WPC @(\_9E zB*E& Qؒ\GGAͦ=meɔ1~uxCs s bvvv~~~~~~~UFUFGU@ BKONICA MINOLTA 7085/IP-602,,,,0"X(#$  0  ($.Courier New Regular(d:2*{$ !    =!!XXdd=    0   <6X9`("Courier NewTTXXx6X@DQX@<6X9`(CourierTTXXw6X@QX@  *{$  =!!XXdd=    2    _Eventhislimitedrelaxationofconventionalstanding  requirementsiscontroversial.See,e.g.,RichardH.Fallon,Jr.,  AsAppliedandFacialChallengesandThirdPartyStanding,113 \ Harv.L.Rev.1321,135964(2000)(arguingthattheSupreme 2 Court'spermissiveapproachtofacialchallengesintheFirst X Amendmentcontexthaslittletodowiththirdpartystandingbut, . rather,reflectsasubstantiveconcernthatfaciallyinvalid   statutesharmtheplaintiffherself,regardlessofwhetheramore   narrowlydrawnstatutecouldregulateherconduct).ې2s 6x26Xy File3|xUTABLE Aq:\template\OPINIONS\SELYA.WPT i *{$  =!!XXdd=    1    _Theplaintiffhasnotappealedfromthisukase.Accordingly,  thatportionofthejudgmentisnotbeforeusandweeschewfurther  discussionofit.- - y *{$  =!!XXdd=    3    _Forthesamereasons,theplaintiff'sdueprocessclaim,not  reachedbythelowercourt,see344F.Supp.2dat801n.2,  likewiseshouldhavebeendismissed..Courier New Regular<4 9Z+.Courier New Regular(9 Z(Times New Roman  d !  _TRY,3'X3' Letter 3' Letter3'T ? * !     "nuX"X#"nuUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals  ##X&X###_X#X&FortheFirstCircuit##X&X#_Y##"XXX#X&#   A') ` dE< ` A   No.042673 K  @!GRACEC._OSEDIACZ_,  G  @<< Plaintiff,Appellee,   @tt)v. O  @ CITYOFCRANSTON,ETC.,ETAL., K  @Defendants,Appellants.  A') ` dE<R` A S @ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT 8 @l l FORTHEDISTRICTOFRHODEISLAND 4 @ [Hon.WilliamE.Smith,U.S.DistrictJudge]  A') ` dE<;` A < @'Before !q   @@((Selya,CircuitJudge,  Coffin,SeniorCircuitJudge,   andHoward,CircuitJudge. y! A') ` dE<$!` A %!u#       Tom_Marcelle_,withwhomSteven_Frias_andMichael_Glucksman_,  "Z% CitySolicitor,wereonbrief,forappellants. "0&   MichaelT._Eskey_,withwhom_Amato_ԀA._DeLuca_,Miriam_Weizenbaum_ #' and_DeLuca_Ԁ&_Weizenbaum_ԀLtd.wereonbrief,forappellee. $( *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  8&!*8&!  SI&!+ @@38538@@SJuly6,_2005_ r'"-  RHCH(#." @@38538 @@ R(&!/  (  * !   + '2? _  8XXdd8*,X` XX* ` SELYA,CircuitJudge. Thisappealhasitsgenesisina  decisionbyCranston,RhodeIsland(theCity)toinstituteapolicy x (thePolicy)thatallowedprivatepartiestoerectholidaydisplays $t onaprimepieceofpublicproperty,subjecttocertain   administrativerequirementsandtheapprovalofthemayor.A |  numberofindividualsandgroupsseizedtheopportunity. ( x  Collectively,theyerecteda_myrioramic_Ԁarrayofexhibits,someof $  which(suchasanativityscene)wereovertlyreligious.Acitizen   ofCranstontookumbrageandsuedfordeclaratoryandinjunctive ,|  relief. (  ` Thedistrictcourtrebuffedtheplaintiff'sEstablishment  ClausechallengebutfoundherFreeSpeechClauseclaimmeritorious 0 andenjoinedcontinueduseofthePolicyonthegroundthatitgave , themayorunconstrainedauthoritytoapprove(and,byextension,to  disapprove)proposeddisplays._Osediacz_v.CityofCranston,344 4 F.Supp.2d799,814(_D.R.I._Ԁ2004).TheCityappeals.Concluding, 0 aswedo,thattheplaintifflacksstandingtomountachallenge   undertheFreeSpeechClause,wereverse. 