartypeofcontroversy."Id.at84.Many x)$, othertypesofclaims,includingevensome"gatewayquestions"that $+t&. mightdisposeoftheentireclaim,arepresumptivelylefttothe  arbitrator.Seeid.at8485.Thiscategoryincludes"procedural \ questionswhichgrowoutofthedisputeandbearonitsfinal X disposition."Id.at84(internalquotationmarksomitted).This   distinctionhasemployedtheroughrubricthatproceduralissues, `  evenifpotentiallydispositive,arelefttothearbitrator;  \  substantivequestionsaboutthekindofdisputesintendedfor   arbitrationarereservedforthecourt,absentclearand d  unmistakableevidencetothecontrary.  #  7      ׀ `   ` InGreenTree,theCourtheldthatwhetheranarbitration   agreementallowedforclassarbitrationwaslikewiseanissueof h contractinterpretationforthearbitratorratherthanthejudge. d GreenTree,539U.S.at45253.TheCourtreaffirmedthebasic  frameworkofpresumptionsdescribedinHowsamandheldthatthe l issuehere,whichwentto"whatkindofarbitrationproceedingthe h partiesagreedto"ratherthan"whethertheyagreedtoarbitratea  matter,"waspresumptivelyforthearbitrator.Id.at452. p   ` TheCourtinbothHowsamandGreenTreealsostressed  issuesofcomparativeexpertise.Inthefaceofcontractual \ silence,courtsshouldpresumethatpartiesintendtogivetheir X disputestothemostabledecisionmakeronagivenissue,bothfor   contractualandpublicpolicyreasons.Howsam,537U.S.at85. `  TheHowsamCourtstatedthatthearbitratorswerepresumptively  \  moreexpertininterpretingtheirownlimitationsrule,id.,while   theGreenTreeCourtnotedthattheclassarbitrationissueraised d  questionsof"contractinterpretationandarbitrationprocedures," `  bothofwhichanarbitratorwas"wellsuitedtoanswer,"Green   Tree,539U.S.at453. h  ` Thiscircuithashadonlytwoopportunitiestoconsider d theimpactofHowsamandGreenTreeonthedivisionofissues  betweenthecourtandthearbitrator.InShaw'sSupermarkets,Inc. l v.UnitedFood&CommercialWorkersUnion,321F.3d251(1stCir. h 2003),weheldthatthequestionofwhetherthreegrievancesbeing  arbitratedseparatelyshouldbeconsolidatedintoasingle p  arbitrationwasa"proceduralmatter"thatwaspresumptivelyfor !l" thearbitrator.Id.at254.InRichardC.Young&Co.v. "$ Leventhal,389F.3d1(1stCir.2004),weheldthataforum t$& selectionclauseinanarbitrationagreementwaslikewiseforthe  &p!( arbitrator,asa"proceduralquestion."Id.at45. '#*  XXXX ` Thedistrictcourt'sholdinginitstwoorders x)$, necessarilyreliedontwodistinctpoints:(1)thatAllied'sdemand $+t&. forarbitrationwasuntimelybecauseitfailedtoabidebythe  sixtydaylimitationsperiodspecifiedinthecontractitself,and \ (2)thatAlliedwaiveditsrighttoarbitrationbynotfilingfor X arbitrationduringandaftertheEEOCproceeding.Weaddressthese   twopointsinturn,findingthatthecontractualtimelinessissue `  isforthearbitratorbutthattheissueofwaiverbyconductis  \  forthecourt.#XXX X#Ԁ XXXX   ContractualTimeLimitation d   ` #XXX X#Thearbitrationclauseinthecontractatissuestates: `  " XXXXArbitrationunderthissectionmustbeinitiatedwithinsixtydays   oftheaction,inaction,oroccurrenceaboutwhichtheparty h initiatingthearbitrationiscomplaining.