WPC  zCHT~Q1 :ŎgGhqDlyԷ9 tMi(7q0^ Eص^F9mG2նiR<,S J)8qnU5)4eĕ>B.[]ʪ˲1d! +at`J5kնj }5ްJ'Uz/Co`J* /s3.%aF h,%C: 5)JǥH!UyE10Cq.쯓P/$Llʧ1tT- 7#Ul<Z]?oi3 y}0PC,$㨕za+9pT>i ߋ8K ;戝Z}Ll:Se4Ɛ[?18IZd~H֖BApWĘzquvPGZeZ# % 0D 0G)U:p 0U?8nTNUNU"Fk^ w4Efa mN^UB bM|U" 0c&'+%-F.$11 0U3 0N4 015 B 5 06 06 7:\< 0 D 0D 0kE 0F 0F 0xG 0IH 0H 0I 0PJ 0J 0K 0!L 0L 0pM 0>N 0N 0O 0T 0T 0U 0V 0W 0X 0zY 0\Z 0[ 02[ 0\ 0:] 0YP] 0_] 0 ^ 0_ 0` B*b D/b D+b 0c D/$e 0Se 06!f 0Wf 0:_g 0^g 0<g 1e3hU6hU>hU* i 1u6i 72iiRiEpAr!t8tP}orL:cc 0c 0c ASyy;̝̝ 0D D5K222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222٬KONICA - Copy Room,,,,0X(#$  0  ($XXXX<6X9`("Courier NewTT(:2$ !XZXXXX    =ZXXXdd=    0  <4 9Z+ Courier New <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@>vr Z6Times New Roman Regular<4 9Z+.Courier New Regularm4  8_p46X3&backup3|xSTABLE AU  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    21    _ԀWerecognizethattheantitruststatutesprovideforan  awardofattorney'sfeestoaprevailingplaintiff.Hence,  arguably,anattorneycouldrelyonthatstatutoryawardinsteadof \ acontingentfeeagreementtorecouptheinvestmentofattorney 2 time.However,thiswouldbe,atbest,adubiousinvestmentfor X anyrationalattorney.Antitrustcasesbytheirnatureare . difficultanduncertain.Inanyindividualcase,thedisproportion   betweenthedamagesawardedtoanindividualconsumerantitrust   plaintiffandtheattorney'sfeesincurredtoprevailontheclaim `  wouldbesoenormousthatitishighlyunlikelythatanattorney 6   couldeverbegintojustifybeingmadewholebythecourt.(For  \  example,usingthefiguresofPlaintiffs'expertwitnesses,the  2  recoveryforanindividualplaintiffinthiscasewould,atmost,   beinthethousandsofdollarswhereasattorneytimecouldescalate   intothemillionsofdollars.)Moreover,beingmadewholeis d  hardlyasufficientincentiveforanattorneytoinvestinacase :  suchasthiswhentimespentonmorepredictablecaseswouldbe `  advantageous,andfrankly,rational.L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- - r $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    4    _ԀThisstatement,thatnoneoftheprioragreementsbetween  _Comcast_Ԁanditssubscriberscontainsalimitationsprovision,is  incorrect.The2001Policies&Practicescontainedalimitations \ provisionidenticaltotheonefoundinthe2002/2003versions. 2 Thisfactwillbecomeimportantlaterintheanalysis.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    19    ___ԀTheEleventhCircuit'sdecisioninJenkins󀄄alsoasuit  againstafinanciallenderextendedthecircuit'sholdingin  RandolphIIenforcingaclassmechanismbarinanarbitration \ agreementtoaplaintiff'sclaimsunderGeorgiausurylaw.See 2 Jenkins,400F.3dat870,87778.WhileJenkinsisthemorerecent X Y decision,RandolphIIestablishedtheruleinfavorofenforcing  classmechanismbarsinarbitrationagreementsfortheEleventh  Circuit.Therefore,wewilluseRandolphIIforpurposesofour \ analysis.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    6    _ԀThe2001Policies&Practicesstatesinrelevantpart:"You  agreethatifyoudonotcontactuswithinone(1)yearofthedate  oftheoccurrenceoftheeventorfactsgivingrisetoadispute. \ ..youwaivetherighttopursue,inanyforum,including 2 arbitrationorcourts,aclaimbaseduponsuchevent,factsor X dispute."The2002/2003versionstatesinrelevantpart:"YOUMUST . CONTACTUSWITHINONE(1)YEAROFTHEDATEOFTHEOCCURRENCEOFTHE   EVENTORFACTSGIVINGRISETOADISPUTE...ORYOUWAIVETHE   RIGHTTOPURSUEACLAIMBASEDUPONSUCHEVENT,FACTSORDISPUTE." `  Thelanguageisnearlyidentical.  (;3$2#  0  .3  0   v $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    8    _Ԁ47C.F.R.76.1603(b)states:"[_c]ustomers_Ԁwillbenotified  ofanychangesinrates,programmingservicesorchannelpositions  assoonaspossibleinwriting.Noticemustbegiventosubscribers \ aminimumofthirty(30)daysinadvanceofsuchchangesifthe 2 changeiswithinthecontrolofthecableoperator.Inaddition, X thecableoperatorshallnotifysubscribers30daysinadvanceof . anysignificantchangesintheotherinformationrequiredby   76.1602.The"otherinformationrequiredby76.1602"includes   "[_p]rices_Ԁandoptionsforprogrammingservicesandconditionsof `  subscriptiontoprogrammingandotherservices."47C.F.R. 6   76.1602(b)(2).  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    20    _ X_XXX_Ԁ"Opportunitycosts"arethevalueofworkanattorney  foregoesinordertoprosecuteaparticularplaintiff'sclaim.#X_XX X_#  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    5    ___ԀThePolicies&Practicesstates:"'Service(s)'"meansthe  cableTVprogrammingandanyothercableserviceweprovidetoyou,  andcableInternetaccess." < $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    13    _ԀMassachusettsGeneralLaws,ch.93,12statesinrelevant  part:"Ifthecourtfindsthattheviolationwasengagedinwith  maliciousintenttoinjuresaidperson,thecourtmayawardupto \ threetimestheamountofactualdamagessustained,togetherwith 2 thecostsofsuit...."Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    7    _Ԁ X_XXX_Thisresultmakessensebecause,oncethedisputeisin  arbitration,thetenetofcontra_proferentem_canstillbeapplied  bythearbitratoronnonscopeissues.#X_XX X_#*+ (_2623  ..*G+G (_25   /%` ` hp x /23  ../%` ` hp x /   *8+8 (_24  ," hp x ,23  ..," hp x ,   d*5+5 (_23 ` ) hp x )23  ..) hp x ) ` *2+2 (_22  &hhp x &23  ..&hhp x &    $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    12    _Ԁ15U.S.C.15(a)statesinrelevantpart:"[_A]ny_Ԁpersonwho  shallbeinjuredinhisbusinessorpropertybyreasonofanything  forbiddenintheantitrustlawsmaysuethereforinanydistrict \ courtoftheUnitedStatesinthedistrictinwhichthedefendant 2 residesorisfoundorhasanagent,withoutrespecttotheamount X incontroversy,andshallrecoverthreefoldthedamagesbyhim . sustained...."  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    14    _ԀOurstatementfromMCIisdictabecausetheargumentthat  thepanelwasdiscussinghadbeenwaivedonappeal.However,the  paneldecidedtodiscusstheramificationsofthisargumentanyway.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    17    _Ԁ15U.S.C.15(a)statesinrelevantpartthat"anyperson  whoshallbeinjuredinhisbusinessorpropertybyreasonof  anythingforbiddenintheantitrustlawsmaysuethereforinany \ districtcourtoftheUnitedStatesinthedistrictinwhichthe 2 defendantresidesorisfoundorhasanagent,withoutrespectto X theamountincontroversy,andshallrecover...thecostof . suit,includingareasonableattorney'sfee."Mass.Gen.Laws.c.   9312statesinrelevantpartthat"[_;;i]f_;;Ԁthecourtfindsthatthe   violationwasengagedinwithmaliciousintenttoinjuresaid `  person,thecourtmayawarduptothreetimestheamountofactual 6   damagessustained,togetherwiththecostsofsuit,including  \  reasonableattorneysfees."  2    Whilethereisstillthe"shall"versus"may"distinction   betweenthefederalandstateantitruststatutes,wefindthatthis   distinctiondoesnotrequireaseparateanalysisastoattorney's d  feesandcostsalongfederalversusstatelines.The"may"inthe :  statestatutedoesnotapplytotheawardofcostsandattorney's `  fees.Theclausecontaining"may"isseparatedfromthe"costsof 6 suit"clausebyacomma.Whileastatecourtmayawarduptothree   timestheamountofactualdamages,thecostsofsuit,including  attorney'sfees,aremandatorilyawarded.*/+/ (_21  #p x #23  ..#p x #  *,+, (_20 h  p x 23  .. p x h *)+) (_19  pp x 23  ..pp x   *&+& (_18   x 23  .. x   *AA (_17  5+ ` hp x 523  Ԁ5+ ` hp x 5  *GG (_16   /%` ` hp x /23  Ԁ/%` ` hp x /   *88 (_15  ," hp x ,23  Ԁ," hp x ,  *55 (_14 ` ) hp x )23  Ԁ) hp x ) ` *22 (_13  &hhp x &23  Ԁ&hhp x &  *// (_12  #p x #23  Ԁ#p x #  *,, (_11 h  p x 23  Ԁ p x h *)) (_10  pp x 23  Ԁpp x   (&& &_9   x 23  Ԁ x   (AA &_8  5+ ` hp x 523  5+ ` hp x 5  (GG &_7   /%` ` hp x /23  /%` ` hp x /   (88 &_6  ," hp x ,23  ," hp x ,  (55 &_5 ` ) hp x )23  ) hp x ) ` (22 &_4  &hhp x &23  &hhp x &  (// &_3  #p x #23  #p x #  (,, &_2 h  p x 23   p x h ()) &_1  pp x 23  pp x   &&& $_   x 23   x   0AA.Normal  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition T  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  <AA:Definition L , 5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 586Definition(hh&H1  5+ ` hp x 5      5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H2  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H3  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H4  5+ ` hp x 5 XXX 5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H5  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  (]]&H6  5+ ` hp x 5  5+ ` hp x 5  2DD0Address  5+ ` hp x 55+ ` hp x 5  8MM6Blockquote , , 5+ ` hp x 5   5+ ` hp x 5,*CITE,dl*CODEKc<6X9`(Courier NewKSd\  `&Times New RomanS42Emphasis64Hyperlink    <:FollowedHype    4go2Keyboard Kc<6X9`(Courier NewKSd\  `&Times New RomanS <:Preformatted  /%  ,Kk %#/Kc<6X9`(Courier NewKSd\  `&Times New RomanS/%  ,Kk %#/  <:zBottom of 7X(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?e%2A`Arial?  Sd\  `&Times New RomanS7Y(X75+ ` hp x 5  &  d dW)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7[(X7    5+ ` hp x 5?e%2A`Arial?  Sd\  `&Times New RomanS7Y(X75+ ` hp x 5  W)2dxd0KS.SampleKc<6X9`(Courier NewKSd\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8dl6TypewriterKc<6X9`(Courier NewKSd\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  12345678 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial3#37=CIQYag1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)fi)  e  H $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    22    _Ԁ X_XXX_Werealizethatastate_unconscionability_Ԁanalysis,based  ontheparticularsofstatecontractlaw,mayinclude  considerationsnotpresentinthevindicationofstatutoryrights \ analysisappliedhere,whichisnotdependentonstatelaw. 2 However,the_unconscionability_Ԁanalysisalwaysincludesanelement X thatistheessenceofthevindicationofstatutoryrightsanalysis . Єthefrustrationoftherighttopursueclaimsgrantedby   statute.Forexample,inFaberv._Menard_,Inc.,367F.3d1048(8th   Cir.2004),theEighthCircuitheldthat"[a]fee-splitting `  arrangementmaybeunconscionableifinformationspecifictothe 6   circumstancesindicatesthatfeesarecost-prohibitiveandpreclude  \  thevindicationofstatutoryrightsinanarbitralforum"while  2  citingRandolph,531U.S.at90,avindicationofstatutoryrights   case.Faber,367F.3dat1053;seealso,supran.18;Jenkins,400   F.3dat87778.#X_XX X_#  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    1    _ԀSwappingagreementsallegedlyviolateantitrustlaws  because,byusingthem,cableproviderscandivideandallocate  marketssothatacablesubscribercanonlyobtaincableservice \ fromasingleproviderinhisorherlocation.Simplyput,through 2 swappingagreements,companiestradeterritory,eliminating X competitioninagivengeographicalarea. 7 $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    *    _ChiefJudgeoftheUnitedStatesCourtofInternational  Trade,sittingbydesignation.Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5 . $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    2    _ԀContractsofadhesionarecontractsformedwiththeuseof  standardformdocuments.Thepartythatpreparedthecontracts  typicallyapproachesthepotentialcontractualrelationshipwitha \ takeitorleaveitposture.SeeToddD._Rakoff_,Contractsof 2 Adhesion:AnEssayinReconstruction,96_Harv_.L.Rev.1173,1177 X (1983).Othercharacteristicsinclude:(1)thedocumentwhose . legalvalidityisatissueisaprintedformthatcontainsmany   termsandclearlypurportstobeacontract;(2)theformhasbeen   draftedby,oronbehalfof,onepartytothetransaction;(3)the `  draftingpartyparticipatesinnumeroustransactionsofthetype 6   representedbytheformandentersintothesetransactionsasa  \  matterofroutine;(4)theformispresentedtotheadheringparty  2  withtherepresentationthat,exceptperhapsforafewidentified   items,thedraftingpartywillenterintothetransactiononlyon   thetermscontainedinthedocument(thisrepresentationmaybe d  explicitormaybeimplicitinthesituation,butitisunderstood :  bytheadherent);and(5)theadheringpartyentersintofew `  transactionsofthetyperepresentedbytheform-few,atleast, 6 incomparisonwiththedraftingparty.Seeid.;seealsoChase   CommercialCorp.v.Owen, X_XXX_32Mass.App.Ct.248,253(Mass.App.  Ct.1992).#X_XX X_ħ# F $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    9    _ԀAdditionally,giventhefactthatthe2002and2003Policies  &Practicesareidentical,andgiventhefactthatPlaintiffsdid  notfilesuituntilDecember2003,thereisatleastsomedoubt \ thatthenoticerequirementsofthestatute,regulations,and 2 subscriberagreementsareevenimplicated.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    23    _ԀOthercourts,bothfederalandstate,havestruckdownclass  arbitrationbarsonsimilargrounds. X_XXX_See,e.g.,Lunav.Household  Fn.Corp.III,236_F.Supp_.2d1166,1178(W.D.Wash.2002);_Lozada_ \ v.DaleBakerOldsmobile,Inc.,91_F.Supp_.2d1087,1105(W.D. 2 Mich.2000);DiscoverBank,36Cal.4that16263;_Powertel_,Inc.v. X _Bexley_,743So.2d570,576(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999)#X_XX X_I# X_XXX_;Stateex . rel._Dunlap_v.Berger,567S.E.2d265,27879(W.Va.2002)#X_XX X_# X_XXX_.#X_XX X_Ď# h $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    15    ___ԀItmayseemoddtoincludeinour"threshold"analysis  (determiningwhotheproperdecisionmakerwillbeacourtoran  arbitrator)somemeritsanalysis(determiningwhethertheconflict \ betweenthearbitrationagreementsandthestatutoryprovision 2 invalidatesthearbitralforumfortheunderlyingantitrustclaim). X However,inthisparticularcontext,the_enforceability_Ԁofthe . arbitrationagreementturnsonthequestionofwaivercana   contractingpartywaiveitsrighttothetrebledamagesprovidedby    theantitruststatute.Iftheanswertothatquestionwere  uncertain,or,tousethelanguageof_Pacificare_,ambiguous,the  conflictbetweenthearbitrationagreementandthestatutewould \ notposeaquestionof_arbitrability_.Todecidewhetheracourtor 2 anarbitratorshoulddecidethemerits,wemustseewhether X resolutionofthemeritsquestion,i.e.,thelegalconsequencesof . theconflictbetweenthearbitrationagreementandthestatutory   provision,areobvious.     Thisisthelessonof_Pacificare_,wheretheSupremeCourt 6   conductedthekindofpreliminarymeritsinvestigationthatweare  \  conductinghere.There,confrontedbyaconflictbetweenthe  2  languageoftheRICOstatute,whichauthorizedtheawardoftreble   damages,andanarbitrationprovision,whichprohibitedtheaward   ofpunitivedamages,see538U.S.at403,theSupremeCourt d  examinedwhetherandunderwhatcircumstancestrebledamagesand :  punitivedamageswereequivalent.Seeid.at40506;seealso, `  supran.10.Becausethelegalconsequencesoftheconflictbetween 6 thearbitrationprovisionandtheRICOstatutewerenotclear,the   SupremeCourtconcludeditsthresholdanalysisbysendingthe  decisiontothearbitratortomakethemeritsdeterminationinthe h firstinstance.Thischoiceservesthepurposeofadvancingthe > liberalfederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationagreements.See d _Howsam_,537U.S.at83("[_T]he_ԀCourthasalsolongrecognizedand : enforcedaliberalfederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationagreements."  (internalcitationsandquotationmarksomitted)).    Thereareprecedentsforthispreliminaryassessmentofthe B meritsfromothercontexts.Whendecidingwhethertogranta h preliminaryinjunction,districtcourtsmustassesstheprobability > ofsuccessonthemeritsofthepartyrequestingthepreliminary  injunction.Insuchasituation,thedistrictcourtdoesnot  actuallydecidethemerits.Whatwearerequiredtodohereis p  akintoapreliminaryinjunctionanalysis.Asweshallsee,that F ! preliminaryassessmentanditsfinaloutcomearenotnecessarily !l" thesame.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    24    _Ԁ"Ambiguitythepossibilitythatawordorphraseina  contractmightbereasonablyandplausiblysubjecttomorethanone  meaningfrequentlyoccursinthelanguageusedbythe \ [contracting]partiestoexpresstheirmeaning.Sincethelanguage 2 ispresumptivelywithinthecontrolofthepartydraftingthe X agreement,itisagenerallyacceptedprinciplethatanyambiguity . inthatlanguagewillbeinterpretedagainstthedrafter.This   ruleisfrequentlydescribedundertheLatintermofcontra   _;;proferentem_;;,literally,againstthe_;;offeror_;;,hewhoputsforth,or `  proffersoroffersthelanguage....Indeed,anycontractof 6   adhesion,acontractenteredwithoutanymeaningfulnegotiationby  \  apartywithinferiorbargainingpower,isparticularlysusceptible  2  totherulethatambiguitieswillbeconstruedagainstthe   drafter."11WillistononContracts32:12(4thed.)