United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 04-1506

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ALVIN JACKSON,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

<u>Holly T. Smith</u> for appellant.

<u>Margaret D. McGaughey</u>, Appellate Chief, with whom <u>Paula D.</u> <u>Silsby</u>, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

June 2, 2005

CAMPBELL, <u>Senior Circuit Judge</u>. The defendant appeals from his sentence, arguing, <u>inter alia</u>, that the sentencing court erroneously relied on police reports in determining whether he pled guilty to a prior "crime of violence" qualifying for sentencing enhancement under the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. This appeal was briefed and argued shortly before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in <u>Shepard</u> v. <u>United States</u>, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), holding that a sentencing court may not look to police reports for this purpose.¹ Recognizing that a decision in <u>Shepard</u> was imminent and would be relevant, this court withheld any disposition pending the issuance of <u>Shepard</u>. Now that that case has been decided, we vacate the district court's sentence and remand to it for resentencing in light of <u>Shepard</u>.

So ordered.

¹In <u>Shepard</u>, the Supreme Court considered whether the defendant's prior burglary conviction constituted a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), a provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The § 924(e)(1) definition of "violent felony" is "the same in all material respects" as the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 definition of a "crime of violence." <u>United States</u> v. <u>Bell</u>, 966 F.2d 703, 704 (1st Cir. 1992). Given the similarity, "we look generally to cases pertaining to either provision 'to elucidate the nature of the categorical inquiry.'" <u>United States</u> v. <u>Delgado</u>, 288 F.3d 49, 53 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002).