#XXX X؋#"Thedistrictcourt's d conclusionthatAllied'smotiontostayproceedingswasuntimely  rested,inpart,oninterpretationofthislanguage.Thecourt l heldthatAlliedhadonlysixtydaysfromtheconclusionofthe h EEOCproceedingsinwhichtodemandarbitration.Weholdthatthe  courterredinitselfinterpretingthecontractualtimelimit p  clauseandapplyingittoAllied. !l"  ` UnderHowsam,whichitselfdealtwithatimelimit "$ provision,thisisthesortofproceduralprerequisitethatis t$& presumedtobeforthearbitrator.SeeHowsam,537U.S.at8485;  &p!( seealsoJohnWiley&Sons,Inc.v.Livingston,376U.S.543,556 '#* 59(1964)(issueofwhetherpartyfailedtoabidebyprocedural x)$, prerequisitestoarbitration,includingrequirementthatnoticeof $+t&. anygrievancebegivenwithinfourweeks,wasforarbitratorand  notcourt).WhilethetimelimitinHowsamwasinthearbitrator's \ ownrulesratherthaninthecontractitself,thismakesno X difference."  #  8      ׀Thearbitratormightbeexpectedtohavecomparative   expertiseindeterminingthemeaningofthesesortsofcontractual `  limitationsprovisionsinlightofthebackgroundnormsinthis  \  employmentarea.AndasinWiley,considerationofthiskindof   proceduralprovisionmayentanglethecourtinissuesthatgo d  properlytothemeritsofthedispute,whichareforthe `  arbitrator.SeeWiley,376U.S.at557.Thepresumptionthatthe   timelimitationclauseisforthearbitratorisnotovercomebyany h ofthelanguageinthecontract. d JudiciallyFoundWaiver   ` Thecourt'sholdingalsorestedimplicitlyonbroader l notionsofjudiciallyimpliedwaiver.Theargumentforwaiverin h thiscaseisessentiallythatAllied'sparticipationintheEEOC  proceedingsinitiatedbyMariewithoutAlliedhavingdemanded p  arbitrationduringorafterthoseproceedingsconstitutedconduct !l" inconsistentwiththefuturedesiretoarbitrateitsclaims.See,  e.g.,MenorahIns.Co.v.INXReinsuranceCorp.,72F.3d218,220 \ 21(1stCir.1995);2I.R.Macneiletal.,FederalArbitrationLaw X 21.3.1(1994).Thiscourthasalonghistoryofdecidingsuch   waiverclaimsitself;invariably,thesecasesinvolvetheinquiry `  intowhether,bychoosingorallowingthelitigationofitsclaims  \  beforeacourtratherthananarbitrator,apartyhaswaivedits   righttoarbitrate.See,e.g.,CreativeSolutionsGroup,Inc.v. d  PentzerCorp.,252F.3d28,3234(1stCir.2001);NavierosInter `  Americanos,S.A.v.M/VVasiliaExpress,120F.3d304,316(1st   Cir.1997);Menorah,72F.3dat22122;Sevinorv.MerrillLynch, h Pierce,Fenner&Smith,Inc.,807F.2d16,19(1stCir.1986); d JonesMotorCo.v.Chauffeurs,Teamsters&HelpersLocalUnionNo.  633ofN.H.,671F.2d38,4244(1stCir.1982).Further,in l MenorahandJonesMotorCo.,weheldexplicitlythattheissueof h waiver,atleastwheretheallegedwaiverwasduetolitigation  relatedactivity,waspresumptivelyforthejudgeandnotthe p  arbitrator.SeeMenorah,72F.3dat222;JonesMotorCo.,671F.2d !l" at43.Thiswasinaccordwiththeoverwhelmingweightofpre "$ Howsamauthority,whichheldthatwaiverduetolitigationconduct t$& wasgenerallyforthecourtandnotforthearbitrator.See  &p!