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SQ\  `&Times New RomanS7F(X7&  d dD)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7H(X7  ?R%2A`Arial?  SQ\  `&Times New RomanS7F(X7D)2dxd0KS.SampleKP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKP<6X9`(Courier NewKSQ\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB   !"#$% 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)Si) YC$X)XXX    3    _AppellantsdonotchallengetheAntiAidExclusionunderthe  FreeExerciseClause.(O$  YC$X)XXX    5    _InLocke,theCourtquicklydismissed_Davey_'sequalprotection  claims.TheCourtexplainedthat"[_b]ecause_Ԁwehold...thatthe  programisnotaviolationoftheFreeExerciseClause,...we \ applyrational-basisscrutinytohisequalprotectionclaims." 2 Locke,540U.S.at721,n.3.Itbearsclarifyingthatwedonot X readthisstatementtobeablanketrulethatwhereaFreeExercise . Claimfails,allequalprotectionclaimsbasedonthesamefacts   mustalsofail.LookingbacktoJohnsonv.Robinson,weinterpret   thislineofSupremeCourtcasestoapplyonlytotheextentthat `  therelatedequalprotectionclaimsarebasedonatheorythatthe 6   laworgovernmentalactioninquestion"interfereswiththe  \  fundamentalconstitutionalrighttothefreeexerciseofreligion."  2  Johnson,415U.S.at375,n.14.Othertypesofequalprotection   claimsmayhaveindependentforce,andmustbeconsidered   accordingly.Seeid.(findingthatonlyrationalbasisreview d  couldbeappliedtoplaintiff'sequalprotectionclaiminsofaras :  itwasbasedoninterferencewiththefundamentalrighttofreedom `  ofreligion,andthenseparately,thoughbriefly,consideringthe 6 meritsofplaintiff'sclaimthat"conscientiousobjectorsarea   suspectclassdeservingspecialjudicial_protection")._ @ YC$X)XXX    7    _Moreover,inbothHunterandWashington,theSupremeCourtfound  thatthelawswerepurposelyaimedsolelyatunlawfulgoals.  Washington,458U.S.at471(notingthatneithertheinitiative's \ sponsors,northelowercourts,hadanydifficultyperceivingthe 2 racialaimoftheinitiative);Hunter,393U.S.at392(recognizing X Akron'sdecisionto"moveslowlyinthedelicateareaofrace . relations"asaeuphemismforplacinganobstacleinthepathof   progressagainstracialdiscrimination).Weaddressthequestion   ofdiscriminatorypurposebelowinconsideringplaintiffs' `  disparateimpactargument.Weconcludethatplaintiffsfailedto 6   presentevidencesufficienttoproveauniquelydiscriminatory  \  purposeinthiscase. | YC$X)XXX    6    _ButseeTribe,AmericanConstitutionalLaw16-13at1465(2d  ed.1988)("Thusfar,thecaseshavelimitedsuchstrictscrutiny  toinstancesofprejudiceoperatingtothedetrimentofracialor \ ancestralgroups.");seealsoSanAntonio_Indep_.Sch.Dist.v. 2 Rodrguez,411U.S.1,61(1973)(namingraceastheprimeexample X ofasuspectclassification,andlistingnationalorigin,alienage, . _indigency_Ԁandillegitimacybutnotreligion󀄄asother   classificationsthataresometimesconsidered_suspect)._ I YC$X)XXX    2    _ThedistrictcourtfoundthatPlaintiffslackedstandingto  challengetheconstitutionalityoftheAnti-AidAmendmentdirectly,  butthatissuehasnotbeenraisedonappeal. ? YC$X)XXX    4    _Plaintiffsclaimthat_McDaniel_standsforthepropositionthat  opponentsofalawneednotshowthatthelawimposesaparticular  burdenonreligiousbelieforpractice.Althoughthismaybetrue \ asageneralproposition,thisleavesplaintiffstoarguethatthey 2 arebeingdiscriminatedagainstonthebasisofreligious"status," X aswasthecasein_McDaniel_.435U.S.at626-27(findingviolation . ofplaintiff'srighttoFreeExerciseofreligionwherehisstatus   asaministerresultedindiscrimination).However,plaintiffs   makenoheadwaywiththisargumentbecausetheycannotshowthat `  theMassachusettsReligiousExclusiontreatspeopledifferently 6   basedontheirreligious"status."  YC$X)XXX    1    _Insum,becausewerecognizethecommunicativeaspectofthe  initiativeprocess,weapplyintermediatescrutinyto  Massachusetts'initiativeexclusions,whereasthedistrictcourt \ appliedrationalbasisreview.Wefindthattheexclusions 2 neverthelesssurvivethisheightenedreview.OurFreeExerciseand X EqualProtectionClauseanalyseselaborateonthedistrictcourt's . similargroundsfordecision. d(J2YC$ !X>XXX      0   !X)XXX  _  XXXX)SXX8)XXdd8  *!@4 4 UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals  _S@ FortheFirstCircuit  _X)XAy) ` dE<C ` A D  No.041625  O @ MICHAELWIRZBURGER,ETAL.,   @Plaintiffs,Appellants, W  @tt)v. S  @!WILLIAMF.GALVIN,   @ SECRETARYOFSTATE,ETAL.,   @Defendants,Appellees. 1 Ay) ` dE<` A - @ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT  @0 0 FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS  @44[Hon.GeorgeA.O'Toole,Jr.,U.S.DistrictJudge] n Ay) ` dE<` A j @'Before O @Torruella,CircuitJudge,  @ Campbell,SeniorCircuitJudge,  @andLipez,CircuitJudge. W Ay) ` dE< ` A  S!   DerekL.Gaubatz,withwhomAnthonyR.Picarello,Jr.,  8# RomanP.Storzer,Burns&LevinsonLLP,MichaelJ.Meagherand !