(2005). 0 $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    18    _ԀInJenkins,theEleventhCircuitdecidedasimilarcase  usingan_unconscionability_Ԁrationale.However,thecourtreliedon  anotherofitsdecisions,whichuseda"vindicationofstatutory \ rights"rationale.TheJenkinscourtequatedthetworationales. 2 SeeJenkins,400F.3dat87778;seealsoRandolphv.GreenTree X Fin.Corp.Alabama,244F.3d814,819(11thCir.2001)(hereinafter . RandolphII).  (;3m$ !XZXXXX  (;3m$ !XZXXXX  luv{|E<<C 1 $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    3    _ԀThelimitationsprovisionhighlightedbythedistrictcourt  states:"YOUMUSTCONTACTUSWITHINONE(1)YEAROFTHEDATEOFTHE  OCCURRENCEOFTHEEVENTORFACTSGIVINGRISETOADISPUTE...OR \ YOUWAIVETHERIGHTTOPURSUEACLAIMBASEDUPONSUCHEVENT,FACTS 2 ORDISPUTE."($$   1  '''')!dxdx  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    16    ___ԀA X_XXX_Ԁ"savingsclause"preemptivelyresolvesconflictsbetween  contractlanguageandapplicablelawinordertopreservethe  remaining,nonconflictingcontractlanguage."Savingsclause"is \ somewhatofamisnomer.Thecontractuallanguageinconflictwith 2 applicablelawisnotsaved.Thenonconflictinglanguageissaved. X Intheabsenceofasavingsclause,thedecisionmaker,beitan . arbitratororacourt,decidestheremedyforresolvingaconflict   betweencontractlanguageandapplicablelaw.Thatremedy,driven   byanassessmentoftheintentoftheparties,couldbeassmallas `  severanceoftheoffendingcontractlanguage,oritcouldextendto 6   outrightnonenforcementofportionsofthecontractthatinclude  \  theoffendingcontractlanguageorthecontractinitsentirety.  2  Inessence,asavingsclauseservesasanexpressionoftheintent    ofthepartiesthatlimitstheremediesanarbitratororcourtmay  useinsituationsofconflictbetweencontracttermsandapplicable  law.Thesavingsclauseatissuehere,containedinthe \ "LimitationonLiability"sectionofthePolicies&Practices, 2 emphasizestheuseofseveranceasaremedy.#X_XX X_#  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    10    _ X_XXX_ԀItistruethatthedistrictcourtconcludedthatthe  Policies&Practicesisacontractofadhesion.However,under  Massachusettslaw,contractsofadhesionlikethePolicies& \ Practicesaregenerallyenforceableabsentaseparatefinding 2 thatsuchcontractsare"unconscionable,offendpublicpolicy,or X areshowntobeunfairintheparticularcircumstances."Owen,32 . Mass.App.Ct.at253.#X_XX X_#ԀThePolicies&Practicesisnotinvalid   simplybecauseitisacontractofadhesion.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    11    _ԀBecausewefindthatthe2002/2003agreementsapply  retroactively,wedonotreach_Comcast_'songoinginjuryargument  inthatcontext.  $X_XXX  =_XXdd=    25    _Ԁ_Comcast_Ԁfiledthemotiontocompelarbitrationthathas  triggeredthisinterlocutoryproceeding.Presumably,_Comcast_Ԁcould  seektowithdrawthatmotiontocompelifitdoesnotlikethe \ conditionsthatnowapplytothearbitralforum.Weventureno 2 opiniononhowthedistrictcourtshouldrespondtoanysuch X development. !X_XXX  _TRX3'X3' Letter3'Letter3'LetterT ? * ! X?^XXX_ vX X?^     UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals O v  FortheFirstCircuit  F O X_X F  A') ` dE< ` A   No.042619 K  @ MARTHA_KRISTIAN_ԀandJAMESD._MASTERMAN_,  G  @Plaintiffs,Appellees,   @tt)v. O    @@TT _COMCAST_ԀCORPORATION;_COMCAST_ԀMOGROUP,INC.;_COMCAST_ԀCABLE K  HOLDINGS,LLC;_COMCAST_ԀCABLECOMMUNICATIONSHOLDINGS,INC.; ! _COMCAST_ԀCABLECOMMUNICATIONS,INC.;and_COMCAST_ԀHOLDINGS  CORPORATION, } d@Defendants,Appellants, )y   AT&TBROADBAND, % Defendant.      ____________________ -}  No.042655 )   JACKROGERSandPAUL_PINELLA_,  Plaintiffs,Appellees, 1   v. !-" _COMCAST_ԀCORPORATIONandAT&TBROADBAND, #$ Defendants,Appellants. 5% & t   `     h      p   A') ` dE<'` A '#) @ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT (#+   ӀFORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS r)$,  @[Hon.EdwardF.Harrington,SeniorU.S.DistrictJudge] +n&. A') ` dE<,` A ,(0    `     h    -(2?M @'Before    @@((LipezandHoward,CircuitJudges, \ and_Restani_,Judgek #  *       2 A') ` dE<` A .       JaimeA._Bianchi_,withwhomChristopherM._Curran_,GeorgeL.   Paul,NoahA._Brumfield_,andWhite&Case_LLP_;andChristopherF.   Robertsonand_Seyfarth_ԀShaw_LLP_wereonbrief,forappellants. o     AlanGilbert,withwhomStaceyL.Mills,SamuelD._Heins_, E   DavidWoodward,JessicaN._Servais_,and_Heins_ԀMills&Olson,_P.L.C_;  k  JohnP._Zavez_,Noah_Rosmarin_,and_Adkins_,_Lelston_Ԁ&_Zavez_,P.C.;  A  andBarryBarnett,JohnTurner,and_Susman_ԀGodfrey_LLP_wereon   brief,forappellees.   *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  o o    SI  @@38826@@SApril_20,_Ԁ2006 Y  RHC/" @@38826 @@ R(   (  * !     `     h      1   8_XXdd8*,X` XX*tOY ` LIPEZ,CircuitJudge .Thisappealrequiresusto  evaluatethe_enforceability_Ԁofarbitrationagreementsthat_Comcast_, x acabletelevisionprovider,invokedagainstagroupofits $t subscribers,whohavesueditforviolationsofstateandfederal   antitrustlaws.Concludingthatthearbitrationagreementsdidnot |  haveretroactiveeffect,thedistrictcourtruledthatthe ( x  subscriberscouldnotbecompelledtoarbitratetheirantitrust $  claims.Insoruling,thedistrictcourtdidnothavetoreacha   numberofotherissuesraisedbythesubscribersinoppositionto ,|  _Comcast_'sdemandforarbitration. (  ` Wedisagreewiththedistrictcourt'sinterpretationof  thearbitrationagreements.Theirlanguagedoeshaveretroactive 0 effect.Thisrulingrequiresustoaddresstheotherarguments , raisedbythesubscribersagainstthe_enforceability_Ԁofthe  arbitrationagreements.Wefindthat_Comcast_Ԁprovidedadequate 4 noticeofthearbitrationagreements.However,weconcludethat 0 theprovisionofthearbitrationagreementsbarringtherecoveryof   trebledamagesisinvalidasappliedtothesubscribers'federal 8!" antitrustclaimsbecauseitpreventsthevindicationofafederal "4$ statutoryright.Similarly,weconcludethattheprovisionsofthe $& arbitrationagreementsbarringtherecoveryofattorney'sfeesand <&!( costsandbarringclassarbitrationareinvalidbecausethey '8#* preventthevindicationofstatutoryrightsunderstateandfederal )$, law.Nevertheless,thearbitrationagreementscontainsavings @+&. tOY t t  clausesthatprovideforseveranceoftheseinvalidprovisions.  Withtheseprovisionssevered,thearbitrationcangoforward. \ Thus,wereversethedistrictcourt'srulingthatthesubscribers X cannotbecompelledtoarbitratetheirantitrustclaims.      hWBI. @`   \    ` PlaintiffsAppelleesJamesD._Masterman_,Paul_Pinella_, $  JackRogers,andMartha_Kristian_Ԁ(collectively,"Plaintiffs")are   BostonareasubscribersofcableservicesobtainedfromDefendant ,|  Appellant_Comcast_ԀCorporation("_Comcast_").Plaintiffssubscribed ( forcableservicesthrough_Comcast_Ԁpredecessorcompaniesin1987,  1991,1994,and1999,respectively.Theirtwocomplaintsonein 0 statecourt,oneinfederalcourtallegethatthepricesthat , theyhavebeenpayingforcableservicesareinflatedasaresult  of_anticompetitive_Ԁpracticesonthepartof_Comcast_ԀandAT&T 4 Broadband,_Comcast_'spredecessorininterest. 0  ` Thecomplaintsallegethat_Comcast_Ԁhasbeenconsolidating   itsholdonmarketsandterritoriesthroughagreementstoswapor 8!" exchangecabletelevisionassets("swappingagreements").j #  1      ׀The "4$ complaintsspecificallyreferencetwoswappingagreements,onein $& 1999andanotherin2001.Plaintiffs_Kristian_Ԁand_Masterman_allege  that_Comcast_Ԁengagesinconductthatexcludes,prevents,or \ interfereswithcompetition,including_Comcast_'srefusaltoprovide X programmingaccesstocompetitorseitherbeforeorafter_Comcast_   mergedwithAT&TBroadbandin2002.Plaintiffsseekcertification `  ofclassactionscomprisedofindividualswhosubscribedto_Comcast_  \  cableservicesintheBostonareaatanytimefromDecember1999to   thepresent. d   ` WhenPlaintiffsfirstsubscribedforcableservices,none `  oftheirserviceagreementscontainedanarbitrationprovision.In   2001,_Comcast_Ԁbeganincludinganarbitrationprovisionintheterms h andconditionsgoverningtherelationshipbetween_Comcast_Ԁandits d subscribers.Thesetermsandconditionsarecontained,inpart,in  noticesthatinformsubscribersatthetimeofcableinstallation l Єandatleastannuallythereafterofthetermsandconditions h governingtheirsubscriptions("Policies&Practices")._Comcast_  includedthePolicies&PracticeswitheachBostonarea p  subscriber'sinvoiceasabillingstufferduringtheNovember2001 !l" billingcycle. "$  ` TheversionofthePolicies&Practicesmailedin t$& November/December2002containedanarbitrationagreementthat,at  &p!( firstblush,substantiallydifferedfromtheoneinthe2001 '#* Policies&Practices.Thearbitrationagreementcontainedinthe x)$, November/December2003Policies&Practicesremainedunchangedfrom $+t&. 2002._Comcast_Ԁseekstocompelarbitrationpursuanttothelanguage  ofthearbitrationagreementscontainedinthe2002/2003Policies \ &Practices;the2002/2003arbitrationagreementsarethefocusof X thisappeal.      II. @  @`   \   70 ` Rogersand_Pinella_Ԁfiledacomplaint("Rogers"complaint) $  against_Comcast_ԀandAT&TBroadbandinMassachusettsstatecourt,   allegingacauseofactionundertheMassachusettsAntitrustAct, ,|  Mass.Gen.Laws.Ch.93._Comcast_ԀremovedthisactiontotheU.S. ( DistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMassachusetts.  Contemporaneously,_Kristian_Ԁand_Masterman_Ԁfiledacomplaint 0 ("_Kristian_"complaint)against_Comcast_,aswellasseveralother , _Comcast_Ԁentities,intheU.S.DistrictCourtfortheDistrictof  Massachusetts,allegingcausesofactionundertheClayton 4 AntitrustAct,15U.S.C.15and26. 0  ` Pursuanttothearbitrationagreementsatissue,_Comcast_   filedmotionstocompelarbitrationinbothcases.Plaintiffsin 8!" Rogerspresentedseveralargumentstothedistrictcourtin "4$ oppositionto_Comcast_'smotiontocompelarbitration(Plaintiffs' $& oppositionto_Comcast_'smotiontocompelarbitrationin_Kristian_ <&!( wasinallrelevantrespectsidenticaltotheoppositionfiledby '8#* theRogers'Plaintiffs).Theyasserted,interalia,thatthefacts )$, thatgaverisetotheircomplaintoccurredbeforetheexistenceof @+&. the2002/2003arbitrationagreements;therefore,theagreementsdid  notapplytotheirantitrustclaims.Plaintiffsalsocontended \ thatthearbitrationagreementspreventedthemfromvindicating X theircausesofactionunderfederalantitrustlaw,andthatthey   violatedpublicpolicyandwereunconscionableunderstatelaw. `  Concludingthatthelanguageofthe2002/2003arbitration  \  agreementsdidnothaveretroactiveeffect,thedistrictcourt   ruledthattheydidnotapplytothestateantitrustclaimsat d  issue.ThedistrictcourtdidnotreachPlaintiffs'other `  arguments.    ` ThedistrictcourtapplieditsdecisioninRogersto h _Kristian_asbothcomplaintswerebasedonthesameunderlying d facts,thearbitrationagreementsatissueinbothcaseswere  identical,andthedistrictcourt'sreasoningappliedequallyto l bothcomplaints.Thereafter,_Comcast_Ԁfiledaninterlocutoryappeal h contestingthedistrictcourt'sdenialofitsmotionstocompel  arbitration.Bothcasesarecurrentlystayed,pendingresolution p  ofthisappeal.Asthedistrictcourt'sorderrefusingtocompel !l" arbitrationappliedtoboththeRogersand_Kristian_complaints,the "$ twocaseshavebeenconsolidatedforpurposesofthisappeal. t$&  ` Weevaluatethedistrictcourt'sdenialofamotionto  &p!( compelarbitrationdenovo.Campbellv.Gen.Dynamics_Gov't_Ԁ_Sys_. '#* Corp.,407F.3d546,551(1stCir.2005).However,indeciding x)$, thisappeal,"[_w]e_Ԁarenotweddedtothelowercourt'srationale, $+t&. but,rather,mayaffirmitsorderonanyindependentgroundmade  manifestbytherecord."_InterGen_ԀN.V.v._Grina_,344F.3d134,141 \ (1stCir.2003).  X   III.  |  A ` Asnoted,thedistrictcourtfoundthatthearbitration D   agreementsinthe2002/2003Policies&Practicesdidnotapply @  retroactively.Below,inrelevantpart,isthe2002/2003   arbitrationlanguageatissue,setforthinboldfaceasitappears H  intheagreements: D  X XIFWEAREUNABLETORESOLVEINFORMALLYANYCLAIMOR  DISPUTERELATEDTOORARISINGOUTOFTHISAGREEMENTOR v THESERVICESPROVIDED,WEHAVEAGREEDTOBINDING L ARBITRATIONEXCEPTASPROVIDEDBELOW.YOUMUSTCONTACT "r USWITHINONE(1)YEAROFTHEDATEOFTHEOCCURRENCEOF H THEEVENTORFACTSGIVINGRISETOADISPUTE...ORYOU  WAIVETHERIGHTTOPURSUEACLAIMBASEDUPONSUCHEVENT,  FACTSORDISPUTE. z THERESHALLBENORIGHTORAUTHORITYFORANYCLAIMSTOBE &v ARBITRATEDONACLASSACTIONORCONSOLIDATEDBASISORON L BASESINVOLVINGCLAIMSBROUGHTINAPURPORTED " REPRESENTATIVECAPACITYONBEHALFOFTHEGENERALPUBLIC   (SUCHASAPRIVATEATTORNEYGENERAL),OTHERSUBSCRIBERS, ~ ! OROTHERPERSONSSIMILARLYSITUATEDUNLESSYOURSTATE'S T!" LAWSPROVIDEOTHERWISE. *"z#  XC XCCThedistrictcourtfocuseditsattentiononthefirstsentenceof #&% thefirstparagraph,inparticularthephrase"theservices % ' provided": .'~")  X XTheinclusionoftheword"the"before"services (*$+ provided"indicatestotheCourtthattheservicesbeing )%, discussedarethosespecificallyprovidedunder"this *%- agreement."Itisalsonoteworthythat"theservices \+&. provided"ismentionedimmediatelyafter"thisagreement" 2,'/ withoutanyqualifyinglanguagewhatsoeverthatwould  indicatethattheservicesdonotrefertotheagreement  itself.Thesetwofactors,actingincombination,lead \ theCourttobelievethatthephrase"theservices 2 provided"referstospecificservicesprovidedunderthe X particularsubscriberagreementatissue,anddoesnot . refertoservicesinageneralsense.    XH XHHThedistrictcourtbuttressedthisinterpretationofthe `  arbitrationclausewithtwootherpoints.  \   ` First,thedistrictcourtcitedcaseswherecertain   contractuallanguagemeantretroactiveeffect.See,e.g.,_Belke_v. d  MerrillLynch,Pierce,_Fenner_Ԁ&Smith,693F.2d1023,1028(11th `  Cir.1982)("anycontroversybetweenusarisingoutofyour   business")(_over'd_ԀonothergroundsbyDean_Witter_ԀReynolds,Inc. h v.Byrd,470U.S.213(1985));Beneficial_Nat'l_ԀBank,U.S.A.v. d _Payton_,214F.Supp.2d679,689(S.D.Miss.2001)(collecting  cases);Whistlerv._H.J._ԀMeyers&Co.,Inc.,948F.Supp.798,802 l (N.D.Ill.1996)("'anycontroversyarisingoutoforrelatingto h anyofmyaccounts'").Thedistrictcourtalsocitedcaseswhere  thearbitrationprovisionexplicitlyaddressedretroactivity.See, p  e.g.,_Boulet_v.BangorSec.Inc.,324F.Supp.2d120,125n.4 !l" (_D.Minn_Ԁ2004)(discussingretroactiveeffectofagreementthat "$ stated"'whetherenteredintoprior,onorsubsequenttothedate t$& hereof'").Becausethe2002/2003arbitrationagreementswerenot  &p!( phrasedliketheagreementsinanyofthecasesitcited,the '#* districtcourtfoundthattheambiguityoftheagreementsshouldbe x)$, interpretedagainst_Comcast_Ԁinlightofthepolicyofconstruing $+t&. adhesioncontractsstrictlyagainstthedrafter.Thedistrict  courtexpresslyfoundthatthearbitrationagreementswere \ contractsofadhesion._m #  2      _ԀSeeRosenbergv.MerrillLynch,Pierce, X _Fenner_Ԁ&Smith,Inc.,170F.3d1,19n.16(1stCir.1999).    ` Second,thedistrictcourthighlightedthepresenceofa `  statuteoflimitationsprovisionfoundinthesentenceimmediately  \  afterthesentencecontainingthephrase"theservicesprovided".y #  3      ׀   Inthedistrictcourt'sview,ifthearbitrationagreementshad d  retroactiveeffect,thestatuteoflimitationsprovisionwouldact `  asawaiverofalldisputesarisingoneyearpriortothe   arbitrationprovisioninthe2002Policies&Practices.Sucha  waiverwouldbea"significantdeparturefromtheparties'prior \ agreements,whichdidnotevencontainanarbitrationprovision."_ #  4      _Ԁ X Thedistrictcourtstatedthat"thereisnoindicationthatthe   phrase'theservicesprovided'wasintendedtohavesuchadramatic `  effectontheparties'preexistingcontractualrelationships."  \   ` Wecannotagreewiththedistrictcourt'sreadingofthe   arbitrationagreements.Asaninitialmatter,thedistrictcourt d  ignoredalargenumberofcaseswherearbitrationagreements `  containedlanguagespecificallyexcludingretroactiveeffect.For   example,inSecurityWatch,Inc.v.SentinelSystems,Inc.,176 h F.3d369(6thCir.1999),theSixthCircuitfoundnoretroactivity d inanarbitrationclausethatread"'[_t]he_Ԁpartiesshallfollow  thesedisputeresolutionprocessesinconnectionwithalldisputes, l controversiesorclaims...arisingoutoforrelatingtothe h ProductsfurnishedpursuanttothisAgreementoractsoromissions  ofDistributororAT&TunderthisAgreement.'"Id.at372 p  (emphasisadded).InChoiceSecuritySystems,Inc.v.AT&TCorp., !l" 141F.3d1149(Table),1998WL153254(1stCir.Feb.25,1998) "$ (unpublished),wefoundnoretroactivityinanarbitration t$& provisionthatread"alldisputes...arisingoutoforrelating  &p!