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Sa\  `&Times New RomanS7U(X7&  d dS)1dxd'dxd<:zTop of For7W(X7  ?b%2A`Arial?  Sa\  `&Times New RomanS7U(X7S)2dxd0KS.SampleK`<6X9`(Courier NewKSa\  `&Times New RomanS0.Strong 8KS6TypewriterK`<6X9`(Courier NewKSa\  `&Times New RomanS42Variable: 8HTML MarkupB      2 0CommentB  -./01234 35;AGMSY_11.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.L:\JUDGES\Boudin\TEMPLATE\OPINIONS\ALDRICH.WPT<6X9`(Courier New\  `&Times New Roman%2A`Arial<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpi- - 7_ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  2      ThePMPAisconcernednotonlywithterminationofafranchise  agreement,butalsowithafranchisor'sfailuretorenewsuchan  agreementwhenitexpires.Althoughtheconstellationof \ agreements(realpropertyleases,fuelsupplyagreements,licenses 2 tousefranchisor'strademark)thatmakeupthefranchiseare X definiteinterm,the"[reasonableexpectationsofthepartiesto . amotorfuelfranchisearethattherelationshipwillbea   continuingone."Id.fXXXXThis,ofcourse,encouragesfranchiseesto   investintheirfranchisesandtobuildupgoodwillthatbenefits `  bothparties.#XXXfXS#ԶL 9Z+.Courier New Regular __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  3      "[N]osuchactionshallbemaintainedunlesscommencedwithin  1yearafterthelaterof(1)thedateofterminationofthe  franchiseornonrenewalofthefranchiserelationship;_or(2)the \ datethefranchisorfailstocomplywiththerequirementsof 2 section102or103."_Ԁ15U.S.C._2805(a)._ B__ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  4      Inthelightofourdispositionoftheconstructivenonrenewal  claimsasawhole,itisunnecessarytocomplicatethisanalysis  withthedefendants'furtherclaimthattwooftheleaserenewals \ arealsotimebarredonthesame_theory._ __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  6      Wenotethatthisissuewasdisposedofbelowinthedistrict  court'sdenialofamotiontodismiss.Thepartiesskirmishabout  whethersuchadenialmayevenbeappealedafterajurytrial. \ Whereadenialofamotionforsummaryjudgmentispredicatedona 2 genuinedisputeoverissuesofmaterialfact,suchadenialisnot X normallyreviewableinthiscircuitaftera"fulldresstrial." . Lama_v._ԀBorras,16F.3d473,476n.5(1stCir.1994).TheDealers   argue,withreason,thatthiswouldapplyafortioritoadenialof   a12(b)(6)motion.SeeBennett_v._ԀPippin,74F.3d578,585(5th `  Cir.1996)("Whentheplaintiffhasprevailedafterafulltrialon 6   themerits,adistrictcourt'sdenialofaRule12(b)(6)motion  \  becomesmoot.").Butherethequestionisoneoflawwhether  2  relationbackcanbeappliedoutsideofthestrictconfinesofRule   15_(c_).Wethinkitlikelythatthischangestheanalysis,but   becauseweultimatelyholdthatrelationbackwasappropriate,it d  makesnodifference:_even_Ԁassumingthattheissuewasproperly :  preserved,thestatuteoflimitationsargumentfails.Weexpress `  noviewastowhetherinthegeneralcaseadenialofa12(b)(6) 6 motionmaybeappealedafterajurytrial;wemoveontodiscuss    therelationbackissueonlybecausewethinkitimportantto  considerwhetherthedistrictcourtactedproperlyinacting  outsidetheletteroftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.In \ conductingthisanalysis,weapplydenovoreviewtothepurelegal 2 question.Finding,aswedo,thatasamatteroflawsuchrelation X _back_Ԁiswithinthepowerofthedistrictcourt,wethenreviewthe . decisiontograntrelationbackforabuseofdiscretion.The   findingoffactsnecessarytothatconclusionwereviewforclear   error. __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  7      Wenotealsothattherecordisrepletewithdelaysbythe  defendants,andtothatextenttheirequitableclaimtothe  benefitsofaspeedyprocessisattenuated. y__  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  8      TheDealerspresentedtestimonyonthisissueattrial.While  thattestimonywasofcoursenotavailabletothedistrictcourt  whenitdecidedthemotiontoamendinTsaniklidesandthemotion \ todismissinthiscase,itdoeshelptocorroboratethedistrict 2 court'sdetermination. __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  9      TheDealersprovidetwoalternatetheoriesonwhichtouphold  thedenialofthemotiontodismiss:_equitable_Ԁestoppeland  equitabletollingofthestatuteoflimitations.Becausethe \ districtcourtdeniedthemotiontodismissonthebasisof 2 relationback,wehavefounditmostconvenienttofollowthat X analysishere.Wenoteonlythatalloftheseapproachesaddress . thefundamentalissueofwhetherdefendantssufferundueprejudice    asaresultofdelayorlackofnotice. s__  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  5      TheDealersassert,astheyhavesincetheiroppositiontothe  motiontodismiss,thatthisresolutionofthemotiontoamendwas   theresultofacompromiseregardingdiscoveryvisvisthenew  parties.Atoralargument,thedefendantsdeniedeveragreeingto  suchasolution. __  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  10      SeeMaySomGulf,869F.2dat92122(notingthatthePMPA  doesnotmandate"apermanentstatusquo"andthattheactwasnot  meanttostymie"majornationalacquisitionandlargescale \ divestiture"(quotingRusso_v._ԀTexaco,Inc.,630F.Supp.682,683 2 (E.D.N.Y.1986)). m __  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  11      Forexample,subsection2802(b)(2)(E)requiresthata  terminationmadepursuanttoafranchisor'swithdrawalfrom"the  marketingofmotorfuelthroughretailoutletsintherelevant \ geographicmarketarea"be"notforthepurposeofconvertingthe 2 premises...tooperationbyemployeesoragentsofthe X franchisorforsuchfranchisor'sownaccount."Foranotherexample, . nonerenewalsarenormallyallowediftheyarebasedon   determinations"tomateriallyalter,addto,orreplacesuch   premises,"ordeterminationsthatthefranchise"islikelytobe `  uneconomicaldespiteanyreasonablechanges...whichmaybe 6   acceptabletothefranchisee."Butsubsection2802(b)(3)(D)(ii)  \  explicitlyprohibitsnonrenewalunderthosesamecircumstanceswhen  2  thatdeterminationis"madeforthepurposeofconvertingthe   leasedmarketingpremisestooperationbyemployeesoragentsof   thefranchisor."Thislanguageforbidsterminationornonrenewal d  underthesecircumstanceseveniftherightoffirstrefusalis :  givenorthebonafideofferismade.(Thisrestrictiondoesnot `  applytosalesofthepremises,perhapsbecausethedraftersofthe 6 legislationdidnotimaginethatthesaleoftheunderlying   premisescouldbeforthepurposeofconvertingthestationtothe  franchisor'scontrol.Butcf.Patel_v._ԀSunCo.,141F.3d447(3d h Cir.1998)(_when_Ԁfranchisorsellsunderlyingpropertywith > leasebackprovisiontooperateservicestation,PMPAimplicatedin d neitherthesaleofthepropertynortheterminationofthe : franchiseonexpirationofthefranchisor'slease)). __  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  12      NothinginthePMPAwouldpreventthedefendantsfrombuying  theDealersout.WhatthePMPAdoesforbidisfranchisorsusing  theirpowertodictateimpossiblefranchisetermsinordertoforce \ thefranchiseestowalkawayfromtheirinvestmentsortosellthem 2 atartificiallylowprices.ThatisexactlywhattheDealers X claimedwashappeninghere. __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  13      InProSalesthesuitwasfiledimmediatelyandtheplaintiff  obtainedpreliminaryreliefsothatitneveroperatedunderthenew  contract.ThisisdifferentfromDerschEnergies,wherethe \ plaintiffoperatedunderthenewcontract"forjustunderayear" 2 beforefilingsuit.314F.3dat865.TheDerschcourtnotedthe X distinction,butfounditirrelevant.Id.Wedonotaddressthe . questionwhetherapreliminaryinjunctionenablingthefranchisee   toavoidoperatingunderthenewagreementcombinedwithan   