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UN0 UF~ ^ w 4   E f a m ( nX0 N 0U 0 0 0 0y 0\ 0< 0 0 0 0C 0 0 0 0] B+ 0H 0 0 0@ 0 0 0z 0H 0 0 0 0b!N""^!"b""""""""""UF"nX"N;$b=$E$[$x%bq()*,. 3>AB#FKONICA MINOLTA 7085/IP-602,,,,0X(#$  0  ( $XXXX<6X9`("Courier NewTT(F:2E$  !XhXXX        0  <4 9Z+ Courier New <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@vr Z6Times New Roman Regular<4 9Z+.Courier New RegularD2s Nx0r?,}backup3|xTABLE AU <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXx6X@JQX@ *+ (_2623  ..*G+M (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;M (_12   #p x #23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *D+M (_24   ," hp x ,23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *A+M (_23  ` ) hp x )23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *>+M (_22   &hhp x &23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *;+M (_21   #p x #23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *8+M (_20  h  p x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *5+M (_19   pp x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  *2+M (_18    x 23  ..  5+ ` hp x 5  * (_1723  Ԁ*GM (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *DM (_15   ," hp x ,23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *AM (_14  ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *>M (_13   &hhp x &23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5   d*8M (_11  h  p x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  *5M (_10   pp x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  (2M &_9    x 23  Ԁ  5+ ` hp x 5  ( &_823  (GM &_7   /%` ` hp x /23   5+ ` hp x 5  (DM &_6   ," hp x ,23   5+ ` hp x 5  (AM &_5  ` ) hp x )23   5+ ` hp x 5  (>M &_4   &hhp x &23   5+ ` hp x 5  (;M &_3   #p x #23   5+ ` hp x 5  (8M &_2  h  p x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  (5M &_1   pp x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  &2M $_    x 23   5+ ` hp x 5  L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT- -  .Courier New Regular<6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXx6X@JQX@- -    E$X@xXXX      1    _ԀThecomplaintalsoallegedasubstantivedueprocess  violation,butthatclaimhasnotbeenpursuedonappeal.  E$X@xXXX      2    _ԀHealsoclaimedthathisrightswereviolatedbecausethe  statutoryprocedureswerenotfollowed.Aswenotebelow,a  plaintiffisnotnecessarilyentitled,asamatteroffederaldue \ process,toalloftheproceduresprovidedbystatelaw.Seeinfra 2 atp.13n.6;seealsoBellvillev.TownofNorthboro,375F.3d25, X 31(1stCir.2004)("Thestates,ofcourse,arefreetoaccord . theircitizensrightsbeyondthoseguaranteedbyfederallaw."). X E$X@xXXX      3    _ԀTheyassertedthatthestatutecoveredonlyemployeeswho  hadbeeninthepositionforthreeyearsatthetimetheCourt  ReorganizationActwaspassedin1978.  E$X@xXXX      4    _ԀWhere,ashere,thedistrictcourtofferednorationalefor  itsdecision,ourreviewobviouslymustbeplenary.  E$X@xXXX      5    _ԀAplausibleclaimthattheassertedreorganizationwas  pretextualwouldwarrantfurtherinquiry.SeeMisek,783F.2dat  10001;Hartman,636F.Supp.at141617;seealsoDuffy,892F.2d \ at147;cf.Milne,381Mass.at583n.3.  E$X@xXXX      6    _ԀAsamatteroffederaldueprocess,Whalenisnot  necessarilyentitledtotheproceduresspelledoutinMass.Gen.  LawsAnn.ch.211B,8.Althoughapropertyrightinemployment \ mustarisefromstatelaw,whatprocessisdueisaquestionof 2 federallaw.Loudermill,470U.S.at541.Weneednot,anddo X not,considertheremedyavailableforviolationofhisstatutory . proceduralrights.SeeO'Neillv.Baker,210F.3d41,49n.9(lst   Cir.2000)(notingthat"claims[]involvingstateprocedural   guaranteesthatareaboveandbeyondconstitutionaldueprocess `  requirements"arenotproperlybeforeacourtexamininganalleged 6   deprivationofaplaintiff'sfederaldueprocessrights).  \    Wealsodonotaddressinthisopinionwhetherdueprocessmay  2  insomeinstances"requiremorethanasimpleopportunitytoargue   ordeny"theemployer'sreasonsfordismissal,Loudermill,470U.S.   at552(opinionofBrennan,J.,concurringinpartanddissenting d  inpart).SeeGilbertv.Homar,520U.S.924,930(1997)("'[D]ue :  processisflexibleandcallsforsuchproceduralprotectionsas `  theparticularsituationdemands.'")