( totheproductsfurnishedpursuanttothisAgreement."Id.at*1  (emphasisadded);seealsoInreUniversalServ.FundBilling \ Practices_Litg_.,300F.Supp.2d1107,1124(D._Kan_.2003);_Coffman_ X v.Provost_Umphrey_ԀLawFirm,_LLP_,161F.Supp.2d720,723,72627   (E.D.Tex.2001).Inthesecases,thelanguageinthearbitration `  clauseunmistakablylimitsarbitrationtowhatiscoveredbythe  \  agreements--e.g.,"pursuanttothisAgreement."These   arbitrationclausesdonotcontaintheadditionallanguagefoundin d  theclausesatissuehere"anyclaimordisputearisingoutof `  thisagreementortheservicesprovided"(emphasisadded).Read   mostnaturally,thephrase"ortheservicesprovided"coversclaims h ordisputesthatdonotarise"outofthisagreement"andhenceare d notlimitedbythetimeframeoftheagreements.   ` Inrejectingthisnaturalreading,thedistrictcourt,as l noted,placedanundueamountofemphasisonthearticle"the"in h thephrase"theservicesprovided",whichappearsimmediatelyafter  thereferenceto"thisagreement".("Ifweareunabletoresolve p  informallyanyclaimordisputerelatedtoorarisingoutofthe !l" agreementortheservicesprovided,wehaveagreedtobinding "$ arbitrationexceptasprovidedbelow.")Ineffect,thisreading t$& addstothephrase"theservicesprovided"wordsoflimitation  &p!( "underthisagreement".Thereisnojustificationforrewriting '#*  thearbitrationprovisioninthisway.Additionally,becausethe x)$, word"services"isdefinedinthePolicies&Practices,_  #  5      _Ԁitis   grammaticallycorrecttoincludethedefinitearticle"the"before \ "services"inordertosignifythat"services"referto"services" X asdefinedinthetext,ratherthanservicesinageneralsense.   Ѐ ` Moreover,contrarytothedistrictcourt'sfinding,the `  2002/2003arbitrationagreementsdidnoteffectasubstantial  \  changeinthetermsgoverningapotentialarbitralproceeding   between_Comcast_Ԁanditssubscribers.Thedistrictcourtfoundthat d  the2002/2003arbitrationagreements,iftheywereenforced,would `  representasignificantshiftinthecontractualrelationship.   Specifically,thedistrictcourtnotedthat"[_t]his_Ԁconclusion[of h nonretroactivity]issupportedbythefactthatthe[2002/2003] d arbitrationprovisionscontainedastrictlimitationsperiod."  However,the2001Policies&Practicesincludedalimitations l periodidenticaltotheonefoundinthe2002/2003arbitration h clauses. #  6      ׀The2001Policies&Practicesalsoexplicitlycontained  languagethataddressedretroactivity,mirroringthelanguageof  thearbitrationagreementsinthedecisionscitedabove: \ X_XX X_ X XANYANDALLDISPUTESARISINGBETWEENYOUANDTHECOMPANY X ...WHETHERARISINGBEFOREORAFTERTHEEFFECTIVEDATE . MUSTBERESOLVEDBYFINALANDBINDINGARBITRATION.THIS   INCLUDESANYANDALLDISPUTESBASEDONANYPRODUCT,   SERVICEORADVERTISINGCONNECTEDTOTHEPROVISIONORUSE `  OFTHESERVICE.p 6    Xp Xxp ` # X_XXX_Yp#Inasidebysidecomparisonofthe2001andthe  2  2002/2003Policies&Practices,theonlymajordifferencebetween   thetwoversionsisthatcertainprovisions,suchasalimitation :  onremediesandabarontheuseofclassmechanisms,arelocated 6 indifferentsections.Inthe2001version,thebaronclass  arbitrationislocatedinitsownoffsetsubsectionsubsection > (b)undersection10,entitled"DisputeResolution";inthe : 2002/2003version,similarlanguageexistsasthesecondparagraph  ofsection10,entitled"MandatoryandBindingArbitration"andis B notoffset.Also,the2001versioncontained,assubsection(c)of > section10,"DisputeResolution,"aremedieslimitationspecificto  arbitration,inadditiontothegeneralremedieslimitation, F ! section8,entitled"Limited30DayWarrantyandLimitationof !B# Liability".Inthe2002/2003version,thearbitrationspecific #% remedieslimitationofthe2001versionhasnoanalogue.Instead, J% ' the2002/2003versionusesthegeneralremedieslimitation. &F") Finally,the2002/2003iterationaddsaprovisionspecifically (#+ permittingseveranceoftheclassmechanismbar.Asidefromthose N*%- changes,nearlyeveryothersectionofthe2002/2003Policies& +J'/ Practicesisidenticaltothe2001version,withonlyafewother  minorchangestolanguage. \  ` Inthisrespect,thedistrictcourtmadeanapt X observationbutdrewthewrongconclusionbecauseitdidnot   incorporatethe2001Policies&Practicesintoitsanalysis:"There `  isnoindicationthatthephrase'theservicesprovided'was  \  intendedtohavesuchadramaticeffectontheparties'pre   existingcontractualrelationships."Precisely.The2002/2003 d  Policies&Practicesmerelyreorderedandrestructuredthe2001 `  Policies&Practices,changingthelanguagedetailingtherules   governingarbitrationandeliminatingsomeredundancyinthe2001 h version.Itwasneverintendedtomakesignificantchangesinthe d preexistingrelationship.   ` Furthermore,thedistrictcourtincorrectlyreliedonthe l statecontractprinciplerequiringcontractsofadhesiontobe h construedstrictlyagainstthedrafter.Ordinarily,giventhe  strongfederalpolicyofresolvinganydoubtsconcerning p  _arbitrability_Ԁinfavorofarbitration,anyambiguitycreatedbythe !l" changeinlanguagefrom2001to2002/2003shouldberesolvedin "$ favoroffinding_arbitrability_.SeeMosesH.ConeMemorial t$& Hospitalv.MercuryConstructionCorp.,460U.S.1,2425(1983)  &p!( ("_A]s_Ԁamatteroffederallaw,anydoubtsconcerningthescopeof '#* arbitrableissuesshouldberesolvedinfavorofarbitration."). x)$, Whilethedistrictcourtacknowledgedthisprincipleas $+t&. profferedby_Comcast_Ԁinitsdiscussion,itchosenottoapply  it.Instead,itconcludedthat"[_i]n_Ԁlightofthefactthatthe \ subscriberagreementsatissueinthiscaseareunquestionably X adhesioncontracts,thisCourtconsidersitappropriatetoholdthe   defendantstothewordstheychosetouseindraftingthe `  arbitrationprovisions."  \   ` Tosupportthischoice,thedistrictcourtcitedPaul   RevereVariableAnnuityIns.Co.v._Kirschhofer_,226F.3d15(1st d  Cir.2000).There,weacknowledgedthat"[_o]ne_Ԁimportant `  constraintisthatthefederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationdoesnot   totallydisplaceordinaryrulesofcontractinterpretation.Thus, h numerouscourtshaveemployedthetenetofcontra_proferentem_in d construingambiguitiesinarbitrationagreementsagainstthe  drafters."Id.at25.ThepetitionersinPaulRevere: l  X X_concede[d_]thatthecontra_proferentem_tenetproperly h appliestosuchquestionsaswhetherapartyhasentered > anarbitrationagreementorwhetheranarbitration  agreementisenforceablevelnon[;]theynonetheless  _maintain[ed_]thatit_ha[d_]noapplicationtoquestions p  touchinguponthescopeofanarbitrationagreement. F ! ! X3 XAId.Inresponse,weheldthat"generallyspeaking,thepresumption !B# infavorofarbitrationappliestotheresolutionofscope #% questions....Ascopequestionariseswhenthepartieshavea J% ' contractthatprovidesforarbitrationofsomeissuesanditis &F") unclearwhetheraspecificdisputefallswithinthatcontract." (#+  Id.(internalcitationsandquotationmarksomitted). N*%-  ` Here,Plaintiffsarguethatthearbitrationagreements   arenotenforceableastotheirparticularantitrustclaimsbecause \ thearbitrationagreementsdonotapplyretroactively.Plaintiffs X concedethatthearbitrationagreementsaregenerallyvalid.Put   anotherway,Plaintiffsarguethattheirantitrustclaimsdonot `  fallwithinthescopeofthearbitrationagreementsasaresultof  \  nonretroactivity.Plaintiffsareinfactraisingascope   question.Thus,thegeneralrulecitedinPaulRevereapplies. d  Wherethefederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationisintensionwith `  thetenetofcontra_proferentem_foradhesioncontracts,andthere   isascopequestionatissue,thefederalpolicyfavoring h arbitrationtrumpsthestatecontractlawtenet._# #  7      _ԀForthisreason d aswell,thedistrictcourterredinrulingthatthearbitration  agreementsdidnotapplyretroactivelytotheantitrustclaimsof l Plaintiffs. h  ` Therefore,weconcludethatthe2002/2003arbitration  agreements,liketheir2001predecessor,dohaveretroactive p  effect.Thus,wemustaddresstheotherargumentsadvancedby !l" Plaintiffsinoppositiontotheenforcementofthearbitration "$ agreements. t$&     '#* IV.   ё  ` Plaintiffsassertthat"_Comcast_'sarbitrationclausesare x alsounenforceablebecause_Comcast_ԀfailedtogivePlaintiffs $t advance30daynoticeofthearbitrationprovisionsasrequiredby   federallaw."Thedistrictcourtdidnotaddressthisissue |  becauseitfoundtheretroactivityissue_dispositive_. ( x  Specifically,Plaintiffsassertthat_Comcast_Ԁdidnotprovidethe $  requisite30daynoticetosubscribersasrequiredby47C.F.R.   76.1602&76.1603,_ #  8      _Ԁwhichinterpretandimplementaportionofthe ,|  CableTelevisionandConsumerProtectionAct,47U.S.C.552(c). (  ` Thestatuteandregulationsdonotspecifythetypeof  noticerequired.Indeed,thestatuteestablishesaflexiblenotice 0 standard.Acompanymayprovidenotice"usinganyreasonably , writtenmeansat[thecablecompany's]solediscretion."47U.S.C.  552(c)(2000).Here,_Comcast_Ԁprovidednoticebysettingoutthe 4 entiretextofthenewsubscriptionagreement.Althoughthismay 0 notbeidealnoticebecauseitdoesnotdrawattentiontothe   changescontainedinthe2002/2003agreementsfromthe2001 8!" agreement,_Comcast_Ԁwasnotrequiredtoprovideanymorenoticethan  itdid.Rather,_Comcast_Ԁneedonlyprovidenoticethatisa \ "reasonablewrittenmeans"inordertosatisfytherequirementsof X 47U.S.C.552(c).Whiletheouterboundaryofwhatisreasonable   maynotbecertain,thenoticeprovidedby_Comcast_Ԁheremeetsthe `  standard.  \   ` Additionally,X_XX X_ԀPlaintiffsassertthat_Comcast_Ԁdidnot   provideadequatenoticeincompliancewiththePolicies&Practices d  itself,whichrequiresthat_Comcast_Ԁwill"provideyou[the `  subscriber]noticeofthechangeanditsEffectiveDate."The# X_XXX_(#   Policies&Practicesdoesnotcontainanexpliciteffectivedate, h notifyingasubscriberwhentheprovisionscontainedinthe d Policies&Practicesbegintoapply.X_XX X_ԀHowever,thePolicies&  Practicesstatesinitsfirstparagraphthatitwasdistributedby l _Comcast_Ԁtosubscribersasnotice"inordertocomplywiththe h Company'sobligationsundertherulesoftheFederalCommunications  Commission."Thus,thePolicies&Practicesincorporatesby p  referencetheFederalCommunicationsCommission's("FCC")30day !l" advancenoticeregulation,47C.F.R.76.1603(b)# X_XXX_ī#X_XX X_.Again,_Comcast_ "$ couldhavecompliedmoreclearlywithitsselfimposedeffective t$& datenoticerequirement,butthiscomplianceisgoodenough.  &p!( Furthermore,neitherthestatutenortheFCC'sregulationsrequire '#*  thatsubscribersreceiveanyexplicitstatementabouttheeffective x)$, dateofnewterms.Wearesatisfiedthat_Comcast_Ԁprovidedadequate  notice.n #  9      ׀# X_XXX_# \   `     V.     ` Plaintiffscontendthatthe2002/2003arbitration |  agreementsshouldbeinvalidatedbecausemanyoftheirprovisions ( x  preventPlaintiffsfromvindicatingtheirstatutoryrights. $  Plaintiffs'"vindicationofstatutoryrights"argumentsreflect   "thepresumptionthatarbitrationprovidesafairandadequate ,|  mechanismforenforcingstatutoryrights."Rosenberg,170F.3dat ( 14;seealsoMitsubishiMotorsCorp.v.SolerChryslerPlymouth,  Inc.,473U.S.614,637(1985)("[S]olongastheprospective 0 litiganteffectivelymayvindicateitsstatutorycauseofactionin , thearbitralforum,thestatutewillcontinuetoservebothits  remedialanddeterrentfunction.")Unlessthearbitralforum 4 providedbyagivenagreementprovidesforthefairandadequate 0 enforcementofaparty'sstatutoryrights,thearbitralforumruns   afoulofthispresumptionandlosesitsclaimasavalid 8!" alternativetotraditionallitigation. "4$  ` Plaintiffsassertthatthearbitrationagreementsprevent $& themfromvindicatingtheirstatutoryrightsbecausethe <&!( agreements:(1)provideforlimiteddiscovery;(2)establisha  shortenedstatuteoflimitationsperiod;(3)barrecoveryoftreble \ damages;(4)preventrecoveryofattorney'sfees;and(5)prohibit X theuseofclassmechanisms.Beforeundertakingouranalysisof   thefiveprovisionsinthearbitrationagreementsthatPlaintiffs `  findobjectionable,wemustexplainsomepreliminaryconsiderations  \  thatinformtheanalysisofeachoftheirvindicationofstatutory   rightsclaims. d   A."Questionsof_Arbitrability_"  `   ` _i_.TheSupremeCourttrilogy (  ` a._Howsam_     ` Inanalyzingagivenvindicationofstatutoryrights h claim,wemustfirstdecidewhotheproperdecisionmakerisfor d suchaclaim:anarbitratororacourt.Thetouchstonefor  decidingthisquestionis_Howsam_v.Dean_Witter_ԀReynolds,Inc.,537 l U.S.79(2002).In_Howsam_,theCourt"_focuse[d_]uponan h arbitrationruleoftheNationalAssociationofSecuritiesDealers   (NASD)"involvingasixyearstatuteoflimitations.Id.at81. p!" Dean_Witter_Ԁhadaskedthedistrictcourt"todeclarethatthe #l$ disputewas'ineligibleforarbitration'becauseitwasmorethan $ & sixyearsold."Id.at82.TheSupremeCourthadtodecide t&!( "whetheracourtoranNASDarbitratorshouldapplythe[NASD's]  (p#*  ruletotheunderlyingcontroversy,"id.at81thetypeof )%, thresholddecisionwemustmakehereforeachofPlaintiffs'  vindicationofstatutoryrightsclaims. \   ` TheCourtbeganitsanalysiswiththeobservationthat X "'arbitrationisamatterofcontractandapartycannotbe   requiredtosubmittoarbitrationanydisputewhichhehasnot `  agreedsotosubmit.'"Id.at83(quotingSteelworkersv.Warrior  \  &GulfNav.Co.,363U.S.574,582(1960)).TheCourtcontinued:    X XAlthoughtheCourthasalsolongrecognizedandenforced d  aliberalfederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationagreements, :  ithasmadeclearthatthereisanexceptiontothis `  policy:Thequestionwhetherthepartieshavesubmitted 6 aparticulardisputetoarbitration,i.e.,the"question   of_arbitrability_,"isanissueforjudicialdetermination  unlessthepartiesclearlyandunmistakablyprovide h otherwise. >  X X|Id.at83(internalcitationsomitted).Thisstatementrequires : closescrutinybecauseitincludesreferencestothreedistinct  elements:(1)thefederalpolicyfavoringarbitrationagreements, B whichhasnothingtodowiththeintentofthepartiesthathave > enteredintoanarbitrationagreement;(2)theexceptiontothis  policybasedonthepresumedintentofthecontractingparties F ! Єthatthequestionofwhetherthepartieshavesubmitteda !B# particulardisputetoarbitration(the"questionof_arbitrability_") #% isanissueforjudicialdetermination;and(3)aclearand J% ' unmistakableexpressionofactualintentbythecontractingparties &F") thattheywantanarbitratorratherthanacourttodecidewhether (#+  theyhavesubmittedaparticulardisputetoarbitration. N*%-  ` Thissecondelement,involvingthepresumedintentofthe   contractingpartiesfavoringjudicialdeterminationofwhethera \ particulardisputehasbeensubmittedtoarbitration,isdescribed X bytheCourtas"theinterpretiverule".TheCourtin_Howsam_had   todecide"whetherapplicationoftheNASDtimelimitprovision `  fallsintothescopeofthis...interpretiverule."Id.at83.  \  IftheCourtdecidedthattheinterpretiveruleapplied,acourt   woulddecidetheapplicabilityofthesixyearstatuteof d  limitations.IftheCourtdecidedthattheinterpretiveruledid `  notapply,thegeneralpolicyfavoringarbitrationwouldgovern,   andthearbitratorwoulddecidetheapplicabilityofthestatuteof h limitations. d  ` X_XX X_Inrejectingtheapplicationoftheinterpretiveruleto  thedisputeovertheapplicabilityofthestatuteoflimitations, l theCourtexplainedthatitwouldbewrongtoviewtoobroadlythe h presumptionthatthepartiestoanarbitrationagreementintend  thatacourtratherthananarbitratorwilldecidewhetherthe p  partieshavesubmittedaparticulardisputetoarbitration.Asthe !l" Courtexplained: "$  X XLinguisticallyspeaking,onemightcallanypotentially t$& _dispositive_Ԁgatewayquestiona"questionof J% ' _arbitrability_,"foritsanswerwilldeterminewhetherthe  &p!( underlyingcontroversywillproceedtoarbitrationonthe &F") merits.TheCourt'scaselaw,however,makesclearthat, '#* forpurposesofapplyingtheinterpretiverule[thata (#+ courtratherthananarbitratorshoulddecidewhetherthe x)$, partieshavesubmittedaparticulardisputeto N*%- arbitration],thephrase"questionof_arbitrability_"has $+t&. afarmorelimitedscope.# X_XXX_x#ԀTheCourthasfoundthephrase +J'/ applicableinthekindofnarrowcircumstancewhere  contractingpartieswouldlikelyhaveexpectedacourtto  havedecidedthegatewaymatter,wheretheyarenot \ likelytohavethoughtthattheyhadagreedthatan 2 arbitratorwoulddoso,andconsequently,wherereference X ofthegatewaydisputetothecourtavoidstheriskof . forcingpartiestoarbitrateamatterthattheymaywell   nothaveagreedtoarbitrate.    