$ RobertJ.O'Reganwereonbrief,forappellants. "%   WilliamW.Porter,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,withwhom j#& ThomasF.Reilly,AttorneyGeneral,andPeterSacks,Assistant @$' AttorneyGeneral,wereonbrief,forappellees. %f (    `     h      p     Ay) ` dE<'` A '"+   June24,2005 }(#-  Ay) ` d E<(*` A  )*y%/L   *!8)XXdXXd8*,X` XX* ` TORRUELLA,CircuitJudge. Plaintiffsappellantswould  liketoamendtheMassachusettsConstitutiontoallowpublic x financialsupporttobedirectedtowardprivate,religiously $t affiliatedschools.Plaintiffsattemptedtoproposetheir   amendmentthroughtheMassachusettsinitiativeprocedure,buttwo |  distinctprovisionsoftheMassachusettsConstitutionprevented ( x  initiativesonthissubject.Theynowchallengethesesubject $  matterexclusionsfromtheinitiativeprocessonfederalFree   Speech,FreeExercise,andEqualProtectiongrounds.Intheend, ,|  plaintiffs'argumentsfail,andalthoughouranalysisdivergesat ( points,weaffirmthedistrictcourt'sgrantofsummaryjudgment.h   1        @& I.Facts  0  ` Plaintiffsareparentsofchildrenenrolledin H religiouslyaffiliatedschoolswhosoughttoamendAmendment  Article18oftheMassachusettsConstitution(the"AntiAid P Amendment"),whichprohibitspublicfinancialsupportforprivate L primaryorsecondaryschools.\j   2      ׀Mass.Const.amend.art.18.   Article48oftheMassachusettsConstitutionprovidesthat,in T!" additiontotheamendmentprocedureavailabletothestate  legislature,theConstitutionmayalsobeamendedbypopular \ initiative.Mass.Const.amend.art.48,pt.1.Followingthe X requiredprocedure,plaintiffssubmittedaninitiativepetition,   forcertification,totheMassachusettsAttorneyGeneraltomodify `  theAntiAidAmendmentbyaddingasentencestatingthatnothingin  \  theAntiAidAmendmentshallpreventtheCommonwealthfrom   providingloans,grants,ortaxbenefitstostudentsattending d  privateschools,regardlessoftheschools'religiousaffiliation. `  TheAttorneyGeneral,however,deniedcertificationoftheproposed   initiative,becauseArticle48prohibitsamendmentoftheAntiAid h Amendmentbyinitiative(the"AntiAidExclusion")andbecausethe d petitionexplicitlyrelatesto"religiousinstitutions,"another  matterexpresslyexcludedfromtheinitiativeprocessbyArticle48 l (the"ReligiousExclusion"). h  ` SectionTwoofArticle48limitsMassachusetts'  initiativeprocessbylistingthe"ExcludedMatters,"whicharenot p  subjecttopopularactionbyinitiative,including,interalia, !l" appointmentorcompensationofjudges;thepowers,creationor "$ abolitionofthecourts;andspecificappropriationofstatemoney. t$& Mass.Const.amend.art.48,pt.2,2.Thepertinentprovision  &p!( ofArticle48,referredtoastheAntiAidExclusion,statesthat '#* "[n]eithertheeighteenth[AntiAid]amendmentoftheconstitution x)$, ...northisprovisionforitsprotection,shallbethe_subject $+t&. ofaninitiativeamendment,"whiletheReligiousExclusionmandates  that"[_n]o_Ԁmeasurethatrelatestoreligion,religiouspracticesor \ religiousinstitutions...shallbeproposedbyaninitiative X petition."Id.Plaintiffschallengethevalidityofbothofthese   exclusionsundertheU.S.Constitution. `  @$ II.Analysis   \    ` A.FreeSpeechClaim  $   ` ThefirstissuebeforeusiswhethertheMassachusetts   Constitution'slimitationsontheinitiativeprocessviolatethe H  FirstAmendmentfreespeechrightsofprospectiveinitiative D proponents.Appellantsarguethattheexclusionstothestate  initiativeprocess,whichpreventthemfrompursuingamendments L regardingreligionorstateaidtoprivateinstitutions,shouldbe H consideredcontentbasedrestrictionsoncorepoliticalspeech  subjecttostrictscrutiny. P  ` Thedifficultywiththeappellants'argumentisthata L stateinitiativeprocedure,althoughitmayinvolvespeech,isalso   aprocedureforgeneratinglaw,andisthusaprocessthatthe T!" statehasaninterestinregulating,apartfromanyregulationof #P$ thespeechinvolvedintheinitiativeprocess.Inotherwords,the $& challengedexclusionsconstituteregulations"aimedatnon X&!( communicativeimpact,butnonethelesshavingadverseeffectson (T#* communicativeopportunity."LaurenceH.Tribe,American )%, ConstitutionalLaw122at790(2ded.1988).See,e.g.,United \+&. Statesv.O'Brien,391U.S.367,382(1968)(rejectingdraftcard  burner'sclaimthatastatuteprohibitingthedestructionofdraft \ cardsviolatedhisFirstAmendmentrights,reasoningthatthelaw X punishedhimforthe"_noncommunicative_Ԁimpactofhisconduct,"   althoughthecourtrecognizedthesymbolicvalueofburningadraft `  card).Unlikeregulationsthatare"aimedatcommunicative  \  impact,"regulationsthataimatpreventingsomeharmindependent   ofspeechinthiscase,theuseoftheinitiativeprocessfor d  thepassageofcertaintypesoflawsbelievedtobeunsuitedto `  thatprocessarenotpresumedunconstitutional,andarenot   subjectedtostrictscrutiny.Tribe,AmericanConstitutionalLaw h 122,at790.See,e.g.,CityofEriev.Pap'sA.M.,529U.S. d 277,291(2000)(upholdingabanonnudedancing,because"the  ordinancedoesnotattempttoregulatetheprimaryeffectsofthe l expression,i.e.,theeffectontheaudienceofwatchingnude h eroticdancing,butratherthesecondaryeffects,suchasthe  impactsonpublichealth,safety,andwelfare,"whichareunrelated p  toexpression).Regulationsofthistypeare,atmost,subjectto !l" intermediatescrutiny,underwhichtheywillbeupheldifthe "$ "harmfulconsequencesofthisparticularformofexpressive t$& behavior,quiteapartfromanyideasitmightconvey,outweighthe  &p!