immediatesuit,asinProSales,wouldsatisfytherequirementsfor `  bringingsuitunderthePMPA.Suchacasewouldavoidseveralof 6   theproblemswehaveidentified,butwouldstillallowafranchisee  \  tochallengeanagreementasanonrenewalwhileretainingtheright  2  totakeadvantageofthatagreementshouldthechallengefail.We   holdonlythatunderthefactsbeforeustodaywecannotrecognize   aclaimforconstructivenonrenewal. s__  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  14      Inthisassertiontheyaresupportedbyamici,whosebriefis  gratefullyacknowledged. Q__ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  15      Damagesforthestatecontractclaimduplicatethosefor  constructiveterminationunderthePMPA.Wediscussthesedamages  onlyonce,underthePMPA.Also,becausewevacatethejury's \ verdictontheconstructivenonrenewalclaim,wedonotconsider 2 thedamagesawardedunderthatclaim.Forthesamereason,wedo X notaddressthedefendants'argumentonappealthattheawardsfor . constructiveterminationandconstructivenonrenewalwere   duplicative. __ XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  16      Eventhisnormallysimplecalculationiscomplicatedsomewhat  inthesecircumstances.HigherrentsmayhaveforcedtheDealers  tomaintainhighergasolineprices,whichinturnmighthave \ loweredsalesvolume.TheSubsidyreducedrentsbasedongasoline 2 volume,soachangeinthatvolumewouldrendermoreuncertaineven X thedamagesonthiselement.(AtleastoneoftheDealers . testifiedthathewouldsometimeslowerhisgasolinepricesbecause   hecouldrecoupthelostmarginbasedonincreasedvolumeandthe   loweredrentprovidedbytheSubsidybasedonthatvolume.)   0#fufXd#  (;30$ !XXXX   ##fufXd# _  XXXX  XXXX=<$XXdd=  1      ThePetroleumMarketingPracticesAct,15U.S.C.28012806  (the"PMPA"),defines"franchise"asthecollectionofagreements  relatingtothreeelements:theleaseofthepremises,thelicense \ tousethefranchisor'strademark,andtheagreementgoverningthe 2 supplyofbrandedmotorfuel.Id.2801(1).Thesethreeelements X  aresometimesreferredtoasthe"statutoryelementsofthe  franchise."   franchisor PMPAnonrenewalU.S.CnonrenewalsfranchisorsMARCOUXKAROLAKMALPRASHADAVRAMIDISPISARCZYKMOTIVAZobelCol;nSansonStaibShipman LLPFarraherScerraTraurigKassofHulse VRP STIPgallonage DTWComplTsaniklidesMel)ndez N]oreviewableBorrasNeversonBissonnette W]e cmtCambridgeport SavBoersnerAntonellisSnellCarvelU]nderMortgviolative A]llRussoE.D.N.Y.nonerenewalsDerschLippo Akky T]heU.C.C. I]nAllapattahServsMathisconcededlyCamarSherwin KolbGoldringConsoloFigueroa !XXXX  _TRX3'X3' Letter3'Letter366 File Folder -3'LetterT ? * !      XnXXX ?nX Xnw UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals# XnX ?n#   +X XnFortheFirstCircuit# XnX +# #XXX Xn#  @*A') ` dE<` A      `     h   No.052771 u  @LLFRANCISMARCOUX,ETAL., ! q    `     h      p   @XX%Plaintiffs,    @*@ MAC'S_SHELLSERVICE_,INC.;_CYNTHIAKAROL;_Ԁ_JOHNA.SULLIVAN;_Ԉ O  @_AKMAL,INC.;_Ԁ_SIDPRASHAD;_Ԁ_RAMCORPORATION,INC.;_Ԉ %u  @_J&MAVRAMIDIS,INC.;_ԀTHREE_K'S_,INC.;STEPHENPISARCZYK, K  @ PlaintiffsAppellees,  @tt)v. S @SHELLOILPRODUCTSCOMPANYLLC;MOTIVAENTERPRISESLLC; O @SHELLOILCOMPANY,INC. % @DefendantsAppellants.     `     h      p     A') ` dE<,` A -} @ APPEALFROMTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT b @0 0 FORTHEDISTRICTOFMASSACHUSETTS  @ [Hon.RyaW.Zobel,U.S.DistrictJudge] j  A') ` dE<!` A !f" @'Before !K$   @@((Torruella,Howard,CircuitJudges, #& andDelgadoCol;n,   #  *      ׀DistrictJudge. }$' A') ` dE<&` A &O"*     PaulD.Sanson,withwhomVaughanFinn,KarenT.Staib,and '4#, Shipman&GoodwinLLPwereonbrief,forappellants. ( $-   JohnF.Farraher,Jr.,withwhomGaryR.Greenberg,LouisJ. )$. Scerra,Jr.,andGreenbergTraurig,LLPwereonbrief,for f*%/ appellees. <+&0? w  w8ffXXdd8 w    RichardC.Godfrey,P.C.,withwhomAndrewA.Kassof,Benjamin  W.Hulse,andKirkland&EllisLLPwereonbrief,forBPProducts  NorthAmericaInc.,amicuscuriae. \ *'ddd Xdd Xdd X(#(#,( dd ,( dd ,( dd +  ..  SIB  `P@39555`P@SApril18,2008  h  RHC > " `P@39555 `P@ R(B    (__   D    8c<$cXXdfXXd8d*,X` XX*",US ,  (:!&),*!vOYy|OY# ` HOWARD,CircuitJudge .DefendantsappellantsShellOil  Company,ShellOilProductsCompany(collectively,"Shell"),and x MotivaEnterprisesappealjuryverdictsagainstthemonseveral $t claimsrelatingtotheirtreatmentofplaintiffsappellees(the   "Dealers"),franchiseesandoperatorsofShellbrandedservice |  stations.ShellandMotiva(together,"thedefendants")challenge ( x  thelegalbasisforverdictsagainstthemunderafederalstatute $  designedtoprotectfranchisees,aswellastheverdictsunder   Massachusettsstatelaw.Additionally,theyappealthejury's ,|  damagesdeterminationsaswithoutsufficientbasisintheevidence. ( Weaffirminpartandreverseinpart.    Facts  0  ` Werecitethefactsinthelightmostfavorabletothe H jury'sverdict.SeeRodriguezTorresv.CaribbeanFormsMfr.,  Inc.,399F.3d52,56(1stCir.2005). P  ` Shellmaintainedanetworkoffranchiseesin L Massachusetts.Plaintiffswereeightofthesefranchisees.In   1998,Shell,Texaco,andStarEnterprisesformeddefendantMotiva, T!" andShelltransferredthefranchiserelationshipstothatentity, #P$ assigningitsrightsanddutiesundertherelevantcontractsto $& Motiva.{  #  1      ׀Shortlythereafter,MotivareplacedtheVariableRent X&!( y y8ffXXdcXXd8 y  Program("VRP")withtheSpecialTemporaryIncentiveProgram  ("_STIP_").Eachoftheseprograms(collectively,the"Subsidy") \ providedforreductionofthecontractrentthroughsalesof X gasoline;oncethespecifiedthresholdgallonagewassoldina   givenmonth,thecontractrentforthenextmonthwouldbe `  discountedbyacertainamountforeverygallonsoldinexcessof  \  thatthreshold.Thethresholdamountandthediscountamount   changedfromtimetotime.TheSubsidyhadbeenineffectsince d  1982;itwasrenewedinanannualnoticetofranchisees,although `  itstermsexplicitlyprovidedforcancellationwiththirtydays'   notice.VariousrepresentationsweremadetotheDealerstothe h effectthattheSubsidyorsomethinglikeitwouldalwaysexist, d thecontractrentwastobedisregarded,andthecancellation  provisionwasonlyintendedtobeinvokedinasituationlikeawar l oranoilembargo.Nevertheless,havinggiventherequirednotice, h Motivaendedthe_STIP_ԀonJanuary1,2000,terminatingtheSubsidy.  WithouttheSubsidy,theDealerspaidmuchmorerent. p   ` Motivaalsoofferednewleasesastheoldleasesexpired. !l" Thenewleasescalculatedrentdifferentlythantheoldleases, "$ resultinginafurtherincreaseinrent. t$&  ` Inaccordancewiththeirfuelsupplycontracts,the  &p!( Dealerswerechargedawholesalepriceforgasolineknownasthe '#* DealerTankWagonprice(the"DTWprice").Thefuelsupply  contractswereopenpricetermcontracts:_the_Ԁcontractswere \ silentastoprice,andonepartysetthepriceunilaterally.This X pricewassetbythedefendants,whocalculateditbyassessingthe   streetpricesofothercompetinggasolinestationsinthearea,and `  reducingthosepricesbythetaxesleviedongasolineandan  \  EstimatedIndustryMargintoapproximatethewholesalepriceofthe   defendants'competitors. d     @` ProceedingsBelow  `  # ` Severalfranchisees,alongwithanunincorporated ( associationcalledtheShellDealersDefenseGroup(the"Defense  Group"),filedforinjunctiveanddeclaratoryreliefaswellas 0 damagesonJune6,2000.Compl.,Tsaniklides_v._ԀShellOilProducts , Co.,00CV11295.WhentheDefenseGroupwasfoundtolack  standing,amotionwasmadetoadditsmembersasindividual 4 plaintiffs.Indenyingthatmotionthedistrictcourtindicatedin 0 amarginorder,"[Plaintiffsmayfileanewcasewhichmaybe   deemedtoberelated."Theindividualfranchiseesfiledanewsuit 8!" onJuly27,2001,andtheoriginalsuitwasvoluntarilydismissed "4$ onAugust10.Thenewsuitwasassignedtothesamedistrict $& judge.ThecasesofNewHampshireandRhodeIslandplaintiffsin <&!