8!" @tt) I. "4$ @%Background  $&  ` Thefactsarestraightforward.Asthe2003holiday t&!( seasonapproached,theCityissuedthePolicy,whichdesignatedthe  (p#* southlawnofCityHallasalimitedpublicforumforthedisplay )%, ofholiday_themed_Ԁandseasonaldecorations.ThePolicywas x+&. designedtocontinueinforcefromyeartoyear.Itpermittedthe  publictoerect"appropriate"displaysbetweenDecember5and \ January1,defined"appropriate"as"beingsuitableandproperfor X theholidayoccasion,"andexplicitlyprohibitedanydisplaythat   would"shocktheconsciousness[sic]ofthecommunity."ThePolicy `  requiredanypersonwishingtoerectanexhibittoprovidehisor  \  hername,address,andtelephonenumber,abriefwritten   descriptionoftheexhibit,andasignedreleaseabsolvingtheCity d  ofanyliabilityfordamagetotheexhibit.Ofparticular `  pertinencehere,thePolicyproclaimedthatthemayororhis   designee"mustapprove"alldisplays. h  ` Inshortorder,severalexhibitsappearedonthesouth d lawn.Theseincludedalargemenorahaccompaniedbyasign  conveyingwishesfor"aHappyChanukah";anearlifesizenativity l scene;aninflatablesevenfoottallsnowmanandasimilarlysized h SantaClaus;ahugeholographicangel;atrainoffifteenpink  flamingoswithSantaClaushats;andasignthatread"Happy p  HolidaysfromtheTeamstersUnion."Facedwiththisembarrassment !l" ofriches,theCitydeterminedonDecember21,2003thatthesouth "$ lawncouldcontainnothingmoreandbarredfurtherentries. t$&  ` OnDecember22,2003,plaintiffappelleeGrace_Osediacz_  &p!( filedsuitintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof '#* RhodeIsland.Sheassertedthatthedisplayofreligioussymbols x)$, ontheCityHalllawnviolatedtheEstablishmentClause.Shealso $+t&. challengedthePolicyascontraveningtheConstitution's  Establishment,FreeSpeech,andDueProcessClauses. \  ` Afterabriefperiodofdiscovery,theCitymovedfor X summaryjudgmentwithrespecttotheEstablishmentClauseclaims.   Theplaintiffopposedthemotion.Thedistrictcourtexpandedthe `  summaryjudgmentbattlegroundtoincludethefreespeechclaimand  \  solicitedadditionalaffidavitsandbriefs.See_Berkovitz_v.Home   BoxOffice,Inc.,89F.3d24,29(1stCir.1996)(discussinga d  districtcourt'sauthoritytograntsuaspontesummaryjudgment). `   ` Inhermainaffidavit,theplaintiffportrayedherselfas   aCranstonresidentandtaxpayerwhoregularlyconductsbusinessat h CityHall.Shestatedthatshefoundthespectacleofamenorah d andcrecheonmunicipalpropertyaninappropriategovernmental  endorsementofreligion.Shedidnotaver,however,thatshe l herselfharboredanyinterestinerectingadisplay. h  ` Thedistrictcourtruledthatthetableauonthesouth  lawnofCityHall,thoughitincludedreligioussymbols,was p  nothingmorethan"acelebrationoftheholidayinbothits !l" religiousandsecularsenses."_Osediacz_,344F.Supp.2dat807 "$ (citingLynchv._Donnelly_,465U.S.668,68081(1984)).Thecourt t$& furtherruledthatthedisplayshadnoreligiouspurposeandthat  &p!