( generally2I.R.Macneiletal.,FederalArbitrationLaw21.3 '#*  (1994). x)$,  ` Fewcourtshavehadoccasiontoconsidertheimpactof   HowsamandGreenTreeonthedoctrineofwaiverofarbitrationby \ conduct,andtheyhavedisagreed.TheEightCircuithasheld,with X littlediscussion,thatHowsamandGreenTreeindicatethatwaiver   isnowpresumptivelyanissueforthearbitrator,andnotforthe `  courts,atleastwheretheconductallegedlyconstitutingwaiveris  \  duetolitigationinsomeothercourt.SeeNat'lAm.Ins.Co.v.   TransamericaOccidentalLifeIns.Co.,328F.3d462,466(8thCir. d  2003);seealsoBellevueDrugCo.v.AdvancePCS,333F.Supp.2d `  318,324(E.D.Pa.2004)(relyingonHowsamfortheproposition   that"itappearsthat...theissueofwhetherthedefendant,by h litigatinginthisCourtthepresentcase,haswaivedtherightto d demandarbitrationshouldproperlybepresentedinthefirst  instancetothearbitrator").TheTransamericacourtcitedto l languageinHowsamstatingthat"thepresumptionisthatthe h arbitratorshoulddecide'allegation[s]ofwaiver,delay,oralike  defensetoarbitrability.'"Howsam,537U.S.at84(quotingMoses p  H.ConeMem'lHosp.v.MercuryConstr.Corp.,460U.S.1,2425 !l" (1983)(alterationinHowsam)). "$  ` Bycontrast,apaneloftheFifthCircuithasheldthat t$& theissueofwaiverbyconductisforthecourt,andnotforthe  &p!( arbitrator,insituationswheretheallegedwaiveroccurreddueto '#* conductbeforethedistrictcourt.SeeTristarFin.Ins.Agency, x)$, Inc.v.EquicreditCorp.ofAm.,97Fed.Appx.462,464(5thCir. $+t&. 2004);seealsoCarbajalv.HouseholdBank,FSB,No.00C0626,  2003WL22159473,at*9(N.D.Ill.Sept.18,2003).Thiswas \ particularlysogiventhecourt'scomparativeexpertise.See X Tristar,97Fed.Appx.at464.    ` Inastreamofrecentcases,theFirstCircuithas `  continuedtodecidewaiverquestionsduetolitigationrelated  \  activitieswithoutdiscussingtheimpactofHowsam,mostlikely   becausenopartyraisedtheissue.SeeInreCitigroup,Inc.,376 d  F.3d23,2629(1stCir.2004);Rankinv.AllstateIns.Co.,336 `  F.3d8,1214(1stCir.2003);RestorationPres.Masonry,Inc.v.   GroveEuropeLtd.,325F.3d54,6062(1stCir.2003).Ithasbeen h raisedhere. d  `  XXXXWestartouranalysisofwhetherwaiverbyconductin  thiscontextisadecisionforthecourtorforthearbitratorby l notingthattextuallyundertheFAA,acourtisonlypermittedto h stayacourtactionpendingarbitrationif"theapplicantforthe  stayisnotindefaultinproceedingwithsucharbitration."9 p  U.S.C.3(emphasisadded).A"default"hasgenerallybeenviewed !l" bycourtsasincludinga"waiver."See,e.g.,PattenGrading& "$ Paving,Inc.v.SkanskaUSABuilding,Inc.,380F.3d200,20405 t$& (4thCir.2004);IvaxCorp.v.B.BraunofAm.,Inc.,286F.3d  &p!( 1309,1316n.17(11thCir.2002)#XXX X# XXXX;MicroStrategy,Inc.v.Lauricia, '#* 268F.3d244,249(4thCir.2001);CountyofMiddlesexv.Gevyn x)$, Constr.Corp.,450F.2d53,56n.2(1stCir.1971)(onlywaiverdue $+t&. tothepursuitoflegalremedyinconsistentwitharbitrationisa  "default"under9U.S.C.3).Thislanguagewouldseemtoplace \ astatutorycommandoncourts,incaseswhereastayissought,to X decidethewaiverissuethemselves.Itistruethatthesame   languagedoesnotappearinsection4,thesectiondealingwith `  attemptstocompelarbitration,9U.S.C.4,buttheSupremeCourt  \  hascautionedustointerpretsections3and4oftheFAAtogether.   