( good."Tribe,AmericanConstitutionalLaw122,791.See,e.g., '#* _Grayned_v.Rockford,408U.S.104,11516(1972)(upholding x)$, ordinancebarringnoisydemonstrationsnearschools,becausethe $+t&. _governmenthassufficiently"weightyreasons"torestrictthistype  ofexpressiveactivity).Applyingthisbalancing,weuphold \ Massachusetts'exclusionstoitsinitiativeprocessforthereasons X explainedbelow.    ` Beforearrivingatthisexplanation,wewillfirst `  examinetheargumentsofthepartiesataskthatisparticularly  \  difficultinthiscase,becausethepartieshaveplantedthemselves   firmlyatoppositepoles,withplaintiffsarguingforstrict d  scrutinyandMassachusettsarguingthatonlyminimalrationality `  reviewisappropriate.Intheend,wefindthatthelawrequires   ouranalysistoproceedbyamiddlepathinthisapparentbattleof h absolutes.WeholdthatMassachusetts'exclusionstoits d initiativeprocessarenarrowlydrawntofurtherasignificant  stateinterest,andthussurviveintermediatescrutiny. l  ` 1.TheCommunicativeValueoftheInitiativeProcess  h  ` Thefirststepinourfreespeechanalysismustbeto 0 determinewhethercitizens'useoftheinitiativeprocess   constitutesexpressiveconduct,permittingappellantstoinvokethe 8!" FirstAmendmenttochallengetheMassachusettsinitiative "4$ exclusions.See,e.g.,Texasv.Johnson,491U.S.397,403(1989) $& (citingSpencev.Washington,418U.S.405,409-11(1974)).Wedo <&!( notfindthatthereisanyseriousdebateastothispoint.A '8#* stateinitiativeprocessprovidesauniquelyprovocativeand )$, effectivemethodofspurringpublicdebateonanissueof @+&. importancetotheproponentsoftheproposedinitiative.The  SupremeCourthasmadeclearthattheprocessinvolvedinproposing \ legislationbymeansofinitiativeinvolvescorepoliticalspeech. X SeeMeyerv.Grant,486U.S.414(1988)(overturningstate's   prohibitiononusingpaidpetitioncirculators);Buckleyv.Am. `  ConstitutionalLawFound.,Inc.,525U.S.182(1999)(overturning  \  variousregistrationrequirementsforpetitioncirculators).In   Meyer,theSupremeCourtrecognizedthat"thesolicitationof d  signaturesforapetitioninvolvesprotectedspeech."486U.S.at `  422,n.5.Furthermore,themerefactthatplaintiffs"remainfree   toemployothermeanstodisseminatetheirideasdoesnottake h their[preferredmeansof]speechthrough[theinitiativeprocess] d outsidetheboundsofFirstAmendmentprotection."Id.at424.  Clearly,plaintiffshavebeenpreventedfromengaginginthesort l ofactivitythatimplicatestheFirstAmendment.Thisconclusion, h however,innowayendsouranalysis;itonlyopensthedoorforus  toapplyconstitutionalfreedomofspeechprinciplestothe p  limitationsMassachusettsplacesonitsinitiativeprocess. !l"  ` Wehaverecognizedthat"afinelineseparates "$ permissibleregulationofstateelectionprocessesfrom t$& impermissibleabridgementofFirstAmendmentrights,"PrezGuzmn  &p!( v.Gracia,346F.3d229,239(1stCir.2003),andthesameistrue '#* ofregulationofstateinitiativeprocedures.InPrezGuzmn,346 x)$, F.3dat23947,weinvalidatedPuertoRico'srequirementthat $+t&. petitionsignaturesneededforregisteringanewpoliticalpartyto  appearonthegeneralelectionballotbenotarized,holdingthatit \ violatedtheFirstAmendmentofthefederalConstitution.Inso X doing,westatedthat"weaffordexactingscrutinytosevere   restrictionsonballotaccess."Id.at239.Webeganouranalysis `  "withanassessmentoftheseverityoftherestriction,"id.,and  \  havingfoundittobesevere,weappliedstrictscrutiny,id.at   24344. d   ` Plaintiffsarguethatweshouldapplyasimilartwostep `  analysishere.However,plaintiffs'suggestedanalysismakesan   endrunaroundthemostdifficultpartoftheircase.Thedistrict h courtinthiscasefoundthatspeechwasonlyincidentallyaffected d bytheMassachusettssubjectmatterexclusions._ZZBoyette_ZZv._ZZGalvin_ZZ,  311F.Supp.2d237,240(D.Mass.2004).Althoughthedistrict l courtrecognizedthatspeechwasinvolved,itconcludedthatthe h primarygoaloftheexclusionwastopreventcertaintypesoflaws  frombeingpassedbymeansofthepopularinitiativeprocess,and p  nottolimitwhatpeoplecouldsayorhowtheycouldsayit.Id. !l" at24041.Bycontrast,thecommondenominatorinPrez_ZZGuzmn_ZZand "$ othercasescitedbyplaintiffsisadirectrestrictiononthe t$& communicativeaspectofthepoliticalprocess.InPrez_ZZGuzmn_ZZ,  &p!