(quotingMorrisseyv.Brewer, 6 408U.S.471,481(1972)). $ E$X@xXXX      7    _ԀTheDCCircuitreachedaseeminglycontraryconclusionin  Wash.Teachers'UnionLocal#6,109F.3dat774,whereitheldthat  dueprocessdidnotrequirepreterminationhearingsformorethan \ 400teacherswholosttheirjobsinareductioninforce("RIF") 2 eventhoughtheteacherswererankedinpartbytheirprincipals X basedonperformance.Thecourthighlightedtheburdenthatwould . beimposedontheschooldistrictbypreterminationproceedings   forsomanyindividuals,id.at781,andminimizedthevalueof   givingteachersanopportunitytorespondtotheprincipals' `  rankingsbecause"principalsenjoyedneartotaldiscretionin 6   rankingtheirteachersandbecausetherecordcontainsnoevidence  \  thatfactualerrorsoccurred,"id.at780.  2    UnionLocal#6maybefactuallydistinguishable.Thecourt's   opiniondoesnotindicatehowthe400layoffsweredistributed   amongthedistrict'sschoolsandwhethersomeprincipalsfaced d  substantialstaffreductions.Here,itappearsthatthesupervisor :  whoselectedtheassistantclerksforlayoffwouldhaveneededto `  meetbrieflywithonlythreeemployees.Weareunpersuadedthat 6 thisminimalprocesswouldhavebeenundulyburdensome.Moreover,   Whalenwasgivennoexplanationforhisselection;theteachersin  UnionLocal#6hadbeengivenanopportunitytoreviewandsignthe h rankingformsusedtoeffectuatetheirRIF.Seeid.at77778. >   TotheextenttheD.C.Circuitreliedonthediscretionary d natureoftheteachers'rankingstodiscounttheneedforpre : terminationprocess,wedisagree.WenotethattheSupremeCourt  hasrecognizedthatapretermination"opportunitytoinvokethe  discretionofthedecisionmaker"canbeofvalueeveninthe l absenceoffactualerrors.SeeLoudermill,470U.S.at543. B     E$X@xXXX      8    _ԀThecourtaskedthefollowingquestionoflawinits  certificationorder:"WhenaMassachusettsDistrictCourtreduces  thetotalnumberofassistantclerksforbudgetaryreasons,must \ theterminationofaDistrictCourtassistantclerkwhohasheld 2 hispositionformorethanthreeyearssincetheenactmentof X M.G.L.c.21810bedoneinaccordancewiththeproceduresof . M.G.L.c.211B8?"Thisformulationofthequestionwasproposed   byWhalen.  E$X@xXXX      9    _ԀWenotethat,onoccasion,wehavecombinedthesecondand  thirdprongsofthequalifiedimmunityanalysisintoasinglestep.  RiverdaleMillsCorp.,392F.3dat60n.5(citingTremblayv. \ McClellan,350F.3d195,199200)(1stCir.2003)).  E$X@xXXX      10    _ԀWewishtoemphasizethatthefactorsdistinguishing  Whalen'scircumstancesfromatypicalbudgetarylayoff!while  perhapsleadingareasonableofficialastray!donotinthiscase \ leadtoadifferentbalanceofthecompetinginterestsidentified 2 inLoudermill.Aswehavenoted,theadministrativeburdenin X providingexplanationtotheaffectedassistantclerkswouldhave . beenslight,andtherewasnoneedforthe"expeditiousremoval"of   anunsatisfactoryemployee.Ontheotherhand,theemployee's   interestinretainingemploymentandthejointinterestinavoiding `  erroneousdecisionsremainhigh.  E$X@xXXX      11    _ԀOurholdinginSectionIIthattheindividualsareentitled  toqualifiedimmunityeliminatesthatavenueofrelief.  !X@xXXX  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * ! X5XXX@x >X X5     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals Ik >  FortheFirstCircuit  S Ik X@xX S  A') ` dE< ` A   No.041976 K  @,,"JAMESM.WHALEN,  G  @ Plaintiff,Appellant,   @tt)v. O  @44MASSACHUSETTSTRIALCOURT;WILLIAMW.TEAHAN,JR., K    ROBERTF.KUMOR,BARBARAA.DORTCHOKARA;ROBERTE.FEIN, ! @@*Defendants,Appellees. } A') ` dE<(` A )y @@ddAPPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT ^ FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS   @@dd[Hon.JosephL.Tauro,U.S.DistrictJudge] f A') ` dE<` A b @@'Before G @@((Torruella,CircuitJudge,   CoffinandStahl,SeniorCircuitJudges. y! A') ` dE<!` A !K$       HarveyA.SchwartzwithwhomLaurieFranklandRodgers,Powers "0& &SchwartzLLPwereonbriefforappellant. #'   CharlesM.Wyzanski,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,withwhom $( ThomasF.Reilly,AttorneyGeneral,wasonbriefforappellees. b% ) *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  '4#,'4#  SIH(#- @@38386@@SFebruary4,2005 )n$/  RHC)D%0" @@38386 @@ R(H(#1  (  * !   |-(4?   