( thenewactionweretransferredtothosedistricts.Fromthe '8#* sixtyfourMassachusettsplaintiffsinthenewsuit,tenplaintiffs )$, werechosentogoforward.Oneofthosesettledontheeveof @+&. trialandanotherlostatsummaryjudgment.Oneplaintiffofthe  remainingeight,Mac'sShellService,Inc.,operatedtwostations \ thatweresometimestreatedasseparateplaintiffs.Therefore, X eightplaintiffsrepresentingninestationsproceededtotrial.    ` TheDealerssuedunderavarietyoftheories.First, `  theycontendedthattheSubsidyhadbeenincorporatedintothe  \  propertyleases,althoughthewrittenleasespurportedtobe   integratedcontractsunderMassachusettslaw.Theyclaimedthe d  amendedcontractswerethenbreachedwhenMotivaeliminatedthe `  Subsidy.UndertheDealers'theory,thisbreachgaverisetotwo   distinctclaims:astatecauseofactionforbreachofcontract h andaclaimunderthePMPAthatShellhadimproperlyterminatedthe d franchiseswhenShellassignedthefranchiseagreementstoMotiva  andMotivaterminatedtheSubsidy.Becausenoactualtermination l occurred,theDealersproceededunderatheoryof"constructive h termination."Similarly,theyclaimedMotivahad"constructively  _nonrenewed_"thefranchiserelationshipsinviolationofthePMPA p  (eventhoughthefranchiseswereinfactrenewed)becausethenew !l" contractschangedtherentcalculationmethodandincreasedthe "$ rent,alongwithotherobjectionablechanges.Finally,theDealers t$& arguedthatMotivafailedtosetpricesforgasolineingoodfaith,  &p!( asrequiredforopenpricetermcontractsunderMassachusettslaw. '#*  ` Thedefendantsunsuccessfullymovedfordismissalonall x)$, constructiveterminationclaimsandtheconstructivenonrenewal $+t&. claimsoftwoplaintiffsonthegroundthattheyweretimebarred.  Theyalsomovedforajudgmentasamatteroflawonallclaims. \ Followingajuryverdictagainstthemonallclaims,theyproperly X renewedthismotion.Theymovedaswellforanewtrialandtoset   asidethejury'sdamagesawards.Thedefendantsnowappealthe `  denialofallofthesemotions.  \     ThePMPA    p3 ` CongressenactedTitleIofthePMPAto"remedythe   disparityinbargainingpowerbetweenfranchisorsandfranchisees." ,|  S.Rep.No.95-731,95thCong.,2dSess.18;seealsoFourCorners ( Serv.Stationv.MobilOilCorp.,51F.3d306,310(1stCir.1995).  Becausefranchiseesclaimedthatthisunequalpowerwasoften 0 wieldedthrougharbitraryordiscriminatoryterminationor , nonrenewal,orthreatsofterminationornonrenewal,thePMPAaimed  toremovethispotentweaponfromthefranchisors'arsenal.S. 4 Rep.No.95-731,at17("Numerousallegationshavebeenmadebefore 0 Congressionalcommitteesinvestigatingpetroleummarketingproblems   thatterminationsandnonrenewals,orthreatsofterminationor 8!" nonrenewal,havebeenusedbyfranchisorstocompelfranchiseesto "4$ complywithmarketingpoliciesofthefranchisor.");id.at18 $& ("[_T]ermination_Ԁoffranchiseagreementsduringthetermasaremedy <&!( forcontractviolationshasbeenrepeatedlyutilized.").The"PMPA '8#*  attemptstoleveltheplayingfieldbyrestrictingthegroundsupon )$, whichafranchisorcanassertaunilateralterminationor  nonrenewalofafranchise."Id.e  #  2       \   ` ThePMPAmakesadistinctionbetweena"franchise"and X the"franchiserelationship."Thefranchiseisasetofdefinite   agreementsfor1)leaseofthepremises,2)therighttopurchase `  gasolineforresale,and3)therighttousethefranchisor's  \  trademark.15U.S.C.2801(1)."Franchiserelationship"refers   totherespectiveobligationsofthefranchisorandfranchisee d  createdbyafranchise.Id.2801(2).Thelegislativehistoryof `  thePMPAmakesclearthat"franchise"and"franchiserelationship"   weredistinguishedtodrivehomethefactthatthefranchise h relationshipsurvivestheexpirationoftheagreementsunderlying d thefranchise._SeeS.Rep.No.95-731,95thCong.,2dSess.30_  ("Theterm'franchiserelationship'isutilizedtoavoidany l contentionthatbecausethe'franchise'doesnotexistthereis h nothingtorenew.").ThestructureandhistoryofthePMPA   emphasizeCongress'sviewthatthefranchiseeshaveareasonable p  _expectation_Ԁthatthefranchiseswouldberenewedandthatthe  relationshipswouldcontinue. \   ` Accordingly,thePMPAforbidsterminationofafranchise X ornonrenewalofafranchiserelationshipexceptunderenumerated   circumstancesandwithpropernotice.See15_U.S.C_Ԁ2802(a) `  (nonrenewalsandterminationsgenerallyprohibited);id.  \  2802(b)(2)(3)(groundsforterminationandnonrenewal);id.   2804(noticerequirements).ThePMPAprovidesacauseofactionto d  franchiseeswhosufferterminationornonrenewalinviolationof `  therelevantsections.Id.2805(a).Aslongastheactionis   broughtwithinoneyearoftheterminationornonrenewalcomplained h of,id.2805(a)(1),thefranchiseemayseekpreliminary d injunctiverelief,id.2805(b)(2),damages,id.2805(d),and  "suchequitablereliefasthecourtdeterminesisnecessary,"id. l 2805(b)(1).ThePMPAmandatesthatpreliminaryrelief"shall"be h grantediftheplaintiffshows1)terminationornonrenewaland2)  "sufficientlyseriousquestionsgoingtothemerits"thatare"a p  fairgroundforlitigation,"andthecourtdetermines3)thatthe !l" balanceofhardshipstipsinfavorofgrantingtheinjunction.Id. "$ 2805(b)(2).Inallprivatecivilactionsforterminationor t$& nonrenewal,itisthefranchisee'sburdentoshowterminationor  &p!( lackofrenewal.Id.2805_(c_). '#*     @+&. StandardofReview   @G ` Wereviewthedenialofjudgmentasamatteroflawde x novoastoissuesoflaw.SeeRodriguezTorres,399F.3dat57. $t Astomattersoffact,weviewtheevidenceinthelightmost   favorabletotheverdict,askingonlywhetherarationaljurycould |  onthebasisofthatevidencefindasthejuryhas.Seeid.We ( x  reviewadenialofamotionforanewtrialfor"amanifestabuse $  ofdiscretion."UnitedStatesv.George,448F.3d96,101(1st   Cir.2006).We"willorderanewtrialonlyiftheverdictis ,|  againstthedemonstrableweightofthecredibleevidenceorresults ( inablatantmiscarriageofjustice."Whitfieldv.Melndez  Rivera,431F.3d1,9(1stCir.2005)(internalquotationomitted). 0 Wewillupholdajuryawardifitisaresultof"anyrational , appraisalorestimateofthedamagesthatcouldbebasedonthe  evidencebeforethejury."DataGen.Corp.v._Grunman_Ԁ_Sys_.Support 4 Corp.,36F.3d1147,1172(1stCir.1994)(quotingAnthonyv. 0 _G.M.D._ԀAirlineServs.,17F.3d490,493(1stCir.1994)).Because   itiscomplexandrequiressomeproceduralbackground,wediscuss 8!" theapplicablestandardofreviewforthestatuteoflimitations "4$ claimwithinthediscussionofthatissue. $& @* @+&. Ї@ StatuteofLimitations    ` ThePMPAcontainsaoneyearstatuteoflimitations._g  #  3      _Ԁ x Thedistrictcourtfound,andthedefendantsheredonotcontest, $t thatthecauseofactionforconstructiveterminationaroseon   January1,2000,whenMotivaterminatedtheSubsidy.The |  defendantsclaimthatalloftheconstructiveterminationclaims ( x  aretimebarredbecausethisactionwasnotfileduntilalmost $  nineteenmonthslater,onJuly27,2001._h  #  4      _ԀTheDealerspointout   thatindismissingtheirmotiontobeaddedasplaintiffstothe ,|  oldaction,thedistrictcourtgavethemleavetofileanewaction ( "whichmaybedeemedtoberelated"totheoriginalcomplaint,and  thatthefirstactionwasnotdismisseduntilafterthesecondwas 0 filed. ,  ` Thedefendantsfiledamotiontodismissforfailureto  stateaclaimonwhichreliefmightbegranted,citingthelapseof 4 timeandthePMPA'sstatuteoflimitations.Thismotionwas 0 denied.n   #  5          ` Ourreviewoftherecordindicatesthatthedistrict  courtdeniedthemotiontoaddtheindividualplaintiffsonly \ becauseitgrantedtheplaintiffsarighttofileanewactionthat X relatedback.Wefurtherconcludethathadthedistrictcourt   allowedthemotiontoamend,theamendedpleadingwouldhave `  relatedbackunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure15.Inthe  \  lightofthis,twopowerfulreasonsleadustoupholdthedistrict   court'sresolutionofthisissue:first,allthepurposesofRule d  15_(c_)aresatisfied,ifnotitsletter;andsecond,thedistrict `  courtwasinabetterpositionwhenitplacedthecaseinthis   posturethanwearenowtoassesswhethertheinterestsofjustice h areservedbypermittingthisrelationback._i  #  6      _ d  ` FederalRuleofCivilProcedure15_(c_)providesthat_an  amendedpleading_Ԁmaybedeemedto"relateback"forstatuteof \ limitationspurposestothedateofthepleadingifcertain X conditionsaremet.ThedefendantsrightlypointoutthatRule15   concernsamendedpleadings,notnewpleadingsinseparateactions. `  "Rule15_(c_)simplydoesnotapplywhere,ashere,theparty  \  bringingsuitdidnotseekto'amend'or'supplement'hisoriginal   pleading,but,rather,optedtofileanentirelynew[action]ata d  subsequentdate."Neverson_v._ԀBissonnette,261F.3d120,126(1st `  Cir.2001)(_noting_Ԁthatadismissalwithoutprejudiceleavesthe   plaintiff"inthesamesituationasif[the]firstsuithadnever h beenfiled"forpurposesofRule15_(c_)).Wenotethatthiscase d differsfromNeversoninthatherethedismissaloftheprevious  actiondidnotoccuruntilafterthenewpleadingwasfiled,andwe l notefurtherthatthedistrictcourtexpresslysuggestedanew h actionbefiledattheverymomentitdeniedleavetoamendthe  complaintinthefirstaction. p   ` AcknowledgingthattheletterofRule15isnotmethere, !l" weconcludethattherulenonethelessdoesprovidesomeguidance. "$ Rule15_(c_)is"intimatelyconnectedwiththepolicyofthestatute  oflimitations."Fed.R.Civ.P.15_(c_), advisorycommitteenote. \ Thepurposeofstatutesoflimitationsistoavoidthedifficulties X inherentinlitigatingmatterslongpast,andtoprovidereposeto   potentialdefendantsregardingsuchmatters.SeeNelsonv.County `  ofAllegheny,60F.3d1010,1014(3dCir.1995)("Statutesof  \  limitationsensurethatdefendantsareprotectedagainstthe   prejudiceofhavingtodefendagainststaleclaims,aswellasthe d  notionthat,atsomepoint,claimsshouldbelaidtorestsothat `  securityandstabilitycanberestoredtohumanaffairs.")   (internalquotationomitted).Thedefendantsatnotimecould h haveexpectedorenjoyedreposeregardingthesematters.The d denialofthemotiontoaddthespecificDealerstotheoriginal  litigationwasaccompaniedinthesamebreathbynoticethatanew l complaintmightbefiledunderthesamefacts.Thisoccurredina h timelyfashion.Andthefirstlitigationwasnotdismisseduntil  afterthesecondonewasfiled.Noevidenceofsandbaggingwas p  broughtforward,nordoweinferanyprejudicetothedefendantson !l" thisrecord.j  #  7       "$  ` Here,theDealershadsoughttovindicatetheirrightsas t$& theDefenseGroup,butlackedstandinginthatguise.Indenying  &p!( amotiontoaddtheplaintiffstotheoriginallitigation,the '#* districtcourtindicateditwouldallowanewfilingtorelateback  tothedateoftheoldone.Itseemsclearthatthedistrictcourt \ couldinsteadhaveallowedthepleadingstobeamendedtonamethe X plaintiffsindividually.Whilewecannotsaywithcertaintywhy   onecourseofactionwastobepreferredoveranother,weare `  confidentthatthedistrictcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretion.  \   ` Rule15_(c_)doesnotspecificallycontemplatethe   substitutionofplaintiffs.SeeFed.R.Civ.P.15_(c_),advisory d  committeenote("Therelationbackofamendmentschanging `  plaintiffsisnotexpresslytreatedinrevisedRule15_(c_),since   theproblemisgenerallyeasier.").Butthisisnotabarto h relationbackhereeither;assumingthatthegeneralprinciplesof d Rule15aretogovernthisadmittedlyunusualsituation,wefind  thatsubstitutingplaintiffsherewreaksnoinjustice. l J , ,K+ ` hp x ,X` XK  J^m  [W]ehavelaiddownthreeseparaterequirementsapplicableto h plaintiffswhoseeksuccorunderRule15(c)(3):Theamended > complaintmustariseoutoftheconduct,transaction,or  occurrencesetforthorattemptedtobesetforthinthe  originalpleading;theremustbeasufficientidentityof p  interestbetweenthenewplaintiff,theoldplaintiff,and F ! theirrespectiveclaimssothatthedefendantscanbesaidto !l" havebeengivenfairnoticeofthelatecomer'sclaimagainst !B# them;andundueprejudicemustbeabsent.J^mm݌ "$ Ќ , ,-,X` XX-  mYoungv._Lepone_,305F.3d1,14(1stCir.2002)(quotingAllied t$& _Int'l_v.IntelLongshoremen's_Ass'n_,814F.2d32,3536(1stCir.  &p!(  1987)).Accepting,asthedistrictcourtdid,thattheDealers '#* weremembersoftheDefenseGroup,k  #  8      _Ԁthesefactorsaremethere.   Thedistrictcourt'sfactualconclusiondoesnotrepresentanabuse \ ofdiscretion,andsoweadoptit. X  ` Theoriginalcomplaintstatesthesamecausesofaction,   arisingfromthesameevents,asthenewcomplaint.TheDealers `  havealwaysclaimedthattheywereallmembersoftheDefense  \  Group.Thatorganizationwasestablishedonlytoassertits   members'rightsandprotecttheirinterests,andsowefind d  sufficientidentityofinteresttoputthedefendantsonnoticeof `  theclaimsagainstthem.Andthereisnoundueprejudicewherethe   Dealersaresimplyassertingthemselvesaclaimtheyhadmade h throughaproxywellwithinthestatuteoflimitations.Hadthe d motiontoamendbeengranted,andtheindividualplaintiffsnamed,  relationbackwouldhavebeenwithinthedistrictcourt's l discretion.Thedistrictcourt,then,properlyallowedthe h relationbackofthenewcasetothepreviousone,andtherefore  didnoterrwhenitdeniedthemotiontodismiss._m  #  9      _ p    StateContractClaim    y ` Thedefendantsappealthejury'sdeterminationthatthe x leaseswereorallyamendedtoincludetheSubsidy,andtherefore $t whentheSubsidywasended,theleaseswerebreached.First,the   defendantscontendthattheleaseswerecompletelyintegrated, |  meaningoralrepresentationsbeforeorduringtheexecutionofthe ( x  contractmustbeexcludedbytheparolevidencerule.Second,they $  claimthateveniftheleaseswerenotintegrated,thejuryhad   insufficientevidencetoconcludethattheleaseswereamendedto ,|  includeapromisetocontinuetheSubsidy. (  ` Thedefendantsargueasaninitialmatterthattheleases  werecompletelyintegratedagreements.Theleasesindisputably 0 representedthattheywereintegratedagreementsandthatany , subsequentmodificationhadtobeinwriting.Thedefendantsclaim  theintegrationclauseoperatedtoinsulatetheleasesfromoral 4 representationsmadepriortoorcontemporaneouswithexecution. 0 Butadocumentisnotintegratedmerelybecauseitsaysso.See   Restatement(Second)ofContracts209cmt._b_Ԁ(1981)("Written 8!" contracts,signedbybothparties,mayincludeanexplicit "4$ declarationthattherearenootheragreementsbetweentheparties, $& butsuchadeclarationmaynotbeconclusive."). <&!(  ` InMassachusetts,"thequestionofintegrationisoneof '8#* factreservedforthetrialjudge,whoseresolutionofthatissue )$, _will_Ԁnotbereversedunlessclearlyerroneous."CambridgeportSav.  Bank_v._ԀBoersner,413Mass.432,436n.7(1992);Antonellis_v._ \ NorthgateConstr.Corp.,362Mass.847,85051(1973)(evenabsent X specificevaluationofevidencebytrialjudge,findingofnon   integrationupheldasnotclearlyerroneous);Alexander_v._ԀSnell, `  424N.E.2d262,264(Mass.App.Ct.1981);accordBrennan_v._ԀCarvel  \  Corp.,929F.2d801,807(1stCir.1991)("[U]nderMassachusetts   law,thedeterminationofwhetheracontractiscompletelyor d  partiallyintegrated,orwhetherasecondcontractiscollateralto `  anintegratedagreement,isaquestionoffacttobedecidedinthe   firstinstancebythetrialjudge."). h  ` Here,thedistrictcourtdidnotmakeaspecificfinding d aboutintegration,butthechargetothejuryonamendmentscompels  theinferencethattheagreementswerenotintegrated.Thejury l wasinstructedtoconsiderwhatthepartiessaidanddidconcerning h thelease;becausetheinstructiondidnotexcludeactionspriorto  orcontemporaneouswiththeexecutionofthewrittenlease,the p  districtcourtmusthaveconcludedthattheleasewasnotan !l" integratedagreement. "$  ` Afterreviewoftherecord,wecannotsaythatthis t$& determinationwasclearerror.TheSubsidywasexplainedtoeach  &p!