( theydidnothavetheeffectofendorsingreligion.Id.at80710 '#* (citingCountyofAlleghenyv.ACLU,492U.S.573,57982(1989)). x)$, Consequently,thecourtgrantedpartialsummaryjudgmentinthe $+t&. City'sfavorontheplaintiff'sflagshipEstablishmentClause  claim. #  1      ׀Seeid.at815. \  ` ThecourtwaslesssanguineaboutthePolicy'sfree X speechimplications.Afterdeterminingthattheplaintiffhad   standingtoraiseafreespeechclaim,id.at81112,thecourt `  notedthatthePolicy,onitsface,providednomeaningful  \  standardsthatinanywayconstrainedthemayor'sauthorityto   approveordisapprovedisplays,id.at81213.Norwastherea d  sufficienthistoryofpastpracticefromwhichsuchstandardscould `  beinferred.Id.at81314.BecausethePolicyvestedessentially   _standardless_Ԁdiscretioninthemayortograntorwithholdapproval h fordisplaysathiswhim,thePolicyconstitutedapriorrestraint d onspeechand,therefore,transgressedtheFreeSpeechClauseof  theFirstAmendment.Id.at814(citingCityofLakewoodv.Plain l Dealer_Publ'g_ԀCo.,486U.S.750,772(1988)).Thecourtgranted h partialsummaryjudgmentfortheplaintiffonthatclaim,id.,and  accordingly,declinedtoaddressherdueprocessclaim,id.at801 p  n.2. !l"  ` TheCityappealsfromthedistrictcourt'sresolutionof "$ thefreespeechclaim.Wehavejurisdictionunder28U.S.C. t$&  1291.Sincethedistrictcourtdecidedthiscaseatthesummary  &p!( judgmentstage,weundertakedenovoreview.HoultonCitizens'  Coalitionv.TownofHoulton,175F.3d178,184(1stCir.1999). \  @88) II. X @  &Analysis     ` Federalcourtsarecourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.Rhode   Islandv.EPA,378F.3d19,22(1stCir.2004).Theyarenot D   empoweredtoofferadvisoryopinions.UnitedStatesv.Green,407 @  F.3d434,444(1stCir.2005).Thus,standingtosueisan   indispensablecomponentoffederalcourtjurisdiction.Asthe H  SupremeCourthasexplained: D 8 ` [_T]he_Ԁcaseorcontroversyrequirementdefines  withrespecttotheJudicialBranchtheidea v ofseparationofpowersonwhichtheFederal L Governmentisfounded.Theseveraldoctrines "r thathavegrownuptoelaboratethat H requirementarefoundedinconcernaboutthe  proper"andproperlylimited"roleofthe  courtsinademocraticsociety.z` x` x Allenv.Wright,468U.S.737,750(1984)(citationandinternal &v quotationmarksomitted). "  ` Inthisinstance,ourdiscussionbeginsandendswiththe ~ ! standingissue.Standingdoctrinecomprisesamixof *"z# constitutionalandprudentialcriteria.SeeElkGroveUnifiedSch. #&% Dist.v._Newdow_,124S.Ct.2301,2308(2004);N.H.RighttoLife % ' PACv.Gardner,99F.3d8,13(1stCir.1996).Theconstitutional .'~") coreofstandingrequiresthataplaintiffmakeatripartite (*$+ showing:shemustdemonstratethatshehassufferedaninjuryin *%- fact,thatherinjuryisfairlytraceabletothedisputedconduct, 2,'/ _andthatthereliefsoughtpromisestoredresstheinjury  sustained.Lujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,56061 \ (1992);Gardner,99F.3dat13.Thepartyseekingtoinvokethe X federalcourt'sjurisdiction"normally,theplaintiff"bearsthe   burdenofpleadingandproofoneachstepofthestandingpavane. `  Lujan,504U.S.at561.  \   ` Inkeepingwiththeseimportantconcepts,theSupreme   Courthasembellishedtheconstitutionalrequirementsattendantto d  standingwithanarrayofprudentialmonitions.Theprudential `  aspectsofstandinginclude"thegeneralprohibitionona   litigant'sraisinganotherperson'slegalrights,therulebarring h adjudicationofgeneralizedgrievancesmoreappropriatelyaddressed d intherepresentativebranches,andtherequirementthata  plaintiff'scomplaintfallwithinthezoneofinterestsprotected l bythelawinvoked."Allen,468U.S.at751. h  ` Inthiscase,theCitychallengestheplaintiff's  standing.Itreasonsthatbecausetheplaintiffneverhadany p  interestinerectingadisplay,therewasnochancethatshewould !l" besubjectedtothevagariesoftheapprovalprocessand,hence, "$ shehasfailedtoshowasufficientlypersonalizedinjuryemanating t$& fromthePolicy.Tobolsterthisreasoning,theCityrelies  &p!