X XId.at8384(internalcitationsomitted).Thecornerstonehereis 6   anassumptionabouttheintentofthecontractingpartiestoan  2  arbitrationagreement,in"thekindofnarrowcircumstanceswhere   contractingpartieswouldlikelyhaveexpectedacourttohave :  decidedthegatewaymatter."Id.at8384.Inthesenarrow 6 circumstances,thegatewaydisputeposesa"questionof  _arbitrability_",meaningthatacourt,ratherthananarbitrator, > decideswhetherthepartieshavesubmittedtheparticulardispute : toarbitration.   ` _Howsam_describedtwocategoriesofdisputeswherewe B presumethatcourtsratherthanarbitratorsshouldresolvethe > gatewaydispute:(1)disputes"aboutwhetherthepartiesarebound  byagivenarbitrationclause";and(2)disagreements"about F ! whetheranarbitrationclauseina_concededly_Ԁbindingcontract !B# appliestoaparticulartypeofcontroversy."Id.at84.Examples #% oftheformerincludewhetheranarbitrationcontractbindsparties J% ' thatdidnotsigntheagreement;andwhetheranarbitration &F") agreementsurvivedacorporatemergerandboundthesubsequent (#+ corporation.SeeFirstOptionsofChicago,Inc.v.Kaplan,514 N*%- U.S.938(1995);JohnWiley&Sons,Inc.v._Livingston_,376U.S. +J'/ 543(1964).Examplesofthelatterincludewhetheralabor  managementlayoffcontroversywascoveredbythearbitrationclause \ ofacollectivebargainingagreement;andwhetheraclause X providingforarbitrationofvariousgrievancescoversclaimsfor   damagesforbreachofanostrikeagreement.SeeAT&T `  Technologies,Inc.v.Comm.WorkersofAm.,475U.S.643(1986);  \  Atkinsonv.SinclairRefiningCo.,370U.S.238(1962).    ` TheCourtalso"foundthephrase'questionof d  _arbitrability_'notapplicableinotherkindsofgeneral `  circumstanceswherepartieswouldlikelyexpectthatanarbitrator   woulddecidethegatewaymatter."_Howsam_,537U.S.at84.For h example,"'[_P]rocedural_'questionswhichgrowoutofthedispute d andbearonitsfinaldisposition"arepresumptivelynotforthe  judge,butforanarbitratortodecide._Howsam_,537U.S.at84 l (quotingJohnWiley,376U.S.at557).Sotoo,thepresumptionis h thatthearbitratorshoulddecide"'_allegation[s_]ofwaiver,delay,  oralikedefenseto_arbitrability_.'"Id.(quotingMosesH.Cone, p  460U.S.at2425).CitingthecommentstotheRevisedUniform !l" ArbitrationActof2000,theCourtelaboratedonthisstatement, "$ stating: t$&  X Xintheabsenceofanagreementtothecontrary,issuesof  &p!( substantive_arbitrability_Ԁ...areforacourttodecide &F") andissuesofprocedural_arbitrability_,i.e.whether '#* prerequisitessuchastimelimits,notice,laches, (#+ estoppel,andotherconditionsprecedenttoanobligation x)$, toarbitratehavebeenmet,areforthearbitratorsto N*%- decide. $+t&.  +J'/  Xp XbPId.at85(citingRev.Un.Arb.Act6and_cmt_.2)(original  emphasisomitted). \  ` Finally,the_Howsam_decisioninvokedtheconceptof X comparativeexpertise:    X XtheNASDarbitrators,comparativelymoreexpertaboutthe `  meaningoftheirownrule,arecomparativelybetterable 6   tointerpretandapplyit.Intheabsenceofany  \  statementtothecontraryinthearbitrationagreement,  2  itisreasonabletoinferthatthepartiesintendedthe   agreementtoreflectthatunderstanding.Andforthelaw   toassumeanexpectationthataligns(1)_decisionmaker_ d  with(2)comparativeexpertisewillhelpbettertosecure :  afairandexpeditiousresolutionoftheunderlying `  controversy.... 6  XW XI7Id.at85.Basedonthisreasoning,theCourtconcludedthat"the  NASD'stimelimitrulefallswithintheclassofgatewayprocedural > disputesthatdonotpresentwhatourcaseshavecalled'questions : of_arbitrability_.'Andthestrongprocourt[asdecisionmaker]  presumptionastotheparties'likelyintentdoesnotapply."Id. B at8586. >  ` b._Pacificare_and_Bazzle_    `  Inthewakeof_Howsam_,theCourtdecidedtwoadditional b ! cases,_Pacificare_ԀHealthSystems,Inc.v.Book,538U.S.401 "^# (2003),andGreenTreeFinancialCorp.v._Bazzle_,539U.S.444 # % (2003),thatmustalsoinformouranalysisoftheproperdecision f% ' makerforthevindicationofstatutoryrightsclaimsbeforeus.In 'b") _Pacificare_,agroupofphysiciansbroughtclaimsagainstanumber ($+ ofhealthcaremanagementorganizations("_HMOs_"),includingaRICO j*%- claim.The_HMOs_Ԁsoughttocompelarbitration.See_Pacificare_,538 ,f'/ U.S.at40203.Thephysiciansopposedarbitrationontheground  thattheycouldnotobtain"meaningfulrelief"inarbitrationfor \ theirclaimsundertheRICOstatute,whichauthorizestreble X damages,becausethearbitrationprovisionprohibitedtheawarding   ofpunitivedamages.Id.at403.The_HMOs_Ԁassertedthattherewas `  noquestionof_arbitrability_,"andhence[thedispute]shouldhave  \  beendecidedbyanarbitrator,ratherthanacourt,inthefirst   instance."Id.at403.Theyalsoassertedinthealternativethat d  iftherewasaquestionof_arbitrability_,theremediallimitation `  atissuedidnotrequireinvalidationofthearbitration   agreements.Id.at404.TheCourtultimatelyreachedneitherof h the_HMOs_'positions,concluding"thatitwouldbeprematureforus d toaddressthesequestionsatthistime."Id.at404.Thatwasso  becauseofacrucialambiguityinthearbitrationagreements. l  ` Thearbitrationagreementsatissuein_Pacificare_ h explicitlyprohibitedtherecoveryofpunitivedamages,nottreble  damages.Id.at405.Thisfact,coupledwithexistingprecedent, p  convincedtheCourtthattherewastoomuchlegalambiguityto !l" concludethattherewasaquestionof_arbitrability_;asaresult, "$ theCourtcompelledarbitration.TheCourtreasonedthat: t$&  X Xsincewedonotknowhowthearbitratorwillconstruethe  &p!( remediallimitations,thequestionswhethertheyrender &F") theparties'agreementsunenforceableandwhetheritis '#* forcourtsorarbitratorstodecide_enforceability_Ԁinthe (#+ firstinstanceareunusuallyabstract....theproper x)$, courseistocompelarbitration. N*%-   $+t&.  X XrId.at407.Becausetheunderlyingmeaningofthearbitration   agreementwasunclearwithrespecttotheavailabilityoftreble \ damages,itwasalsounclearwhetherthatagreementconflictedwith X theRICOstatute.Sincesuchaconflictmightthreatenthe   validityofthearbitrationagreements,"weshouldnot,onthe `  basisof'merespeculation'thatanarbitratormightinterpret  \  theseambiguousagreementsinamannerthatcaststheir   _enforceability_Ԁintodoubt,takeuponourselvestheauthorityto d  decidetheantecedentquestionofhowtheambiguityistobe `  resolved."Id.at40607.Giventhepresumptioninfavorof   arbitration,acourtshouldnotforeclosetheoperationofthat h presumptionbydecidingthatthereisaquestionof_arbitrability_ d whenthereisthepossibilitythatanarbitrator'sdecisioninthe  firstinstancewouldobviatetheneedforjudicialdecisionmaking. l Seeid.at407n.2. h  ` In_Bazzle_,decidedsoonafter_Pacificare_,theCourtonce  againconfrontedthesignificanceofambiguityinanarbitration p  agreement._Bazzle_concerned"contractsbetweenacommerciallender !l" anditscustomers,eachofwhichcontainsaclauseprovidingfor "$ arbitrationofallcontractrelateddisputes."539U.S.at447. t$& TheSupremeCourtofSouthCarolinaheldthatthearbitration  &p!( clausesweresilentastowhetherarbitrationcouldtakeplaceon '#* aclassbasis,andthatSouthCarolinalawpermittedclass x)$, arbitrationunderthosecircumstances.Id.TheSupremeCourtwas $+t&. "facedattheoutsetwithaproblemconcerningthecontracts'  silence.Arethecontractsinfactsilent,ordotheyforbidclass \ arbitration?"_Bazzle_,539U.S.at447.Thelenderassertedthat X thearbitrationlanguageprohibitedclassarbitration;theCourt   disagreed.Itheldthatbecausetheliteraltermsoftheagreement `  didnotresolvetheclassarbitrationquestion,i.e.,theterms  \  wereambiguous,thecase"_present[ed_]adisputedissueofcontract   interpretation."Id.at450.Drawingon_Howsam_,theCourtnoted d  that"thequestionheredoesnotfallinto[the]narrow `  exception"describedin_Howsam_.539U.S.at452.Thatis,"[_i]n_   certainlimitedcircumstances,courtsassumethattheparties h intendedcourts,notarbitrators,todecideaparticular d arbitration-relatedmatter....Theyincludecertaingateway  matters,suchaswhetherthepartieshaveavalidarbitration l agreementatallorwhethera_concededly_Ԁbindingarbitrationclause h appliestoacertaintypeofcontroversy."Id.Thecontract  interpretationquestionposedin_Bazzle_didnotfallintothis p  narrowexception: !l"  X XRathertherelevantquestionhereiswhatkindof "$ arbitrationproceedingthepartiesagreedto.That #% questiondoesnotconcernastatestatuteorjudicial t$& procedures.Itconcernscontractinterpretationand J% ' arbitrationprocedures.Arbitratorsarewellsituatedto  &p!( answerthatquestion. &F") Ѐ '#* E X7 X)539U.S.at45253(internalcitationsomitted). (#+  ` Inessence,the_Bazzle_courtappliedprinciplesderived N*%- from_Howsam_and_Pacificare_.From_Howsam_,itconsideredand +J'/ rejectedtheinterpretiverule(anexceptiontothefederalpolicy  favoringarbitration)thatcourtsassumethatthepartiesintended \ courts,notarbitrators,todecidecertainarbitrationrelated X matters.Confrontedwithadisputeaboutwhatthearbitration   languagemeantwithrespecttotheavailabilityofclass `  arbitration(anuncertaintyanalogoustotheambiguityaddressedin  \  _Pacificare_),theCourtconcludedthatanarbitrator,notajudge,   shoulddecidewhatkindofarbitrationproceedingthepartieshad d  agreedto. `   ` ii. Applyingthe"trilogy"     ` Toreiterate,Plaintiffsassertthatthearbitration  agreementspreventthemfromvindicatingtheirstatutoryrightsin 0 thefollowingways.Theagreements:(1)provideforlimited , discovery;(2)establishashortenedstatuteoflimitationsperiod;  (3)barrecoveryoftrebledamages;(4)preventrecoveryof 4 attorney'sfees;and(5)prohibitclassarbitration._Comcast_ 0 contendsthatnoneoftheseassertionsraiseaquestionof   _arbitrability_. 8!"  ` Wemustfirstdecidewhetheranarbitratororacourt "4$ shouldresolveeachofthevindicationofstatutoryrightsclaims, $& i.e.,whetheraquestionof_arbitrability_Ԁisactuallyraised.That <&!( inquiryrequiresustoapplytheprincipleswehaveculledfromthe '8#* Court'sdecisionsin_Howsam_,_Pacificare_,and_Bazzle_.Then,ifa )$, questionof_arbitrability_ԀisindeedraisedbyanyofPlaintiffs' @+&. assertions,wemustdecide"themerits"ofthatassertion.By"the  merits"wemeanthequestionofwhethertheparticularchallenge \ raisedbyPlaintiffstothearbitrationagreementsisavalid X defensetothedemandforarbitration.By"themerits"wedonot   meanthe"underlyingdispute,"i.e.,Plaintiffs'antitrustclaims `  against_Comcast_.  \   B._Howsam_'sClearQuestionsof_Arbitrability_     ` WeconcludethatnoneofPlaintiffs'claimsfallsinto   eitherofthetwocategoriesofclearquestionsof_arbitrability_ ,|  detailedin_Howsam_.Plaintiffsdescribetheirpositiongenerally ( asfollows:"thePolicies&Practicesasawholeisvalid.  However,asappliedtoourantitrustclaims,thearbitration 0 agreementcontainedthereinpreventsusfromobtainingstatutorily , guaranteedrelief;therefore,thearbitrationclauseisinvalidas  appliedtoourantitrustclaims." 4  ` Thetwotypesofclearquestionsof_arbitrability_ 0 describedbytheCourtin_Howsam_are:(1)disputesaboutwhether   thepartiesareboundbyagivenarbitrationclause;and(2) 8!" disputesaboutwhetheranarbitrationclauseina_concededly_ "4$ bindingcontractappliestoaparticulartypeofcontroversy.See $& _Howsam_,537U.S.at84.WhileearlierwecategorizedPlaintiffs' <&!( nonretroactivityclaimasanargumentaboutthe"scope"ofthe '8#* arbitrationagreements,theirvindicationofstatutoryrights )$, claimsdonotfitintoeitherof_Howsam_'scategories.Theexamples @+&. providedbythe_Howsam_courtbearthisout.Id.at84.Theformer  categoryconcernswhetherthereisabindingarbitrationagreement \ atall,e.g.,arenonsignatoriesofanarbitrationagreementbound X byit?Here,thereisnoquestionthatthePolicies&Practices,   whichincludesthearbitrationprovisions,establishesavalid `  contractualrelationshipbetween_Comcast_Ԁandeachofits  \  subscribers.~ #  10      ׀Plaintiffsdonotchallengegenerallythevalidity   ofthePolicies&Practices,therequirementtoarbitrate,orthe d  fiveparticularrulesgoverningarbitrationhere.Rather, `  Plaintiffsrelyonthespecificcircumstancesoftheircase,i.e.,   theirantitrustclaims,inchallenging_Comcast_'sdemandfor h arbitration. d  ` Thesecond_Howsam_categoryalsodoesnotdescribe  Plaintiffs'claims.Thatcategoryinvolvesdisputesoverwhether l aparticulartypeofcontroversyiscoveredbya_concededly_Ԁvalid h arbitrationagreement.Here,Plaintiffsdonotassertthatthe  arbitrationprovisionsofthePolicies&Practicesdonotapplyto p  antitrustclaims.Rather,Plaintiffsassertthatarbitration !l" subjecttotheprovisionsatissueshields_Comcast_Ԁfromantitrust "$ liability,andhenceconflictswiththestatutesprovidingforsuch  liability. \  ` Inshort,_Howsam_'stwocategoriesofclearquestionsof X _arbitrability_ԀdonottelluswhetherPlaintiffshaveraised   questionsof_arbitrability_.Still,evenwithoutthebenefitofa `  _dispositive_ԀSupremeCourtprecedent,thereareusefulguidesinthe  \  precedentswehavediscussedandinothers.    C.LimitedDiscovery  d   ` Thelanguageinthearbitrationagreementsaddressing ,|  discoverystatesthat"Moreover,participatinginarbitrationmay ( resultinlimiteddiscovery."Plaintiffscontendthatthelanguage  constrainingdiscoverypreventsthemfromobtainingtheamountof 0 discoverythattheycouldexpecttoreceiveifdiscoverywere , conductedinthecourts.ButtheSupremeCourthasalready  foreclosedlimiteddiscoveryasagroundforopposingthe 4 enforcementofanarbitrationclause.In_Gilmer_v. 0 Interstate/JohnsonLaneCorp.,500U.S.20(1991),theSupreme   Courtconfrontedthisveryargumentinthecontextofanage 8!" discriminationarbitrationdispute.TheCourtstatedthat"[_i]t_Ԁis "4$ unlikely,however,thatagediscriminationclaimsrequiremore $& extensivediscoverythanotherclaimsthatwehavefoundtobe <&!( arbitrable,suchasRICOandantitrustclaims,"andrejectedthe '8#* plaintiff'sdiscoveryargument.Id.at31(emphasisadded).Given )$, thisprecedent,thereisnoneedtodecideanewwhetherlimited @+&. discoveryraisesaquestionof_arbitrability_.Itdoesnot.  Moreover,X_XX X_theCourt'sdecisionin_Gilmer_conformstothe \ interpretiveprinciplestheCourtdetailedin_Howsam_,_Pacificare_ X and_Bazzle_.Anydisputeoverdiscoverywouldbeproceduralin   nature,andthereforeleftforanarbitratortoresolve.# X_XXX_u!# `   D.Limitationsperiod   \   ` TheShermanAntitrustAct,15U.S.C.15b,andthe $  MassachusettsAntitrustAct,Mass.Gen.Law.ch.93,13,provide   afouryearlimitationsperiodforantitrustclaims.Indirect ,|  conflictwiththestatutorylimitationsperiod,the2002/2003 ( arbitrationagreementsstatethat"youmustcontactuswithinone  (1)yearofthedateoftheoccurrenceoftheeventorfactsgiving 0 risetoadispute...oryouwaivetherighttopursueaclaim , baseduponsuchevent,factsordispute."Plaintiffsoppose  arbitrationoftheirantitrustclaimsbasedonthebasisofthis 4 directconflictbetweentheantitruststatutesandthearbitration 0 provisions.    ` Itistemptingtorelyontheprecedentestablishedin 8!" _Howsam_󀄄wheretheCourtruledthatanarbitratoristheproper "4$ decisionmakerfordisputesconcerningtheapplicabilityofthe $& arbitrator'sowntimelimitstoconcludethatthisconflictdoes <&!( notposeaquestionof_arbitrability_.See_Howsam_,537U.S.at85 '8#* 86.Thetemptationtorelyon_Howsam_isbuttressedbyourown )$, precedent,specificallyMariev.AlliedHomeMortgageCorp.,402 @+&. F.3d1(1stCir.2005).InMarie,weconfrontedalimitations  clausecontainedinanarbitrationagreementitself,ratherthanin \ thearbitrator'sgoverningrules.Id.at11.Here,wearealso X facedwithastatuteoflimitationscontainedinavalid   arbitrationagreement.However,thereisonesignificant `  differencebetweenthesituationwefaceandthecircumstancesin  \  _Howsam_andMarie,whichpreventsusfromsimplyapplyingherethe   ruleestablishedinthosecases. d   ` Inboth_Howsam_andMarie,thelimitationsperioddidnot `  conflictwithanyotherstatuteoflimitations.See_Howsam_,537   U.S.at8182;Marie,402F.3dat46.In_Howsam_,thequestionwas h whetherthearbitrator'sowntimelimitofsixyearsappliedtoa d disputeallegedlybroughtoutsideofthesixyearwindow.See  _Howsam_,537U.S.at8182.InMarie,thequestionwaswhetherone l ofthepartieshadcompliedwiththe60daytimelimitsetforthin h thearbitrationagreement.SeeMarie,402F.3dat11.Inother  words,inneithercasewasthestatuteoflimitationsinconflict p  withastatutorylimitationsperiodapplicabletotheparticular !l" claimsatissue.Instead,in_Howsam_andMarietherewerequestions "$ ofwhetherastatuteoflimitationsappliedtoaparticularfactual t$& circumstance.Thatisadifferenttypeofquestionthantheonewe  &p!