( plaintiffindocumentsaccompanyingthelease,andmanyplaintiffs '#* testifiedtheyregardedtheSubsidyasessentialtotheir x)$, businesses.Therewasevidencethatthedefendantssaidthatthe $+t&. vOY v v  Subsidywasintendedtobepermanent,thatthe30daynotice  provisionwasonlyinplaceforcasesofwarorembargo,andthat \ theDealerscouldrelyonthecontinuationoftheSubsidyor X somethinglikeit.Thedistrictcourtthereforehadampleevidence   beforeittodeterminethattheleasewasnotanintegrated `  agreement.  \   ` Becausetheleaseswerenotintegrated,theycouldbe   variedbymutualagreement."Mutualagreementonmodificationof d  therequirementofawritingmay...beinferredfromtheconduct `  ofthepartiesandfromtheattendantcircumstances."FirstPa.   Mortg.Trustv.DorchesterSav.Bank,395Mass.614,625(1985) h (internalquotationomitted).Thedefendantsassertthatthe d evidencewasinsufficienttoallowthejurytodecide,asitdid,  thatapromisetocontinuetheSubsidywasincorporatedintothe l leases.Thedistrictcourtinstructedthejury:"[_Y]ou_Ԁmay h considerwhateachonesaid,onetotheother,howthey_behave[d_],  whateachdid,whateachknewandwhatthecircumstanceswere.. p  .thenyoumayinfer...fromtheirstatementsandtheirconduct !l" ...whetherbothShellandeachplaintiffagreedtoamendthe "$ leases."Evidenceadducedattrialincludednotonly t$& representationsmadedirectlytotheDealersthattheSubsidyor  &p!( somethinglikeitwouldalwaysbeavailable,butalsointernal '#* ShelldocumentationindicatingthattheSubsidywasintendedtobe x)$, permanent,thatfranchiseesshouldplantheirbusinessesaroundthe $+t&. _continued_ԀavailabilityoftheSubsidy,andthatfranchiseeswould  understandthelossoftheSubsidytobeabreachofapromiseby \ Shell.Arationaljuryviewingthisevidencemightcometothe X conclusionthattheleaseswereamendedtoincludetheSubsidy.      @` ConstructiveTermination  `     ` TheDealersclaimedthatwhenMotivabreachedtheir ( x  leasesbyeliminatingtheSubsidy,thatbreachperfecteda $  constructiveterminationbyShell.ThePMPAallowsassignmentof   dutiesinfranchiseagreementsinaccordancewithstatelaw.See ,|  15U.S.C.2806(b).Butanassignmentthatisviolativeofstate ( law,oronethatresultsinabreachofoneofthestatutory  componentsofafranchise,givesrisetoaclaimunderthePMPA 0 againsttheoriginalfranchisor/assignor.Inthewordsofthe , FourthCircuit,"Afranchisorcannotcircumventtheprotectionsthe  [PMPA]affordsafranchiseebythesimpleexpedientofassigning 4 thefranchisor'sobligationtoanassigneewhoincreasesthe 0 franchisee's_burden...._"Barnes_v._ԀGulfOilCorp.,795F.2d   358,362(4thCir.1986)(_reversing_Ԁsummaryjudgmentandholding 8!" thatwhereassigneebreachesfranchiseagreement,actionwilllie "4$ againstfranchisor/assignor).InChestnutHillGulf_v._ԀCumberland $& Farms,Inc.,940F.2d744(1stCir.1991),weadoptedthetestfor <&!( constructiveterminationarticulatedbytheSixthCircuit. '8#* Tosustainaclaim,underthePMPA,thatafranchisor )$, assignedandtherebyconstructivelyterminateda j*%- franchiseagreement,thefranchiseemustproveeither: @+&. (1)thatbymakingtheassignment,thefranchisor ,f'/ _breached_Ԁoneofthethreestatutorycomponentsofthe  franchiseagreement,(thecontracttousetherefiner's  trademark,thecontractforthesupplyofmotorfuel,or \ theleaseofthepremises),andthus,violatedthePMPA; 2 _or_Ԁ(2)thatthefranchisormadetheassignmentin X violationofstatelawandthus,thePMPAwasinvoked. . ͙Id.at75051(quotingMaySomGulf,Inc._v._ԀChevronU.S.A.,Inc.,   869F.2d917,922(6thCir.1989)). 6    ` WhatsetBarnesapartfrombothChestnutHillGulfand  2  MaySomGulfwasthatinBarnestheassignmentofthecontracthad   resultedingasolinepricesabovethepricespecifiedinthe :  contract;inotherwords,Barnesconcernedabreachofoneofthe 6 statutoryelementsofthefranchise,theagreementforthesupply  ofbrandedmotorfuel.TheFourthCircuitvacatedsummaryjudgment > forthedefendant,holdingthatthebreachofthecontractforthe : supplyofgasolinecreatedaconstructiveterminationofthe  franchise.InChestnutHillGulfweheldthePMPAwasnot B implicatedbecausetherewasnoevidencethatanyofthestatutory > componentsofafranchisehadbeenbreached."[A]llthirteen  dealerscontinuedtooccupythesameservicestationsunderthe F ! sameleases;theycontinuedtopurchaseGulfbrandgasolineunder !B# thesamesupplyagreements;_andthey_Ԁcontinuedtodobusinessunder #% thesameGulftrademark."ChestnutHillGulf,940F.2dat752.In J% ' MaySomGulf,thedefendantswereentitledtosummaryjudgment &F") becausetheplaintiffshadmerelycomplainedofpotentialbreaches (#+ tothefranchiseagreement.Inthecasebeforeus,theDealers N*%- haveproventothejury'ssatisfactionthatMotivabreachedthe +J'/ _lease_Ԁcomponentofthefranchiseagreements.Thatbreachallowed  thejurytofindthatShellconstructivelyterminatedtheDealers' \ franchiseswhenitassignedthefranchisestoMotiva. X  ` Thedefendantsarguethatinordertoshowaconstructive   termination,thebreachmustbecontemporaneouswiththeassignment `  andthebreachmustamounttoatotaldeprivationofoneofthe  \  threeelementsofthefranchise.Bothcontentionsmisunderstand   constructivetermination. d   ` First,weagreewiththeFourthCircuitthatanaction `  forconstructiveterminationliesagainsttheassignorofa   franchisewhentheassigneebreachesthefranchise.Barnes,795 h F.2dat362.Thispreventstheassignor/franchisorfromshielding d itselfagainstliabilitythroughtheuseofanothercorporation.  "The[PMPA]doesnotcontemplatethatafranchiseeshouldbe l relegatedtoseekingdamagesfromanassigneethatmightnothave h theresourcestosatisfyajudgment."Id.Adelaybetweenthe  assignmentandthebreachchangesnothing.Thereasonsforthis p  areevenstrongerwheretheassigneeisasubsidiaryofthe !l" franchisor,orajointventureinwhichthefranchisorisaparty. "$  ` Second,thebreachofthestatutoryelementofthe t$& franchisedoesnothavetobeatotalbreach.InBarnesthe  &p!( plaintiffwas"forcedtoraiseherprices,andhersalesandnet '#* income...declined."Id.at361.Shedidnotsufferacomplete x)$, lossofthebenefitsofthemotorfuelsupplycontract.The $+t&. _defendants'_Ԁattemptedanalogytoconstructiveterminationin  employmentlaworconstructiveevictioninlandlordtenantlawis \ misleading.Thosedoctrinesrequireanactualseveranceofthe X relationship:Theemployeemustleavetheworkplace;thetenant   mustmoveout.Buthere,astheDealerstestified,sunkcosts, `  optimism,andthehabitofyearsmightleadfranchiseestotryto  \  makethenewarrangementswork,evenwhenthetermshavechangedso   materiallyastomakesuccessimpossible.Indeed,someplaintiffs d  testifiedtheyhadgoneintopersonaldebt,driventhemselvesinto `  bankruptcy,orenlistedtheaidoffamilymembersworkingwithout   paytomakeendsmeet.Torequireanactualabandonmentofyears h ofworkandinvestmentbeforewerecognizearightofactionunder d thePMPAwouldbeunreasonable.The"congressionalplanwouldbe  frustratedbyrequiringafranchiseetogooutofbusinessbefore l invokingtheprotectionsofthePMPA."ProSales,Inc._v._ԀTexaco, h U.S.A.,792F.2d1394,1399(9thCir.1986).   ` Wedonot_here_Ԁsaythatanymaterialbreachofthelease p  wouldnecessarilybesufficienttosustaintheconstructive !l" terminationclaim.Inthiscase,thedistrictcourtinstructedthe "$ jurythatitcouldfindconstructiveterminationonlyifthebreach t$& ofthelease"wassuchamaterialchangethatiteffectivelyended  &p!