( likeinMeyer,thestateregulatedhowpeoplecouldpromulgate '#* theirpoliticalviews,intheirrespectiveattemptstoputanew x)$, partyontheballot,Prez_ZZGuzmn_ZZ,346F.3dat23031,andto $+t&. circulatepetitionsforaproposedinitiative,Meyer,486U.S.at  414.Strictscrutinyappliedinthesecasespreciselybecausethey \ involveddirectregulationofthepetitionprocessitself. X  ` Webelievethatthepresentcasecallsforalowerlevel   ofscrutiny.Weknowofnogeneralprinciplethat,inadditionto `  constitutionalamendmentorlawmakingviaaprocessinstitutedby  \  thestatelegislature,astatemustprovideanopportunityforits   residentstoproposeconstitutionalamendmentsorlawsonall d  subjectsbymeansofaninitiativeprocess.Whileweacceptthat `  useoftheinitiativeprocesscanfacilitatedisseminationof   initiativeproponents'views,thenextstepinafreespeech h analysisistodeterminewhetherornottheregulationinquestion d aimsatregulatingspeech,orwhetherithassomeotherprimary  end,suchthatanyeffectonspeechispurelyincidental.Aswe l alludedtoattheoutsetofthisanalysis,theFirstAmendment h generallyprovidesgreaterprotectionagainstlawsthatare"aimed  atcommunicativeimpact"oftheconducttheyregulatethanfrom p  laws"aimedatnon-communicativeimpact,butnonethelesshaving !l" adverseeffectsoncommunicativeopportunity."Tribe,American "$ ConstitutionalLaw122,at790.Theprimarygoalofstate t$& initiativeproceduresistocreateanavenueofdirectdemocracy  &p!( wherebycitizenscanparticipateinthegenerationoflegislation '#* Єthatis,theactofcreatinglaw.Lawssuchasthoseconsidered x)$, inMeyeranditsprogenywereaimedatdirectlyregulatingthe $+t&. meansthatinitiativeproponentscouldusetoreachtheiraudience  ofpotentialpetitionsigners.Incontrast,wefindthatsubject \ matterexclusionslikethoseregulatingtheMassachusetts X initiativeprocessaimatpreventingtheactofgeneratinglawsand   constitutionalamendmentsaboutcertainsubjectsbyinitiative. `  Whiletheyeliminateavaluableavenueofexpressionaboutthose  \  subjects,thespeechrestrictionisnomorethananunintended   sideeffectoftheexclusions.Itisbecauseofthissometimes d  overlooked,butneverthelessfundamentalprinciplein `  constitutionalfreespeechdoctrinethatwemustrejectappellants'   proposedanalysis.WeturnnowtoMassachusetts'proposed h alternativeanalysis. d  ` 2.Massachusetts'NeedtoRegulatetheLawmakingAct    ` Thecommunicativepowerofaninitiativestemsprecisely  fromthefactthatitisnotjustspeech;itisaprocessthatcan 4 leadtothecreationofnewlawsorconstitutionalamendments. 0 Massachusettsurgesustoholdthatitsrestrictionsonthe   amendmentprocessdonotregulatespeechquaspeech,andthusdo 8!" nottriggerstrictscrutinyundertheFirstAmendment. "4$  ` Governmentactionsthatareaimedatsomegoalotherthan $& restrictingtheconveyanceofideasaregenerallypermissible,even <&!( iftheyincidentallyinhibitfreespeech.See,e.g.,Arcarav. '8#* CloudBooks,Inc.,478U.S.697(1986)(upholdingtheclosureofan )$, adultbookstorebecauseprostitutionwastakingplaceonthe @+&. premises).Arcaraisaprototypicalexampleofthistypeofcase,  becausethelawinquestiononlyregulatedaspecifictypeof \ conductprostitutionwhichdidnotimplicatespeech. X However,evenalawseeminglyentirelyremovedfromspeechcanhave   effectsonspeech.InArcara,forexample,theprohibitionon `  prostitutionresultedintheclosureofabookstore.Enforcement  \  ofaprohibitionwithsuchincidentaleffectsdoesnot,however,   implicatetheFirstAmendment,andthistypeoflawneedonly d  surviverationalityreview. `   ` Plaintiffsdonotcitetoanyprecedentforthe   propositionthat,undertheFreeSpeechClauseoftheFirst h Amendment,astatemaynotrestrictthesubjectsthatcanbe d addressedthroughitsinitiativeprocess.TheD.C.Circuit  addressedasimilarfreespeechchallengetoarestrictiononan l initiativeprocessinthecaseofMarijuanaPolicyProjectv. h UnitedStates,304F.3d82(D.C.Cir.2002).Inthatcase,the  D.C.CircuitheldthatastatuteprecludingtheuseoftheD.C. p  ballotinitiativeprocesstolowerdrugpenaltiesdidnot !l" unconstitutionallyrestrictfreespeechrightsofmedicalmarijuana "$ advocates,butonlyshiftedtheforumofdebatefromtheDistrict t$& ofColumbiatoCongress.Id.at8586.Thecourtexplainedthat  &p!( "althoughtheFirstAmendmentprotectspublicdebateabout '#*  legislation,itconfersnorighttolegislateonaparticular x)$, subject."Id.at85.Massachusettsarguesthatweshouldadopt  thisreasoningtoapplyrationalbasisreviewintheinstantcase. \   ` 3.RegulatingConductwithSpeechandNonspeechElements  X  ` WecannotagreewiththeD.C.Circuit'sfindingthat   subjectmatterexclusionsfromtheinitiativeprocess"restrict[] |  nospeech,"id.at85,norwithitsconclusionthatthistypeof ( x  selectivecarveout"implicatesnoFirstAmendmentconcerns,"id. $  at83.Forthesamereasons,wealsorejectMassachusetts'   argumentthatweshouldapplyonlyrationalbasisreviewtothe ,|  AntiAidandReligiousExclusions.ThiscaseisnotlikeArcara, ( wheretheSupremeCourtcriticizedtheNewYorkCourtofAppeals  forhavingappliedtheanalysisestablishedinUnitedStatesv. 0 O'Brien,391U.S.367(1968),becausetheCourtdidnotconsider , theregulatedconductprostitutionexpressive.SeeArcara,  478U.S.at705(concludingthat"unlikethesymbolicdraftcard 4 burninginO'Brien,thesexualactivitycarriedoninthiscase 0 manifestsabsolutelynoelementofprotectedexpression").Rather,   wewouldcontinuealongtheanalysislaidoutbytheSupremeCourt 8!" inTexasv.Johnson,491U.S.at403.Havingdeterminedthat "4$ Meyer,486U.S.at422,indicatesthatastateinitiativeprocess $& manifestselementsofprotectedexpression,underJohnson,"wenext <&!