9bDo[X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:<H?AXoEb8A@xAXXdd8  COFFIN,SeniorCircuitJudge. InSeptember2002,the  Springfield(Massachusetts)DistrictCourtwasobligedtolayoff x threeofitsnineassistantclerksbecauseofabudgetdeficit. $t AppellantJamesWhalen,whohadheldhispositionsince1989,was   oneoftheclerkschosenforlayoff.Hesubsequentlybroughta |  federalcivilrightssuitagainsttheMassachusettsTrialCourtand ( x  fourindividuals,claimingthathisproceduraldueprocessrights $  hadbeenviolatedbecausehewasgivennoopportunitytocontest   hisselectionforlayoff.See42U.S.C.1983.F #  1      ׀Hesought ,|  damagesagainsttheindividualdefendantsandinjunctiverelief ( againsttheTrialCourt.Thedistrictcourtdismissedthecase  againsttheindividualdefendantsbasedonqualifiedimmunityand, 0 afterWhalenwasreinstatedtohisposition,dismissedthecase , againsttheTrialCourtasmoot.Whalenappealsbothdecisions.    Intworespects,Whalen'sclaimsrequireustolookbeyond 4 basicprinciples,firstinconsideringtheproceduraldueprocess 0 rightsassociatedwithabudgetarytermination,andsecondin   consideringthenatureoftheinjunctivereliefpermittedagainst 8!" astateunderExParteYoung,209U.S.123(1908).Aftercareful "4$ review,weconcludethatWhalensufferedadueprocessinjury,but $& thattheindividualdefendantsproperlyweregrantedimmunity <&!( becausethelawwasnotclearlyestablishedthathewasentitledto '8#* apreterminationhearing.Becausewealsoconcludethatthe  EleventhAmendmentbarsafederalcourtfromorderingthe \ injunctivereliefWhalenseeks,weagreewiththedistrictcourt X thattheremainderofthecaseshouldbedismissedasmoot.   Ѐ@hh#I.Background󀀈 `    Afterimplementingaseriesofvoluntarycostsavingmeasures  \  inthesummerof2002,includingreducedworkweeksandextended   leavesofabsence,administratorsfortheMassachusettsTrialCourt d  determinedthattheiranticipatedbudgetshortfallalsorequireda `  numberofinvoluntarylayoffs.IntheSpringfieldDistrictCourt,   the"[i]nvoluntarypersonnelreductions"affectedatotaloftwelve h employees,includingthreeofthethennineassistantclerks.In d anaffidavit,theTrialCourt'sPersonnelAdministratorstatedthat  theChiefJusticeforAdministrationandManagement("CJAM"), l BarbaraA.DortchOkara,had"determinedthatmanagershadthe h discretiontoconsidersuchfactorsaspriordiscipline,  attendance,workproductandotherrelevantfactors"inselecting p  theemployeestobelaidoff. !l"   AppellantWhalenreceivedaletterfromDortchOkaradated "$ August29notifyinghimthat,asaresultofabudgetshortfall,he t$& hadbeenselectedforlayoffeffectiveSeptember13.Theletter  &p!( gavenoreasonsforhisselection.Itwasaccompaniedbymaterials '#* explainingthecontinuationofhishealthinsurancebenefitsand x)$, theproceduresforapplyingforunemploymentcompensation.At $+t&. leasttwooftheassistantclerksretainedbythecourthadless  seniorityinthepositionthanappellant.Beforethelayoffwent \ intoeffect,additionalfundingbecameavailableandoneofthe X otherassistantclerksselectedforlayoffwasretained.That   employeehadheldhisjobforlessthanthreeyears. `    Thetenureandterminationofassistantclerksisaddressedby  \  twoMassachusettsstatutes.UnderMass.Gen.LawsAnn.ch.218,   10,anassistantclerkwhohasheldhispositionforthreeyears d  beforetheeffectivedateoftheact"shallholdofficeduringgood `  behavior,"subjecttoapplicableretirementlaws.Theprovision   goesontostatethatsuchanemployeemayberemovedfromoffice h underproceduresauthorizedbyMass.Gen.LawsAnn.ch.211B,8. d Section8providesthatanemployeecoveredbytheprovision"may  beremovedforcause."Sucharemovalmustbereviewedbythe l advisorycommitteeonpersonnelstandardsandisnotfinaluntil h approvedbythecommittee.Coveredemployeeswhohaveservedthree  fullyearsinapositionhavetherighttoappearpersonallybefore p  thecommitteebeforeitrendersadecision. !l"   Inhiscomplaint,Whalencontendedthattheseprovisionsgave "$ himaprotectedpropertyinterestinhisjobandthatthe t$& FourteenthAmendment'sguaranteeofdueprocessthusentitledhim  &p!( tonoticeofthereasonswhyhewasselectedforlayoffandapre '#* terminationopportunitytorespondtothereasonsgiven.See, x)$, e.g.,ClevelandBd.ofEduc.v.Loudermill,470U.S.532,542 $+t&. (1985);Wojcikv.Mass.StateLotteryComm'n,300F.3d92,10102  (lstCir.2002).G #  2      ׀Hesoughtmonetarydamagesfromfourindividuals \ !twojusticesoftheSpringfieldDistrictCourt,theclerkofthat X court,andCJAMDortchOkara!andaninjunctionorderingthecourt   toreinstatehimwithbackpayandbenefits. `    ThedefendantsinitiallyarguedthatWhalendidnothavethe  \  requisitethreeyearsofservicetoqualifyforsection10'stenure   protection,Hj #  3      ׀butabandonedthatargumentandconcededthat d  "plaintiff'slengthofservicewassufficienttoqualifyhim"under `  thestatute.Theymaintained,however,thathewasnotentitledto   theproceduresoutlinedinsection8ofchapter211Bbecausethe h provisionappliesonlytoremovalforcauseandnotlayoff. d Moreover,theindividualdefendantsclaimedtheshieldofqualified  immunity,arguingthatWhalendidnothaveaclearlyestablished l constitutionalrighttoahearingbeforeabudgetdriven h terminationofhisposition!and,indeed,hadnorighttosucha   hearingatall. p    Withoutarticulatingitsreasons,thedistrictcourtgranted   immunitytotheindividualdefendants.Itthencertifiedtothe \ MassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourtthequestionwhethersection X 8'sproceduralrequirementsapplytoanassistantclerkwhois   terminatedwhenthecourtreducesthetotalnumberofsuch `  positionsforbudgetaryreasons.InMarch2004,whilethat  \  questionwaspendingbeforetheSJC,Whalenwasreinstated.In   June,thedefendantsmovedtodismisstheremainderofthecase, d  whichinvolvedonlyinjunctiverelief,asmoot.Thedistrictcourt `  grantedthemotionoverWhalen'sobjectionandorderedthe   certificationquestiontobewithdrawnfromtheSJC. h   Onappeal,Whalenchallengesboththegrantofqualified d immunitytotheindividualdefendantsandthemootnessruling.He  claimsthathisconstitutionalrighttosomekindofpre l terminationprocesswasclearlyestablished,andthatreasonable h courtofficialswouldhaveunderstoodthatthepropertyrighthe  heldinhispositionentitledhimtonoticeofthereasonshewas p  selectedforlayoffandanopportunitytorespond.SeeHarlowv. !l" Fitzgerald,457U.S.800,81819(1982)(explainingqualified "$ immunityinquiry);Mihosv.Swift,358F.3d91,102(1stCir.2004) t$& (same).Hefurthermaintainsthathisdemandforinjunctiverelief  &p!( didnotbecomemootuponhisreinstatementbecausehestillseeks '#* restorationofcredittowardhisretirementandpensionbenefits x)$, forthetimehewasoutofwork. $+t&.   Weconsidereachoftheseissuesinturn.  @II.QualifiedImmunity \   GuidedbySupremeCourtprecedent,wehaveconsistently X appliedathreeparttestforevaluatinganofficial'sclaimto   qualifiedimmunity.RiverdaleMillsCorp.v.Pimpare,392F.3d55, `  6061(1stCir.2004);Mihos,358F.3dat102;Subohv.Dist.  \  Attorney'sOffice,298F.3d81,90(1stCir.2002);seealsoHope   v.Pelzer,536U.S.730,73536(2002);Harlow,457U.S.at81819. d  Wefirstconsiderwhethertheplaintiff'sallegations,iftrue, `  establishaconstitutionalviolation.Hope,536U.S.at736;   Mihos,358F.3dat102.Thesecondquestioniswhethertheright h wasclearlyestablishedatthetimeoftheallegedviolation. d Suboh,298F.3dat90.Finally,weaskwhetherasimilarly  situatedreasonableofficialwouldhaveunderstoodthatthe l challengedactionviolatedthatright.Mihos,358F.3dat102; h Suboh,298F.3dat90.Wereviewqualifiedimmunitydeterminations  denovo,atleasttotheextenttheyturnonissuesoflaw.Mihos, p  358F.3dat102;seealsoMitchellv.Forsyth,472U.S.511,52830 !l" (1985).I #  4       "$   A.Dotheallegationsadduptoaconstitutionalviolation? t$& ЀWhalencontendsthathehadapropertyrightincontinued  &p!( employmentthatwascreatedbystatelawandthat,consequently,he '#* hadarighttoproceduraldueprocessthatwasviolatedwhenhewas  givenneithernoticeofthespecificreasonsforhislayoffnor \ opportunitytorespond.Weagreethattheseallegationsgenerally X describeaconstitutionalinjuryandconclude,forreasonsweshall   explain,thattheconstitutionalclaimremainsviableevenwhen `  examinedmoreparticularly.  \    Ourcourtconsistentlyhasheldthatanemployeewhounder   statelawcanbeterminatedonlyfor"justcause"hasa d  constitutionallyprotectedpropertyinterestinhisemployment. `  See,e.g.,Wojcik,300F.3dat102;Croninv.TownofAmesbury,81   F.3d257,260n.2(lstCir.1996);Perkinsv.Bd.ofDirs.,686 h F.2d49,51(lstCir.1982);seealsoGilbertv.Homar,520U.S. d 924,92829(1997)("[W]ehavepreviouslyheldthatpublic  employeeswhocanbedischargedonlyforcausehavea l constitutionallyprotectedpropertyinterestintheirtenureand h cannotbefiredwithoutdueprocess.");Loudermill,470U.S.at  53839(propertyrighttocontinuedemploymentcreatedbystatute p  thatgave"'classifiedcivilserviceemployees'"theright"to !l" retaintheirpositions'duringgoodbehaviorandefficient "$ service,'"withdismissalconditionedon"'misfeasance, t$& malfeasance,ornonfeasanceinoffice'").ThetwoMassachusetts  &p!