( facehere,whichiswhetherastatuteoflimitationsfoundinthe '#* arbitrationagreementmustyieldtoastatutorilymandatedstatute x)$, oflimitations. $+t&.  ` Nevertheless,wearenotwithoutsomeguidancefromthese  decisions.Inparticular,inMarie,afternotingthatadispute \ overastatuteoflimitations"isthesortofprocedural X prerequisitethatispresumedtobeforthearbitrator,"wealso   explainedthat: `   X XWhilethetimelimitin_Howsam_wasinthearbitrator's  \  ownrulesratherthaninthecontractitself,thismakes  2  nodifference.Thearbitratormightbeexpectedtohave   comparativeexpertiseindeterminingthemeaningofthese   sortsofcontractuallimitationsprovisions....And d  ...considerationofthiskindofproceduralprovision :  mayentanglethecourtinissuesthatgoproperlytothe `  meritsofthedispute,whichareforthearbitrator. 6 4 X4 X4Marie,402F.3dat11(emphasisadded)._Comcast_ԀX_XX X_pointsoutthat  bothofPlaintiffs'complaintsallegeantitrustviolations > committedby_Comcast_Ԁbeforeitpromulgatedthe2002/2003Policies : &Practices.But# X_XXX_7#X_XX X__Comcast_Ԁarguesthatthecomplaintsareactually  basedonongoinginjury,ratherthandiscreteeventsinthepast. B While_Comcast_Ԁraisesthisargumenttochallengetheviewthatit > seeksretroactiveapplicationofthearbitrationagreements,_ #  11      _Ԁwe  canstillconsidertherelevanceoftheongoinginjuryinquiryto F ! thequestionof_arbitrability_.# X_XXX_9#X_XX X_ !B#  ` Ongoinginjuryhastraditionallybeenunderstoodtotoll #% astatuteoflimitationsundercertaincircumstances.See,e.g., J% ' _Roemmich_v.EagleEyeDevelopment,LLC,386F.Supp.2d1089,1094 &F") (D.N.D.2005);_Achee_v.PortDrumCo.,197F.Supp.2d723,73536  (E.D.Tex.2002);_Geddes_v.CountyofKane,121F.Supp.2d662, \ 666(N.D.Ill.2000).Todetermine:(1)whetherPlaintiffsinfact X sufferfromanongoinginjuryasaresultof_Comcast_'sallegedly   illegalacts;and(2)# X_XXX_;#whethersuchaninjury,ifitexists,tolls `  thestatuteoflimitationscontainedinthePolicies&Practices,  \  wouldrequireanexaminationofthe"meritsofthecase",i.e.,the   facts,theprovinceofthearbitrator.SeeMarie,402F.3dat11. d  Moreover,thestatuteoflimitationsdefenseisanaffirmative `  defense.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.8(c)("Inpleadingtoapreceding   pleading,apartyshallsetforthaffirmatively...statuteof h limitations...andanyothermatterconstitutinganavoidanceor d affirmativedefense.")Affirmativedefensesofteninvolvefactual  questionsthatdotouchonthemeritsofacase.Indeed,_Howsam_ l placed"'_allegation[s_]ofwaiver,delay,oralikedefenseto h _arbitrability_'"squarelyinthepurviewofthearbitrator.537  U.S.at84(quotingMosesH.Cone,460U.S.at2425).Forthese p  reasons,weconcludethatPlaintiffs'challengetothestatuteof !l" limitationscontainedinthe2002/2003Policies&Practicesdoes "$ notraiseaquestionof_arbitrability_. t$& _ E._ԀTrebledamages   &p!(   ` The2002/2003Policies&Practicesstatesinrelevant '8#* part: )$,  X XINNOEVENTSHALLWEOROUREMPLOYEESORAGENTSHAVEANY @+&. LIABILITYFORPUNITIVE,TREBLE,EXEMPLARY,SPECIAL, ,f'/ INDIRECT,INCIDENTALORCONSEQUENTIALDAMAGES....  SUCHLIMITATIONOFLIABILITYAPPLIESINALL  CIRCUMSTANCES,REGARDLESSOFWHETHERSUCHDAMAGESMAYBE \ AVAILABLEUNDERAPPLICABLELAW,ANDTHEPARTIESHEREBY 2 WAIVETHEIRRIGHTS,IFANY,TORECOVERANYSUCHDAMAGES. X  X*F XF FAtfirstblush,thelanguageofthefirstparagraphcontravenesthe   remediallanguagesetforthintheShermanActandthe `  MassachusettsAntitrustAct,whichprovideexplicitlyforthe  \  recoveryoftrebledamages.15U.S.C.15(a);_* #  12      _ԀMass.Gen.Laws   ch.93,12.!j #  13      ׀ThelanguageinthePolicies&Practices"strips" d  Plaintiffsofabroadarrayofdamagesremedies.Seegenerally, `  DavidS.Schwartz,UnderstandingRemedyStrippingArbitration   Clauses:Validity,_Arbitrability_,andPreclusionPrinciples,38 h _U.S.F._ԀL.Rev.49,56(2003)(explaining"remedystripping"). d RelyingontheSupremeCourt'sdecisionin_Pacificare_,_Comcast_  assertsthatquestionsconcerningtheapplicabilityofremedies l strippingprovisionsinarbitrationclausesdonotpresent h  questionsof_arbitrability_.   ` Becausethelanguageofthefederalandstateantitrust   statutesontheawardoftrebledamagesvariesfederallawuses \ theword"shall",Massachusettslawusestheword"may"we X conductaseparateinquiryastoeach.     ` _i_.Plaintiffs'federalantitrustclaims  `   ` a.Thequestionof_arbitrability_  ( x   ` WithrespecttoPlaintiffs'federalantitrustclaims, @  _Comcast_'srelianceon_Pacificare_ismisplaced.Asexplained   earlier,theCourtin_Pacificare_reasonedthat: H   X Xsincewedonotknowhowthearbitratorwillconstruethe D remediallimitations,thequestionswhethertheyrender  theparties'agreementsunenforceableandwhetheritis  forcourtsorarbitratorstodecide_enforceability_Ԁinthe v firstinstanceareunusuallyabstract....[_T]he_ L propercourseistocompelarbitration. "r  XQ XQQ_Pacificare_,538U.S.at407.TheCourtdecidedthatthe  uncertaintyofwhethertheremedieslimitationinthearbitration z agreementactuallyconflictedwiththeRICOstatutemeantthatthe &v arbitratorshouldconstruetheremedieslimitationinthefirst " instance,andthendecideinlightofthatconstructionwhetherthe ~ ! arbitrationagreementisenforceable.Inotherwords,whenthere *"z# isambiguityaboutthescopeofaremedieslimitationofan #&% arbitrationagreement,thearbitratorwilldecidethequestionof % ' _enforceability_Ԁinthefirstinstance.Seeid. .'~")  ` Unlikethesituationin_Pacificare_,thereisnodoubt (*$+ thatthelanguageofthe2002/2003arbitrationagreementsandthe *%- languageof15U.S.C.15(a)directlyconflict.Theplain 2,'/ languageofthe2002/2003arbitrationagreementsexcludesanytype  ofdamagesremedythatisnotsimple,compensatorydamages. \ _Pacificare_󀄄whichholdsthatcourtsshouldnot"presumethatan X arbitratorwillconstrueanambiguousarbitrationagreementina   mannerthatrenderstheagreementunenforceable,"Schwartz,supra `  at7778doesnotapplyhere.Thereisnothingambiguousabout  \  theremediesstrippingprovisionatissue.    ` _Comcast_Ԁalsofindssupportforitspositioninsomedicta d  fromMCI_Telecomm_.Corp.v.MatrixCommunicationsCorp.,135F.3d `  27(1stCir.1998),acaseinwhichtheappelleeassertedthatthe   arbitrationclauseatissuewasinvalidbecausethearbitration h rulesitreferredtoforeclosedremediessuchasmultipledamages. d Inresponse,westatedthat"thisargumentmustbebroughttothe  arbitratorbecauseitdoesnotgotothe_arbitrability_Ԁofthe l claimsbutonlytothenatureofavailablerelief."Id.at33 h n.12.   ` _Pacificare_castsconsiderabledoubtontheaccuracyof p  ourdicta+ #  14      ׀inMCIthatalimitationonremediescitedasabasis !l" foravindicationofstatutoryrightsclaimcannotposeaquestion "$ of_arbitrability_Ԁforacourttodecide.Implicitinthe_Pacificare_ t$& analysisisthepropositionthatiftheremedieslimitationinthe  &p!( arbitrationagreementposedaclearconflictwiththeremedies '#* availableintheRICOstatute,thatclearconflictwouldposea  questionof_arbitrability_.Inotherwords,inthefaceofa \ vindicationofstatutoryrightsclaimbasedonsuchaclear X conflict,thecourtwoulddecidethequestionofthe_enforceability_   ofthearbitrationclauseinthefirstinstance.Asone `  commentatorhasobserved:  \   X X[_t]he_ԀCourtapparentlyassumed,_arguendo_,thataremedy   limitationbarringtrebledamageswouldrendertheRICO   claimsnonarbitrable.ButtheCourtassertedthatit d  wouldnotpresumethatanarbitratorwillconstruean :  ambiguousarbitrationagreementinamannerthatrenders `  theagreementunenforceable.Instead,"thepropercourse 6 istocompelarbitration"and,presumably,seehowthe   arbitratoractuallyconstruestheagreement.b   Xb XbSchwartz,supraat7778(quoting_Pacificare_,538U.S.at407). >  ` Here,however,unlike_Pacificare_,thereisnoinitial : ambiguityforanarbitratortoconstruewithrespecttothefederal  antitrustclaim.Thereisaclearconflictbetweenthelanguageof B thearbitrationagreementsandthefederalantitruststatutes. > Moreover,asweshallexplaininthenextsectionofthisopinion,  theconsequencesofthisconflictareequallyclear.Thatis, F ! underfederallaw,theremediesprovidedbytheantitruststatute !B# cannotbecontractuallywaived._p #  15      _ԀInlightoftheclarityofthis #% _;conflictandtheclarityofthelegalconsequences,Plaintiffs'  challengetotheremedieslimitationinthearbitrationprovisions \ ofthe2002/2003Policies&Practicesraisesaquestionof X _;;arbitrability_;;.Wewillresolveinthefirstinstancetheclaim   thatthedamageslimitationpreventsarbitrationofPlaintiffs' `  federalantitrustclaimsbecauseitprecludesthevindicationof  Plaintiffs'statutoryrightsinthearbitralforum. \  ` b.Themerits  X  ` 1._;;Comcast_;;'sstructuralargument     ` _;;Comcast_;;Ԁassertsthatbecausethedamageslimitation   appearsinaseparatesectionofthePolicies&Practicesfromthe D   arbitrationagreement,thedamageslimitationdoesnotapplyto @  disputesresolvedinarbitration.Thelanguageofthedamages   limitationitselfeffectivelynullifiesthisassertion.The H  damageslimitationstatesthat:"SUCHLIMITATIONOFLIABILITY D APPLIESINALLCIRCUMSTANCES".Thisremedieslimitationapplies  anytime_;;Comcast_;;Ԁincursliability,includinginarbitration. L  ` Moreover,inthe2001Policies&Practices,thedamages H limitationislocatedwithinthearbitrationsection;therefore,  underthe2001agreement,thelimitationonliabilityclearly P appliedtoarbitrationproceedings.Attheveryleast,the L 2002/2003arbitrationagreements'damageslimitationdoesthesame.   Infact,giventhenewlocationofthedamageslimitationoutside T!" thearbitrationprovision,itisafairconclusionthat_;;Comcast_;; #P$ intendsittoapplyincourtaswellasinarbitrationproceedings, $& i.e.,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁexpandedthescopeofthedamageslimitationinthe X&!( 2002/2003Policies&Practices.X_XX X_Ԁ# X_XXX_r#Additionally,itwouldbe (T#* nonsensicalfor_;;Comcast_;;Ԁtocreateamandatoryalternateresolution )%, systemtoresolvedisputeswithitssubscribers,andtheninclude \+&. adamageslimitationthatunderthetheory_;;Comcast_;;Ԁoffershere  Єwouldneverapplybecauseallcaseswouldgotoarbitration.In \ dealingwiththeretroactivityquestion,wefoundthatthe X 2002/2003arbitrationagreementsreflectedachangeinlanguagebut   notasignificantchangeinthesubstanceofthecontractual `  relationshipbetween_;;Comcast_;;Ԁanditssubscribers._;;Comcast_;;'s  \  "separatesection"argumentisunpersuasive.    ` 2.Waiver  d   ` 15U.S.C.15(a)statesinrelevantpartthataprivate ,|  antitrustplaintiff"X_XX X_shallrecoverthreefoldthedamagesbyhim ( sustained# X_XXX_pw#"(emphasisadded).Congress'suseoftheword"shall"  makesthetrebledamagesremedyamandatoryresultifaplaintiff 0 successfullysuesanantitrustviolator.Thislanguagedirectly , conflictswiththelanguageofthefirstparagraphofthedamages  provisionquotedabove. 4  ` ThereisnoSupremeCourtprecedentthatspeaksdirectly 0 tothequestionofwhethertrebledamagesunderfederalantitrust   lawmaybewaivedbycontract.However,inMitsubishi,theCourt 8!" notedindictathatifprovisionsinthearbitrationagreementat "4$ issuehadoperated"asaprospectivewaiverofaparty'srightto $& pursuestatutoryremediesforantitrustviolations,wewouldhave <&!( littlehesitationincondemningtheagreementasagainstpublic '8#* policy."473U.S.at637n.19.AstheMitsubishicourtnoted, )$, othercircuitshavesimilarlydisapprovedofwaiversofstatutory @+&. remediesforantitrustviolations.See,e.g.,Gainesv.Carrollton  TobaccoBd.ofTrade,Inc.,386F.2d757,759(6thCir.1967) \ ("[_;;I]t_;;Ԁseemsclearasamatteroflawthatsuchanagreement,if X executedinafashioncalculatedtowaivedamagesarisingfrom   futureviolationsoftheantitrustlaws,wouldbeinvalidonpublic `  policygrounds.").Onthebasisoftheseprecedents,weconclude  \  thattheawardoftrebledamagesunderthefederalantitrust   statutescannotbewaived. d   ` Atfirstblush,theconflictontheawardoftreble `  damagesbetweenthearbitrationagreementsandthefederal   antitruststatutes,andthenon_;;waivability_;;Ԁoftrebledamagesin h thefederalantitrustcontext,indicatethatPlaintiffsshould d prevailontheirvindicationofstatutoryrightsclaim.However,  the"LimitationonLiability"sectionofthePolicies&Practices l alsocontainsa"savingsclause"locatedimmediatelyafterthe h operativelanguage,quotedearlier,thatlimitsaplaintiff's  remedies.This"savingsclause"_;;} #  16      _;;Ԁstates: p   X XYOURSOLEANDEXCLUSIVEREMEDIESUNDERTHISAGREEMENTARE  ASEXPRESSLYSETFORTHINTHISAGREEMENT,UNLESS  APPLICABLELAWPROVIDESTHATCERTAINREMEDIES,DAMAGES \ AND/ORWARRANTIESCANNOTBEWAIVED,LIMITEDOROTHERWISE 2 MODIFIED. X ς X XThemeaningofthislanguageisstraightforward.Ifthelawdoes   notpermitwaiverofaremedy,aplaintiffwillstillhavethat `  remedy,thePolicies&Practicesliabilitylimitation  \  notwithstanding.Thesavingsclause,inotherwords,removesthe   conflictbetweenthelanguageofthearbitrationagreementsandthe d  federalantitruststatutesontheissueoftrebledamages. `  Therefore,bythetermsofthearbitrationagreements'savings   clause,thearbitratormustawardtrebledamagesforafederal h antitrustviolation. d  ` Astothe_;;Kristian_;;complaint(whichraisesthefederal  antitrustclaims),thepresenceofadamageslimitationinthe l 2002/2003agreementseventhoughitposesaquestionof h _;;arbitrability_;;Ԁdoesnotprecludeenforcementofthearbitration  agreements.Becausethedamageslimitationdoesnotapplyto p  Plaintiffs'claimsunderfederalantitrustlaw,thedamages !l" limitationdoesnotpreventthePlaintiffsin_;;Kristian_;;from "$  vindicatingtheirstatutoryrightsinarbitration.Thegoverning t$& lawmandatesthatPlaintiffscanrecovertrebledamagesin  arbitrationforfederalantitrustviolations. \    ` ii.Plaintiffs'stateantitrustclaims  X  ` a.Thequestionof_;;arbitrability_;;     ` MovingtoouranalysisoftheRogerscomplaint(which   raisesthestateantitrustclaims),Massachusettsstateantitrust D   law,whilegenerallytrackingfederalantitrustlaw,doesnotuse @  thesamelanguage.Inrelevantpart,Mass.Gen.Laws.c.9312   statesthat"X_XX X_thecourtmayawarduptothreetimestheamountof H  actualdamagessustained# X_XXX_#"(emphasisadded).Unlikefederal D antitrustlaw,whichmandatesthatavictoriousantitrustplaintiff  willrecovertrebledamages,Massachusettslawplacestheawardof L trebledamageswithinacourt'sdiscretion.Theuseoftheword H "may"inMassachusettslaw,asopposedtotheword"shall"in  federallaw,meansthattheprohibitionagainsttrebledamagesin P thearbitrationagreementsprecludestheexerciseofthediscretion L givenbystatutetoadecisionmaker(beitanarbitratorora   court)inawardingtrebledamages.However,whetherthe T!" arbitrationagreements'languageprohibitstheactualawardof #P$ trebledamages(federal),ormerelythepossibilityforthataward $& (Massachusetts),theconflictbetweenthearbitrationagreements X&!( andstateantitrustlawontheissueoftrebledamagesisplain. (T#*  ` Onthebasisofthisobviousconflict,onemightbe )%, temptedtoconcludethat,aswiththefederalantitruststatuteson \+&. thetrebledamagesissue,thestateantitruststatutepresentsa  questionof_;;arbitrability_;;.However,unlikeunderfederallaw, \ wherethewaiverofthestatutoryantitrustremedyisproscribed, X itisunclearorinotherwords,ambiguouswhetherwaiverof   trebledamagesispermissibleunderMassachusettslaw.Ifthe `  answertothewaiverquestionunderstatelawwereclear,wewould  \  immediatelyconcludethatthereisaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;Ԁand   wouldproceedtodecidethemeritsofPlaintiffs'vindicationof d  statutoryrightsclaim.Instead,astheSupremeCourtdidin `  _;;Pacificare_;;,wemustascertaintheextentofthelegalambiguityon   thewaiverissueinresolvingthethresholdquestionof h _;;arbitrability_;;. d  ` b.Waiver    ` TheMassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourtmostrecently  discussedwhetherastatutoryrightorremedymaybewaivedunder 4 MassachusettsstatelawinCanalElectricCo.v.Westinghouse 0 ElectricCorp.,548N.E.2d182(Mass.1990).There,theSupreme   JudicialCourtansweredquestionsoflawthatwerecertifiedbythe 8!" UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofMassachusetts "4$ concerning,interalia,whethera"LimitationofLiability" $& provisioninasalescontractbarredastatutoryunfairtrade <&!