( decidewhethertheState'sregulationisrelatedtothesuppression '8#* offreeexpression."491U.S.at403.Here,aswehavealready )$, explained,theMassachusettsexclusionsinquestionregulatewhich @+&. typesoflawsoramendmentscanbepassedbyinitiative,without  anyreferencetowhomayspeakorwhatmessagetheymayconvey. \ Thus,because"theState'sregulationisnotrelatedtoexpression, X ...thelessstringentstandard[theSupremeCourt]announcedin   UnitedStatesv.O'Brienforregulationsofnoncommunicative `  conductcontrols."Id.(citingO'Brien,391U.S.at377(finding  \  that,althoughburningadraftcardcanbeexpressiveconduct,the   federalgovernment'sinterestinpreventingthedestructionof d  draftcardsissufficienttoupholddefendant'sconviction)). `   ` ThestandardenunciatedinO'Briengoverns"when'speech'   and'nonspeech'elementsarecombinedinthesamecourseof h conduct."O'Brien,391U.S.at376.SeealsoClarkv.Community d forCreativeNon-Violence,468U.S.288(1984)(applyingO'Brien  scrutinytotheapplicationofabanoncampingontheMallin l Washington,D.C.,todemonstratorswhosoughttosleepovernight h theretoprotesttheplightofhomelesspeople).Whileweagree  withtheD.C.Circuitthatthistypeofregulationofastate p  initiativeprocessisnotaimedatregulatingspeech,wecannotsee !l" how,giventheSupremeCourt'sanalysisinMeyer,subjectmatter "$ exclusionsfromastateinitiativeprocess"restrict[]nospeech." t$& MarijuanaPolicyProject,304F.3dat85.Tothecontrary,since  &p!( expressionisaffectedbytheregulationsofthestateinitiative '#* process,weapplytheintermediatescrutinystandardsetoutin x)$, O'Brien. $+t&.  ` 4.ApplyingO'BrienScrutiny    ` UndertheO'Brienstandard,conductcombining"speech" x and"nonspeech"elementscanberegulatediffourrequirementsare $t met:(1)theregulation"iswithintheconstitutionalpowerofthe   Government;"(2)"itfurthersanimportantorsubstantial |  governmentalinterest;"(3)"thegovernmentalinterestisunrelated ( x  tothesuppressionoffreeexpression;"and(4)"theincidental $  restrictiononallegedFirstAmendmentfreedomsisnogreaterthan   isessentialtothefurtheranceofthatinterest."O'Brien,391 ,|  U.S.at377.WehavenodifficultyfindingthattheMassachusetts ( exclusionsmeetthesecondrequirement,asMassachusettscertainly  hasasubstantialinterestinmaintainingtheproperbalance 0 betweenpromotingfreeexerciseandpreventingstateestablishment , ofreligion.NeitherdowedoubtthatMassachusettshasa  substantialinterestinrestrictingthemeansbywhichthese 4 fundamentalrightscanbechanged.Wehavealreadystatedthatthe 0 exclusionsaimatpreventingcertainusesoftheinitiative   process,notatstemmingexpression,andthusmeetthethird 8!" O'Brienrequirement. "4$  ` Asforthefirstrequirement,thattheregulationbe $& withintheconstitutionalpowerofthegovernment,wefindthatthe <&!( onlyserious,nonspeechrelatedconstitutionalchallengesto '8#* Massachusetts'powertoregulatethesubjectsthatmaybereached )$, byitsinitiativeprocessaretheFreeExerciseandEqual @+&. Protectionarguments,whichwerejectinthisopinion.Havingnow  concludedthatMassachusetts'interestinprotectingthe \ fundamentalfreeexerciseandfreedomfromstateestablished X religionissubstantialanditsmethodotherwiseconstitutionally   permissible,wefinallyconsiderthefourthO'Brienrequirement: `  whethertheincidentalrestrictionsonwouldbeinitiative  \  proponents'FirstAmendmentfreedomsaregreaterthanessentialto   thefurtheranceofthatinterest.Sinceweseenootherwayin d  whichMassachusettscouldachieveitsinterestinsafeguarding `  thesefundamentalfreedomsinitsConstitutionfrompopular   initiative,werecognizethattherestrictiononspeechisnomore h thanisessential.Thus,weconcludethatMassachusetts'AntiAid d andReligiousExclusionsdonotviolatetheFirstAmendmentfree  speechguarantee. l   ` B.FreeExerciseClaim  h  ` WenowconsiderwhethertheReligiousExclusionviolates 0 theFreeExerciseClauseoftheFirstAmendment.U   3      ׀TheFree   ExerciseClauseguaranteesthat"Congressshallmakenolaw 8!" respectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthefree "4$ exercisethereof,"U.S.Const.amend.I(emphasisadded),andit $& hasbeenappliedtotheStatesthroughtheFourteenthAmendment. <&!( SeeCantwellv.Connecticut,310U.S.296,303(1940). '8#*  ` TheprotectionsprovidedbytheFreeExerciseClausemay  bebrokendownintoanumberofconceptualcategories,noneof \ whichareimplicatedbytheReligiousExclusion.Firstand X foremost,theFreeExerciseClauseentailsanabsoluteprohibition   ongovernmentinfringementonthe"freedomtobelieve."Torcasov. `  Watkins,367U.S.488,49293(1961).Becausetheprohibitionis  \  absolute,lawswhichinfringeonindividuals'freedomofbeliefare   perseunconstitutional.Id.(refusingtoconsiderthestate's d  assertedjustificationsforalawthatinfringedoncitizens' `  freedomofbelief);seealsoWestVirginiaStateBd.ofEduc.v.   Barnette,319U.S.624(1943)(holdingthatastatecouldnot h compelstudentsinpublicschoolstosalutetheflag,wheretheir d religionforbadeit).However,thatprohibitionisinappositehere  becausetheReligiousExclusiondoesnothingeonthereligious l beliefsofinitiativeproponents.SeeMcDanielv.Paty,435U.S. h 618,627(1978)(findingthataTennesseelawthatprecluded  ministersfromeligibilityasconstitutionalconventiondelegates p  didnotinfringeonfreedomofbelief,butnevertheless !l" invalidatingitunderstrictscrutiny). "$  ` InMcDanielv.Paty,theSupremeCourtexaminedastate t$& lawpreventingaministerfromservingasaconstitutional  &p!