( heavilyonLairdv.Tatum,408U.S.1(1972),inwhichtheSupreme '#* Courtwrotethatifthecomplainingparties"themselvesarenot x)$, chilled,butseekonlytorepresentthosemillionswhomthey $+t&. believearesochilled,[they]clearlylackthatpersonalstakein  theoutcomeofthecontroversyessentialtostanding."Id.at13 \ n.7(citationsandinternalquotationmarksomitted). X  ` Theplaintiffattemptstoblunttheforceofthis   reasoningbytoutingalineofcasesholdingthattraditional `  standingrequirementsarerelaxedintheprecinctspatrolledbythe  \  FirstAmendment.See,e.g.,Broderickv.Oklahoma,413U.S.601,   612(1973)(holdingthatwhenFirstAmendmentconcernsareat d  stake,aplaintiffmay"challengeastatutenotbecause[her]own `  rightsareviolated,butbecause...thestatute'sveryexistence   maycauseothersnotbeforethecourttorefrainfrom h constitutionallyprotectedspeechorexpression").Thedistrict d courtacceptedthisdistinction.SeeOsediacz,344F.Supp.2dat  812.Wedonot. l  ` Wethinkthatthisclashbetweencompetinglinesof h authoritymayreadilyberesolvedbysortingoutsomebasic  concepts.Standingisnotaunitaryconceptbut,rather,agroup p  ofdoctrinescollectivelyintendedtoensurethatthefederal !l" courtsadjudicateonlythoseactualcasesorcontroversiesthat "$ fallwithinthepurviewofArticleIIIoftheConstitution.See t$& Newdow,124S.Ct.at2308(describingstandingdoctrineas"a  &p!( seriesofrules").Whencertaintypesoffacialchallengesto '#* statutes,ordinances,regulations,orgovernmentalpoliciesare x)$, premisedonFirstAmendmentgrounds,theyinvitealoweringof $+t&. conventionalstandingbarriersbecausethetraditionaljustertii  banonlitigatingtherightsofthirdpartiesisarguably \ inapplicable.  #  2      ׀SeeForsythCountyv.NationalistMovement,505 X U.S.123,129(1992)(explainingthatthirdpartystandingconcerns   willnotpretermitafacialchallengetoastatuteonFirst `  Amendmentgrounds).Thus,theloweringofthebarintersectswith  \  standingdoctrineonlyontheissueofthirdpartystanding.    ` ThatdistinctiondemonstrateswhyCityofLakewoodand d  similarcasesarenotpersuasivehere.Historically,facial `  challengesweredisfavored,inpartbecausetheywerethoughtto   requirethechallengertoraisetherightsofothers.See,e.g., h UnitedStatesv.Raines,362U.S.17,2022(1960).Underthis d traditionalapproach,thenormaljustertiirulesmadeitnearly  impossibletohaveacourtdeclareastatutefacially l unconstitutional;afterall,anindividuallitigantwouldhave h standingtoobjecttoitonlyasappliedtohersituation.See  RichardH.Fallon,AsAppliedandFacialChallengesandThirdParty p  Standing,113Harv.L.Rev.1321,1322(2000).Asacorollary,a !l" plaintiffwhohadnotherselfbeensubjectedtoanunconstitutional "$ exerciseofpowercouldnotchallengetheoffendingstatuteatall.  