( statutesatissuehere,certainlywhentakentogether,fitthis '#* model,specifyingthatanassistantcourtclerkhastherightto x)$, retainhisposition"duringgoodbehavior"andtoberemovedonly $+t&. "forcause."Seesuprap.4(discussingMass.Gen.LawsAnn.ch.  218,10andch.211B,8). \   RelyingontheSupremeCourt'sdecisioninBishopv.Wood,426 X U.S.341(1976),defendantsassertthattheMassachusettsstatutes,   ratherthancreatinganenforceableexpectationofcontinued `  employment,simplysetoutprocedurestogovernremovalof  \  employees.InBishop,theSupremeCourtacceptedthe   interpretationofalocalordinancebyaNorthCarolinajudgewho d  hadconcludedthatanemployeewasterminableatwill,eventhough `  theapplicableordinance"[o]nitsface...mayfairlybereadas   conferring...aguarantee"tocontinuedemployment.Seeid.at h 345.TheCourtnotedthatithadinthepastacceptedan d interpretationofstatelawinsimilarcircumstances"evenifan  examinationofthestatelawissuewithoutsuchguidancemighthave l justifiedadifferentconclusion."Id.at346. h   NosuchcontraryinterpretationoftheMassachusettsstatutes  hasbeencitedbydefendantsinthiscase,andtheirrelianceon p  Bishopisthereforemisplaced.Weseenobasisuponwhichto !l" departherefromourordinaryconclusionthataguaranteeoftenure "$ intheabsenceof"goodcause"forremovalcreatesa t$& constitutionallyprotectedpropertyinterest.Whalenthushada  &p!( propertyrighttocontinuedemploymentasanassistantclerk. '#*   Whetherthatpropertyinterestgaverisetoarightto x)$, proceduraldueprocess,however,isanothermatter.Althougha $+t&. propertyrightandproceduraldueprocesstypicallygohandinhand  !triggeringarequirementfor"somekindofahearing"before \ discharge,Bd.ofRegentsv.Roth,408U.S.564,56970&n.7 X (1972)!wehaverecognizedalimited"reorganizationexception"   todueprocessthateliminatestheneedforahearingwherea `  reorganizationorothercostcuttingmeasureresultsinthe  \  dismissalofanemployee.SeeDuffyv.Sarault,892F.2d139,147   (lstCir.1989);seealsoMisekv.CityofChicago,783F.2d98, d  10001(7thCir.1986);Hartmanv.CityofProvidence,636F.Supp. `  1395,140910(D.R.I.1986)(Selya,J.);cf.Milnev.Sch.Comm.of   Manchester,381Mass.581,58283&n.3(1980)(statutorynotice h andhearingrequirementsinapplicabletodismissaloftenured d teacherduetodeclineinenrollment).J #  5      Defendantsassertthat,  evenifWhalenhasapropertyright,thisprecedentestablishes l thatnoconstitutionalviolationoccurred.Additionally, h defendantscontendthatWhalenwasnot"removed"fromhisjobfor  cause,butmerelylaidoff,andsothedueprocessprocedureswere p  nottriggered. !l"   Defendants'argumentswouldhaveconsiderableforceifan "$ entirelyneutrallayoffwereatissue,i.e.,ifthelayoffdecision t$& wereunrelatedtoindividualqualifications.Thecaselawthat  &p!( requiresapreterminationhearingforanemployeewithastate  protectedpropertyinterestinhisjobreflects"abalancingofthe \ competinginterestsatstake"whenanemployeewithalegitimate X claimtopermanencefacesa"forcause"lossofhisposition.See   Loudermill,470U.S.at542.Thegovernment'sinterestsin"the `  expeditiousremovalofunsatisfactoryemployeesandtheavoidance  \  ofadministrativeburdens"arecounterednotonlybytheemployee's   significantinterestinretainingemploymentbutalsobythe d  interestinavoidinganerroneoustermination.Id.at54243. `  8  [S]omeopportunityfortheemployeetopresenthisside   ofthecaseisrecurringlyofobviousvalueinreaching  anaccuratedecision.Dismissalsforcausewilloften h involvefactualdisputes....Evenwherethefactsare > clear,theappropriatenessornecessityofthedischarge d maynotbe;insuchcases,theonlymeaningful : opportunitytoinvokethediscretionofthedecisionmaker  islikelytobebeforetheterminationtakeseffect.   Id.at543. B   Whentheterminationatissueis"ingoodfaithdirectedat > positionsratherthanindividuals,"Hartman,636F.Supp.at1409,  however,thehearingcontemplatedbytheSupremeCourt'sdue F ! processprecedentlosesitsrelevance."Insuchcases,sincethere !B# arenochargesagainsttheemployee...involved,therewouldbe #% nooccasionforahearing,anditwouldbeidletoholdone." J% ' Kuszav.Maximonis,363Pa.479,48283,70A.2d329,331(1950) &F") (quotedinHartman,636F.Supp.at1411).Inaddition,because (#+ reorganizationsoftenaffectnumerousemployees,thegovernmental N*%- interestinefficientadministrationmayweighmoreheavilyinsuch +J'/ circumstances.See,e.g.,Mayfieldv.Kelly,801F.Supp.795,798  (D.D.C.1992)("ARIF[reductioninforce]involvesalargenumber \ ofemployees...forwhomitisimpossibletohavepre X terminationhearings.")