( conventiondelegateunderstrictscrutiny,becausealthoughitdid '#* notdirectlyburdenhisreligiousbeliefs,itdirectlyburdenedhis x)$, religious"status,acts,andconduct."McDaniel,435U.S.at626 $+t&. 27.Thisprotectionisrelatedto,thoughdistinctfrom,theper  seprohibitiononlawsinfringingonbelief.Arguingfrom \ McDaniel,plaintiffsmaintainthatastateviolatestheFree X ExerciseClausewhenitcreatesageneralpoliticalprocess,but   excludessomefromaccesstothatprocessonthebasisofreligion. `  However,plaintiffsfailtoexplainhowthispropositionappliesto  \  theircase.TheReligiousExclusionpreventsanyonefromproposing   newlawsorconstitutionalamendmentsrelatingtoreligionthrough d  theinitiativeprocess.Itdoesnotexcludereligiouspeople,or `  peopleofacertainreligion,fromproposinglawsoramendments.   Inotherwords,areligiousindividualofanyparticularfaith, h likeanyothercitizen,canproposeanewlaworamendmentonany d subjectthatisopentoamendmentbyinitiative.   ` Moreover,theReligiousExclusionweareaskedto l scrutinizedoesnotdistinguishbasedonreligiousstatus.a   4      ׀Like h thescholarshipprogramatissueinLockev.Davey,theReligious  Exclusiondoesnotdenyplaintiffs"therighttoparticipateinthe p  politicalaffairsofthecommunity,"540U.S.at720 !l" (distinguishingLockefromMcDaniel,435U.S.618);nordoesit  "require[][plaintiffs]tochoosebetweentheirreligiousbeliefs \ andreceivingagovernmentbenefit."Id.at72021(distinguishing X Hobbiev.UnemploymentAppealsComm'nofFla.,480U.S.136(1987);   Thomasv.ReviewBd.ofInd.EmploymentSecurityDiv.,450U.S.707 `  (1981);Sherbertv.Verner,374U.S.398(1963)).Theexclusion  \  appliesequallytomeasuresproposedbyanygrouporindividual,   regardlessoftheirreligiousaffiliationorlackthereof. d   ` HavingconcludedthattheReligiousExclusiondoesnot `  discriminateonthebasisofreligiousbelieforstatus,wealso   brieflynotethatplaintiffsmakenocolorableargumentthatthe h exclusionprohibitsanyreligiousactorconduct.Itdoesnot,for d example,precludeperformingritesrequiredbytheirreligion,see  ChurchoftheLukumiBabaluAyev.CityofHialeah,508U.S.520, l 533(1993)(outlawinganimalsacrificecentraltotheSantera h religion),orsingleouttheirreligion'smethodofworship,see  Fowlerv.RhodeIsland,345U.S.67(1953)(preventingJehovah's p  Witnessesfrommeetinginpublicparkswhileotherdenominations !l" wereallowedtoholdservices).TheSupremeCourthasstatedits "$ reluctancetostrikedown"legislationwhichimposesonlyan t$& indirectburdenontheexerciseofreligion,i.e.,legislation  &p!( whichdoesnotmakeunlawfulthereligiouspracticeitself." '#* Braunfeldv.Brown,366U.S.599,606(1961).Certainly,the x)$, amendmentsthatplaintiffswanttoproposemaybemotivatedby $+t&. theirreligiousbeliefs,buttheydonotclaimthatworkingtopass  thoseamendmentsisanaspectofpracticingtheirreligion. \  ` Finally,plaintiffsaskustoconsiderwhetherthe X passageoftheReligiousExclusionwasmotivatedbyanimustoward   religion.TheSupremeCourthasconsideredtheexistenceofanimus `  motivatingalaw'sproponentswhendeterminingwhetherthelaw  \  violatestheFreeExerciseClauseoftheFirstAmendment.See,   e.g.,Locke,540U.S.at725(findingnothinginthehistory,text d  orapplicationoftheWashingtonscholarshipprograminquestion `  "thatsuggestsanimustowardsreligion").IntheEstablishment   Clausecontext,theSupremeCourthas"oftenstatedtheprinciple h thattheFirstAmendmentforbidsanofficialpurposetodisapprove d ofaparticularreligionorofreligioningeneral."Churchofthe  Lukumi,508U.S.at532(notingthat"[t]hesecases,however,for l themostparthaveaddressedgovernmentaleffortstobenefit h religionorparticularreligions,andsohavedealtwithaquestion  different,atleastinitsformulationandemphasis,fromtheissue p  here").Althoughplaintiffspresentsignificantevidenceofanimus !l" againstCatholicsinMassachusettsin1855whentheAntiAid "$ Amendmentwaspassed,theyfailtoshowthatreligiousanimus t$& motivatedthepassageoftheReligiousExclusionin1918.  &p!( PlaintiffsrelyheavilyononestatementmadebytheReligious '#* Exclusion'ssponsor,indicatingthathewould"protectthe x)$, initiativeandreferendumagainstthereligiousfanaticsand $+t&. againsttheprofessionalreligionists."However,weneednotreach  thequestionofwhetherthistypeoffervoragainstreligiously \ motivatedpoliticalactionwouldrequirethattheamendmentbe X struckdown,becauseplaintiffspresentnoevidencethattheother   membersoftheConstitutionalConventionof19171918actedfrom `  similarmotivations.GiventhewidemarginbywhichtheReligious  \  Exclusionpassed,andthesignificantCatholicrepresentationat   theConvention,weseenoevidencethatanimusagainstreligionwas d  amotivatingfactorbehindtheExclusion'spassage. `   ` Furthermore,plaintiffscitetonocaseinwhichevidence   ofanimustowardreligionwasitselfsufficienttoinvalidatea h governmentaction,withouttheanimusbeingtiedtosomeresulting d infringementonfreedomofbelieforonreligiousstatus,actsor  conduct.Whilewemustapplystrictscrutinywhen"theobjectof l alawistoinfringeuponorrestrictpracticesbecauseoftheir h religiousmotivation,"plaintiffsherehavenotshownthatthe  ReligiousExclusionresultsinanyrestrictionoftheirreligious p  practices.Id.at533(citingEmploymentDiv.,Dept.ofHuman !l" ResourcesofOre.v.Smith,494U.S.872,87879(1990))(emphasis "$ added)(consideringevidenceofanimustowardtheSanterareligion t$& wheretheordinanceprohibitingritualslaughterofanimalsdid  &p!