SeePrimaPaintCorp.v.Flood&ConklinMfg.Co.,388U.S.395, d  40304(1967);seealsoDoctor'sAssocs.,Inc.v.Distajo,66F.3d `  438,45657(2dCir.1995).Atanyrate,Alliedismovingfora   stayofMarie'slawsuitagainstitundersection3.#XXX X'# h  ` HowsamalsoreliesheavilyontheRevisedUniform d ArbitrationActof2000("RUAA").TheRUAA,inturn,asquotedby  theHowsamCourt,establishesthatproceduralissuesaregenerally l forthearbitratorandsubstantiveissuesgenerallyforthecourt. h SeeRUAA6,cmt.2,7U.L.A.1415(Supp.2004).Anothercomment  inthesamesectionoftheRUAAtreatswaiverasanissueforthe p  court:"Waiverisoneareawherecourts,ratherthanarbitrators, !l" oftenmakethedecisionastoenforceabilityofanarbitration "$ clause."RUAA6,cmt.5,7U.L.A.16(Supp.2004). t$&  ` AsexpressedinthecommentarytotheRUAAandelsewhere,  &p!( thereareimportantpolicyreasonswhyacourtandnotan '#* arbitratorshoulddecidewaiverissues,atleastwherethewaiver x)$, Єashasgenerallybeentrueinourcasesisduetolitigation $+t&. relatedactivity.Wheretheallegedwaiverarisesoutofconduct  withintheverysamelitigationinwhichthepartyattemptsto \ compelarbitrationorstayproceedings,thenthedistrictcourthas X powertocontrolthecourseofproceedingsbeforeitandtocorrect   abusesofthoseproceedings.SeeJonesMotorCo.,671F.2dat43; `  Doctor'sAssocs.,66F.3dat456&n.12.  \   ` Also,thecomparativeexpertiseconsiderationsstressed   inHowsamandGreenTreeargueforjudgestodecidethisissue. d  SeeHowsam,537U.S.at85;GreenTree,539U.S.at45253.Judges `  arewelltrainedtorecognizeabusiveforumshopping.SeeTristar,   97Fed.Appx.at464;Bellv.CendantCorp.,293F.3d563,569(2d. h Cir.2002);JonesMotorCo.,671F.2dat43.Aswell,theinquiry d heavilyimplicates"judicialprocedures,"whichGreenTreesuggests  shouldbeanimportantfactorinpresumingthatanissueisforthe l court.SeeGreenTree,539U.S.at45253(emphasisadded). h Further,theproceduralwaiverissueisnotlikelytobe  intertwinedwiththemeritsofthedispute.SeeRUAA6cmt.5, p  7U.L.A.16(Supp.2004);seealsoWiley,376U.S.at55758;Prima !l" PaintCorp.,388U.S.at40304. XXXX "$  ` Finally#XXX XM#,sendingwaiverclaimstothearbitratorwouldbe t$& exceptionallyinefficient.Awaiverdefenseisraisedbyoneparty  &p!( toalawsuitinresponsetoanotherparty'smotiontocompel '#* arbitrationorstayjudicialproceedingsonthebasisofan x)$, arbitrationagreementsignedbytheparties.Ifthearbitrator $+t&. weretofindthatthedefendanthadwaiveditsrighttoarbitrate,  thenthecasewouldinevitablyendupbackbeforethedistrict \ courtwiththeplaintiffagainpressinghisclaims.Thecasewould X havebouncedbackandforthbetweentribunalswithoutmakingany   progress.See2I.R.Macneiletal.,FederalArbitrationLaw `  21.3(1994);RUAA6cmt.5,7U.L.A.16(Supp.2004).  \   ` Thisisdifferentinkindfromthearbitrator'snormal   resolutionofagatewayissue:normally,theresolutionofsuchan d  issuewouldbarnotonlyarbitrationbutanysortoflitigationon `  theissuesbyeitherside.Thus,allowingcourtstodecidewaiver   issuesatleastwhenduetolitigationrelatedactivity h furthersakeypurposeoftheFAA:topermitspeedyresolutionof d disputes.See,e.g.,DeanWitterReynolds,Inc.v.Byrd,470U.S.  213,21820(1985);MosesH.ConeMem'lHosp.,460U.S.at2223; l seealsoMenorahIns.Co.,72F.3dat222(observingincontextof h international,nonFAAarbitrationcasethat"[a]rbitrationclauses  werenotmeanttobeanotherweaponinthearsenalforimposing p  delayandcostsinthedisputeresolutionprocess").Moreover,the !l" HowsamandGreenTreerulesexistpartly"toavoid...delay." "$ Shaw'sSupermarkets,Inc.,321F.3dat255.Weholdthatthe t$& SupremeCourtinHowsamandGreenTreedidnotintendtodisturb  &p!(  thetraditionalrulethatwaiverbyconduct,atleastwheredueto '#* litigationrelatedactivity,ispresumptivelyanissueforthe  court.$  #  9      ׀ \   ` Thewaiverhereissomewhatunusualinthattheclaimis X oflitigationactivitybeforetheEEOCthatisinconsistentwitha   righttoarbitrate,asopposedtoactivitybeforeacourt.But `  thismakesnodifference.Courtsarestillwellsuitedto  \  determinethesortofforumshoppingandproceduralissuesthatare   likelytoariseinlitigationbeforetheEEOC,andsendingthe d  waiverissuetothearbitratorwouldstillbeinefficient.The `  properpresumptioninthiscaseisthatthewaiverissueisforthe   courtandnotthearbitrator. h  ` Allied,seekingreversalonanyavailableground,argues d thatthispresumptionisovercomebecauseofspecificlanguagein  thearbitrationagreement.ThereisnomerittoAllied's l contention.!j  #  10      ׀Ashiftingoftheissuetothearbitratorwillonly h befoundwherethereis"clearandunmistakableevidence"ofsuch  anintentinthearbitrationagreement.Nosuchevidenceexists p  here.FirstOptionsofChicago,Inc.v.Kaplan,514U.S.938,944  (1995)(quotingAT&TTechs.,Inc.v.CommunicationsWorkersofAm., \ 475U.S.643,649(1986)(alterationsomitted)).Thestandardin X FirstOptionsismeanttobeahighone,andthenormal   presumptionsinfavorofarbitrationdonotapply.See,e.g., `  CoadyvAshcraft&Gerel,223F.3d1,910(1stCir.2000).  \   ` Alliedfocusesonthefollowinglanguageinthe   agreement:"Employerandemployeeagreetosubmittofinaland d  bindingarbitrationanyandalldisputes,claims(whetherintort, `  contract,statutory,orotherwise),anddisagreementsconcerning   theinterpretationorapplicationofthisAgreement...including h thearbitrabilityofanysuchcontroversyorclaim...."  d  (emphasisadded).Specifically,Alliedfocusesontheclause  statingthatquestionsof"arbitrability"areforthearbitrator. l "Arbitrability"itselfencompassesavarietyofpossiblemeanings, h butthemostobviousmeaningfocusesoncertainsubstantiveissues,  andparticularlythequestionofwhetheraparticularkindof p  disputeatissuefallswithinthescopeofthearbitrationclause. !l" Mostcasesthatdiscussarbitrabilityfocusonthesesubstantive "$ issues.See,e.g.,FirstOptions,514U.S.at942;AT&T,475U.S. t$& at645;Coady,223F.3dat9;seealsoJohnsonv.PolarisSales,  &p!