(quotedinWash.Teachers'UnionLocal#6   v.D.C.Bd.ofEd.,109F.3d774,780(D.C.Cir.1997)). `    Underthisprecedent,iftheTrialCourthadingoodfaith  \  eliminatedthepositionofassistantclerk,Whalenclearlywould   havenoconstitutionalclaim.Similarly,ifthethreeassistant d  clerksoriginallyselectedforlayoffhadbeenchosenentirely `  basedonfactorsunrelatedtopersonalperformance!forexample,   seniorityorjoblocation!the"reorganizationexception"caselaw h wouldbeonpoint.Likewise,thedistinctionthatdefendantsdraw d betweena"removalforcause"anda"layoff"!thelatterconnoting  anabsenceofperformancefactors!wouldbepertinentifWhalen's l selectionhadbeendirectedsolelyathispositionratherthanat h him.SeeMass.Gen.LawsAnn.ch.31,1(a"layoff"is"a  temporarydiscontinuanceofemploymentforlackofworkorlackof p  money"). !l"   Here,however,therecordindicatesthatperformancefactors "$ playedaroleinWhalen'sselectionforlayoff.Asnotedabove, t$& CJAMDortchOkaraauthorizedmanagerstotakeintoaccounta  &p!( varietyofqualitativefactorsinchoosingwhichthreeassistant '#* clerkstolayoff.Thoseindividualizedconsiderationstookon x)$, evengreatersignificanceforWhalenwhenfundsbecameavailableto $+t&. retainoneofthethreeclerksinitiallyselectedfortermination,  andhewaspassedoverinfavorofsomeonewithconsiderablyless \ experiencewhoevenlackedsufficienttenuretoclaimaproperty X interestinhisjob.Onthesefacts,itseemsinescapablethat   Whalen'sjobperformancewasadecidingfactorinhisselection. `  Andcertainly,forpurposesofconsideringthelegalquestions  \  beforeus,wemustpresumethatthatwasso.     Consequently,weconcludethatWhalenhadarighttothe d  minimalproceduralprotectionsofnoticeandanopportunityto `  respond.AstheSupremeCourthasobserved,therequisite   procedures"neednotbeelaborate,"Loudermill,470U.S.at545, h andtheopportunitytohearandrespondtotheemployer'sreasons d couldbeaccomplishedeitherinwritingorinaninformalfaceto  facemeeting,id.at546.K #  6      ׀Itis"fundamental,"id.,however,that l someprocessisduewhenanemployeewithaprotectedproperty  interestinhisjobisterminatedina"persondirectedratherthan \ positiondirectedpersonnelaction[],"Hartman,636F.Supp.at X 1412.L #  7           WethusconcludethatWhalensatisfiedthefirstprongofthe `  qualifiedimmunityinquirybystatingaconstitutionaldueprocess  \  violation.    `    B.The"ClearlyEstablishedRight"and"Reasonableness"    Itisbeyonddebatethat,asageneralmatter,the \ constitutionalrighttodueprocessclaimedbyWhalenwasclearly X establishedatthetimehewaslaidoff.Aswehavediscussed,the   lawwasunequivocalin2002thatanemployeewithaproperty `  interestinhisemploymentwasentitledtopreterminationnotice  \  ofthereasonsforhisperformancebaseddischargeandan   opportunitytorespond. d    Buttheinquiryintowhetherarightisclearlyestablished `  "'"mustbeundertakeninlightofthespecificcontextofthecase,   notasabroadgeneralproposition,"'"Mihos,358F.3dat109 h (quotingSuboh,298F.3dat93(quotingSaucierv.Katz,533U.S. d 194,201(2001)));seealsoBrosseauv.Haugen,125S.Ct.596,599  (2004);RiverdaleMillsCorp.,392F.3dat6566,andthisisnot l astandardperformancebaseddismissalcase.Atthethreshold h level,themotivationbehindWhalen'sterminationwasbudgetary.  Itisundisputedthat,withoutthefiscalcrisis,Whalenwouldnot p  havebeentargetedfordismissal,and,indeed,oncethecrisis !l" passedhewasreinstated.Asthedefendantshavepointedout,this "$ wasnotaterminationintendedtoseveranemploymentrelationship t$& butalayoffaccompaniedbyrecallrightsintheeventfiscal  &p!( conditionsimproved.Inthesecircumstances,thereisatleast '#* somemerittothedefendants'argumentthattheprocedural x)$, protectionsoutlinedinsection8(ofchapter211B)foraremoval $+t&. "forcause"areinapplicable.Indeed,beforeitdismissedthecase  asmoot,thedistrictcourtcertifiedthatissuetothe \ MassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourt.M #  8       X   Althoughtheapplicabilityoftheproceduralprotections   specifiedinsection8doesnotdetermineWhalen'sfederaldue `  processrights,theuncertaintyreflectedbythecertificationis  \  relevanttoourinquiry.Thestatute,inconjunctionwithch.218,   10,appearstoconferproceduralprotectionsonthesamegroupof d  assistantclerkswhopossessafederalconstitutionalrighttodue `  process,i.e.,thosewhohaveheldtheirjobsforatleastthree   years.Ifwecannotsaywithassurancethatthestatutory h proceduresareintendedtoapplyinWhalen'scircumstances!and, d