( thelease,eventhoughtheplaintiffscontinuedtooperatethe '#* business....It'snotsimplywastheleasebreached,butdid x)$, thatbreachamountto...effectivelytheendofthefranchise $+t&. _relationship_."Inthisinstructionthedistrictcourtsetan  appropriatethreshold. \  ` Weagreewiththedistrictcourtthatanassignormaybe X liableforevenasubsequentbreachofthefranchiseagreementby   anassignee,andthatabreachofthefranchiseagreementneednot `  resultincompletedeprivationofastatutoryelementofthe  \  franchisetosupportaconstructivetermination.    ` Indeed,thiscasepresentsastrongargumentforthe d  doctrineofconstructivetermination.AttrialtheDealersargued `  thatShellassignedthefranchiseagreementstoMotiva,even   createdMotiva,inordertosqueezethemoutoftheirfranchises. h Theypresentedevidencethatthiswasthereasonforthechangein d therentformulation,theeliminationoftheSubsidy,andthe  dramaticincreaseinrentstheypaid.Ifthejuryacceptedthisas l thereason,thecasefallswithinthescopeofthePMPA,whichis h designednottofreezethefranchiseagreementsexactlywherethey  were,o  #  10      ׀buttopreventfranchisorsfromimproperlyterminating p  franchisesandtherebytoensurethatfranchiseesbenefitfrom !l" successfulinvestmentintheirfranchises. "$  ` Thissameprotectionforfranchiseeexpectations t$& underliesthePMPA'srequirementthatafranchisormakeabonafide  &p!( offer,orgrantarightoffirstrefusal,tothefranchiseewhen  thefranchisorcontemplateswithdrawingfromtherelevantmarket, \ sellingtheunderlyingrealproperty,ordedicatingthepropertyto X anotheruse.15U.S.C.2802(b)(2)(E)&(b)(3)(D).Thisisalso   whypartsofthePMPAplacemorerestrictionsonfranchisorswhen `  thepurposeofterminationornonrenewalistoconvertthestation  \  todirectoperationbythefranchisor._p  #  11      _ԀWereitotherwise,the   franchisorcouldextractanyincreaseinvaluecreatedbythe d  franchisee'sinvestment,withoutsharingthatincreasewiththe `  franchisee.Thiswoulddampentheincentiveforafranchiseeto   developthebusiness.Inthiscase,theDealerspresentedevidence h thatthedefendantswantedtoconverttheirstationstodirect  operation.q  #  12      ׀Whereafranchisorhasbreacheditsobligationstothe \ franchiseesuchthatthefranchiseefacestheeffectiveendofthe X franchise,thePMPAmusttreatthatasaterminationofthe   franchise. `   ` Neitherwillwecontradictthejury'sverdict.Whenwe  \  aresatisfiedthatthelawhasbeenfaithfullyinterpreted,wewill   overturnajury'sverdictonlywhennoreasonablejurycouldhave d  cometothatverdictonthefactspresented.SeeRodriguezTorres, `  399F.3dat57.Thejuryheardampleevidencetoconcludethatthe   financialhardshipresultingfromthelossoftheSubsidymeantthe h endoftherelationship.Thedefendantshadopportunitytoattack d thecredibilityofthatevidenceandtoputontheirown.Wewill  notstepintothejuryboxtoprovideasecondopinion.Norwas l theverdictagainstthedemonstrableweightoftheevidenceor h likelytoresultinablatantmiscarriageofjustice.  Consequently,therewasnomanifestabuseofdiscretioninthe p  districtcourt'sdenialofthemotionforanew_trial.___ !l"    $& ConstructiveNonrenewal      ` AseachDealer'sleaseexpired,Motivapresentedanew x lease.Thenewleaseschangedthewayrentwascalculated,which $t hadtheeffectofincreasingtherentscharged.TheDealersargued   thatthischangeandotherswerenotmadeingoodfaith,as |  requiredbythePMPA,butratherwerepartoftheplantodrivethe ( x  franchiseesoutofbusiness.Theyclaimedthatinclusionofthese $  termsamountedtoanonrenewaloftheiragreements,eventhough   eachDealersignedanewagreement(albeit"underprotest").We ,|  concludethatthePMPAdoesnotsupportaclaimfornonrenewal ( underthesecircumstances.Wethereforevacatethisportionofthe  districtcourt'sjudgmentandremandwithinstructionstoissue 0 judgmentonthisclaimforthedefendants. ,  ` Itistheplaintiffs'burdentoprovethatanonrenewal  oraterminationhastakenplace.15U.S.C.2805_(c_).Anotice 4 ofnonrenewalissuedpursuantto15U.S.C.2804,whilenot 0 strictlyspeakinganonrenewal,presumablysatisfiesthisburden.   SeeDerschEnergies,Inc._v._ԀShellOilCo.,314F.3d846,864(7th 8!" Cir.2002)("[A]franchisor'sissuanceofanoticeofnonrenewalis "4$ thepreciseequivalentofanonrenewal.");Lippo_v._ԀMobilOil $& Corp.,776F.2d706,720(7thCir.1985)("Inanactionbrought <&!( undersection2805(a)thefranchiseehastheburdenofproving '8#* terminationofthefranchise.(Thismustreallymeanattempted )$, terminationiftheinjunctivereliefistobeofanyuse.)").But @+&. see_Seckler_v.StarEnter.,124F.3d1399,1403(11thCir.1997)  (_no_ԀclaimunderPMPAwhennoticeofnonrenewalrescindedbefore \ actioncommenced);Akky_v._ԀBPAm.,73F.3d974,974(9thCir.1996) X (_same_).    ` Thethresholdquestioniswhethertorecognizesucha `  "constructivenonrenewal"andtherebybringMotiva'sactionswithin  \  thereachofthePMPA.TheNinthCircuitistheonlycircuitso   fartorecognizeaclaimforconstructivenonrenewal.ProSales d  792F.2d1394.InProSales,theplaintiffsignedarenewal `  agreement"underprotest"andimmediatelybroughtsuitunderthe   PMPA.Id.at1398.Thecourtreliedonlegislativehistoryto h concludethatthesefactsgaverisetoaclaimforconstructive d nonrenewalunderPMPA.Id.at1399.   ` ProSaleshasbeenrejectedbytheothercircuitsto l considertheissue.ThePMPA,afterall,requiresafranchisorto h provideanoticeofnonrenewal,15U.S.C.2805_(c_),andthen  providesaframeworkforthefranchiseetoseekpreliminaryrelief p  onreceiptofthatnotice,id.2805(b)(2).Twocircuitshave !l" heldthatthisnoticeandpreliminaryreliefstructureisevidence "$ thatCongressintendedtolimitthereachofthePMPAtocases t$& whereeitheranoticeisgivenoranactualnonrenewalhastaken  &p!( place.SeeAbramsShell_v._ԀShellOilCo.,343F.3d482,489n.16 '#* (5thCir.2003)("[T]heSeventhCircuitrejectedtheProSales x)$, approachbasedona'franchisee'sabilitytoobtainaninjunction $+t&. underthePMPA'incasesofnonrenewal.WerejecttheProSales  approachonthesamebasis."(quotingDerschEnergies,314F.3dat \ 865)).Thus,inDerschEnergies,theSeventhCircuitheldthata X franchiseewhohadsignedarenewal"underprotest"didnothavea   claimforconstructivenonrenewalbecausethefranchisehadinfact `  beenrenewed."HadDerschallowedthedefendantstoissueaformal  \  noticeofnonrenewal,itsdisputewiththedefendantswouldhave   beentransformedfromamerecontractdisputeintoanonrenewal d  (within90days)ofitsfranchiserelationshipthusallowingit `  to...maintainsuit"underthePMPA.Id.at866;accordAbrams   Shellv.ShellOil,343F.3d482,489(5thCir.2003)("Wefindthe h SeventhCircuit'sreasoninginDerschEnergiestobeespecially d persuasive,thusweapplythesamelogictothiscase.Plaintiffs  havenotprovidedanyevidencethatDefendantsfailedtorenewthe l relevantagreements;therefore,Plaintiffshavenotshownabreach h inthefranchiserelationship.").   ` Theplaintiffs'constructivenonrenewalargumentrequires p  thefollowingreasoning.HadtheDealersrefusedtoagreetothe !l" newcontractterms,Motivawouldhaveissuednoticesofnonrenewal "$ allegingasapermissiblebasisfornonrenewalthe"failureof[the t$& parties]toagreeonchangesoradditionstotheprovisionsofthe  &p!( franchise...."15U.S.C.2802(b)(3)(A).TheDealerswould '#* haveassertedthatthenonrenewalwasimproperbecausethechanges x)$, werenotofferedingoodfaith,id.2802(b)(3)(A)(_i_),orelse $+t&. _were_Ԁofferedinordertoconvertthepremisestothefranchisor's  owncontrol,id.2802(b)(3)(A)(ii).OnthosegroundstheDealers \ couldhavesoughtpreliminaryreliefanddamagesunderthePMPA. X Id.2805(a)&(b).    ` Thestumblingblockthattripsuptheplaintiffsisthat, `  ratherthaninsistonreceivingnoticesofnonrenewal,theDealers  \  signedthenewagreements"underprotest"andcontinuedin   operationunderthenewagreements.Weconcludethatjustasthe d  PMPArequiresaclearindicationfromfranchisorsthattheyseek `  nonrenewalofafranchiserelationship,itlikewiserequiresthat   franchiseesfacedwithobjectionablecontract_terms_Ԁrefrainfrom h ratifyingthosetermsbyexecutingthecontracts(even"under d protest")andoperatingunderthem.Allowingafranchiseetosign  "underprotest"andthenlaterchallengetherenewalwouldextend l theperiodofuncertaintythroughtheentirefirstyearofa h contractthatinthiscasewasonlythreeyears.Recognizing  constructivenonrenewalalsowouldenableafranchiseetosignthe p  contractandsimultaneouslychallengeit.Ifitsclaimswere !l" rejectedbythecourts,thefranchiseewouldhavelostnothingand "$ couldcontinuetooperatethefranchiseundertheagreementwith t$& thePMPAenforcedreasonableexpectationofcontinuationand  &p!( renewal.Absentaclaimforconstructivenonrenewal,afranchisee '#* mustwaitforanoticeofterminationtobringsuitunderthePMPA. x)$, Thefranchiseethereforeriskstheendofthefranchiseifthe $+t&. claimfailsandsomustcarefullyweighthedecisiontosignor  sue._r  #  13      _ԀThisisthebalanceCongresshasstruck,andshouldwe \ preferanother,wewouldnotbefreetoimposeit.Consequently, X werejectapplicationofconstructivenonrenewaltothesefacts.    ` We_note_ԀwithsomeconcernthelimitedscopeofthePMPA. `  Twounexpectedconsequencesofthelegislationseemtoloomas  \  potentialproblems.Thefirstisthatfranchisors_willconform   theirbehavior_Ԁtotheletterofthelawbutstillusetheir d  positionofpowertoimposetheirwillonfranchisees.Thestatute `  isofcoursenotapanaceaandcannotbefaultedforwhatitfails   todo.Butsomestatutoryprotectionisworsethannonewhenit h servesasprotectivecoverfortheverymisdeedsitpurportsto d eliminate.Thesecondunintendedconsequenceisthat,tothe  extentCongresssucceedsinlevelingtheplayingfield,itmakes l thefranchisearrangementlessappealingtofranchisors.Itisnot h difficulttoimagineprotectionsforfranchiseessostrongthat  franchisorsabandonthemodelentirely.Evidenceintroducedat  trialspoketobothofthesehazards.However,theseareissues \ forCongresstoweighandremedy,notforthecourts. X  ` Becausewedonotrecognizeaclaimfornonrenewalunder   thePMPAwherethefranchiseehassignedandoperatesunderthe `  renewalagreementcomplainedof,wevacatethisportionofthe  \  districtcourt'sjudgmentandremandwithinstructiontoenter   judgmentonthiscountforthedefendants. d    UnreasonableGasolinePrices  `     ` TheUniformCommercialCode,asadoptedinMassachusetts, ( contemplatestheenforcementofcontractsinwhichonepartysets  thepriceofgoodsovertime.Mass.Gen.Lawsch.106,2305(2). 0 Butthepricemustbesetingoodfaith.Id.Thejuryfoundthat , thedefendantshadfailedtosetreasonablepricesingoodfaith.  Thedefendantsappealontwogrounds.First,theyclaimthatthe 4 "goodfaith"requirementmeansonlythatsuchapricemaynot 0 discriminateamongsimilarlysituatedbuyers.s  #  14      ׀Andsecond,the   defendantsassertthattheDealers'evidenceofunreasonable 8!" pricingisinadequateasamatteroflaw,because1)itwasbased "4$ onlyonretailpricingchargedbycompetitorstotheDealers, $& ratherthanDTWpriceschargedtothosecompetitors;and2)the <&!( Dealers'expertpresentedpricinganalysisofonlyonecompetitor, '8#* _thereby_Ԁfailingtoestablisha"range"ofpricesoutsideofwhich  thedefendants'wholesalepricesfell.Wefindneithercontention \ persuasive. X  ` Section2305(2)"rejectstheuncommercialideathat..   .theseller...mayfixanypricehemaywishbytheexpress `  qualificationthatthepricesofixedmustbeingoodfaith.Good  \  faithincludesobservanceofreasonablecommercialstandardsof   fair_dealing...._"Id.2305(2)cmt.3;_U.C.C.2305(2) d  cmt._Ԁ3."[I]nthenormalcase"a'postedprice'orafuture `  seller'sorbuyer's'givenprice,''priceineffect,''market   price,'orthelike_satisfies_Ԁthegoodfaithrequirement."Id. h Thedefendantsandamiciurgeustoreadthiscommentasproviding d anabsolutesafeharborfornondiscriminatorypostedpricesinopen  pricetermcontracts.Thiswewillnot_do._ l  ` Foronething,theverycommentonwhichthedefendants h andamicirelyexpresslyinvokesthegeneralnotionof"reasonable  commercialstandardsoffairdealing."Ifthecommentmeantthat p  onlydiscriminatorypricingwouldbedisalloweditcertainlycould !l" havesaidthat.Foranother,itiscleartousthatasituationin "$ whichonemerchantisraisingitspricesinordertoforcea t$& customeroutofbusinessishardlythe"normalcase."TheEleventh  &p!( Circuitallowedthisquestiontogotoajuryinaclassaction '#* involvinganotheroilcompany'spricingpolicies.Allapattah x)$, Servs.v.ExxonCorp.,333F.3d1248,_1262n.16_Ԁ(11thCir.2003) $+t&. (concedingthatina"normalcase"nondiscriminatorypricingis  protected,butholdingthatwheretheallegationwasthatanoil \ companywastryingtodriveservicestationsoutofbusiness, X "whetherthiscaseconstitutedanormalcasewasafactualissue   necessarytodeterminewhetherExxonactedingoodfaith"and `  thereforerightlysubmittedtothejury).Morerecently,theFifth  \  Circuitupheldthedenialofamotionforjudgmentasamatterof   lawonthebasisthatsettinggasolinepricesinbadfaithtodrive d  franchiseesoutofbusinessviolatedtheUCC.Mathisv.Exxon `  Corp.,302F.3d448,45759(5thCir.2002)("[T]hejury'sfinding   thatExxonbreacheditsdutyofgoodfaithinsettingtheDTWprice h itchargedtheplaintiffsisnotwithoutfoundationinthelawor d theevidence.");seealsoBob'sShell,Inc.v.O'ConnellOil  _Assocs_.,2005U.S.Dist.LEXIS21318(D.Mass.Aug.31,2005); l _Wayman_v.AmocoOilCo.,923F.Supp.1322,1349(D._Kan_.1996) h (findingthatthecasebeforeitwasa"normalcase"butnoting  that"[_i]f_ԀtherewasevidencethatAmocohad,forexample,engaged p  indiscriminatorypricingortriedtorunplaintiffsoutof !l" business,thenthecourt'sdecisionmightbedifferent").But "$ seeShellOilv._HRN_,Inc.,144S.W.3d429,43538(Tex.2004) t$& (holdingabsenceofpricediscriminationcreatedpresumptionof  &p!( goodfaithnotwithstandingallegationsthat_that_Ԁoilcompanyset '#* pricesinbadfaithaspartofaplantodrivefranchiseesoutof x)$, business). $+t&.  ` Commerceispredicatedontheideathatatransactionis  goodforbothbuyerandseller.Thecommentrecognizesthat \ allowingonepartycompletecontroloverthepricewouldbe X "uncommercial."Wedonotthinktheonlyreasonforthisisthe   riskofpricediscrimination.ThedraftersoftheUCCandamici `  herearerightlyconcernedaboutafloodoflitigationsecond  \  guessingeverypricesetinanopenpricetermcontract.Mere   allegationsofbadfaithwillneverbeenoughtosurvivesummary d  judgment.Butthiscasecomestousafterajuryverdictfinding `  badfaithandcommercialunreasonableness.    ` Nordothedefendants'objectionstothesufficiencyof h theevidencerequireustosetthejuryverdictaside.While d perhapsmorespecificandmorecomprehensiveevidencewouldbe  preferable,thejuryhadenoughevidenceofthedefendants'motives l andpractices,aswellasenoughinformationaboutcompetitors' h pricing,tocometotheconclusionthattheDTWpriceswere  commerciallyunreasonable.Specifically,theuseofcompetinggas p  stations'retailpricestodrawconclusionsaboutwhatthose !l" stationsmightbepayingforgasolineisnotideal,butisadequate "$ tothetaskathand.Infact,itisthesamebenchmarkthatthe t$& defendantsusedintheir"streetback"pricingmodelinsettingthe  &p!( DTWpriceinthefirstplace.Inthelightofthis,thedefendants '#* cannotbeheardtocomplainthatsuchpricesarenotagoodmeasure x)$, ofwhatotherdistributorsofgasolinearecharging.Andalthough $+t&. _the_ԀDealers'expertfailedtopresenta"range"ofsuchprices,the  experttestimonywasnottheonlytestimonyavailable.OneDealer \ testifiedthattheretailpricesheobservedwereequaltoorlower X thanthewholesalepriceshepaid.Additionally,atleastone   DealerhadfirsthandknowledgeoftheDTWpriceschargedinthe `  sameareabyanotherfranchisor.Onappeal,thedefendantsput  \  forwardonceagainthecontentionsoftheirownexpertsregarding   therangeofpricessetbycompetitors.Butitwasuptothejury d  tochoosebetweenthesecompetingcharacterizations,andthejury `  did_so_.      @` Damagest  #  15       h      ` Thedefendantsarguethatthedamagesawardedforthe 0 PMPAconstructiveterminationclaimarenotsupportedbysufficient , evidence.Thedistrictcourtinstructedthejurytocalculatetwo  kindsofdamages:_damages_Ԁintheamountsofrentspaidthatwere 4 inexcessoftherentsundertheSubsidy,anddamagesforreduction 0 inthevaluesoftheDealers'businesses.Weagreewiththe    districtcourtthattherewasampleevidenceintherecordforthe 8!" _jury_Ԁtomakeadamagesaward,andweupholdthatawardas  reasonable. \   ` Thedefendantsclaimthatthedamagesarenotsupported X bysufficientevidencefortworeasons.First,theplaintiffs'   expertusedtheVRPwhencalculatingdamagesforexcessrent, `  ratherthanthe_STIP_,aswouldhavebeencorrect.Becausethe_STIP_  \  waslessgenerous,theexpert'sfigureswereprobablytoohigh.   Andsecond,theexpertpresented_damagesfigures_Ԁforlostbusiness d  value,butthosefigureswerebasedonexcessrentpaidunderthe `  newleases,notontheeliminationoftheSubsidy.Becausethis   testimonyappliedproperlyonlytodamagesundertheconstructive h nonrenewalclaim,thedefendantssaythatacorrespondencebetween d theexpert'sfiguresandtheactualawardsforlostbusinessvalue  awardedundertheconstructiveterminationtheorymustbeerror. l Weaddresseachoftheseinturn. h  ` Thejudgeinstructedthejurytofinddamagesforexcess  rentpaidduetotheeliminationoftheSubsidyandforthelossof p  valuetotheDealers'businessesduetotheincreasedrentandthe !l" highergasoline_prices.___ "$  ` Calculationofexcessrentrequiresseveralpredictions: t$& _of_ԀtheSubsidythresholdamount,ofthediscountrate,andofhow  &p!( muchgasolinetheDealerscouldhavesoldunderthescheme.Aside '#*  fromthoseassumptionsitisarelativelycertaincalculation,on x)$, |OY& | |  whichexperttestimonywasreceived.u  #  16      ׀TheDealers'damagesexpert   concededlyusedtheVRPinsteadoftheSTIPtocalculatedamages, \ therebypotentiallyinflatingthedamages.Butevenifwecould X statewithcertaintythatthedamageswerethereforeinaccurate,   thatwouldnotnecessitateourremandingforanewdamages `  calculationoroursettlingthematterourselves.Aclockthatis  \  fiveminutesfastis,strictlyspeaking,wrong.Butitstillmay   giveageneralsenseofthetimeandtherebyserveitspurpose. d  Andthedamagefiguresprovidedbytheexpertare,afterall,only `  guidepostsforthejury.    ` Calculatingthelossofbusinessvalue,ontheother h hand,reliesonmanymoreintangiblefactorsandrequiresmanymore d assumptions.Inthisrespectitissimilartocalculatingfuture  lostprofits,whichwehavepreviouslyheldisamorespeculative l inquirythannormaleconomicdamagescalculations.See,e.g., h CamarCorp.v.PrestonTruckingCo.,221F.3d271,279(1stCir.  2000)("[_M]athematical_Ԁprecisionisnotrequiredincalculating p  lostprofits"but"adamagesawardmusthavearationalbasisin !l" theevidence."(_internal_Ԁquotationomitted));E.MountainPlatform "$ Tennis_v._ԀSherwinWilliamsCo.,40F.3d492(1stCir.1994)  (_upholding_Ԁasnoterroneousajury'sawardoffuturelostprofits \ wherethecompanywasonly"atabreakevenpoint"andoperations X werenotyetprofitable).Werejectthedefendants'comparisonof   thiscasetoKolb_v._ԀGoldring,694F.2d869,873(1stCir.1982). `  Thatcasedealtwithlostwages,inastatutorysettingthat  \  limitedrecoveryto"accountsowing"onasimilarfootingasa   "commonlawsuitforbackwagesforbreachof_contract_."Id.at d  87182.Here,theplaintiffsareentitledtothelossofthevalue `  oftheirbusinessasaresultofthedefendants'actions.    ` Becausethatcalculationisnecessarilycomplexand h uncertain,werequirefromthejurylessrigorinmakingtheaward. d Here,alongwithexperttestimony,theDealerspresentedtestimony  thatthedefendantsthemselveshadvaluedthesestationsmore l highlybeforetheeliminationoftheSubsidy,andthatsomeofthe h franchiseshadlostsubstantialvalue.Werecognizethewide  latitudeaffordedthejuryinthissituationaskedtomakean p  uncertaincalculationonlittlehardevidenceandwearemindful !l" thatwereviewtoseeonlyifnorationaljurycouldhavemadethis "$ award."[T]heassessmentofdamagescannotbedisturbedunlessthe t$& awardexceededanyrationalappraisalorestimateofthedamages  &p!( thatcouldbebasedupontheevidenceorwasgrosslyexcessive, '#* inordinate,shockingtothe[conscience]ofthecourt,orsohigh x)$, thatitwouldbeadenialofjusticetopermitittostand." $+t&. Consolo_v._ԀGeorge,58F.3d791,795(1stCir.1995)(_quotation_  marksandcitationsomitted).Wedeclinetogosofar. \  ` Thejury'sawardslargelycorrelatewiththefiguresput X forwardbytheDealers'damagesexpert.Webelieve,asdidthe   districtcourt,thatoncetheweaknessesintheexpert'sfigures `  werepointedoutinclosingargumentsandjuryinstructions,the  \  jurynonethelesswasfreetousethemasmarkersofprobable   damages.Thatthejuryadheredcloselytothesenumbersdoesnot d  changethefactthatthejurywasawareoftheirinadequacies.The `  jurymayhavedecidedthattheywerecloseenough,orthatnoother   methodofcalculationwouldbebetter.Whileajuryisnotfree h "topullfiguresoutofahat,"Kolb,694F.2dat873,webelieve d thattheexpert'stestimony,theavailabilityoftheexpert's  backgrounddata,andthecautionaryinstructionissuedbythe l districtcourtgaveenoughguidancetothejury. h  ` Andthejurydidnotsimplyparrottheexpert'sfigures  inanyevent.Infact,wherethejurydiddepartfromtheexperts' p  figures,thedefendantsattackthosedeparturesasaberrations !l" deservingofreversal.ThreeDealersreceivedawardsinexcessof "$ thedamageexpert'scalculations.Thedefendantscharacterize t$& theseasmystery"bonus"amountsunsupportedbyanyviewofthe  &p!( evidence.ButeachofthesethreeDealerstestifiedtoparticular '#* hardshipsthatthejurymighthavethoughtindicatedspecial x)$, reductionsinbusinessvalue.Thejurymaywellhavebeen $+t&. _performing_Ԁitsfunctionincalculatinglossesinbusinessvalue  stemmingfromthosehardships. \  ` Similarly,wefindthatthejuryhadampleevidenceto X make_adamages_Ԁawardfortheclaimundertheopenpricetermofthe   gasolinesupplycontract.Thatitdifferedinsomeparticulars `  fromthenumbersputforwardbytheexpertisimmaterial,  \  particularlywhere,ashere,differentformsofevidenceshowed   differentpiecesofthispicture. d   ` Theawardofattorneys'feesismandatedbythePMPA. `  Becauseweupholdonlyoneofthetwostatutoryclaims,however,we   mustremandforadeterminationwhetherthefailedconstructive h nonrenewalclaimwasa"severable"claimforthepurposeof d awarding_attorney's_Ԁfees.Suchfeesarenormallynotrecoverable.  SeeFigueroaTorresv.Toledo_Dvila_,232F.3d270,278(1stCir. l 2000)(feesforunsuccessfulseverableclaimsnormallynot h recoverable);_Coutin_v.Young&Rubicam,P.R.,124F.3d331,339  (1stCir.1997)(discussingframeworkfordeterminingwhetherto p  reducefees);seealso_Hensley_v._Eckerhart_,461U.S.424,43437 !l" (1983).Wearemindfulbothofthedistrictcourt'sdiscretionin "$ thismatter,andoftheSupremeCourt'sadmonitionthat t$& determinationofattorney'sfeesshouldnotresultinasecond  &p!( majorlitigation._Hensley_,461U.S.at437.Butwehavenobasis '#* hereonwhichtomakeajudgment,andsowemustremand. x)$, ,   $+t&. Conclusion      ` Thejudgmentofthedistrictcourtonthestatecontract x claims,theunreasonablegasolinepricingclaims,andthe $t constructiveterminationclaimsis affirmed .Thejudgmentonthe   constructivenonrenewalclaimsis reversed .Thejuryawardsasto   thesurvivingclaimsare affirmed asrationalawardssupportedby `   sufficientevidence.Theawardofattorney'sfeesandcostsis (x   vacated and remanded forreconsiderationinthelightofourmixed $  dispositionoftheclaimsunderthePMPA.Costsonappealare   awardedtotheappellees.  H >