( Inc.,257F.Supp.2d300,30809(D.Me.2003)(interpreting '#* "arbitrability"languageinarbitrationagreementtothrowissues x)$, ofsubstantivescopetothearbitrator);1DomkeonCommercial $+t&. Arbitration15(3ded.2003)(discussingarbitrabilityquestion  asanissueofthescopeofthearbitrationagreement).The \ contextoftheagreementsuggeststhatthissortofsubstantive X meaningisintendedfortheterm"arbitrability"here;the   referenceto"arbitrability"issurroundedbyreferencestowhich `  typesofclaimsshouldbearbitratedandwhichshouldnotbe.We  \  cannotsaythattheuseofthetermhereevincesaclearand   unmistakableintenttohavewaiverissuesdecidedbythe d  arbitrator.Therearenoreferencestowaiverorsimilarterms `  anywhereinthearbitrationagreement.Neitherpartyshouldbe   forcedtoarbitratetheissueofwaiverbyconductwithouta h clearerindicationintheagreementthattheyhaveagreedtodoso. d Theissueofwhowoulddecidesuchaquestionisan"arcane"one  thatemployeesareunlikelytohaveconsideredunlessclearly l spelledoutbytheemployer.SeeFirstOptions,514U.S.at945. h  ` WeholdthatthequestionofwaiverofAllied'srightto  arbitrateduetoitsparticipationinEEOCproceedingsisproperly p  forthejudge,andweturnnowtothemeritsofthatquestion. !l" B.WaiverduetoEEOCproceedings "$  ` Marieurgesustofindwaiverbothfromthefactthat t$& Alliedfailedtofileforarbitrationduringthependencyofthe  &p!( EEOCinvestigationandfromthefactthatitfailedtofilefor '#* arbitrationaftertheEEOCproceedinghadconcludedwiththeEEOC's x)$, findingofnoviolationbutbeforeMariehadbroughtherprivate $+t&. civilsuitinfederaldistrictcourt.Atleasttwoelementsof  waiverbyconductthatthiscircuithasidentifiedare(1)undue \ delayinbringingarbitrationthatisinconsistentwiththedesire X toarbitrateand(2)prejudicetotheotherpartyfromthatdelay.   SeeRankinv.AllstateIns.Co.,336F.3d8,12(1stCir.2003); `  Menorah,72F.3dat22122.Since,inthiscase,therewasno  \  unduedelay,weneednotreachtheprejudiceissue.    ` Theargumentthatwaiveroccurredduringthependencyof d  theEEOCproceedingsrunscontrarytocircuitprecedent.Brennan `  v.King,139F.3d258,26364(1stCir.1998),foundnowaiver   whereanemployerfailedtoraiseitsrighttoarbitratewiththe h EEOCduringthependencyofEEOCproceedings.Aswell,since d Brennan,theSupremeCourthasheldthatanemployercannotstop  theEEOC,athirdparty,frombringingapublicenforcementaction l againstanemployerbyinvokinganarbitrationagreementbetween h theemployerandtherelevantemployee.SeeEEOCv.WaffleHouse,  Inc.,534U.S.279,29798(2002).TheEEOCisanonpartytothe p  arbitrationagreementandthereforecannotbeboundbyit.Seeid. !l" at294.ThesamelogicappliestoapreliminaryEEOC "$ investigation,whichalsocannotbehaltedbyanarbitration t$& agreementbetweenthecomplainingemployeeandheremployer.  &p!(  ` IftheEEOC'sinvestigationofanemployercannotbe '#* stoppedbyinvokinganarbitrationagreement,thenforcingthe x)$, employeeandemployertobeginanarbitrationproceedingduringthe $+t&. pendencyofthatinvestigationwillautomaticallyresultintwo  adjudicationsinvolvingthesameissueatthesametime:(1)the \ EEOCinvestigationoftheemployerattheemployee'surgingand(2) X thearbitrationbetweentheemployerandtheemployeethatthe   employerinitiated.Thisisquiteinefficient.