likethedistrictcourt,wecannot!itwouldbeastretchto  concludethatWhalenhadaclearlyestablishedrighttothenotice l andhearingaffordedbytheFourteenthAmendment.Thedifferences h wehavenotedbetweenthecircumstanceshereandthetypical  terminationforcausecomplicatemattersinbothsettings. p    Butwhetherornotweproclaimtherightclearlyestablished !l" inthespecificcontextofthiscase,theoutcomeofourimmunity "$ inquirywouldbethesamebecausedefendantsinevitablywould  prevailatthethirdstepoftheanalysis.N #  9      ׀Webelievean \ objectivelyreasonableMassachusettsofficialcouldhavedrawnthe X conclusion!albeitincorrectly!thatabudgetdrivenlayoff   effectuatedbyreferencetoperformanceisnonethelessabudget `  drivenlayoff,andthusexemptfromtheproceduralrequirements  \  applicabletoterminationsforcause.Althoughwehavenow   clarifiedthatdueprocessrequiresthatanemployeewhoholdsa d  propertyrightinhisjobbegivennoticeandopportunityto `  respondwheneverheisterminatedina"persondirectedratherthan   positiondirectedpersonnelaction[],"Hartman,636F.Supp.at h 1412,areasonableofficialcouldhavetakenintoaccountthe d possibly(andultimately)temporarynatureofWhalen'stermination  andthefinancialcrisisthattriggeredittoconcludethatthe l Loudermilllineofcaseswasnotimplicated. h   Certainly,intermsoffutureemployment,abudgetarylayoff  islikelytohavelessdrasticconsequencesthanaclassic p  terminationforcause;anofficialfocusingonthe"layoff"label !l" andthenatureoftheharm,againstthebackdropofthe "$ "reorganizationexception,"reasonablymayhavemiscalculatedin t$& weighingthecompetinginterests.SeeGilbert,520U.S.at932  &p!( ("[W]hileouropinionshaverecognizedtheseverityofdepriving  someoneofthemeansofhislivelihood,...theyhavealso \ emphasizedthatindeterminingwhatprocessisdue,accountmustbe X takenof'thelength'and'finalityofthedeprivation.'")   (citationsomitted).Insum,becausewebelieveanobjectively `  reasonableofficialinthedefendants'positionwouldnot  \  necessarilyhaveunderstoodthathisactionviolatedthe   plaintiff'srights,weholdthatthedistrictcourtproperly d  grantedqualifiedimmunitytotheindividualdefendants.O #  10       `  @$III.Mootness     Whalenalsodisputesthedistrictcourt'srulingthathiscase h becamemootoncehewasreinstatedtohispositioninMarch2004, d arguingthatheremainedentitledtopursueinjunctivereliefto  restorehispensionandretirementcreditfortheapproximately l eighteenmonthshewasoutofwork.Defendantsarguethatsuch h reliefisprohibitedbytheEleventhAmendment,whichgenerally  barssuitsinfederalcourtagainstunconsentingstates.SeeRosie p  D.exrel.JohnD.v.Swift,310F.3d230,234(1stCir.2002). !l" Theprohibitionextendstosuitsagainststateofficialsactingin  theirofficialcapacities,id.,anditisforthatreasonthat \ Whalensoughtbackpayandothermonetaryreliefonlyfromthe X courtofficialsintheirindividualcapacities.P #  11           InExParteYoung,however,theSupremeCourtcarvedoutan `  exceptiontoEleventhAmendmentstateimmunitythatallowsfederal  \  courtsto"enjoinstateofficialstoconformtheirfutureconduct   totherequirementsoffederallaw,"Quernv.Jordan,440U.S.332, d  337(1979).SeealsoGreenv.Mansour,474U.S.64,68(1985); `  Edelmanv.Jordan,415U.S.651,664(1974).TheCourthas   describedthedifferencebetweenpermissibleandimpermissible h reliefas"thedifferencebetweenprospectivereliefononehand d andretrospectivereliefontheother."Quern,440U.S.at337.    Whalensuggeststhatrestorationofhisservicecredit l qualifiesasprospectiveinjunctivereliefbecauseheseeksonly h futurerecognitionofhislengthoftenuretoestablishhis  retirementeligibilityandpensionbenefits.Wedisagreethatthis p  meetstheExParteYoungstandard. !l"   Beforeweexplainthatconclusion,wesidestepbrieflytonote "$ thattheEleventhAmendmentmaynotbetheonlybarrierWhalen t$& faced.Aplaintiff'sentitlementtomorethannominaldamagesin  &p!