Seeid. \  ` TheCityofLakewoodCourtrecognizedthataslongasno X onewasdeniedapermit,noonewouldhavestandingtomounta   challenge"yetthechillingeffectoftheunconstitutionalgrant `  ofstandardlessdiscretionwouldremainundiminished.Id.at757  \  58.Tocorrectthisproblem,theCourtloosenedthecustomary   prudentiallimitsthatconstrainaplaintiff'sstandingwith d  respecttofacialchallengesbroughtagainststatutesthatvest `  unbridleddiscretioninpublicofficialstocensorspeech.Seeid.   at759.Confrontedwithafacialchallengetoalicencingstatute, h itruledthatinthecaseof"alicensingstatute[that]allegedly d vestsunbridleddiscretioninagovernmentofficialoverwhetherto  permitordenyexpressiveactivity,"aplaintiff"whoissubjectto l thelawmaychallengeitfaciallywithoutthenecessityoffirst h applyingfor,andbeingdenied,alicense."468U.S.at75556.   ` TheCourtdidnot,however,carveoutanyexceptionto p  thecorerequirementsofconstitutionalstanding.These !l" requirements,includingthebedrockrequirementthattheplaintiff "$ herselfhavesufferedaninjuryinfact,wereleftintact. t$& Importantly,theCourtrecognizedthatthetheoreticalriskof  &p!( selfcensorshipinherentinstatutesconferringstandardless '#* discretiononpublicofficialswasnotitselfasufficientinjury x)$, withinthemeaningofArticleIII.Id.at759.Indeed,the $+t&. Justicesstressedthataplaintiff,asaprerequisitetosuit,had  toshowthatthelawthatsheaspiredtochallenge"pose[d]areal \ andsubstantialthreat[to]identifiedcensorshiprisks."Id. X (emphasissupplied);seealsoTatum,408U.S.at1314&n.7   (explainingthateveninFirstAmendmentcases,courtsmustguard `  againstrenderingadvisoryopinions).  \   ` Virtuallybydefinition,thethreatofselfcensorship   cannotexistifapartyhasnointentioneitherofspeakingor d  otherwiseexposingherselftothevagariesofastandardless `  licensingpolicy.Itis,therefore,notsurprisingthatinevery   casetheplaintiffcites,thepartymountingafacialchallengeat h theveryleastdesiredorintendedtoundertakeactivitywithinthe d compassofthechallengedstatute.See,e.g.,ForsythCounty,505  U.S.at127;CityofLakewood,486U.S.at75354.Consequently, l thosecasescannotbereadtoreducetoastateofirrelevancythe h constitutionallymandatedrequirementthataplaintiffmustshowan  injuryinfact. p   ` Theshortofitisthatweretheinstantplaintiffarmed !l" withconstitutionallysufficientstandingcredentials,shecould "$ prevailonanissueofthissortmerelybyshowingthatthePolicy, t$& byvestingstandardlessdiscretioninthemayor,constitutesan  &p!( impermissiblepriorrestraint.See,e.g.,Freedmanv.Maryland, '#* 380U.S.51,56(1965). Inthatevent,theplaintiffcouldpress x)$, therightsofothers;shewouldnothavetomaketheadditional $+t&. (prudential)showingthatthemayorcouldnot,consistentwiththe  FreeSpeechClause,denyherpermissiontoerectaparticular \ display.Thenetresult,then,isthateventhoughprudential X standingconcernsarerelaxedincertainfacialchallenges   implicatingtheFirstAmendment,alitigantstillmustdemonstrate `  thatshesatisfiestheconstitutionalminimaessentialtoestablish  \  standing.    ` Seeninthislight,thequestionreducestowhetherthe d  plaintiffhasbeeninjuredwithinthemeaningofArticleIII. `  Here,thatinquiryisinformedbywhattheplaintiffdoesnot   assert.Shedoesnotassertthatsheherselfunsuccessfully h attemptedtoplaceherhandiworkonthesouthlawnofCityHall. d Shedoesnotassertthatshehasanyinterestinerectinga  display,butfearsthatherexpressionwillbesubjugatedtoa l standardlessapprovalprocess.ShedoesnotassertthatthePolicy h takesawayherappetiteforexpressingherselforchillsherspeech  inanycognizableway.Heronlyclaimofinjuryisthat,asa p  residentandtaxpayer,sheissubjecttotheeffectsofthePolicy !l" andthat,byconferringunbridleddiscretiononthemayorto "$ approveorrejectdisplays,thePolicyhasachillingeffectonthe t$& speechofothers.  &p!(  ` Thisisnotasufficientpredicatetoallowthissuitto '#* goforward.Itisapodicticthatamereinterestinseeingthe x)$, governmentturnsquarecornersisnotthekindofparticularized $+t&. interestthatcansatisfythemostbasicconstitutional  prerequisiteforstanding.SeeFed.ElectionComm'nv.Akins,524 \ U.S.11,2324(1998)(collectingcases).Ithasbeenequally X clearformorethanthreequartersofacenturythat,withcertain   narrowexceptionsnotimplicatedhere,taxpayers,assuch,lack `  generalizedstandingtochallengetheconstitutionalityof  \  governmentalaction.SeeFrothinghamv.Mellon,262U.S.447,487   (1923).Theplaintiff'sstanding,therefore,cannotbegroundedon d  themerefactthatshepaystaxestoamunicipalitywhich,inturn, `  expendsfundstofurtheranunconstitutionalexerciseofgovernment   power.SeeValleyForgeChristianColl.v.Ams.Unitedfor h SeparationofChurchandState,454U.S.464,477(1982). d  ` Inthelastanalysis,allthatremainsisthequestionof  whethertheriskthatthePolicywillhaveachillingeffectonthe l speechofothersisasufficientinjurytotheplaintifftomeet h thefirstprongoftheconstitutionaltestforstanding.The  SupremeCourtansweredthatquestioninTatum,acasethatinvolved p  achallengetothescopeofdomesticintelligencegatheringbythe !l" UnitedStatesArmy.There,theplaintiffsallegedthattheArmy "$ wasspyingoncivilianswhomtheArmybelievedmightengagein t$& civildisobedienceandthatsuchsystematicsurveillancechilled  &p!( speechbydeterringcitizensfromindulginginexpressionthat '#*  mightdrawtheArmy'sire.Tatum,408U.S.at910. x)$,  ` TheTatumCourtheldthattheplaintiffs,whohadnot   themselvesbeensurveilled,lackedstandingtochallengethe \ purportedlyperniciouspractice.Id.Insoholding,theCourt X acknowledgedthatachillonspeechsometimesmaybeacognizable   injurybutexplainedthat,inordertohavestanding,theplaintiff `  mustbewithintheclassofpersonspotentiallychilled.Id.at  \  1213.Inwordsthatseemaproposhere,theCourtconcluded:   "Allegationsofasubjective'chill'arenotanadequatesubstitute d  foraclaimofspecificpresentobjectiveharmorathreatof `  specificfutureharm."Id.at1314.    ` Theplaintiff'splightfallssquarelywithinthecompass h ofthisadmonition.AlthoughoffendedbythePolicy,shehas d sustainednoinjuryinfact.Thus,shehasnosufficientpersonal  stakeinthislitigationtogroundadeterminationthatshehas l standingtosue.Seeid.at13n.7.EvenifthePolicychilled h somespeech,itdidnotchillanyoftheplaintiff'sspeech.   ` Theplaintiffstrivesmightilytododgethisbullet.Her p  firstattemptedevasionisasuggestionthatweshouldnotassume !l" fromanemptyrecordthatherspeechwasnotchilled.That "$ suggestionturnsthestandinginquiryonitshead.Itwasthe t$& plaintiffwhoinvokedfederaljurisdiction.Hence,itwasher  &p!