%  #  11      ׀Further,theEEOC `  investigationmightdefinitivelyresolvetheclaim:theemployee  \  mightreceiveanoticethattheEEOCdidnotwishtostartan   enforcementaction,alongwitharationaleforthisdecisionanda d  righttosueletter,anddeterminethatshedidnotwanttosue `  afterall.ThatwasnotMarie'sreactiontoherletter,butitmay   wellbethereactionofmanyemployees.Andifthiswerethe h reaction,thentherewouldbenoneedforemployeremployee d arbitrationatall.   ` Thus,forcingemployerstobringarbitrationduringthe l pendencyofEEOCinvestigationsisawasteofresourcesandis h contrarytothegeneralpurposesoftheFAA.?  #  12      ׀See,e.g.,Dean  WitterReynolds,Inc.v.Byrd,470U.S.213,21820(1985);Sinkv. p  AdenEnters.,352F.3d1197,1201(9thCir.2003).Itisalso  contrarytotheschemeestablishedinthefederalemployment \ discriminationstatutes,whichgenerallyisdesignedtoavoid X inefficient,duplicativeproceedings.See42U.S.C.2000e   5(f)(1)(employee'sprivatecivillawsuitagainstemployermayonly `  befiledafterEEOChasinvestigatedandissuedarighttosue  \  letter;noprivatecivillawsuitmaybeinitiatedduringthe180   dayperiodallottedforEEOCinvestigationsoraftertheEEOChas d  decidedtobringapublicenforcementaction);seealsoGilmerv. `  Interstate/JohnsonLaneCorp.,500U.S.20,27(1991)(explaining   similarschemeunder29U.S.C.626,theAgeDiscriminationin h EmploymentAct).0  #  13      ׀ d  ` Wereaffirmthatanemployercannotwaiveitsrightto  arbitrationbyfailingtoraisethearbitrationdefensewiththe l EEOCorbyfailingtoinitiatearbitrationduringthependencyof h theEEOCproceedings.Theemployer'sfailuretoinitiate  arbitrationduringthependencyofsuchproceedingsmerelyreflects p  adesiretoavoidinefficiencyandisnotactioninconsistentwith !l" adesiretoarbitrate.Ourholdinghereisinaccordwiththefew "$ caseselsewheretodiscussthisissue.See,e.g.,Brownv.ITT t$& ConsumerFin.Corp.,211F.3d1217,122223(11thCir.2000);  &p!( Gonzalezv.GEGroupAdm'rs,Inc.,321F.Supp.2d165,17172(D.  Mass.2004). \  ` ThesameconsiderationsapplyafteranEEOCinvestigation X hasconcludedwithafindingofnoviolation.Wewillnotforce   theemployertomakeawasteful,preemptivedecisiontoarbitrate `  whenithasnoideawhetheradisputewillstillexist.Asthe  \  Browncourtstated,ingeneralthereisnoneedforthenon   complainingparty,theemployer,tomakea"presuitdemandfor d  arbitration."Brown,211F.3dat1223. `   ` MariehasrightlymadenoclaimherethatAllied's   actionsafterMarie'slawsuitwasfiledconstitutewaiverof h Allied'srighttoarbitrate.Themotiontocompelarbitrationand d stayproceedingswasmadeinareasonablypromptfashionafterthe  lawsuitbegan. l   IV.  h 9 ` Thedecisionofthedistrictcourtis reversed ,andthe 0 caseisremandedforproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.   SinceAlliedhasnotwaiveditsrighttoarbitrate,theissueof T!" timelinessunderthesixtydaycontractualprovisionisforthe #P$ arbitrator,andMariehasraisednootherissuesonappeal,  #  14      ׀an $& ordershouldentercompellingarbitrationofallclaimsthatMarie  hasraisedandeitherstayingordismissingMarie'sjudicial \ proceedingsinconformancewiththeFAA.SeeBercovitchv.Baldwin X Sch.,Inc.,133F.3d141,156&n.21(1stCir.1998)("[A]court   maydismiss,ratherthanstay,acase[under9U.S.C.3]whenall `  oftheissuesbeforethecourtarearbitrable.").  \  Ѐ