( aproceduraldueprocesscaseturnsonwhethertheconstitutional '#* violation!thefailuretoprovideapreterminationopportunityto  contesttermination!didinfactcausetheharmasserted!the \ lossofthejobandrelatedbenefits.IfWhalenwouldhavebeen X terminatedevenafteraproperhearing,hewouldnotbeeligible   foreitherreinstatementordamagesflowingfromhisunemployment. `  SeeCareyv.Piphus,435U.S.247,260(1978);Brewerv.Chauvin,  \  938F.2d860,86264(8thCir.1991)(enbanc);Knudsonv.Cityof   Ellensburg,832F.2d1142,1149(9thCir.1987);Rodriguezde d  Quinonezv.Perez,596F.2d486,491(1stCir.1979). `    Weneednotconsidertheissueofcause,however,becauseeven   ifWhalenwouldhaveavoidedlayoffifhehadhadanopportunityto h addressthereasonsforhisselection,allavailableremediesare d foreclosedinthiscasebythecombinedforceoftheEleventh  Amendmentandprinciplesofqualifiedimmunity.Aswehave l explained,theEleventhAmendmentbarsmonetaryawardsagainstthe h TrialCourtitself,andtheindividualsarelikewiseprotectedfrom  moneydamagesbyqualifiedimmunity.Reinstatementalreadyhas p  occurredoutsidethelitigation. !l"   WecanunderstandwhyWhaleninsiststhattheremainingremedy "$ !restorationofcreditforhistimeoutofwork!fallsintothe t$& categoryofprospectiverelief.Heseeksnomonetaryreward,and  &p!( hisrequestwouldhaveonlyfutureimpactonthestate.Buttiming '#* isnotthesoleinquiryunderExParteYoung.Thepivotalquestion x)$, iswhethertherelief"servesdirectlytobringanendtoapresent $+t&.  9bEb 9 E9 E  violationoffederallaw."Papasanv.Allain,478U.S.265,278  (1986);seealsoid.at27778("Younghasbeenfocusedoncasesin  whichaviolationoffederallawbyastateofficialisongoingas SX opposedtocasesinwhichfederallawhasbeenviolatedatonetime   oroveraperiodoftimeinthepast....").Reliefthatis   "tantamounttoanawardofdamagesforapastviolationoffederal W \  law,eventhoughstyledassomethingelse,"isbarred.Id.at278.     Thedifferenceisnotalwaysobvious."Asinmostareasof   thelaw,thedifferencebetweenthetypeofreliefbarredbythe [`  EleventhAmendmentandthatpermittedunderExParteYoungwillnot   inmanyinstancesbethatbetweendayandnight."Edelman,415  U.S.at667;seealsoPapasan,478U.S.at278("ForEleventh _d Amendmentpurposes,thelinebetweenpermittedandprohibitedsuits   willoftenbeindistinct[.]");cf.Floridav.Long,487U.S.223,  238(1988)("Thedistinctionbetweenretroactiveandprospective ch reliefisnotalwaysselfevident.").󀀀    Wearepersuadedthat,despitetheforwardlookingnatureof   Whalen'srequestforservicecredit,suchreliefwould"inessence g!l" serve[]tocompensate"himforpastinjury,Papasan,478U.S.at #$ 278.Evenasamatterofvocabulary,the"restoration"ofcredit $& isdesignedtogivehimbacksomethinghelostwhenhewas k&p!( terminatedunlawfully.Althoughreinstatement,too,involvesa (#* "restoration"ofrights,itdiffersbecauseterminationwithoutdue )$, processistheveryunlawfulactatissue;reinstatementpendinga o+t&. hearingthus"servesdirectlytobringanendtoapresent  violationoffederallaw,"id.Bycontrast,restoringcreditfor  timelostduetoapastterminationhasnoimpactonanongoing SX violation.     WethereforeconcludethattheEleventhAmendmentbarsa   federalcourtfromorderingrestorationofWhalen'sservicecredit. W \  SeeMansour,474U.S.at71("Becausethereisnocontinuing   violationoffederallawtoenjoininthiscase,aninjunctionis   notavailable.").Becausenofurtherreliefwasavailable,the [`  districtproperlydismissedthecaseasmoot.     Affirmed.󀀀     _d    `     h   Dissentfollows.    7D*,X` XX*",US ,  (:!&), ` STAHL,SeniorCircuitJudge  (Dissenting). Atthetime  Whalenwastargetedforlayoffbasedonperformancerelated  factors,thelawwassuchthatareasonableofficer,whenselecting ot anemployeeforremovalbasedonsuchfactors,wasonnoticethat   suchanemployeewasentitledtodueprocess.Thefactthat   budgetaryconstraintspromptedtheofficialstoevaluateWhalen's s x  performanceisirrelevanteveninthis"novelfactual $  circumstance[],"the"officials[were]stillonnotice"thatWhalen   wasentitledtosomeformofdueprocessassoonasfactorsother w|  thansenioritywereconsideredinhisbeingselectedforremoval. #( SeeHopev.Pelzer,536U.S.730,741(2002).   ` Intheirsearchthroughourprecedentforaperfect { factualmatchtothefactsofthiscase,mybrethrenignorethe ', SupremeCourt'scleardirectioninHopev.Pelzerthat"[a]lthough  earliercasesinvolving'fundamentallysimilar'factscanprovide  especiallystrongsupportforaconclusionthatthelawisclearly +0 established,theyarenotnecessarytosuchafinding."Id.   Indeed,thissameerrorwasmadebyfourmembersofthiscourt !" sittingenbancinSavardv.RhodeIsland,338F.3d23(1stCir. /#4$ 2003)(enbanc)(opinionofSelya,J.),whenthisCourtevenly $& dividedovertheproprietyofsuchasearchfortheperfect &!( precedentialmatch.Theproperinquiryis"whetherthestateof 3(8#* thelaw[atthetimeoftheaction]gave[Appellees]fairwarning )$, thattheirallegedtreatmentof[Whalen]wasunconstitutional." +&. SeeHope,536U.S.at741.Andhere,theanswerisunequivocally  yes.  @*