( not,onitsface,targettheSanterareligion,buteffectively '#* outlawedoneofthereligion's"principalformsofdevotion").  x)$,  ` C.EqualProtection    ` PlaintiffsalsoarguethattheMassachusettsExclusions x violatetheprotectionsaffordedbytheEqualProtectionClause. $t U.S.Const.amend.XIV.PlaintiffsarguethattheReligious   Exclusionviolatesequalprotectionguaranteesbecauseitinfringes |  onthefundamentalrighttoreligiousfreeexercise,disadvantages ( x  asuspectclass,andfailsthemoresearchingrationalbasisreview $  requiredinRomerv.Evans,517U.S.620(1996).Theyalso   challengetheAntiAidExclusionunderasuspectclassification ,|  theoryandadisparateimpacttheory.Becauseofthecomplexityof ( thevariousequalprotectionargumentspresented,wewilladdress  theargumentsoneatatime,totheextentthatispossible.In 0 theend,weaffirmthedistrictcourt'sgrantofsummaryjudgment , againstplaintiffs'equalprotectionclaims.  0 ` 1.AllegedViolationoftheEqualProtectionFundamental 4 RighttoFreeExerciseofReligion h` (#` (#  ` Beforemovingtowhatweseeasthesubstanceof " plaintiffs'equalprotectionclaims,wefirstaddresstheir ~ ! argumentthattheMassachusettsExclusionsrestrictstheir *"z# fundamentalrighttofreeexerciseofreligion.Wherea #&% plaintiff'sFirstAmendmentFreeExerciseclaimhasfailed,the % ' SupremeCourthasappliedonlyrationalbasisscrutinyinits .'~") subsequentreviewofanequalprotectionfundamentalrightto (*$+ religiousfreeexerciseclaimbasedonthesamefacts.Locke,540 *%- U.S.at721,n.3(citingJohnsonv.Robison,415U.S.361,375,n. 2,'/ 14,(1974)).W   5      ׀Becauseweheld,above,thattheReligiousExclusion  doesnotviolatetheFreeExerciseClause,weapplyrationalbasis \ scrutinytothefundamentalrightsbasedclaimthatthisexclusion X violatesequalprotection.Forthereasonsstatedthroughoutthis   opinion,wefindthattheMassachusettsExclusionspasssuch `  review.  \  0 ` 2.Plaintiffs'ClaimthattheReligiousandAntiAid   ExclusionsImplicateaSuspectClassification  ` (#` (#  ` Thecentralequalprotectionissuepresentediswhether V  theMassachusettsReligiousExclusionandAntiAidExclusion R impermissiblydistortthepoliticalprocesstothedisadvantageof  religiousindividuals.BecausewefindthattheReligious Z  Exclusiondoesnotdrawdistinctionsbasedonasuspect V classification,weholdthatitdoesnotviolatetheEqual  ProtectionClause. \   ` PlaintiffsclaimthattheReligiousExclusionandAnti X AidExclusiondrawdistinctionsonthebasisofreligion,which   theyargueisasuspectclassificationforpurposesofequal `  protectionanalysis.Y   6      ׀However,evenassumingthatreligious  \  classificationshouldbetreatedassuspect,wedonotseehowthe   ReligiousExclusionandAntiAidExclusiondrawdistinctionsamong d  Massachusettscitizensbasedonasuspectclassification.The `  ReligiousExclusionprohibitsinitiativepetitionsthatconcern   "religion,religiouspracticesorreligiousinstitutions."The h AntiAidExclusionprecludesamendmentbyinitiativeoftheAnti d AidAmendment,which,inadditiontocontainingMassachusetts'free  exerciseclause,preventsstatefundingforprivateinstitutions. l Ontheirface,theExclusionssimplycarveoutparticularsubject h mattersfromtheinitiativeprocess.Theydonotrequiredifferent  treatmentofanyclassofpeoplebecauseoftheirreligious p  beliefs.Theydonotgivepreferentialtreatmenttoanyparticular !l" religion.SeeLarsonv.Valente,456U.S.228,246(1982) "$ (holding,onFirstAmendmentgrounds,that"astatelawgrantinga  denominationalpreference"mustbetreatedassuspect,and \ subjectedtostrictscrutiny).Inshort,thisisnottheclassic X violationofequalprotectioninwhichalawcreatesdifferent   rulesfordistinctgroupsofindividualsbasedonasuspect `  classification.See,e.g.,Strauderv.WestVirginia,100U.S.303  \  (1879)(overturningstatelawwhichlimitedjuryservicetowhite   menonly). d   ` TheSupremeCourthas,nevertheless,sometimesstruck `  downfaciallyneutrallaws,whichitrecognizedwerecraftedto   avoidfacialdiscrimination.See,e.g.,Hunterv.Erickson,393 h U.S.385,38791(1969)(invalidatinganamendmenttotheAkron, d Ohiocitycharter,which,inadditiontotheusualvotebythecity  council,requiredapprovalbyamajorityofthecity'svotersfor l anyordinanceregulatingrealestatetransactions"onthebasisof h race,color,religion,nationaloriginorancestry,"eventhough  thelaw"onitsfacetreats[AfricanAmerican]andwhite,Jewand p  gentileinanidenticalmanner");Washingtonv.SeattleSchool !l" Dist.No.1,458U.S.457(1982)(strikingdownaWashington "$ initiativethatprohibitedschoolboardsfromrequiringchildrento t$& bebusedtomoredistantpublicschools,whileatthesametime  &p!