( practiceclaimagainstamanufacturer.Seeid.at183.InCanal, '8#* theplaintiffs,includingCanal,were"electricutilitycompanies )$, thatallegethattheyincurredsubstantiallossesasaresultof @+&. thefailureofcertaincomponentsofanelectricgenerator  manufacturedbythedefendant,Westinghouse...."Id.The \ questionwas"whetherCanalcouldvalidlywaiveits[Mass.Gen. X Laws]c.93A,11,claimbyassentingtotheLimitationof   Liabilityclause."Id.at187. `   ` TheSupremeJudicialCourtheldthat:  \   X XAstatutoryrightorremedymaybewaivedwhenthewaiver   wouldnotfrustratethepublicpoliciesofthestatute.   Forexample...westatedthatacontractualwaiverof d  statutoryrightsispermissiblewhenthestatute's :  purposeisthe"protectionofthepropertyrightsof `  individualparties...ratherthan...theprotection 6 ofthegeneralpublic."Astatutoryrightmaynotbe   disclaimedifthewaivercould"doviolencetothepublic  policyunderlyingthelegislativeenactment." h  X XId.(internalcitationsomitted).Onthebasisofthisreasoning, d theSupremeJudicialCourtconcludedthatCanalcouldwaiveits  claimunderc.93A. l  ` Arguably,giventhatMassachusettsdecidedtomakethe h awardoftrebledamagesunderitsantitrustlawamatterof  discretion,trebledamagesarenotanindispensableelementof p  Massachusetts'antitrustscheme,andtherecoveryoftrebledamages !l" istherefore_;;waivable_;;.However,theCanalcourtalsostated, "$ albeitinpassing,that"[_;;a]lthough_;;Ԁtheremightbecertainc.93A, t$& 11claimsthatabusinessplaintiffcouldnotwaive,suchasa  &p!( claimsoundinginantitrust,factstoestablishsuchaclaimhave '#* notbeenallegedorestablished."Id.at187888(emphasisadded). x)$, TheCanalcourtalsostatedthat"weordinarilywouldnot $+t&. effectuateaconsumer'swaiverofrightsunderc.93A,"id.at187.  Giventhisadditionallanguagehintingthatwaiverofstatutory \ remedieswillnotbeallowedinsituationsinvolvingaconsumer X plaintiffand/orantitrustclaims,categoriesthatPlaintiffsfall   into,weseeMassachusettslawonthisquestionofwaiveras `  ambiguousatbest.  \   ` Inthepresenceofthisambiguity,_;;Pacificare_;;is   _;;dispositive_;;.Whenthereisanunderlyinglegalambiguity,andthe d  partieshavenotexplicitlyexpressedotherwise,_;;Howsam_;;'s `  "interpretiverule"doesnotapply,andanarbitratormustdecide   theunderlyinglegalquestioninthefirstinstancesothatthe h federalpolicyinfavorofarbitrationisnotfrustrated. d Plaintiffs'vindicationofstatutoryrightsclaim,basedonthe  conflictbetweenthearbitrationagreementsandMassachusetts l antitrustlaw,doesnotraiseaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;. h  ` Insummary,astobothcomplaints,Plaintiffs'  vindicationofstatutoryrightsclaim,basedonthedamages p  limitationinthearbitrationagreements,fails.Asto_;;Kristian_;;, !l" whilethereisaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;,thedamageslimitation "$ isinoperativebecauseofthesavingsclause.InRogers,thereis t$& noquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;Ԁbecauseoftheambiguityonthewaiver  &p!( issue. '#*   x)$, _;;F._;;ԀAttorney'sfees   ` _;;i_;;.Thequestionof_;;arbitrability_;;  x  ` Inrelevantpart,the2002/2003arbitrationagreements @ statethat:  <  X XTheCompanywillpayforallreasonablearbitration   filingfeesandarbitrator'scostsandexpensesexcept n   thatYOUARERESPONSIBLEFORALLCOSTSTHATYOUINCURIN D   THEARBITRATION,INCLUDING,BUTNOTLIMITEDTO,YOUR j  EXPERTWITNESSESORATTORNEYS. @   X} Xo]Thearbitrationagreements'prohibitionontherecoveryof   attorney'sfeesandothercostsdirectlyconflictswithstatutory H  languageinfederalandMassachusettslaw,bothofwhichprovide D fortherecoveryofattorney'sfeesandcostsinantitrustcases._;;, #  17      _;;    ` InGreenTreeFinancialCorp.Alabamav.Randolph,531 L U.S.79,82(2000),apurchaserofamobilehomebroughtaputative H classactionagainstalenderthathadfinancedthepurchase,  assertingclaimsundertheTruthinLendingAct("_;;TILA_;;").There, \ theSupremeCourtaddressed"thequestionwhetheranarbitration X agreementthatdoesnotmentionarbitrationcostsandfeesis   unenforceablebecauseitfailstoaffirmativelyprotectaparty `  frompotentiallysteeparbitrationcosts."Id.at82.  Randolph  \  predatesthe"trilogy"of_;;Howsam_;;,_;;Pacificare_;;,and_;;Bazzle_;;andis $  notmentionedorcitedinanyofthethreesubsequentdecisions.   However,Randolphhasneverbeenabrogated.Itisalsoconsistent ,|  withthelaterdecisions.  (  ` TheplaintiffinRandolphassertedthat:   X Xthearbitrationagreement'ssilencewithrespecttocosts L andfeescreatesa"risk"thatshewillberequiredto "r bearprohibitivearbitrationcostsifshepursuesher H claimsinanarbitralforum,andtherebyforcesherto  forgoanyclaimsshemayhaveagainstpetitioners.  Therefore,sheargues,sheisunabletovindicateher z statutoryrightsinarbitration. P Ѐ X XֵId.at90.TheCourtacknowledgedthattypically,inanalyzing L whetherstatutoryclaimsmaybearbitrated,"we[theCourt]first   askwhetherthepartiesagreedtosubmittheirclaimsto T!" arbitration,andthenaskwhetherCongresshasevincedanintention #P$ toprecludeawaiverofjudicialremediesforthestatutoryrights $& atissue."Id.Butinsteadofconductingthiswaiveranalysis(as X&!( wedid,forexample,inregardtotrebledamagesunderfederaland (T#* stateantitruststatutes),theCourtbypassedit,andconcluded )%, that"[_;;i]t_;;Ԁmaywellbethattheexistenceoflargearbitration \+&. costscouldprecludealitigantsuchasRandolphfromeffectively  vindicatingherfederalstatutoryrightsinthearbitralforum." \ Id.Moreover,theCourtalsoheld:(1) thatwhere"apartyseeks X toinvalidateanarbitrationagreementonthegroundthat   arbitrationwouldbeprohibitivelyexpensive,thatpartybearsthe `  burdenofshowingthelikelihoodofincurringsuchcosts,"id.at  \  92,and(2)"thearbitrationagreement'ssilenceonthesubject.   ..aloneisplainlyinsufficienttorenderitunenforceable," d  i.e.,ashowingbytheplaintiffofsilenceoncostsdoesnotmeet `  theplaintiff'sburden.However,theCourtdidnotexplainhow   detailedaplaintiff'sshowingmustbetomeettheburden.Seeid. h  ` Bybypassingthewaiveranalysis,assumingthat d prohibitivecostisavalidgroundtochallengethe_;;enforceability_;;  ofanarbitrationagreement,andallocatingtotheplaintiffthe l burdenofshowingprohibitivearbitrationcosts,theSupremeCourt: h (1)assumesthattheissueofarbitrationcostsraisesaquestion  of_;;arbitrability_;;;and(2)rulesonthemeritsofthatquestionof p  _;;arbitrability_;;,concludingthat"Randolph[theplaintiff]didnot !l" meet[her]burden."Id.TheCourt'sassumptionthatashowingof "$ prohibitivearbitrationcostsisavalidchallengetoenforcement t$& ofanarbitrationagreementmakespracticalsense.If,becauseof  &p!( aconsumeragreementforexample,thePolicies&Practicesa '#* plaintiff'sonlyapparentdisputeresolutionforumisbinding, x)$, mandatoryarbitration,andtheplaintiffcannotaffordtoarbitrate $+t&. becauseofaninabilitytorecoverattorney'sfeesandcosts,the  plaintiffisessentiallydeprivedofanydisputeresolutionforum \ whatsoever. X X_XX X_ ` OthercircuitshavesimilarlyinterpretedRandolph.For   example,inAndersv.HometownMortgage_;;Servs_;;.,Inc.,346F.3d1024 `  (11thCir.2003),theEleventhCircuitalsoconfrontedthequestion  \  ofwhetheranarbitrationclausewillbeinvalidatedbecauseit   failedtoprovideforarbitrationcosts.TheEleventhCircuit d  foundaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;,andthenlookedtotheSupreme `  Court'sdecisioninRandolphtodecidethemerits.Anders,346   F.3dat102829.# X_XXX_Ĺ# h  ` Here,Plaintiffshaveamuchstrongerpositionthanthe d plaintiffinRandolph.TheclauseinRandolphwassilentonthe  questionofcostsandfees.Bycontrast,the2002/2003arbitration l agreementsexplicitlystatethataplaintiffbearsallofhisor h herowncosts,includingthecostofexpertsandattorneys.The  conflictbetweenthearbitrationagreementsandthestatutescould p  notbeclearer.Moreimportantly,againincontrasttothe !l" plaintiffinRandolph,Plaintiffsmakeastrongshowingthatcosts "$ andattorney'sfeeswillbeprohibitivelyexpensive.Inthe t$& districtcourt,Plaintiffssubmittedextensivedeclarationsfroma  &p!( formerMassachusettsSuperiorCourtjustice,anattorneywho '#* specializesinantitrustlawandclassactions,andaneconomist. x)$, ThesedeclarationsestablishthatthepursuitofPlaintiffs' $+t&. antitrustclaimswillrequireahugeoutlayoffinancialresources.  Withoutthepossibilityofrecoveringcostsandattorney'sfees,an \ individualplaintiffwouldundoubtedlyhaveanimpossibletime X securinglegalrepresentationineither_;;Kristian_;;orRogers,given   theminoramountanindividualplaintiffwouldlikelyrecover `  relativetothecostofprosecution.Thispreliminarymerits  \  analysis,inlinewith_;;Pacificare_;;,andRandolph'spresumptionthat   acostbasedchallengeraisesaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;,leadsus d  toconcludethatPlaintiffshaveraisedaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;; `  intheirchallengetothe_;;enforceability_;;Ԁofthearbitration   agreementsbecauseoftheprohibitionagainstanawardof h attorney'sfeesandcosts. d   ` ii.Themerits    ` _;;Comcast_;;Ԁdirectlyrespondsintwoways.First,X_XX X__;;Comcast_;;  assertsthatifourdecisionreliesprimarilyontheaffidavitsof 4 Plaintiffs'expertssubmittedbelow,weshouldremandtothe 0 districtcourtforfurtherdevelopmentofthefactualrecordonthe   costsissue.Wedisagree.Wearenotrequiredtocloseoureyes 8!" totheoverwhelmingweightoffactsalreadyintherecord.The "4$ prosecutionofacomplexantitrustlawsuit,eitherincourtorin $& arbitration,requirestheoutlayofsubstantialfinancial <&!( resources.Theaffidavitssubmittedtothedistrictcourtby '8#* Plaintiffsdetailthisreality.Weseenoreasontoignorethe )$, obvious.# X_XXX__#Ԁ @+&.  ` Next,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁarguesthat,contrarytotheplainlanguage  oftheagreements,Plaintiffscanrecoverattorney'sfeesand \ costs._;;Comcast_;;Ԁstatesthatthephrase"responsibleforallcosts" X doesnotbyitselfbaranawardoffees.Rather,"aplaintiffis   always'responsibleforallcosts'untilitisawardedsuchcosts." `  _;;Comcast_;;Ԁwouldhaveusviewthelanguagebarringcostsasamere  \  statementofthetruismthatapartymustpayitscostsupfront,   andthencanrecoverthemaftertheproceedingsareover.Thisis d  animplausibleargument.Thelanguageofthefeesandcosts `  provisionunequivocallystatesthatwhile_;;Comcast_;;Ԁwillpay   arbitrationfilingfees,andanarbitrator'scostsandexpenses, h "YOU[aplaintiff]ARERESPONSIBLEFORALLCOSTSTHATYOUINCURIN d THEARBITRATION,INCLUDING,BUTNOTLIMITEDTO,YOUREXPERT  WITNESSESORATTORNEYS."Thislanguageunmistakablyplacesthe l burdenofaplaintiff'scostsandattorney'sfeessquarelyonhim h orher.   ` AswefindtheseresponsestoPlaintiff'spositionon p  attorney'sfeesunpersuasive,wearelefttoconcludethat,indeed, !l" thebanontherecoveryofattorney'sfeesandcostsinthe "$ arbitration_;;agrements_;;ԀwouldburdenPlaintiffsherewithprohibitive t$& arbitrationcosts,preventingPlaintiffsfromvindicatingtheir  &p!( statutoryrightsinarbitration.Leftinplace,theprovisionof '#*  thearbitrationagreementsbarringtherecoveryofattorney'sfees x)$, andcostsmightrequireustodenythemotiontocompelarbitration  or,atleast,precludetheapplicationofthebarinarbitration. \   ` iii.Severance  X  ` ThePolicies&Practicesanticipatesthisscenario.Near   theendofthe2002/2003Policies&Practicesisasectionentitled |  "_;;Enforceability_;;ԀandSurvival",whichstates,inrelevantpart: ( x  "[_;;i]f_;;ԀanyportionofthesePoliciesandPracticesisdeterminedto $  beillegalorunenforceable,thentheremainderofsuchPolicies   andPracticesshallbegivenfullforceandeffect."Inother ,|  words,inadditiontothesavingsclausecontainedwithinthe ( "LimitationonLiability"section,thePolicies&Practices  containsageneralsavingsclause. 0  ` Onthebasisofthisprovision,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁtakesthegeneral , positionthat"[_;;n]eedless_;;Ԁtosay,anytermsotherthantheclass  arbitrationlimitation,areseverable.Subscribersfailto 4 identifyanytermthatisinseparablefromthegeneralrequirement 0 thatSubscribersarbitratetheirclaims...."Inotherwords,   intheeventthatcertainprovisionsarefoundillegalor 8!" unenforceable,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁassertsthatsuchprovisionscanandshould "4$ beexcised,savingtheunoffendingprovisions. $&  ` Weagreewiththispropositionasitrelatestothe <&!( prohibitionagainstanawardofattorney'sfeesandcosts. '8#* Therefore,intheend,ourconclusiononPlaintiff'svindicationof )$, statutoryrightsclaimbasedonthebaragainstattorney'sfeesand @+&. costsparallelsourconclusioninregardstoPlaintiffs'  vindicationofstatutoryrightsclaimbasedontrebledamages \ mandatedbyfederalantitrustlaw.Plaintiffsmayrecover X attorney'sfeesandcostsinarbitrationbecausethesavingsclause   severstheprohibitiononattorney'sfeesandcosts,and"saves" `  theremainingtermsofthePolicies&Practices.Thus,the  \  arbitralforumremainsviable.    G.Classarbitration  d    ` _;;i_;;.Thequestionof_;;arbitrability_;;  ,|   ` The2002/2003arbitrationagreementsclearlyprohibitany D typeofclassorconsolidatedaction:   X XTHERESHALLBENORIGHTORAUTHORITYFORANYCLAIMSTOBE L ARBITRATEDONACLASSACTIONORCONSOLIDATEDBASISORON "r BASESINVOLVINGCLAIMSBROUGHTINAPURPORTED H REPRESENTATIVECAPACITYONBEHALFOFTHEGENERALPUBLIC  (SUCHASAPRIVATEATTORNEYGENERAL),OTHERSUBSCRIBERS,  OROTHERPERSONSSIMILARLYSITUATEDUNLESSYOURSTATE'S z LAWSPROVIDEOTHERWISE. P  X X_;;Comcast_;;Ԁcites_;;Bazzle_;;forthepropositionthatclassactionsarea L proceduralissueleftproperlyforanarbitratortodecide.   However,aswithitsinterpretationoftheCourt'sholdingin T!" _;;Pacificare_;;,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁmisreadsthedecision. #P$  ` Asexplainedearlier,theCourtin_;;Bazzle_;;was"facedat $& theoutsetwithaproblemconcerningthecontracts'silence.Are X&!( thecontractsinfactsilent,ordotheyforbidclassarbitration (T#* ...?"_;;Bazzle_;;,539U.S.at447.Sincetheliteraltermsofthe )%, agreementdidnotresolvetheclassarbitrationquestion,theCourt \+&. concludedthat"thequestionwhethertheagreementforbidsclass  arbitrationisforthearbitratortodecide."_;;Bazzle_;;,539U.S. \ at451.However,wedonotconfrontthatsituationhere.Unlike X thearbitrationagreementin_;;Bazzle_;;,the2002/2003arbitration   agreementsunmistakablyforbidtheuseofclassproceduresin `  arbitration.Inotherwords,_;;Pacificare_;;'sholdingdidnotapplyto  \  Plaintiffs'attorney'sfeesandcostsclaimbecauseoftheclarity   oftheconflictbetweenthearbitrationprovisionsandthestate d  andfederalantitruststatutes.Similarly,_;;Bazzle_;;doesnotapply `  herebecauseoftheclarityoftheprohibitionagainstclass   arbitration. h  ` WerecognizethatX_XX X_thearbitrationagreements'class d mechanismprohibitionisnotindirectconflictwiththerelevant  antitruststatutes,stateandfederal,whichdonotmentionclass l actionsorthelike.However,thearbitrationagreements'language h ostensiblyconflictswiththeFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,  whichprovideforclassactions.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.23.Wesay p  ostensiblybecausethePolicies&Practicesexplicitlyforbidsonly !l" classarbitration,andnotclassactions.However,becausethe "$ Policies&Practicescreatesamandatoryarbitrationregime,aban t$& onclassarbitrationeffectivelyforeclosestheuseofanyclass  &p!( basedmechanism. '#*  ` Thebarhassubstantialimplicationsforthe x)$, _;;enforceability_;;Ԁofthearbitrationagreements.Wehavesaidthat $+t&. thelegitimacyofthearbitralforumrestson"thepresumptionthat  arbitrationprovidesafairandadequatemechanismforenforcing \ statutoryrights."Rosenberg,170F.3dat14.TheSupremeCourt X hasstatedthissamepremise.InMitsubishi,theCourtheldthat   "[_;;s]o_;;Ԁlongastheprospectivelitiganteffectivelymayvindicate `  itsstatutorycauseofactioninthearbitralforum,the[federal  \  substantive]statutewillcontinuetoservebothitsremedialand   deterrentfunction."473U.S.at637.Thebaronclass d  arbitrationthreatensthepremisethatarbitrationcanbe"afair `  andadequatemechanismforenforcingstatutoryrights."Rosenberg,   170F.3dat14. h  ` # X_XXX_"#In_;;Amchem_;;ԀProds.,Inc.v.Windsor,521U.S.591(1997), d theSupremeCourtstatedthat"[_;;t]he_;;Ԁpolicyattheverycoreofthe  classactionmechanismistoovercometheproblemthatsmall l recoveriesdonotprovidetheincentiveforanyindividualtobring h asoloactionprosecutinghisorherrights,"id.at617(quoting  Macev.VanRuCreditCorp.,109F.3d338,344(7thCir.1997)). p  InCarnegiev.Household_;;Int'l_;;,Inc.,376F.3d656,661(7thCir. !l" 2004),theSeventhCircuitstatedthepropositionevenmore "$ bluntly:"Itwouldhardlybeanimprovementtohaveinlieuofthis t$& singleclassaction17,000,000suitseachseekingdamagesof$15.00  &p!