( burdentoputadequatefactsintherecordfromwhichacourt '#*  reasonablycouldconcludethatshewasamongthosewhosespeechwas x)$, potentiallychilled.SeeLujan,504U.S.at561.Havingfailedto  carrythatburden,shelacksstandingtomaintainthissuit. \   ` Theplaintiff'ssecondattemptedevasionisequally X unavailing.ShesuggeststhatbecausethePolicyvestsunfettered   discretioninthemayoroverwhatdisplaysarepermitted,themayor `  conceivablycouldusethatdiscretiontofavorreligious  \  expositionsand,thus,infringetheplaintiff'srightsunderthe   EstablishmentClause.Werejectthisefforttohitchthe d  plaintiff'sFirstAmendmentclaimtoherdefunctEstablishment `  Clauseclaim.Simplyassertingthatthemayormightexercisehis   authorityinanunconstitutionalmannerisnodifferentthansaying h thattheexistenceofstandardlessdiscretionisitself d unconstitutionalandredressablewithoutregardtotheexistenceof  aninjuryinfact.Anywaythepieissliced,theplaintiffstill l hastoshowsomereasonablepossibilitythatshewouldbesubject h totheconstitutionallydefectiveaction.SeeTatum,408U.S.at  13n.7.Shehasnotdoneso. p   ` Itis,ofcourse,disquietingwhenevergovernmenttakes !l" anactionthatseemstotransgressaconstitutionalprotection. "$ Butinthelaw,aselsewhere,"twowrongsseldommakearight," t$& Fosterv.Dalton,71F.3d52,57(1stCir.1995)"anditwouldbe  &p!( wrongtoarrogateuntoourselvesthepowertohearacaseatthe '#*  behestofaplaintiffwholacksstandingtosue. x)$,  ` Moreover,weperceivenounfairness.Thestanding   inquiryisnotverydemanding.Tosatisfyitsfirstelement,the \ plaintiffneednotshowthatthemayoractuallydeniedher X permissiontoerectadisplay.See,e.g.,CityofLakewood,486   U.S.at756.Sheneednotevenshowthatsheactuallymadesucha `  request.See,e.g.,Freedman,380U.S.at56.Nevertheless,the  \  recordmustcontainevidencesufficienttoindicateanobjectively   reasonablepossibilitythatshewouldbesubjecttotheallegedly d  unconstitutionalmayoralapprovalrequirement.SeeTatum,408U.S. `  at11;seealsoFriendsoftheEarth,Inc.v.LaidlawEnvtl.Servs.   (TOC),Inc.,528U.S.167,18384(2000)(explainingthata h plaintiffneednotshowacertaintyoffutureharmtoestablish d standing,solongasthereisareasonablethreatofsuchharm).   Therecordbeforeuscontainsnosuchevidence.Itfollowsthat l thissuitcannotbemaintainedinafederalcourt. h @( III.  @%Conclusion     ` Letusbeperfectlyclear.Werecognize,asdidthe T!" learneddistrictcourt,Osediacz,344F.Supp.2dat81214,that #P$ thePolicyisconstitutionallysuspectandweencouragetheCityto $& abandonit(or,atleast,tomodifyitsubstantially).Absenta X&!( plaintiffwithacognizableinterestintheoutcome,however,this (T#* isnotanappropriateproceedinginwhichtoadjudicatethe )%, Policy's_merits. \+&.  ` Weneedgonofurther.TheConstitutionrequiresthat  litigantshaveapersonalstakeinacasebeforetheymaysueina \ federalcourt,see,e.g.,_Warth_v._Seldin_,422U.S.490,499 X (1975),andthisplaintiffhasnotprovidedfactssufficientto   showthatshepossessessuchastake.Accordingly,herfreespeech `  claimshouldhavebeendismissedwithoutprejudiceforwantof  \  subjectmatterjurisdiction. #  3          ` Wereversethepartialsummaryjudgmententeredbythe d  districtcourtonthefreespeechclaimandremandthecasetothe ,|  districtcourtwithinstructionstodismissthatclaimandthedue D processclaimwithoutprejudiceforwantofstanding.Allparties   shallbeartheirowncosts.