( makingexceptionsforeveryimaginableimpetusforbusingother '#* thanracialintegration).UnliketheMassachusettsExclusions,the x)$, lawinHunterevincesaclear,solelydetrimentaleffectona $+t&. suspectclass.InHunter,thelaw'soneobviousresultwastomake  itmoredifficulttopasslawsprohibitingracialdiscrimination. \ Hunter,393U.S.at391.Similarly,inWashington,althoughthe X initiativedidnotsaysoonitsface,childrencouldbebusedto   amoredistantschoolforvirtuallyanyreasonexceptracial `  integration.458U.S.at471.Incontrast,theMassachusetts  \  ReligiousExclusionpreventsbothinitiativesthatwoulddisfavor   aswellasthosethatmightbenefitreligion,andtheAntiAid d  Exclusion,inadditiontopreventingamendmentoftheclause `  precludingfundingtoprivateinstitutions,alsoprohibits   amendmentofMassachusetts'freeexerciseclause.Unlikethelaws h invalidatedinHunterandWashington,itisundeniablethatthe d MassachusettsExclusionsbothhinderandhelpthecausesofthe  allegedsuspectclass.X   7       l  ` Certainlyanyformofinvidiousdiscriminationbecauseof h religionisforbidden.But"theEstablishmentClauseandtheFree  ExerciseClause[]arefrequentlyintension."Locke,540U.S.at p  718.Statesmayproperlyrefusetoenactlawsthattheyreasonably  believemaytendtoestablishreligion.Whilethefreeexerciseof \ religionisguaranteed,statesupportofreligionis,ingeneral, X disfavored.Andweknowofnoconstitutionalprinciplethat   preventsastatefromdeterminingthatsensitivemeasuresthat `  relatetoreligion,religiouspractices,orreligiousinstitutions  \  shouldnotbemadeorinitiatedbythepublicinitiativeprocess   butratheronlyviathelegislature.Astatemightfearthatsuch d  measures,ifpresentedaspublicreferenda,mightbemorelikelyto `  fuelreligiousstrifeortoresultinenactmentsunfairto   religious(ornonreligious)minorities.Bearingthese h distinctionsinmind,wearedisinclinedtoextendtheracebased d HunterandWashingtonlinesofcasestothiscontext,whichso  closelymirrorsthemandatesfoundinourfederalEstablishment l ClauseandFreeExerciseClause. h  ` 3.PlaintiffsHaveNotShownDiscriminatoryIntent    ` PlaintiffsfurtherarguethattheAntiAidExclusion   violatestheEqualProtectionClauseonadisparateimpacttheory. 8!" However,thisargumentfailsbecauseplaintiffshavenotshowna "4$ discriminatorypurposebehindtheexclusion."[A]law,neutralon $& itsfaceandservingendsotherwisewithinthepowerofgovernment <&!( topursue,"isnotinvalidundertheEqualProtectionClausesimply '8#* becauseitmaydisproportionatelyaffectasuspectclass. )$, Washingtonv.Davis,426U.S.229,242(1976)."Anunwaveringline @+&. ofcasesfrom[theSupremeCourt]holdsthataviolationofthe  EqualProtectionClauserequiresstateactionmotivatedby \ discriminatoryintent;thedisproportionateeffectsofstateaction X arenotsufficienttoestablishsuchaviolation."Hernndezv.   NewYork,500U.S.352,37273(1991).Plaintiffspresentevidence `  thatwidespreadantiCatholicprejudicewasamotivatingfactor  \  behindpassageoftheoriginalAntiAidAmendmentin1855,afact   whichdefendantsdonotdispute.However,theAntiAidAmendment d  waslargelyoverhauledin1917,withthesupportof85ofthe94 `  CatholicdelegatestotheConstitutionalConvention,andsoon   afterwards,theAntiAidExclusionwaspassedwithsimilarlybroad h support.Noevidencehasbeenofferedthattheexclusionwas d motivatedbythesameAntiCatholicanimusthatimpelledthe  passageoftheoriginalAntiAidAmendment.Plaintiffscannotmix l andmatchtheintentbehindoneamendmentandplaceitwiththe h impactofalater,distinctamendment.Thus,withoutreachingthe  questionofwhethertheAntiAidExclusionhasadisparateeffect p  onreligiousindividuals,werejectplaintiffs'equalprotection !l" disparateimpactargumentbecauseplaintiffsfailtoshowthe "$ requireddiscriminatoryintent. t$&   ` 4.RationalBasisReviewUnderRomerv.Evans   &p!(  ` Havingrejectedplaintiffs'argumentsthatthe '8#* MassachusettsExclusionsshouldbesubjectedtostrictscrutiny,we )$, concludebyconsideringwhethertheexclusionssurvive_rational @+&. basisreview."[_I]f_Ԁalawneitherburdensafundamentalrightnor  targetsasuspectclass,wewillupholdthelegislative \ classificationsolongasitbearsarationalrelationtosome X legitimateend."_Romer_v.Evans,517U.S.620,631(1996)   (strikingdownanamendmenttotheColoradoConstitutionthatwould `  haveprecludedprotectionfromdiscriminationonthebasisof  \  sexualorientationasfailingrationalbasisreview).Inthis   case,wehavenodifficultyfindingthatMassachusetts'goalof d  preventingtheestablishmentofreligionisalegitimateone. `  Additionally,thechosenmeansclearlybeararationalrelationto   thatend.Thus,theinstantcaseiseasilydistinguishedfrom h _Romer_,wheretheCourtfoundthatpassageoftheColoradoamendment d couldonlybeexplainedby"'abare...desiretoharma  politicallyunpopulargroup,'"which"'cannotconstitutea l legitimategovernmentalinterest.'"Id.at634(quoting_Dep't_Ԁof h Agric.v.Moreno,413U.S.528,534(1973)).  @,," III.Conclusion  p   ` Fortheforegoingreasons,thedecisionofthedistrict 8!" courtisaffirmed. "4$  ` Affirmed.  $&