( to$30.00....Therealisticalternativetoaclassactionis '#* not17,000,000individualsuits,butzeroindividualsuits,asonly x)$, alunaticorafanaticsuesfor$30.00."While_;;Comcast_;;Ԁiscorrect $+t&. whenitcategorizestheclassaction(andclassarbitration)asa  procedureforredressingclaimsandnotasubstantiveor \ statutoryrightinandofitselfwecannotignorethe X substantiveimplicationsofthisproceduralmechanism.    ` Here,theputativeclasswouldconsistof_;;Comcast_;;'s `  Bostonareasubscribers.Accordingtothefactualinformation  \  containedintheunopposedexpertdeclarationsPlaintiffssubmitted   tothedistrictcourtbelow,eachputativeclassmember'sestimated d  recoveryassumingthedamageawardwastrebledpursuanttothe `  applicableantitruststatutewouldrangefromafewhundred   dollarstoperhapsafewthousanddollars.Bycontrast,theexpert h feesaloneareestimatedtobeinthehundredsofthousandsof d dollars;andattorney'sfeescouldreachintothemillionsof  dollars.Tosaythateachpotentialclassmemberisunlikelyto l haveormakeavailabletheupfrontcostsneededtoprosecutethis h costlyantitrustsuitisalargeunderstatement.Theclass  mechanismban"particularlyitsimplicitbanonspreadingacross p  multipleplaintiffsthecostsofexperts,depositions,neutrals' !l" fees,andotherdisbursements"forcestheputativeclassmember "$ "toassumefinancialburdenssoprohibitiveastodeterthe t$& bringingofclaims....Andthesecosts...willexceedthe  &p!( valueoftherecoverysheisseeking."_;;Myriam_;;ԀGilles,OptingOut '#* ofLiability:TheForthcoming,NearTotalDemiseoftheModern x)$, ClassAction,104Mich.L.Rev.373,407(2005). $+t&.  ` InRandolph,theplaintiffassertedthat:   X Xthearbitrationagreement'ssilencewithrespecttocosts \ andfeescreatesa riskthatshewillberequiredto 2 bearprohibitivearbitrationcostsifshepursuesher X claimsinanarbitralforum,andtherebyforcesherto . forgoanyclaimsshemayhaveagainstpetitioners.   Therefore,sheargues,sheisunabletovindicateher   statutoryrightsinarbitration. `  Ѐ X X531U.S.at90.Inresponse,theSupremeCourtacknowledgedthat  \  "theexistenceoflargearbitrationcostscouldprecludealitigant   suchasRandolphfromeffectivelyvindicatingherfederalstatutory d  rightsinthearbitralforum."Id.Here,thereisnodoubtabout `  theselargearbitrationcosts.    ` AlthoughneithertheSupremeCourtnortheFirstCircuit h hasdecidedacasethatpresentstheexactissuewefacehere, d othercourtsofappealshave.Thesecourtsconcludedthatthere  wasaquestionof_;;arbitrability_;;Ԁpresentedbythebaronclass l arbitration.See,e.g.,Jenkinsv.FirstAm.CashAdvanceof h Georgia,400F.3d868(11thCir.2005);_;;r #  18      _;;Ԁ_;;Livingston_;;v.Associates  Fin.,Inc.,339F.3d553(7thCir.2003).Weseenoreasonnotto p  dothesamehere.Theclassarbitrationbarisunmistakable. !l" Becausethedenialofclassarbitrationinthepursuitofantitrust "$ claimshasthepotentialtopreventPlaintiffsfromvindicating t$& theirstatutoryrights,Plaintiffspresentaquestionof  _;;arbitrability_;;Ԁwithrespecttothe2002/2003arbitrationagreements' \ classarbitrationprohibition. X   ` ii.Themerits     ` a.Relevantfederallaw  |   ` Onthemerits,thedecisionsofothercourtsofappeal D   appeartoweighagainstPlaintiffs,althoughnotoverwhelminglyso. @  Fourofoursistercircuits--theThird,Fourth,Seventh,and   Eleventh--enforceconsumerarbitrationclausesbarringtheuseof H  classmechanisms(classactionand/orclassarbitration).See D Johnsonv.WestSuburbanBank,225F.3d366,374(3dCir.2000)  ("Becausethereisnoirreconcilableconflictbetweenarbitration L andthegoalsofthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁ[TruthinLendingAct],wesimilarlyhold H thatclaimsarisingunderthe_;;EFTA_;;Ԁ[ElectronicFundTransferAct]  mayalsobesubjecttoarbitrationnotwithstandingthedesireofa P plaintiffwhopreviouslyconsentedtoarbitrationtobringhisor L herclaimsaspartofaclass.");_;;Snowden_;;v.CheckpointCheck   Cashing,290F.3d631,638(4thCir.2002)("Wealsoreject[the T!" plaintiff's]argumentthattheArbitrationAgreementis #P$ unenforceableasunconscionablebecausewithouttheclassaction $& vehicle,shewillbeunabletomaintainherlegalrepresentation X&!( giventhesmallamountofherindividualdamages.");_;;Livingston_;;, (T#* 339F.3dat559("[_;;H]aving_;;ԀfoundtheArbitrationAgreement )%, enforceablewemustgivefullforcetoitsterms....The \+&. ArbitrationAgreementatissuehereexplicitlyprecludes...  classclaimsorpursuing'classactionarbitration'");RandolphII, \ 244F.3dat819("[_;;W]e_;;Ԁholdthatacontractualprovisionto X arbitrate_;;TILA_;;Ԁclaimsisenforceableevenifitprecludesa   plaintifffromutilizingclassactionproceduresinvindicating `  statutoryrightsunder_;;TILA_;;.").  \   ` Thesefourdecisionshavetwoimportantcommonalities.   First,attorney'sfeesandcostswereeitherrecoverablebythe d  plaintiffswhocontestedthearbitralforumonthebasisofthe `  classarbitrationban,orthefeesandcostsissuewasmoot.For   example,inJohnson,thecourtstated"[_;;n]or_;;Ԁwillarbitration h necessarilychokeoffthesupplyoflawyerswillingtopursue d claimsonbehalfofdebtors.Attorneys'feesarerecoverableunder  the_;;TILA_;;."Johnson,225F.3dat374.In_;;Livingston_;;,thedefendant l agreedtopayallcostsassociatedwitharbitration._;;Livingston_;;, h 339F.3dat557.Here,too,becauseofthegeneralsavingsclause  inthePolicies&Practices,wehaveruledthatattorney'sfeesand p  costsmustbeavailableinthearbitralforum. !l"  ` Second,inallfourdecisions,theplaintiffsraised "$ claimsagainstbanksorotherfinanciallendersprimarilyunderthe t$& _;;TILA_;;._;; #  19      _;;ԀThisisnotthecasehere,wherewearedealingwith  &p!( federalandstateantitrustclaims.Thatisapotentially  importantdistinction.Therefore,wemustexaminetherationale \ forthesedecisionsmoreclosely.Forthispurpose,wewill X discusstheThirdCircuit'sJohnsondecision.Eachoftheother   circuitsreliesonJohnson.See_;;Snowden_;;,290F.3dat63839 `  (citingJohnson,225F.3dat374);_;;Livingston_;;,339F.3dat559  \  (citingJohnson,225F.3dat369);RandolphII,244F.3dat818   ("OurthinkinginthisrespectisconsistentwiththeThird d  Circuit'sdecisionthat'[arbitration]clausesareeffectiveeven `  thoughtheymayrenderclassactionstopursuestatutoryclaims   underthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁ...unavailable.'"(quotingJohnson,225F.3dat h 369).Insupportingthebaronclassarbitration,Johnsonalso d containsthemostextensiveanalysisforthatposition.See  generallyJohnson,225F.3dat37077. l  ` b.TheJohnsondecision  h  ` TheJohnsondecisionbeginsitsanalysisofthevalidity 0 ofaclassmechanismbarwiththeSupremeCourt'sdecisionin   _;;Gilmer_;;.X_XX X_Ԁ# X_XXX_'#In_;;Gilmer_;;,theplaintiffbroughtanagediscrimination 8!" claim,andthencontestedarbitrationofthatclaimbecause,inter "4$ alia,thearbitralforumdidnotofferalloftheproceduresa $& judicialforumwould,suchasfulldiscoveryandclassactions. <&!( See_;;Gilmer_;;,500U.S.at2933.X_XX X_Ԁ# X_XXX_)#Ԁ_;;Gilmer_;;'sholdingthatan_;;ADEA_;;  plaintiffcanbecompelledtoarbitratehis_;;ADEA_;;Ԁclaimisbased \ onthepropositionfromMitsubishithat"solongastheprospective X litiganteffectivelymayvindicate[hisorher]statutorycauseof   actioninthearbitralforum,thestatutewillcontinuetoserve `  bothitsremedialanddeterrentfunction."_;;Gilmer_;;,500U.S.at28  \  (quotingMitsubishi,473U.S.at637)(internalquotationmarks   omitted). d   ` Johnsonextends_;;Gilmer_;;tothe_;;TILA_;;Ԁcontextandenforces `  aclassactionbarinarbitration,basedonthreeassertions.   First,classactionsdonotnecessarilygiveplaintiffsbetter h incentivestobringprivateenforcementactions: d  X X[_;;t]he_;;Ԁsumsavailableinrecoverytoindividualplaintiffs  arenotautomaticallyincreasedbyuseoftheclass  forum.Indeed,individualplaintiffrecoveriesavailable l inaclassactionmaybelowerthanthosepossiblein B individualsuitsbecausetherecoveryavailableunder h _;;TILA_;;'sstatutorycaponclassrecoveriesisspreadover > theentireclass.  . X. X.Johnson,225F.3dat374. p   ` Second,plaintiffswillstillbeabletofind !l" representationwithouttheclassactionmechanismbecauseofthe "$ availabilityofattorney'sfeesandcosts: t$&  X XNorwillarbitrationnecessarilychokeoffthesupplyof  &p!( lawyerswillingtopursueclaimsonbehalfofdebtors. &F") Attorneys'feesarerecoverableunderthe_;;TILA_;;,see15 '#* U.S.C.1640(a)(3),andwouldthereforeappeartobe (#+ recoverableinarbitration,asarbitratorspossessthe x)$, powertofashionthesamereliefascourts. N*%-   $+t&. 2 Xw2 Xi2Johnson,225F.3dat37475(internalcitationsomitted).   AccordingtotheJohnsoncourt,"thoughpursuingindividualclaims \ inarbitrationmaywellbelessattractivethanpursuingaclass X actioninthecourts,wedonotagreethatcompellingarbitration   oftheclaimofaprospectiveclassactionplaintiffirreconcilably `  conflictswith_;;TILA_;;'sgoalofencouragingprivateactionstodeter  \  violationsoftheAct."Id.    ` Third,Johnsonassertsthatevenif_;;TILA_;;Ԁplaintiffsare d  discouragedfrombringingprivateenforcementactions, `  administrativeenforcementexiststofillthevoid."Our   conclusionthatthereisnoirreconcilableconflictbetweenthe h _;;TILA_;;'ssocialpolicygoalsandarbitrationofclaimsthatcould d havebeenheardaspartofaclassactionisbolsteredbythe  statute'sadministrativeenforcementprovisions.Theseprovisions l offermeaningfuldeterrentstoviolatorsofthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁifprivate h enforcementactionsshouldfailtofulfillthatrole."Id.at375.   ` Inourview,theserationalesdrawnfromthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁcontext p  donotsupportthevalidityofabartoclassarbitrationof !l" Plaintiffs'antitrustclaims. "$  ` c.TheinapplicabilityofJohnsontotheantitrust t$&  ` context  <&!(  ` Asaninitialmatter,prosecutingatypical_;;TILA_;;Ԁclaimis (T#* vastlydifferentfromprosecutinganantitrustclaimbecauseofthe )%, sheercomplexityofthelatter.Forexample,in_;;Snowden_;;,the \+&. plaintiffengagedin"deferreddeposit"transactions,where"a  customertendersachecktothestorethatiscashedforaservice \ feewiththeunderstandingthatthecheckwillnotbenegotiated X untilsomelater,agreedupontime."290F.3dat633.The   plaintiffallegedinhercomplaintthat:(1)the"deferreddeposit `  transactionswith[thedefendant]wereloans;and(2)thatthe  \  servicefeechargedby[thedefendant]forsuchtransactions   constitutedinterest."Id.at635.Asaresult,theplaintiff d  assertedthatthedefendanthadviolated,interalia,the_;;TILA_;;. `   ` Inacasessuchas_;;Snowden_;;,thereisaspecific   transactionatissue.Whetherthereisa_;;TILA_;;Ԁviolationusually h hingesonwhetherthefactsaboutthattransactiondoordonot d establishaviolationofthe_;;TILA_;;.Thisisnotaparticularly  difficultanalysis.Asonecommentatorhassummarized,in_;;TILA_;; l cases,"onemustbecognizantofthetypeofcreditbeingextended h aswellasthetermsofthecreditcontracttodeterminewhich  disclosures,inadditiontotheAPRandfinancecharge,are p  requiredunder_;;TILA_;;ԀandanyotherapplicableFederalandstate !l" laws."MatthewA.Edwards,EmpiricalandBehavioralCritiquesof "$ MandatoryDisclosure:_;;Socioeconomics_;;ԀandtheQuestforTruthin t$& Lending,14Cornell_;;J.L._;;Ԁ&Pub._;;Pol'y_;;Ԁ199,216(2005).By  &p!( contrast,whetheracompany'sactionconstitutesanantitrust '#* violationisusuallyacomplicatedquestionoffact.Thelawthat x)$, thenappliestothosefactsisequallycomplex.Thiscomplexityof $+t&. prosecutinganantitrustclaimisconfirmedbytheunopposed  experts'affidavitsprovidedbyPlaintiffs,whichdescribethe \ greatexpenseandlaborrequiredbysuchacase. X  ` ThreeofPlaintiffs'expertsHowardJ._;;Sedran_;;,an   attorneywithtwentysix(26)yearsofexperiencelitigatingclass `  actions,includingantitrustactions;J.OwenTodd,aformer  \  justiceoftheMassachusettsSuperiorCourt;andJohnC._;;Beyer_;;,an   economistagreethattoprosecutetheirantitrustclaims d  successfully,Plaintiffswillhavetoundertakeanelaborate `  factualinquirythatincludes:    X Xdefiningtherelevantproductmarket,definingthe h relevantgeographicmarket,establishingthemarketpower > ofdefendantsandthemannerinwhichtheyexercisedsuch d power;theeffectsofpotentialcompetitionwithinthe : relevantmarkets;theimpactofconductonanynon  incumbentcableprovidersintherelevantmarket;  analyzingthe"swapping"agreementsallegedinthe l Complaint,aswellasmergerandpurchaseofasset B transactionsthatdefendantsmayhavebeeninvolvedin h relatingtotheallegedmonopolizationconduct;reviewing > andanalyzingtheincreasesincablesubscriptionrates  overtime;establishing_;;Comcast_;;'sallegedmonopoly  overchargesinrelevantmarkets;andfurthercalculating p  thenamedplaintiffs'damages. F ! I XI XI_;;Beyer_;;Ԁestimatesthatexpertwitnessfeesalonewillcostaminimum !B# of$300,000,whichcouldexceedinexcessof$600,000dependingon #% theimplementationofthefactualinquiry._;;Beyer_;;Ԁaversthat J% ' "[_;;d]irect_;;Ԁcosts(travel,communications,computeranalysis,etc.) &F") wouldbeanadditionalexpense,whichgenerallyis1215percentof (#+ professionalservicecosts."_;;Sedran_;;Ԁaversthat"basedonmy N*%- experienceincomplexantitrustcases,itisreasonabletoexpect +J'/ hWF he h  thatcompetentattorneyswouldberequiredtoexpendseveral  milliondollarsofattorneys'timeandhundredsofthousandsof \ dollarsinexpenses,includingexpertwitnessfees."Additionally, X asstatedearlier,accordingtoPlaintiffs'expertaffidavits,an   individualrecoveryherewillrangefromafewhundreddollarsto `  afewthousanddollarsatmost.  \   ` Thecomplexityofanantitrustcasegenerally,andthe   complexityandcostrequiredtoprosecuteacaseagainst_;;Comcast_;; d  specifically,underminetheJohnsoncourt'srationalesfor `  supportingabartoclassarbitration.Johnsonfirstassertsthat   aclassactiondoesnotnecessarilyprovidegreaterincentivesfor h privateenforcementactionsinthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁcontext.Yet,Plaintiffs d haveprovideduncontestedandunopposedexpertaffidavits  demonstratingthatwithoutsomeformofclassmechanismbeit l classactionorclassarbitrationaconsumerantitrustplaintiff h willnotsueatall.Forexample,Toddaversthat"[_;;d]ue_;;Ԁtothe  smallvalueoftheindividualconsumer/subscriber'sclaim, p  retainingexpertwitnessesiscompletelyunrealisticand !l" impracticalonanindividualclaimbasis.Furthermore,duetothe "$ complexityofantitrustcases,includingacaseofthiskind,the t$& individualconsumer/subscriber'scaseswouldbeextremely  &p!( compromised,andeffectivelyprecluded,withoutthetestimonyof '#*  expertwitnesses." x)$,  ` Johnson'ssecondassertionthattheavailabilityof   attorney'sfeesprovidesthenecessaryincentiveforprivate \ enforcementactionssimilarlyfindslittletonopurchaseinthe X antitrustcontext.Aplaintiff'sattorneyintheconsumer   antitrustcontextwouldberequiredtoinvestalargeinitial `  outlayintimeandmoney,including"opportunitycosts" #  20      ׀  \  estimatedinthehundredsofthousandsofdollarsforonlya   portionofanindividualplaintiff'srecovery,whichatmostisa d  fewthousanddollars.Then,factoringintheuncertaintyof `  success,theappealforanattorneytotakeonanindividual   plaintiff'santitrustclaimshrinksevenfurther.Astwo h commentatorshavenoted: d  X X[_;;t]he_;;Ԁcourtdecisionsstrikingclassactionprohibitions  haveallemphasizedthatmanysmall-dollarclaimsare  simplynotfeasibleifbroughtindividually.Inessence, l thesecasesrecognize...thatbyincreasing B plaintiffs'transactioncosts,defendantscaninducethem h toacceptlowersettlementsorevendroptheirclaims > altogether.CitingtheSupremeCourt'soft-stated  justificationforsupportingclassactions,courts  invalidatingclassactionprohibitionsexplainthatitis p  oftennotrationalforindividualconsumersorattorneys F ! tobringsmallclaims,whetherthroughlitigationor !l" arbitration. !B# ЀU] XG] X9]JeanB._;;Sternlight_;;Ԁ&ElizabethJ.Jensen,UsingArbitrationto #% EliminateConsumerClassActions:EfficientBusinessPracticeor J% ' UnconscionableAbuse?,67SPGLaw&Contemp._;;Probs_;;.75,8586 &F") (2004).Inhisaffidavit,_;;Sedran_;;Ԁsuccinctlyputsitthisway: (#+ "[_;;i]t_;;Ԁshouldnotsurpriseanyonethataqualifiedattorneywould  notpursueafewindividualcasesonacontingentbasiswhereeven \ avictorywouldresultinthelossofmillionsofdollarsoftime X andexpense." #  21          ` If,asapracticalmatter,therewillbenoinventivefor `  privateenforcementofantitrustclaimsbyconsumers,theJohnson  \  court'sthirdassertionthatanydecreaseinprivateenforcement   actionswillberedressedbyadministrativeenforcementbecomes d  evenmoresuspect.WhenCongressenactsastatutethatprovides `  forbothprivateandadministrativeenforcementactions,Congress   envisionsaroleforbothtypesofenforcement.Otherwise, h Congresswouldnothaveprovidedforboth.Weakeningoneofthose d enforcementmechanismsseemsinconsistentwiththeCongressional  scheme.Eliminatingoneofthementirelyissurelyincompatible l withCongress'schoice. h  ` Insummary,wefindJohnson'srationaleforallowing  arbitrationtomoveforwardinthe_;;TILA_;;Ԁcontextdespiteabaron \ theuseofclassmechanismsunpersuasivewhenappliedto X Plaintiffs'antitrustclaims.Becauseofthepresenceofthebar   onclassmechanismsinarbitration,Plaintiffscannotbecompelled `  toarbitratetheirantitrustclaims,bothstateandfederal,if  \  thatbarremainsinplace.    ` d.Thepositionofothercourts  d   ` Thereissupportforthisconclusionintheholdingsof ,|  othercourts.Althoughthesecourtsbetheystatecourtsor ( federalcourtsapplyingstatelawhavegenerallyrefusedto  compelarbitrationonstate_;;unconscionability_;;Ԁgrounds,these 0 decisionscontainreasoningthatmirrorsourown._;;i #  22      _;;ԀThesedecisions , emphasizethataclassmechanismbarcanimpermissiblyfrustrate  theprosecutionofclaimsinanyforum,arbitralorjudicial.As 4 theCaliforniaSupremeCourthasobserved,"classactionsand 0 arbitrationsare,particularlyintheconsumercontext,often  inextricablylinkedtothevindicationofsubstantiverights." \ DiscoverBankv.SuperiorCourt,36Cal.4th148,161(Cal.2005). X  ` InTingv.AT&T,319F.3d1126,1130(2003),theNinth   Circuitconfrontedanarbitrationagreementinaconsumerservice `  agreementthat"_;;barr[ed_;;]customersfrom,amongotherthings,  \  pursuingclaimsagainstAT&Tona_;;classwide_;;Ԁbasis."Decidingthe   caseonthebasisofCaliforniastateunconscionabilitydoctrine, d  theNinthCircuitupheld"thedistrictcourt'sconclusionthatthe `  classactionbanviolatesCalifornia'sunconscionabilitylaw"on   thebasisofthispersuasivereasoning: h  X X[i]twouldnothavebeeneconomicallyfeasibletopursue d theclaimsinthesecasesonanindividualbasis,whether : thecasewasbroughtincourtorinarbitration.Ifthe  LegalRemediesProvisionscontainedinAT&T'snewCSA  hadgovernedcustomers'rightsinthesesituations,itis l highlyunlikelyanyoftheclaimswouldhavebeen B prosecuted.Itisundisputedthatthelawyerswho h representedtheplaintiffsinthesecaseswouldnothave > takenthemiftheonlyclaimtheycouldhavepursuedwas  theclaimoftheindividualplaintiff.Thereasonsfor  thisarenothardtosee.Theactualdamagessoughtby p  thenamedplaintiffsarerelativelyinsubstantial... F ! .Consequently,itwouldnotmakeeconomicsenseforan !l" attorneytoagreetorepresentanyoftheplaintiffsin !B# thesecasesinexchangefor331/3%orevenagreater "$ percentageoftheindividual'srecovery.Thelawyerwould #% almostcertainlyincurmoreincostsandtimecharges t$& justgettingthecomplaintprepared,filedandserved J% ' thanshewouldrecover,evenifthecasewereultimately  &p!( successful.Simplyput,thepotentialrewardwouldbe &F") insufficienttomotivateprivatecounseltoassumethe '#* risksofprosecutingthecasejustforanindividualon (#+ acontingencybasis.Whileretainingcounselonanhourly x)$, basisispossible,inviewofthesmallamountsinvolved, N*%- itwouldnotmakeeconomicsenseforanindividualto $+t&. retainanattorneytohandleoneofthesecasesonan +J'/ hourlybasisanditishardtoseehowanylawyercould  adviseaclienttodoso.Thenetresultisthatcases  suchastheoneslistedabovewillnotbeprosecutedeven \ ifmeritorious.Thus,theprohibitiononclassaction 2 litigationfunctionsasaneffectivedeterrentto X litigatingmanytypesofclaimsinvolvingrates,services . orbillingpracticesand,ultimately,wouldserveto   shieldAT&Tfromliabilityevenincaseswhereithas   violatedthelaw. `  q Xq XqTingv.AT&T,182F.Supp.2d902,918(N.D.Cal.2002).  \   ` Theparallelsbetweentheeffectoftheclassactionban   inTingandtheclassmechanismbarinthePolicies&Practicesis d  impossibletoignore.Iftheclassmechanismprohibitionhereis `  enforced,Comcastwillbeessentiallyshieldedfromprivate   consumerantitrustenforcementliability,evenincaseswhereit h hasviolatedthelaw.Plaintiffs'willbeunabletovindicate d theirstatutoryrights.Finally,thesocialgoalsoffederaland  stateantitrustlawswillbefrustratedbecauseofthe"enforcement l gap"createdbythedefactoliabilityshield.o #  23      ׀ h  ` e.Severance    ` Initsappellatereplybrief,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁstates:"[_;;n]eedless_;;   tosay,anytermsotherthantheclassarbitrationlimitation,are 8!" severable."Comcastreiteratedthispositionatoralargument, "4$ stating: $&  X XWithrespecttotheclassactionbar,thecompanyhas  takenanditisourpositionthatitisnotseverable  fromarbitration.Inotherwordsifitgoesto \ arbitration,itgoeswiththebar.Ifthecourtwereto 2 findthattheclassactionbarwouldhavetobesevered X fromtheclauseinordertomakeitenforceable,wewould . saythatthewholearbitrationclausewouldgodown,and   noneofitwouldbeenforceable.    X XHowever,thispositionisinstarkcontrasttotheplainlanguage 6   ofthearbitrationagreements.Inadditiontothegeneralsavings  2  clause,whichweappliedtosevertheprovisionpreventingthe   recoveryofattorney'sfeesandcosts,theclassarbitrationbar :  muchliketheremedieslimitationprovisioncontainsitsown 6 savingsclause.Thatprovisionstates:"THERESHALLBENORIGHTOR  AUTHORITYFORANYCLAIMSTOBEARBITRATEDONACLASSACTIONOR > CONSOLIDATEDBASIS...UNLESSYOURSTATE'SLAWSPROVIDE : OTHERWISE"(emphasisadded).Thissavingsclausewasexplicitly  addedtothe2002/2003version;the2001iterationcontainsno B savingsclausespecifictotheclassarbitrationbar._;;Comcast_;; > neveracknowledgedthisadditionallanguageinitsbriefingon  appealoratoralargument. F !  ` Contraryto_;;Comcast_;;'spositiononappeal,thelanguageof !B# the2002/2003Policies&Practicesanticipatesthepossible #% severanceoftheclassarbitrationbar.Althoughthesavings J% ' clausereferstoaconflictbetweentheclassarbitrationbarand &F") statelawandwehavefoundanimpermissibleconflictbetween (#+ theclassarbitrationbarandfederallawthebasisforthe N*%- conflictisirrelevanttotheseveranceanalysis.Whatmattersfor +J'/ thatanalysisisanunmistakableexpressioninthesavingsclause  thattheclassarbitrationbarisnotanindispensableconditionof \ thearbitralforum.Thisdisparitybetweenthelanguageofthe X arbitrationagreementsand_;;Comcast_;;'spositiononappealraisesan   unusualquandary:dowedisregardtheplainlanguageofthe `  Policies&Practicesinfavorof_;;Comcast_;;'sexpostdisavowal?  \   ` Weanswerthisquestioninthenegative.Apparently,   _;;Comcast_;;Ԁhassimplychangeditsmindabouttheseverabilityofthe d  classarbitrationbar.Weareunawareofanyprincipleofcontract `  lawthatpermitsdisregardofacontractprovisiononthebasisof   secondthoughtsbyacontractingparty.Moreover,asthedistrict h courtcorrectlynoted,wearedealingwithacontractofadhesion, d whichisusuallyconstruedagainstthedraftingparty._;;q #  24      _;;ԀItwould  beparticularlyincongruoustoallow_;;Comcast_;;Ԁtodisavowtheplain l languageofthecontractinsuchacircumstance. h  ` Inthecontextofourretroactivityanalysis,wenoted  thatthetenetofcontra_;;proferentem_;;doesnotapplyinsituations p  wherethescopeofanarbitrationagreementisatissue.Seealso  PaulRevere,226F.3dat25.Inthoseinstances,thefederalpolicy \ infavorofarbitrationtrumpsthetenetallowingcourtsto X construeambiguityinanagreementstrictlyagainstthedrafter.   Buttheapplicationoftheclassarbitrationbar'ssavingsclause `  doesnotraiseaquestionaboutthescopeofthearbitration  \  agreement.Indeed,byapplyingthesavingsclauseandseveringthe   classarbitrationbar,weareactuallysavingthearbitralforum d  anoutcomeconsistentwiththefederalpolicyfavoringarbitration. `   ` Weacknowledgethatbyseveringtheclassarbitrationbar   fromthearbitrationagreements,asappliedtoPlaintiffs' h antitrustclaims,weareexcisingamajorprovisionofthe d arbitrationagreements.Theclassarbitrationbarcomprisesthe  secondfullparagraphofthesectioninthePolicies&Practices l describingthetermsofthemandatory,bindingarbitrationregime. h Itestablishesanarbitrationregimethathandlesindividualclaims  only.Typically,courtspreferdeclaringanarbitrationagreement p  unenforceableratherthanusingseveranceasaremedywhen !l" fundamentalelementsofthearbitrationregimeareatissue.See "$ Bookerv.RobertHalfIntern.,Inc.,413F.3d77,84-85(D.C.Cir. t$& 2005)("Acriticalconsiderationinassessingseverabilityis  &p!( givingeffecttotheintentofthecontractingparties....If '#* illegalitypervadesthearbitrationagreementsuchthatonlya x)$, disintegratedfragmentwouldremainafterhackingawaythe $+t&. unenforceableparts...thejudicialeffortbeginstolookmore  likerewritingthecontractthanfulfillingtheintentofthe \ parties.").Sincethepremiseofarbitrationisthecontractual X agreementofthepartiestothearbitralforum,drasticrewriting   isparticularlyinappropriate.SeeMCITelecomms.Corp.v.Exalon `  Indus.,Inc.,138F.3d426,428-29(1stCir.1998)("[T]hereisno  \  generallegaldutytoarbitrateprivatecommercialdisputes;   instead,suchproceedingsarestrictlytheproductofvoluntary d  contractualobligations.").Intheabsenceofasavingsclause `  specificallyaffixedtotheclassarbitrationbar,severingthat   barwouldbedifficulttojustify. h  ` However,here,thearbitrationagreementsdoanticipate d specificallytheseveranceoftheclassarbitrationbar.  Therefore,_;;Comcast_;;Ԁcannotclaimthatitdidnotforeseethe l possibilitythat,despiteitsstrongpreferenceforindividual h arbitration,itwouldhavetoarbitrateonaclassbasisbecause  thecontractualbaronclassarbitrationmight,initsapplication p  toparticularclaims,runafoulofcontrollinglaw.Thisis !l" preciselywhathashappenedhere._;; #  25      _;;Ԁ "$   t$& H.State_;;unconscionability_;;    ` Beforethedistrictcourt,Plaintiffsalsochallenged x the_;;enforceability_;;Ԁofthearbitrationagreementsonthebasisof $t Massachusetts_;;unconscionability_;;Ԁlaw.Wehavefocusedona   vindicationofstatutoryrightsanalysis,whichdrawsonthe |  federalsubstantivelawof_;;arbitrability_;;.Therelationshipbetween ( x  thetwoapproachesmeritscomment.Seealsosupran.22. $   ` X_XX X_Section2oftheFederalArbitrationAct("FAA")provides   thatwrittenarbitrationagreements shallbevalid,irrevocable, ,|  andenforceable,saveuponsuchgroundsasexistatlaworin ( equityfortherevocationofanycontract.9U.S.C.2.In  Doctor'sAssociates,Inc.v._;;Casarotto_;;,517U.S.681(1996),the 0 SupremeCourtreiteratedthatbecauseofthislanguage,"generally , applicablecontractdefenses,suchasfraud,duress,or  _;;unconscionability_;;,maybeappliedtoinvalidatearbitration 4 agreementswithoutcontravening2."Id.at687.Asaresult, 0 whendecidingwhethercertainclaimscangoforwardinarbitration,   federalcourtshaveinvalidatedorrefusedtoenforcearbitration 8!" agreementsonthebasisofthesestatecontractlawdoctrines. "4$  ` Ineffect,thesestatecontractlawdoctrines,by $& operationoftheFAA,becomepartofthefederalsubstantivelawof <&!( _;;arbitrability_;;.AsstatedbytheSupremeCourtinMosesH.Cone: '8#* "Theeffectof[2oftheFAA]istocreateabodyoffederal )$, substantivelawof_;;arbitrability_;;,applicabletoanyarbitration @+&. agreementwithinthecoverageoftheAct."460U.S.at24  (emphasisadded).Whenitcomestothe_;;arbitrability_;;Ԁofa \ particulardispute,"[_;;f]ederal_;;ԀlawinthetermsoftheArbitration X Actgovernsthatissueineitherstateorfederalcourt."Id.   AlthoughPlaintiffs'challengestothe_;;enforceability_;;Ԁofthe `  arbitrationagreementscouldbeevaluatedthroughtheprismof  \  state_;;unconscionability_;;Ԁlaw,wehavechosentoapplyavindication   ofstatutoryrightsanalysis,whichisalsopartofthebodyof d  federalsubstantivelawofarbitration,tothequestionofwhether `  Plaintiffs'federalandstateantitrustclaimsarearbitrableunder   thePolicies&Practices.SeeBookerv.RobertHalf_;;Int'l_;;,Inc., h 413F.3d77(D.C.Cir.2005# X_XXX_^#X_XX X_)(applyingvindicationofstatutory d rightsanalysistoclaimsofracediscriminationandwrongful  constructivedischargeunderDistrictofColumbialaw)# X_XXX_U#X_XX X_;_;;Popovich_;;v. l McDonald'sCorp.,189F.Supp.2d772(N.D.Ill.2002)(applying h vindicationofstatutoryrightsanalysisto,interalia,claimsof  breachofcontractandconsumerfraud)# X_XXX_X#X_XX X_.# X_XXX_ư# p   ` X_XX X_Asapracticalmatter,# X_XXX_0#therearestrikingsimilarities !l" betweenthevindicationofstatutoryrightsanalysisandthe "$ _;;unconscionability_;;Ԁanalysis.Infact,manyofPlaintiffs' t$& _;;unconscionability_;;Ԁargumentsaremerelyreiterationsoftheir  &p!( vindicationofstatutoryrightsarguments.Forexample,astothe '#*  _;;unconscionability_;;Ԁoftheclassmechanismbar,Plaintiffsstatethat x)$, "theclassactionbanisoppressivetoPlaintiffsbecauseit  preventsthemfromvindicatingtheirstatutoryrights." \   ` Moreover,any_;;unconscionability_;;Ԁanalysisunder X Massachusettslawwouldhavetoincludetheseveranceprovisions   thathavefeaturedsoprominentlyinourvindicationofstatutory `  rightsanalysis.Thoseseveranceprovisions,viewedthroughthe  \  lensof_;;unconscionability_;;,wouldsavethearbitralforum,justas   theyhaveinourvindicationofstatutoryrightsanalysis.With d  newgroundrules,arbitrationcouldproceed.Thus,weseenoneed `  toconductaseparate_;;unconscionability_;;Ԁanalysisunder   Massachusettslaw. h  `   VI.        ` Wesummarizeourmajorconclusions.Contrarytothe  findingofthedistrictcourt,weconcludedthatthearbitration 4 provisionsatissueappliedretroactivelytoPlaintiffs'antitrust 0 claims.Asaresult,weevaluatedotherargumentsthatPlaintiffs   hadraisedbelowinoppositiontoarbitration. 8!"  ` Weconcludedthat_;;Comcast_;;Ԁprovidedadequatenoticefor "4$ thearbitrationagreementsatissuehere.Plaintiffs'vindication $& ofstatutoryrightsclaimseachchallengingarbitrationoftheir <&!( antitrustclaimsbychallengingthevalidityofaparticular '8#* provisionofthearbitrationagreementsrequiredatwopart )$, analysis.First,usingprinciplesculledpredominantlyfromthe @+&. SupremeCourt'strilogyofarbitrationdecisions_;;Howsam_;;,  _;;Pacificare_;;,and_;;Bazzle_;;󀄄wedeterminedwhethereachofPlaintiffs' \ vindicationofstatutoryrightsargumentsrequiredtheapplication X of_;;Howsam_;;'s"interpretiverule"X_XX X_thatacourtratherthanan   arbitratorshoulddecidewhetherthepartieshavesubmitteda `  particulardisputetoarbitration,i.e.,whetheraquestionof  \  _;;arbitrability_;;Ԁwaspresented.# X_XXX_c#ԀSecond,ifwefoundthataparticular   vindicationofstatutoryrightsargumentpresentedaquestionof d  _;;arbitrability_;;,weproceededtodecideits"merits",i.e.,whether `  theprovisionchallengedbyPlaintiffsrequiredafindingthatthe   Policies&Practices'arbitrationagreementwasunenforceablewith h respecttoPlaintiffs'antitrustclaims. d  ` Usingthisframework,wedeterminedthatPlaintiffs'  challengestothearbitrationagreements'discovery,statuteof l limitations,andtrebledamageslimitation,asappliedto h Plaintiffs'stateantitrustclaims,didnotpresentquestionsof  _;;arbitrability_;;.WedeterminedthatPlaintiffs'challengestothe p  Policies&Practices'slimitationoftrebledamagesasappliedto !l" Plaintiffs'federalantitrustclaims,itslimitationonthe "$ recoveryofattorney'sfeesandcosts,andtheclassarbitration t$& _>;bardidposequestionsof_>>arbitrability_>>.Onthemerits,we  &p!( concludedthattheseprovisions,ifappliedinthearbitralforum, '#* wouldpreventthevindicationofstatutoryrights.However,we x)$, thenappliedthesavingsclausesofthearbitrationagreementsto $+t&. severtheseprovisionsfromthearbitrationagreementsasapplied  toPlaintiffs'antitrustclaims.Withtheseprovisionsremoved, \ arbitrationoftheantitrustclaimscanproceed. X    ` Whethertheshortenedlimitationsperiodcontainedinthe   Policies&Practicesappliesinlieuofthefouryearstatutory `  limitationsperiodfoundinstateandfederalantitrustlaw,and  \  whetherPlaintiffscanrecoverstatetrebledamages,arequestions   anarbitratormustresolveinthefirstinstance.However, d  Plaintiffswillbeabletorecoverfederaltrebledamagesand `  attorney'sfeesandcostsinthearbitralforum.Additionally,   arbitrationmustproceedonaclassorconsolidatedbasis. h  ` Forthereasonsstated,thedistrictcourt'sholdingthat d thearbitrationclauseinthe2002/2003Policies&Practices,in  itsentirety,doesnotapplytoPlaintiffs'antitrustclaimsis l  reversed .We remand forfurtherproceedingsnotinconsistentwith h thisopinion.Thepartiesshallbeartheirowncosts. 0  ` Soordered .